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Abstract 
This is the first attempt to estimate social returns, by which is meant 
pre-tax wage gains, to education in the Republic of Mauritius. Social 
returns are estimated for both sexes, by gender, by private and public 
sectors, and by rural and urban areas. This study uses cross sectional 
data from a sample of the 2000 Population Census. Although 
Psacharopoulos along with other researchers have estimated returns to 
education for many countries, the Republic of Mauritius had not so far 
been included due to lack of data prior to 2000. 
The Mincerian approach is used to estimate social returns for the 
Republic of Mauritius, using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method. All wage equations are adjusted for selectivity bias. Findings 
are similar to those reported in the literature. First, there is evidence of 
diminishing marginal returns to education when the social return to a 
year of education is estimated. Second, when highest academic 
qualifications are considered, tertiary education yields the highest 
social return relative to no schooling at all or to primary schooling 
only. Third, social returns to academic and vocational qualifications 
are higher for women than for men, a finding consistent with those 
reported for other countries and attributed to women's lower foregone 
earnings. Fourth, social returns to high level academic qualifications 
(' A' level and above) and vocational qualifications are higher in the 
private sector than in the public sector. Fifth, social returns are higher 
for those who reside in urban areas. Sixth, selectivity bias is minimal 
in most cases. 
This study also uses the instrumental variable (IV) approach to deal 
with the omitted variable bias, endogeneity of schooling and 
measurement error. The 1976 free secondary education law is used as 
an instrument. This instrument only predicts the schooling of women 
for the Republic of Mauritius. IV estimates are consistently higher 
than OLS estimates. Implications of these results are discussed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Objectives of the current study 
The purpose of this study is to estimate the social returns to education in 
the Republic of Mauritius I and to eventually supplement existing returns 
to education studies conducted elsewhere (Psacharopoulos, 1973; 
Psacharopoulos, 1985; Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharapoulos & Patrinos, 
2002; Psacharopoulos, G. & Ng Y. c., 1994). This is the first attempt in 
the Mauritian context to estimate social returns to schooling and to 
different qualification levels. This thesis will therefore act as pioneering 
work for future researchers to carry out rate of return analysis for the 
Republic of Mauritius which will take into account costs of education and 
net incomes of individuals. 
This study uses national level representative data. All results are derived 
from cross section data based on a 1 % sample of the 2000 Population 
Census data. This is a survey which is made every ten years2. The data 
generated from this census is micro data at the household level and 
provides detailed information about each individual, for instance, 
I The Republic of Mauritius is an island group consisting of the island of Mauritius, a 
smaller island Rodrigues and a group of inhabited outer islets. The Republic has a 
democratic system of government based on the British pattern and a system of education, 
which also emerges from the British educational system. 
2 Except for the population census which was due in 1941 but was eventually postponed 
to 1944 because of the Second World War (CSO, 2002a). The Population Census 2000 
as compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) of the Republic of Mauritius, is the 
seventeenth for the islands of Mauritius, Rodrigues and Agalega. 
1 
occupation by industry, gross Incomes from all sources, age, labour 
market experience and gender. No information about individuals' 
incomes was collected prior to 2000 so this census provides the first 
opportunity to estimate return to education in the Republic of Mauritius. 
Social returns give the return to society when an individual completes an 
incremental education program. These indicators are useful to educational 
policymakers, for example, a comparison of social returns across the 
different levels of education will enable them to improve efficiency by 
reallocating resources across different levels of academic qualifications. 
Thus, this PhD, not only makes significant contributions to the existing 
literature on returns to education, but will also contribute to improving 
efficiency in the provision of education in the Republic of Mauritius, 
which is a developing country where resources are very scarce. 
This PhD also estimates the patterns of social returns for men and women 
separately for different qualifications such as vocational and academic. 
As will be reported later in Chapter 5, social returns are relatively higher 
for women, telling policymakers that education plays a more important 
role for women in the Republic of Mauritius. Comparisons of social 
returns across private and public sectors are also made and the 
implications discussed. Insights into the differing characteristics of public 
and private sector employees and the resulting social returns are also 
2 
provided. This will highlight the need (if any) of these sectors to revise 
their wage policies. 
Also some researchers are concerned by over expansion of educational 
investments. An examination of the reported social returns generated by 
this study will reveal whether or not the Republic of Mauritius needs to be 
concerned by its level of investment in education, especially after the 
considerable investments made recently in setting up many secondary 
schools and the expansion of its existing tertiary education institutions. As 
will be deduced in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, there are high social returns 
to high qualification levels in the Republic of Mauritius and these may be 
explained through the Skilled Biased Technology Change theory (Chapter 
2). 
Finally this PhD looks at the returns generated within the Republic of 
Mauritius in relation to other countries, with similar years of schooling 
and levels of GDP, and an investigation is also made to check whether or 
not the law of diminishing returns applies in its context. 
Below I set out the limitations of this research along with the research 
questions. 
3 
1.1 Limitations of study 
As discussed in Section 1.0, the Human Capital Theory hypothesises that 
education makes individuals more productive, leading to higher earnings. 
Education is, thus, an investment of current resources in exchange for 
future returns. According to Psacharopoulos (1995) there are three 
important methods of calculating rates of returns namely: the algebraic 
method, the short cut method and the earnings function method. Each of 
them brings specific advantages and disadvantages to the researcher. 
However, the most widely used method is the Mincerian earnings 
function. The more complete method, as argued by Moock et al (1998), is 
the net earnings profile method where detailed age-earnings profiles by the 
level of education are used and the rate of return is computed as the 
discount rate that equates the present value of the stream of education 
benefits to that of the stream of educational costs. This is computed as 
follows: 
where Bf and Ct are the benefits and costs of that particular educational 
investment (for example, completing upper secondary education following 
the completion of lower education) in year t while n is the expected life of 
the investment, and r is the internal rate of return. The benefits are 
measured as the extra average additional earnings received by an 
individual following his/her decision to have an extra year of schooling. 
4 
The costs of the investment in education include both direct and indirect 
costs. The direct costs comprise of all expenditures related to school 
attendance and the full resource costs of providing the educational service 
(such as any subsidised costs not borne by the individual) while the 
indirect costs are the average foregone earnings as a result of the 
investment decision. 
Thus, any cost-benefit analysis requires both the direct and indirect costs 
to be weighted against the likely benefits before rates of return may be 
computed. Rate of return is split into two components: the private rate of 
return (PRR) and the social rate of return (SRR). Private rates of return 
just include those costs that are borne by the student (or their family) and 
those benefits that flow to the individual. Social rates of return, on the 
other hand, also include those costs and benefits that accrue by the rest of 
the society (particularly the taxpayer). The gap between the private rate of 
return and the social rate of return helps the government in resource 
allocation, for instance, if PRR exceeds SRR for a particular level of 
education, it implies that a government reducing its spending on that 
particular level of education would be socially efficient. It will not result 
in individuals investing in less than the socially optimal amount of 
education. However if SRR exceeds PRR, then the government may 
increase its spending on that particular level of education, for instance, 
primary schooling has been repeatedly reported to generate higher SRR 
5 
relative to PRR (Psacharopoulos & Alam, 1991; Psacharopoulos & Ng, 
1994; Psacharapoulos & Patrinos, 2002). 
Moreover, to calculate the private rate of return, all resources invested by 
the private individual such as the opportunity costs and direct costs are 
required while social rate of return calculations include the public cost of 
education. In theory the private and social rates of return must include the 
monetary and non-monetary benefits of education. The private benefits 
of education, for instance, are higher wages for educated individuals over 
the less educated over their working lives. Other benefits include the 
consumption aspects, that is, enjoyment while being at school (Menon, 
2003). The social rate of return must include the monetary value of an 
external benefit. Some examples of such a benefit would be the increased 
productivity of others as a result of the educated individual and an 
environment suitable for research and development. Other studies report 
benefits of education which include reduced family size, better health, 
political awareness, and improved child care (Schultz, 1988; McMahon, 
1995). 
It is argued that the non-monetary benefits are potentially large and, thus, 
a measure of the total effects of education is desirable. However in 
practice most studies do not include external benefits in the calculations of 
social rates of return due to data limitations. Similarly the available micro 
6 
data at household level for the Republic of Mauritius does not provide 
enough information for such comprehensive returns estimation and no 
information about costs is available, making it impossible to use cost-
benefit analysis. Thus, the present study focuses on only the monetary 
returns to education in wage employment. The model that will be used 
throughout this study is the human capital earnings function, as developed 
by Mincer (Mincer, 1974; Mincer, 1980): 
In 1'; = a + PSi + y1EXP + Y2 EXp2 + Gi 
where Sj is the number of years of schooling of individual i, EXPj and 
EXP? are labour market experience and its square. Thus, given the 
absence of cost data, this Human Capital Model will be used but it will 
incorporate some modifications to fit the actual data set. This earnings 
function method is discussed at length in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5. 
Another limitation is that this study uses cross-sectional data which 
combines cohorts who have gone through different schooling cycles and 
employment experiences and not panel data that follows an individual 
over a certain period of time, making it difficult for the researcher to 
address any change in educational quality. 
Ideally it would be better if private returns and social returns could be 
estimated for each qualification because the difference between the private 
and social returns can act as policy indicators. The gap between these 
7 
estimates act as signals to policy-makers as to where to invest more (when 
social returns exceed private returns) and when to transfer part of the 
educational expenditure onto the student or their parents, that is, reduce 
the public subsidisation of education (when social returns are much lower 
than private returns). However the 2000 Population Census data set does 
not separate wages from other sources of incomes before taxation, and 
costs of educational investments are also not available. Thus, the main aim 
of this research is to only generate gross returns and not private or social 
returns to different qualification levels for the Republic of Mauritius. 
Nevertheless, the empirical fitness of the Human Capital Theory (HCT) in 
explaining earnings differentials in an upper-middle income country may 
still be tested through earnings profiles. Also testing the HCT may 
provide useful insights into whether or not expanding a particular 
educational level would exacerbate earning inequality and how to address 
the inequality problem best. Moreover this study will help in 
understanding how the Mauritian labour market functions. Labour market 
conditions will be highlighted when returns between the public sector and 
the private sector, between male and female employees, and between rural 
and urban areas are compared. Thus, a number of hypotheses may be 
tested using the 2000 Population Census data and these hypotheses are set 
out in the Section 1.2: 
8 
1.2 Research questions 
The importance of human capital theory has been constantly reaffirmed 
(Psacharapoulos, 1985; Psacharopoulos & Hinchliffe, 1973; 
Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002). Psacharopoulos 
uses the semi-log (Mincer-type) earnings functions and estimates the co-
efficients on years of schooling, and his models generally include 
explanatory variables such as years of schooling, experience and 
experience squared. He estimates the returns to schooling for over 61 
countries and he reports a pattern of declining returns to education by 
years of schooling. In other words if education is treated as any other 
investment, educational expansion is subject to the law of diminishing 
returns. Moreover he reports that as a country moves from a less 
developed status to a more developed one, the returns to education tend to 
decline. However these declines are relatively minor implying that the 
returns to schooling are relatively stable over time (Psacharopoulos & 
Patrinos, 2002). Also private returns to higher education exceed social 
returns to higher education across all countries irrespective of the level of 
economic development (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002: Table 2). 
Thus, given these empirical findings and due to the limited information 
provided by the 2000 Population Census data set, the current study aims to 
answer the following research questions: 
9 
• Is there evidence of diminishing returns to investment in education 
for the Republic of Mauritius? 
It is hypothesised that as an individual acquires more education, the 
law of diminishing returns sets in, that is, social returns to primary 
schooling are much higher than those for secondary schooling and 
social returns to tertiary education are lower than those for secondary 
schooling. 
• Do women in the Republic of Mauritius have higher social returns 
than men? 
Other studies, as will be discussed have reported that females have 
relatively lower foregone earnings as reflected by their low gross 
incomes. They enjoy higher returns than males and education appears 
to play a more important role in determining the gross incomes of 
women. 
• Do social returns vary between the public and private sectors 
within the Republic of Mauritius? 
The returns to qualifications may be higher in the private sector than in 
the public sector due to the productivity enhancing role of education in 
the private sector rather than the prevailing signalling role of education 
in the public sector. Siphambe (2000), for instance, argues that 
productivity, experience and unobserved individual influences such as 
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efforts, are more important in the private sector and that wages are less 
tied to productivity in public sectors. 
However this thesis does not address the signaling value of education 
but explores the differences that exist in the social returns enjoyed by 
public and private sector employees after taking into account relevant 
factors such as age, gender, tenure and level of qualifications. 
• Do social returns vary by rural and urban areas in the Republic of 
Mauritius? 
It is hypothesised that those who live in urban areas enjoy higher 
social returns relative to those who live in the rural areas. This is 
explored in this thesis. 
Unfortunately the data cannot address the following empirical questions: 
• Given that education at all levels is free 3 in the Republic of 
Mauritius, do private returns to all qualification levels exceed the 
social returns to all qualification levels? Since the only measure 
for wages is total income from all sources before taxation, private 
returns to education cannot be computed and thus, the difference 
between social and private returns cannot be investigated. 
3 Except for MA, MSc and PhD courses, although these are subsidised by the government 
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• Do Mauritians from less privileged backgrounds experience lower 
returns to all qualification levels? This hypothesis cannot be tested 
as data on the socio-economic background of the respondents are 
not adequately provided. 
• Have returns to education varied over time? As the Population 
Census of 2000 was the first census to have a question on income 
it is impossible to examine how the returns to education varied 
over time within the country. Similarly, hypotheses about time 
trends in the returns to education, depicting an improvement in 
returns to qualifications for women cannot be tested. 
1.3 Methodological issues 
Methodological issues include dealing with the problems of selectivity 
bias, omitted variables bias, endogeneity of schooling and measurement 
error. It is argued that in the presence of these methodological issues, the 
conventional OLS would generate biased estimates to social returns. 
These are discussed at length in Chapter 2 but for the purpose of this 
chapter, I outline how I tackled these problems in order to generate 
estimates of social returns to education that are consistent. 
I attempted to generate consistent estimates to social returns to a year of 
schooling and to different highest qualification levels. I first use the 
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Mincerian method to generate conventional OLS estimates. However the 
problem of selectivity bias arises because the Mincerian wage equation is 
defined for a subset of individuals which has been non-randomly drawn 
from the overall population. It is possible that the characteristics of men 
and women employed and unemployed differ and in this case, OLS 
regression analysis leads to inconsistent estimates. Thus, I used the 
Heckman two-step procedure to obtain social returns that are free from 
selectivity bias. 
I used the Instrumental Variables approach to deal with the other 
problems: the omitted variables bias given that the 2000 Population data 
set do not provide adequate information on individuals' abilities; the 
endogeneity of schooling because more able individuals may choose to 
stay at school longer; and finally, to correct for measurement error. This 
approach requires the use of some instrument that is correlated to the 
schooling decision but does not affect earnings outcomes directly. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I use the 1976 free secondary education policy as an 
instrument given that it predicts schooling in the cases of women 4 but not 
their wages. 
Thus, being fully aware of the dangers of producing inconsistent 
estimates, I report, in this thesis, social returns to an extra year of 
4 This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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schooling and to the highest qualification levels which do take into 
account these methodological issues. 
1.4 A note of caution. 
Human Capital Theory assumes that through education people acqUIre 
attributes that make them more productive in the labour market (Mace, 
1992) and that wages may be used to measure productivity. However 
according to the screening hypothesis, 'the educated enjoy higher earnings 
because education acts as a filter or screening mechanism, and not from an 
increase in productivity resulting from additional education' (Menon, 
2003; p. 373). In its strong version, the screening hypothesis invalidates 
rates of return analysis, and this can have devastating implications for 
policy makers. This implies that the provision of education throughout the 
world entails considerable subsidies to students without adding anything 
to the productive capacity (Mace, 1992). But in its weak version, the 
screening hypothesis can be reconciled with the Human Capital Theory as 
the latter postulates that employers do use education as a screening device 
and they associate skills and abilities of the educated with their 
attainments in education. Thus, the effect of education on productivity 
need not be questioned (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985). The 
underlying theory for this thesis is Human Capital Theory. 
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Rate of return analysis is a popular tool among policy makers. It is used to 
understand and compare the returns on one investment to the returns on 
another. I follow some of the rates of return studies conducted elsewhere 
in the world to estimate values of social return to education in the 
Republic of Mauritius. In the absence of an alternative measure, gross 
income is used as a proxy for productivity in this thesis and gross wage 
premiums are computed. 
Policy makers must understand that rates of return studies do not yield 
perfect measures of the profitability of educational investment (Menon, 
2003). They need to be aware of the limitations of rates of return analysis, 
for instance, in this thesis, due to the lack of data, social return estimates 
do not capture the non monetary benefits of education when these have 
been reported to be considerable in the literature. Social returns in this 
thesis are gross returns or wage gains arising from the individual's 
decision to acquire a particular qualification level. The social return 
values, thus, generated here must be viewed as gross indicators of the 
economic value of education. In the absence of alternative measures, 
these will provide valuable input to education decision making in the 
future. These would enable policy makers to make informed decisions 
about the allocation of resources across the education system in the 
Republic of Mauritius. 
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1.5 Structure of thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 is organised into three major parts. The first part evaluates the 
underlying theoretical framework for this thesis, that is, the Human 
Capital Theory. This is also discussed in relation to Spence's (1973) Job 
Market Signalling Theory. The second part highlights the need to produce 
consistent estimates. I provide an in-depth explanation about the 
methodological issues surrounding rates of return analysis which include 
the need to correct for ability bias, endogeneity and measurement errors. 
The use of IV approach is advocated as an alternative to the OLS 
technique and I also highlight the fact that returns to education can be 
heterogenous. The third part provides empirical evidences on the rates of 
return studies conducted elsewhere in the world. However I focus only on 
those studies that are most relevant to the context of the Republic of 
Mauritius. 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to briefly review the whole education system 
of the Republic of Mauritius. Expenditure on education as a proportion of 
GDP is reported, the mechanics of promotion to the next grade in the 
primary and secondary schooling cycles are explained and the basis on 
which students are allocated to academic and vocational streams are 
16 
discussed. I lay particular emphasis on efficiency and equity issues for the 
education system of Republic of Mauritius by referring to drop-out and 
survival rates. These will eventually serve to inform recommendations for 
educational planners and policy makers in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 4 is split into two major parts. The first part presents the 2000 
Population Census data set and issues about validity and reliability of the 
sample used are addressed. Some main variables that are used throughout 
this study are discussed at length. The second part provides some 
descriptive statistics combined with test statistics so that the reasons 
behind earnings differentials may emerge. 
Chapter 5 provides the first set of results for the analysis carried out for 
the purpose of this thesis. OLS estimates to social returns to highest 
qualification levels in the Republic of Mauritius for the combined sample 
of men and women, by gender, by private/public sectors and by 
rural/urban areas are presented and the implications discussed. Initially, 
only conventional OLS estimates are presented. But later in an attempt to 
produce estimates that are free from censoring bias, the issue of sample 
selection bias is addressed through the Heckman selection model. These 
results are also presented and discussed for each group of the sample. 
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Chapter 6 makes another original contribution to the existing rates of 
return studies. The instrumental variable approach is applied in the 
context of the Republic of Mauritius. Following other studies, an attempt 
to use changes in the supply side is made. The possibilities of using two 
pieces of educational legislation: the 1993 basic compulsory schooling law 
and the 1976 free secondary education law as instruments are explored. 
The IV approach is used to generate consistent estimates in the presence of 
omitted variables, endogeneity of schooling and measurement error. 
Again IV estimates to social returns are presented and discussed for men 
and women combined, by gender, by private/public sectors and by 
rural/urban areas. 
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis by first giving an overview of what this 
thesis contains, then highlighting the major findings and finally making 
recommendations for policy makers. The need for policy makers to use 
all findings reported here, cautiously and to supplement these are also 
emphasised. 
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Chapter 2: Theory and evidences on rates of return throughout the 
world 
2.0 Introduction 
The underlying theory of this thesis is Human Capital Theory and in this 
chapter, I examine some studies that have used rates of return analysis. 
Human Capital Theory hypothesises that education makes individuals 
more productive and that this yields higher earnings and hence a positive 
return is derived on the investment made in that person's education 
(Menon, 2003). 
Private rates of return provide an explanation for trends and changes in the 
private demand for education. Private rates can thus be used to help 
policy makers to understand and predict demand. These can be used on 
issues such as social equity and student loans (Psacharopoulos, 1992). 
Social rates of return are used to determine the profitability of educational 
investment and comparisons are made to find whether educational 
investment IS preferable to investment in physical capital or among 
various educational projects (Menon, 2003). 
Numerous studies have been conducted throughout the world to estimate 
the returns to education, using a variety of methodologies. According to 
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Psacharopoulos (1995) there are three important methods of calculating 
rates of returns namely: the algebraic method or the internal rate of return, 
the short cut method and the earnings function method. Each of them 
brings specific advantages and disadvantages to researchers. But the fact 
that it is difficult to measure the benefits and costs of education accurately 
must be acknowledged and the results of rates of return analysis must be 
interpreted carefully. Other objections to the use of rates of return 
analysis are raised because of data constraints, cross sectional profiles, 
consumption benefits, uncertainty, and the fact that education is not the 
sole factor that contributes towards higher earnings (Mace, 1992). 
Severe problems may be encountered when carrymg rates of return 
analysis, especially in some developing countries where there is shortage 
of data required to make rate of return calculations. Also the use of cross-
sectional data, which is based on a snap-shot, does not represent the trend 
of the individuals' earnings over the course of their working lives. 
Investment in education is not restricted solely to investment for future 
returns. It includes the desire to consume education now (Menon, 2003). 
Calculations of private rate of returns assume that all educational spending 
is for investment purposes so that future earnings may rise. Nevertheless 
individuals do not spend on education for future benefits only. They also 
want to derive enjoyment from participating in education. It is practically 
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impossible to measure the amount of educational spending for 
consumption purposes because that amount will differ for each individual. 
Besides this, educational expenditures may give rise to a sense of well-
being or an improvement in the quality of life (Mace, 1992). But these are 
not captured in the rate of return calculations. Only increased salaries are 
considered to be the benefits to education. Thus, since these consumption 
benefits are excluded from the rate of return analysis, the calculation will 
underestimate the return to individuals. 
As mentioned earlier, the social rate of return calculations use observed 
wages as being a 'good' proxy for the marginal product of labour. It is 
assumed that the economy is competitive. Thus, even if data for 
individuals who work in the private sector of the economy are considered, 
it may not reflect the true value of marginal productivity of labour. In 
some countries, especially in Africa, the government controls the private 
sector and people are paid according to the scale set by the government 
(Blaug, 1967). So people may be paid below or above what they actually 
produce. A further difficulty arises with the existence of an informal 
economy. Whether or not the imperfections in the market invalidate rates 
of return analysis, depends on the extent to which wages may be used as a 
proxy for marginal productivity and whether labour markets are 
sufficiently competitive to allow earnings to move up and down to reflect 
market forces (Mace, 1992). 
21 
The basic idea is that individuals are rational and will undergo additional 
schooling only if sufficiently higher earnings compensate the costs. 
However the rate of return analysis which is based on the earnings of a 
large number of individuals, cannot make any allowance for the 
uncertainty faced by an individual, for example, the uncertainty faced by a 
generation of students would be less than what students on their own 
would face. They may be uncertain about the earnings they expect either 
with or without the extra year of schooling, about being able to stay at 
work throughout their lifetimes or even about their chances of surviving 
up to retirement age (Mace, 1992). In some countries, women move out 
of the labour force for a certain period of time without knowing whether 
they can go back to work or when they can join the labour force again. 
All these factors make it difficult to visualise the age-profiles of 
individuals as a single line. Instead it may be conceptualised as a zone, 
with a higher density at the centre but also with a very considerable spread 
over time to reflect the greater uncertainty of the more distant future. 
The extent of the external benefits may be large. Usually we tend to 
associate more education with less crime. For example, Lochner (1999) 
found that a significant relationship between higher rates of high school 
participation and tougher penalties had the lowest index for property 
crimes while ability and high school graduation significantly reduced the 
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participation of young men in crime and rates of incarceration. His study 
was based upon large scale US micro datasets and he developed a model 
whereby education was correlated with crimes that required less skill. 
According to him education affects factors such as unemployment and 
inequality. Leigh (1998) claims that there is a strong and positive 
correlation between increased education and the absence of violent crime, 
measures of health, family stability and environmental benefits. Thus, 
other more indirect effects of education may be possible, for instance, 
according to Gemmell (1996), education may also provide positive 
production externalities whereby the educated workers in a firm may not 
only be more productive themselves but may also enhance the productivity 
of their less-educated colleagues. Although these economy-wide 
educational spill-overs exist, it is difficult to actually verify their size and 
calculate their true social returns. 
Also as highlighted by the Signalling Theory, education may not always 
add to productivity. In the extreme case where education only acts as a 
screening device for employers, education does not add to productivity at 
all and the net contribution to national output may be negative (Mace, 
1992). However, available evidence runs counter to the above argument 
(Boissiere et aI, 1985; Lambropoulos, 1992; Psacharopoulos, 1987; 
Psacharopoulos, 1989; Psacharopoulos, 1996) and thus, rates of returns 
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analysis are still used as a planning and policy tool in education (Menon, 
2003). 
Despite all these objections, rate of return analyses are still widely used 
because it is easy to understand and enables comparisons with various 
other forms of investments. However these can only act as gross 
indicators to inform policy-making and need to be supplemented. 
Similarly in this thesis I can only compute gross wage premiums to an 
increase in educational attainment and these are only approximations to 
social returns. The most widely used method to calculate returns to 
education, is the Mincerian earnings function and the standard method 
used to estimate any regression is the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). But 
due to various shortcomings of the OLS technique, researchers often tum 
to the Instrumental variables method. In this chapter, I examine its use 
and the advantage it has over the conventional OLS method. However the 
Instrumental variables method is discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 2.1 provides the theoretical aspects of the rates of return to 
education. Sub-section 2.1.1 outlines the underlying theory for this PhD 
while I move on to discuss the signalling value of education where I focus 
largely on Spence's (1973) model in Sub-section 2.1.2. This adds a 
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cautionary note to the use of wages as a measure of productivity. The 
concept of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is outlined in Sub-
section 2.1.3 to highlight the importance of technological change in 
promoting demand for skilled workers and to justifY the stable returns to 
education following educational expansion. 
Section 2.2 looks at some methodological issues and reminds us that the 
conventional OLS method may yield biased estimates. I address each of 
these methodological issues in separate sub-sections. Sub-section 2.2.1 
provides the rationale as to why it is important to deal with the problem of 
omitted variables bias. The importance of correcting for endogeneity and 
measurement errors issues is highlighted in Sub-section 2.2.2. The 
Instrumental Variable approach is then introduced as an alternative to the 
Conventional OLS method in Sub-section 2.2.3. The need to address 
heterogeneity in returns is pointed out in Sub-section 2.2.4. 
Section 2.3 presents some empirical evidence on the rates of return to 
education. The main findings on returns to education throughout the 
world are presented in Sub-section 2.3.1, for instance, by addressing the 
effects of educational expansion on the returns to education and tackling 
the issue of whether or not educational investment has caused a decline in 
the rates of returns. I analyse some studies conducted by Psacharopoulos 
(1973; 1980; 1985; 1994; 1995; 1996) and I also present Bennell's (1994; 
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1996) reviews of the validity of these studies. Then I discuss two studies 
in depth which support the SBTC theory in Sub-section 2.3.2. I look at 
two studies: one conducted by Machin & Van Reenen (1998) and the 
second one by Berman & Machin (2000) in an attempt to assess the 
empirical evidence in favour of the SBTC hypothesis and to briefly 
incorporate the concept of technological transfer from high income 
countries. This theory proves particularly useful when I have to justify the 
existing high returns to education that prevail in the Republic of Mauritius 
in Chapter 7. I move on to discuss the issue of omitted variables bias in the 
Sub-section 2.3.3. I examine the empirical study conducted by Griliches 
& Mason (1972). This study points out how the schooling coefficient may 
be overstated if ability and school quality measures are omitted from the 
analysis. It also deals with how the ability measure may be included in the 
regression analysis. Endogeneity and measurement error issues are 
addressed in Sub-section 2.3.4. I focus on three studies that use a 
particular instrument of interest, namely Pons & Gonzalo (2002), Harmon 
& Walker (1995) and Dearden (1999). These studies illustrate how one 
can produce consistent estimates of the return to schooling even in the 
presence of measurement error and endogeneity of schooling. In Sub-
section 2.3.5, I discuss empirical evidence around the heterogeneity in the 
returns to education by referring to three studies conducted by Harmon et 
al (2000), Dearden (1999) and Koop & Tobias (2004). Each study uses 
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different data sets. I present some empirical evidence on returns to 
education for vocational education in Sub-section 2.3.6. 
Finally I conclude this chapter by highlighting how these studies influence 
the subsequent estimation of the returns to education in the Republic of 
Mauritius. 
2.1 Theoretical aspects of rates of return to education 
2.1.1 The human capital framework 
The theory underlying this study is Human Capital Theory pioneered by 
Mincer (1962) and Becker (1964). The model hypothesises that wages are 
determined by the stock of human capital and the allocation of time to the 
labour market (Horowitz & Schengzler, 1999). In this section, therefore, I 
outline what Human Capital Theory is. 
Education is an investment of current resources in exchange for future 
returns. These current resources may include both the direct costs and the 
opportunity cost incurred while this investment is undertaken. According 
to Becker (1964), 's' years of schooling is chosen to maximise the 
expected present value of future incomes streams, up to retirement at date, 
T, net of the costs of education, C
s
• Schooling is thus, an optimising 
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investment decision based on future earnings and current costs: that is, on 
the (discounted) difference in earnings from undertaking and not 
undertaking education and the total cost of education including foregone 
earnings. Investment in education continues until the marginal cost of 
education equals the marginal return. The equations used by Harmon et al 
(2000) may be used to illustrate this equilibrium position: 
where rs is the internal rate of return to the sth year of schooling. 
In equilibrium the present value of the sth year of schooling just equals the 
present value of costs associated with that particular year of schooling and 
the internal rate of return, rs gives the discount rate at which the 
equilibrium position is attained. It is the discount rate that equates the 
present value of the relevant streams of additional pecuniary benefits and 
costs. Thus, the financial payoff to an extra year of schooling can be 
quantified by computing its internal rate of return. (Fuente, 2003). 
When making decisions about educational investments, one would 
compare the internal rate of return, rs to the market interest rate, 1 and 
such investments would only be undertaken if rs > 1 making the 
investment worthwhile for the individuals. An individual who attaches 
more (less) value on current income than future income will have a higher 
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(lower) discount rate and they are therefore less (more) likely to undertake 
educational investments. 
Also if C
s
' that is, the direct education costs is large then the net benefits 
of schooling fall, eroding the reward from undertaking education. 
However if C
s 
is sufficiently small and T is large then the equilibrium 
condition may simply be reduced to: rs = Ws - Ws-1 ~ log Ws -log Ws-1 
Ws - 1 
Hence the return to the sth level of schooling may be obtained by the 
difference between the log of wages an individual is likely to earn after's' 
years of schooling and the log of wages he/she would have earned had 
he/she chosen only 's-l' level of schooling. Basically the argument 
stressed here by Harmon et al (2000) is that the returns to education 
depend on how log wages vary with the level of schooling. 
One of the major problems of calculating internal rates of return is data 
collection. Thus, to use this method, data on the earnings of a 
representative sample of workers classified by age, by educational level 
and by type of course taken are required. Also, data on their length of 
schooling, occupation, sex, social background, location of employment 
and measures of natural ability should be available; estimates of private 
expenditures on tuition fees, books, and so on are required and even the 
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average income tax rates. Data requirements also include information on 
the labour market such as the rate of unemployment, the labour force 
participation by age, sex and educational level (Mace 1986). However in 
reality it is difficult for countries to keep this information and even if they 
do, the data are not collated in a way suitable for analysis but researchers 
still compute the rate of returns by filling in the gaps by making 
assumptions (Mace, 1992). 
An approximation to this human capital theoretical framework is the 
earnings function popularised by Mincer (1974) whereby decisions about 
optimum educational investment are based on current costs and future 
earnmgs. Mincer's original formulation used data on 1959 annual 
earnings of white, non-farm, men in the USA. His model did not include 
any specific measure of the costs of education, although it does 
incorporate opportunity costs, i.e. earnings foregone, that are a high 
proportion of total costs. A basic empirical model can be written as 
follows: 
logw= a+bS +cE+dE2 +e 
where log w again represents the log of wages, S is the years of 
schooling, E is the years of experience and a is the constant whereas b, c 
and d are coefficients of their respective variables while e is an error term. 
Note that experience is included as a quadratic term to capture the 
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concavity of the expenence earnmgs profile. Again the returns to 
schooling can be estimated by analyzing how log wages vary with S as b 
measures the proportionate effect on wages of an increment to S. If an 
individual chooses an additional year of schooling, then his extra 
education would cause his wages (log w) to rise by the value of the co-
efficient 'b' and this value is in fact the average private return, rs to an 
additional year of schooling, assuming that tuition fees are zero and that 
foregone earnings are the only costs associated with that extra year of 
schooling. However we need to bear in mind that this co-efficient is only 
an approximation to the internal rate of return and only equals it under 
certain conditions - including the assumption of an infinite working life. 
Instead of measuring returns to the overall schooling level, this equation 
can be extended to estimate the private returns to primary, secondary and 
tertiary education separately. To do so, it will require dummy variables 
which will be equal to one if the event occurred and zero, if otherwise. 
One way of rewriting the Mincerian function emerging from the human 
capital theoretical framework is as follows: 
log Wi = a' + b'Sli + C'S2i + d'S3i + fXi + gXi2+ e 
where S 1 , S2 and S3 are dummy variables representing different levels of 
education. For instance, if an individual has attended only primary school, 
then SI will take the value of I while S2 = 0 and S3 = O. The private return 
to primary schooling can be calculated as PRR1 = b' / N I, the private 
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returns to secondary schooling is given by PRR2 = c' I N2 and the private 
returns to tertiary education is given by PRR3 = d' I N3 where Nx denotes 
the number of years required to complete the xth level of education. In 
other words if an individual attended primary school between the age of 5 
to 11 years, secondary school from the age of 11 to 18 years and if s/he 
chose a bachelor's degree which lasted for 4 years, then NJ = 6, N2 = 7 
and N3 = 4 and by deducing the values of the coefficients (b', c' and d') 
from the regression model, the private returns to each level of schooling 
can be obtained (lohnes, 1993). However Psacharopoulos (1995) cautions 
us about the foregone earnings of primary school aged children, for 
example in his study, he assigned only three years of foregone earnings to 
this group. But different assumptions are appropriate for the opportunity 
cost of child labour in different countries or areas depending on the local 
economy and stages of development. 
The extended Mincerian function including a number of additional 
variables can be rewritten as follows: 
where Wi is the earnings measure for an individual, Si denotes schooling 
, Ei measures labour market experience (to be calculated as age minus the 
age at which the individual left school) and finally Xi is a set of other 
variables which affect earnings. The quadratic term for experience is 
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included to account for the concavity of the earnmgs profile. u, the 
I 
disturbance term is assumed to be independent of Xi and represents other 
unobservable factors. To estimate this model consistently, we need to 
assume that there is no correlation between Si and u i' in other words that 
schooling is exogenous. These assumptions are necessary if we want to 
obtain an unbiased estimate of r. Further methodological issues, and the 
problematic nature of the assumption of exogeneity, are discussed later in 
this chapter. 
The precise return to education is arrived at by Halvorsen & Palmquist 
(1978) by taking the antilog of the schooling coefficient minus one or 
simply (er-l). This adjustment is not required for continuous variables 
but is needed in specifications using dummy variables. The general form 
of any equation estimating returns to education containing both Zi 
representing a set of continuous variables and Di representing a set of 
dummy variables may be written as follows: 
lnY = a+ Ibi Zi+ Ie} D j 
i } 
Here the percentage effect of a small change in a continuous variable on Y 
may be obtained by multiplying the coefficient of that variable by 100. 
However the same cannot be done for dummy variables because if the 
event occurs (i.e. the factor is present) then the coefficient of that dummy 
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variable measures its discontinuous effect on Y. So the relative effect of 
that dummy variable on Y is computed through exp (coefficient) - 1 and 
the percentage effect is given by [( ecocfficient_l) x 100]. If this mathematical 
adjustment is not done, then there can be serious misinterpretations of 
dummy variables in semi logarithmic equations. For example, Hanushek 
& Quiley (1978) as cited in Halvorsen & Palmquist (1978) report that a 
postgraduate degree increases the earnings of a black worker by only 64% 
whereas the correct result should have been 90%. Siphambe (2000) 
interprets the returns to each level of education (primary, secondary and 
tertiary) for Botswana by first adjusting each of the coefficients of the 
dummy variables. However in most studies which have investigated the 
education-earnings relationship, this mathematical adjustment is not done. 
Similar to these studies, I report the OLS estimates to returns to education 
without making the adjustment for using dummy variables in the tables. 
However while discussing social returns to education in the text, I do refer 
to those returns for which the mathematical adjustments have been made 
and where the impacts on the magnitude of the social returns to education 
are substantial. 
The extended verSIOn of the Mincer (1974) model is thus generally 
estimated by OLS and can include a number of explanatory variables that 
also determine wages, such as experience, age and so on. This allows the 
estimation of rates of return to education to be derived from simple cross 
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sectional data. Indeed this type of model is the basis of many hundreds of 
research studies that have undertaken empirical estimations of the rate of 
return to education across a range of countries. Thus I will use this 
Mincerian model to derive social returns to qualifications for the Republic 
of Mauritius. 
2.1.2 Signalling 
According to the Human Capital Theory, returns to education are due to 
the fact that schooling augments productivity as valuable skills are learnt 
at school (Hartog et aI, 1999). However, Wolf (2002) argues that 
'earnings are a highly imperfect measure of an individual's 'productivity" 
(p.28). Education may simply function as a screening or signalling device. 
Education signals the effect of ability on earnings and it is difficult to 
unravel the extent to which education is a signal of existing productivity or 
the capacity to enhance productivity. Either way there is a positive 
correlation between earnings and education although the reasons differ. 
The estimates of returns to education thus do not only reflect the 
productivity enhancing effect of education. Thus, according to Wolf 
(2002) education is a socially acceptable way of ranking, screening and 
selecting people without which employers would find it hard to hire 
employees. 
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Since education may not reflect productivity but instead may simply signal 
ability, the rate of return may not provide accurate estimates of the 
productive value of education. To illustrate the fact that education may 
simply act as a sorting mechanism, I use Spence's (1973) job market 
signalling theory. He argues that education may be used as a signalling 
device by job applicants when employers are uncertain about a worker's 
productivity and the information will not necessarily become available to 
the employer immediately after hiring. Here the employer is assumed to 
be risk-neutral and education is used to identify existing differences in 
worker productivity, rather than enhancing worker productivity. In the 
most extreme cases, it is argued that education does not have any social 
value, that is, it does not increase total output in the economy. Risk-
neutral employers who do not have any information about the worker's 
productivity, will tend to pay a wage equal to the average productivity of 
the population. However employers know the level of education acquired 
by the individual and if education is assumed to be a good proxy for 
marginal product, employers will start offering higher wages for workers 
with more education, who are likely to have a higher marginal product. If 
better-educated people are more productive, then employers may use 
educational attainments to employ higher ability workers. An individual 
will invest in education if there is adequate return in terms of the offered 
wage. Education is a costly investment and these costs are referred to as 
signalling costs. For individuals to invest in different levels of education, 
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signalling costs must be negatively correlated with productivity (Spence, 
1973; Vignoles, 1998). The rationale behind this negative correlation is 
that more able individuals must be able to purchase the same amount of 
education as less able individuals at lower schooling costs. In other words 
for each and every wage offer, more able people will invest more in 
schooling than the less able and thus, the level of education provides 
accurate signals of productivity levels. 
Employers hold conditional beliefs about productivity and if the 
employers conditional beliefs are not confirmed by observation of the 
workers employed, these conditional probabilistic beliefs will be adjusted 
and new entrants in the market will face a new wage schedule. The new 
wage schedule will cause individuals to adjust their investments in 
education accordingly. This process of revising conditional probabilistic 
beliefs as new market information becomes available to the employer 
through hiring and subsequent observation of the workers at work, will 
continue until the employer's conditional beliefs are confirmed. Workers 
will continue to invest in education until the marginal benefit from 
signalling is equal to the marginal cost. Spence (1973) illustrates this 
equilibrium, splitting the population into two groups: group 1 is a 
proportion ql of the population while group 2 is a proportion l-ql but both 
groups face the same employer. Workers in group 1 have a productivity 
of 1 while those in group 2 have a productivity of 2. The costs of 
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acquiring education level y to any individual in group I is y whereas any 
individual in group 2 faces a cost equal to y/2. The employer believes that 
there is some level of education say y* such that y<y* where productivity 
is one with probability one and where y;:::y*, productivity is two with 
probability one. Assuming that there are only two wage offers, 
individuals in each group will select the optimal levels of education. 
Individuals in group 1 will set y = 0 because if he invest in education and 
by the time he reaches y* there is no benefit, education is costly for 
him/her. Individuals in group 2 will set y = y* and increase their 
educational investments no further because there is no additional gain in 
terms of higher wage offer. The optimised choices of education for both 
groups are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 2.1: Optimal choice of education level 
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Given the level of y* in the diagram, it is easy to see that group 1 will 
select y = 0 and group 2 will select y = y*. Here the employer's beliefs 
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are confirmed and we have a signalling equilibrium. Here the employer's 
initial belief is confirmed by market experience provided that I < y* < 2. 
With signalling, group 1 will be worst off, as without it, they will be paid a 
wage equal to the average productivity of the population. With signalling 
the employer pays the higher wage only to those who are genuinely more 
productive (Vignoles, 1998). Hence education is helping to allocate the 
right people to the right jobs. But it should be noted that at extremes, 
education does not increase productivity levels and there is no gain in 
. I 5 natIOn a output . 
Hence in empirical estimates of rates of return analysis to education, it 
becomes important to control for ability and test whether education still 
has a strong effect on earnings - any likely difference is to be attributed to 
the signalling value of education. 
There are other ways of assessing the signaling value of education. One 
way may be by looking at the education/earnings relationship for public 
sector versus private sector employees where the latter is supposed to be 
the competitive sector. Also in some studies, the returns to years of 
schooling in the public sector are assessed relative to those generated 
within the public sector and for those who are self employed. Hence, for 
5 However there can still be a net social value due the improved information if this 
reduces employers' costs for search and post-hire selection for dismissal, sufficiently 
relative to the cost of education minus any consumption benefit of education. 
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instance, if public sector workers and those who are self employed have 
identical rates of return to years of schooling and this is exceeded by the 
rate of return in the private sector, this would support the productivity 
enhancing role of education as the private sector rewards the more 
educated workers (Gomez-Castellanos & Psacharapoulos, 1990). 
However the signaling value of education is not explored in this thesis. 
The only measure that I can use of 'whether people are productive and 
economically valuable is their wages' (Wolf 2002, p.24) and I 
acknowledge that wages may not reflect the average contribution of 
workers. However in the absence of other reliable measures of 
productivity, I use wages to estimate social returns to education which if 
used carefully can guide future investments in education in the Republic 
of Mauritius. This is discussed at length in Chapter 7. 
2.1.3 Skilled Biased Technological change (SBTC) 
Investment in education, if treated as any other investment is likely to be 
subject to the law of diminishing marginal returns. However as will be 
discussed in Section 2.31, Psacharopoulos (1985) concluded that 
educational expansion does not lead to lower returns. He reported stable 
returns to education over time. The stable over time behaviour of the 
returns to education following expansion, is consistent with what 
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Tinbergen (1975) views as a race between education and technology with 
rightward shifts of demand and supply curves of education, causing the 
rate to return to change accordingly. Alternatively this Tinbergen (1975) 
race between education and technology may be interpreted through the 
skilled-biased technology change (STBC) literature. Either way, both may 
be used to explain why such a large increase in the supply of educated 
labour in so many developed and developing countries has not been 
accompanied by a fall in the mean rate of return across these countries. It 
is hypothesized that both demand for skilled persons and supply shift in 
the same direction. The extent to which demand shifts will depend on 
technological advances, whereas the extent to which supply shifts will 
depend on educational expansion. This is illustrated in the Figure 2.2: 
Figure 2.2: Race between education and technology 
Rates of return 
Do 
So 
Time 
The above figure presents the outcome of such a race where at first supply 
shifts dominate demand shifts and the returns to education fall. But 
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thereafter, the expansion of education is dominated by demand with a rise 
in returns to education. This is further explored in Sub-section 2.3.2. 
2.2 Methodological issues 
The OLS techniques generate biased estimates of the returns to education. 
Some of these biases are briefly listed here and are elaborated in later sub-
sections. 
~ Endogeneity 
The schooling measure, Si is assumed to be exogenous although the 
Human Capital Theory treats it as being endogenous. Human Capital 
models of schooling attainment suggest that lower-wage individuals 
are more likely to invest in education than higher-wage individuals 
(Grilliches, 1977). Even in reality, those who stand to gain more from 
education, (those who are more trainable) may invest in more 
education. Thus, it is argued that high-wage individuals leave school 
earlier and there is endogeneity bias in the estimate of the return to 
schooling when the OLS technique is used. 
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~ Omitted variable bias 
The disturbance term, U i captures unobservable individual effects and 
these individual factors (for example unobserved ability and family 
background) may affect the decision to invest in education, causing a 
correlation between schooling and the error term in the earnings 
function 
~ Measurement error 
Measurement error in the education variables cause OLS estimates to 
be biased downwards (Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Dearden, 1999). 
Given these problems, estimation by the conventional OLS methods will 
give biased estimates of the return to schooling, rs. There are a number 
of ways to deal with these and sub-sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 briefly 
demonstrate how this may be done. 
2.2.1 Omitted variables and ability bias 
If the estimation procedure is unable to separate the contribution of 
unobserved ability to productivity from that made by education, then it 
will simply ascribe all the additional productivity of more able and better 
educated individuals compared to those with less education, to extra 
43 
schooling. Thus, the schooling co-efficient may overstate the contribution 
of education. 
Similarly the education-income relationship may be overstated or 
understated if some variables that affect schooling are omitted from the 
model. For instance, if a measure of ability is omitted then the error term 
will capture it as it is one of the unobserved factors, which also affects 
schooling. Also as education and ability are positively associated, the 
OLS parameter, which measures the contribution of education to income, 
will be biased upward. Ability to do better in education may be correlated 
with ability to make money in the labour market. There IS a 
complementarity between ability and education so that workers with 
higher ability (or higher opportunity) will invest more in education 
(Blackburn & Neumark, 1995). More able people might earn more and 
this may be translated into higher returns. 
An approach to distinguish between impact of education and ability, is to 
directly include ability measures in a standard OLS model. Here an ability 
measure such as an IQ test score is introduced as another independent 
variable affecting wages and the problem of omitted variables bias arises 
if it is omitted from the equation. So the inclusion of an explicit proxy for 
ability should reduce the estimated coefficient of schooling (Griliches & 
Mason, 1972). 
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However, the problem of ability bias is just one of many problems that 
arise while estimating returns to schooling. School quality, family 
background and ability are among the potential omitted variables that have 
been identified and studied. Card & Krueger (1992) for instance, report 
that those who grew up in states with better quality schools acquired more 
education. They argue that school quality affects educational attainment 
by lowering the marginal cost schooling and by raising the marginal 
benefits of schooling and thus, making schooling more attractive to 
individuals. 
2.2.2 Endogeneity and Measurement error issues 
As argued by Harmon & Walker (1995) there are a variety of sources of 
bias associated with the returns estimated by the OLS method. In an 
equilibrium condition, there is a positive correlation between schooling 
and its return causing the OLS estimates of the return to schooling to be 
biased upward. So schooling may be endogenous as a result of the 
individual's optimal choice (Card, 2000). The endogeneity problem is 
about the schooling variable, S in the earnings function not being 
exogenous such that the level of education an individual chooses to 
undertake is influenced by other characteristics such as ability, motivation 
and expected returns. Motivation, for instance, may be correlated 
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negatively with ability (Weisbrod, 1972). In other words, people with 
relatively high ability for their particular educational level may have 
modest or even relatively low levels of motivation. In fact the evidence on 
this is unclear as it may be that high ability individuals have higher levels 
of motivation. Weisbrod (1972) points out that one may wrongly 
conclude that two variables interact instead of acknowledging the effects 
of a third factor. 
Thus, to deal with the endogeneity issue, a researcher posits the existence 
of an observable covariate that affects schooling choices but IS 
uncorrelated with (independent of) ability factors. Much attention IS 
focussed on the supply-side features of the education system as a source of 
potential instruments, for example, the minimum school leaving age, 
tuition costs or the geographic proximity of schooling (Card, 2000). 
In the next sub-section (Sub-section 2.2.3), I introduce the instrumental 
variable approach and state why IV may be preferred over the 
conventional OLS technique. This IV approach will be discussed at length 
in Chapter 6. 
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2.2.3 Instrumental Variables (IV) 
Ordinary Least Squares method provides an estimate of the rate of return 
to education on average while the IV provides an estimate of the rate of 
return for a specific group of people whose behaviour can be manipulated 
by the instrument (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). So OLS estimates are 
commonly lower than IV estimates. However the size of the extra return 
depends on the choice of instruments. To compute the returns to 
schooling both the conventional OLS and instrumental variables can be 
used as in this study. However the IV approach enables the researcher to 
tackle the problems of ability bias, endogeneity and measurement errors. 
The IV approach is a way of splitting the variance in schooling into an 
exogenous component and endogenous component. These are done by 
adding variable(s) into an equation to explain schooling decisions which 
is( are) not in the wage equation. The two-equation system describing log 
earnings (Yi ) and years of schooling (Si ) may be written as follows: 
Yi = X;S + PSi +Ui 
Si =Zi'a+Vi 
COV(X;,Zi') -:t 0 
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where estimation of the first equation by OLS will yield an unbiased 
estimate of ~ only if schooling Sj is exogenous. X and Z are vectors of 
observed attributes where E (Xj,uD = E(Zj,vj) = O. The instruments are 
variables that are not contained in X, i.e. do not have an independent effect 
on earnings but are included in the vector Z, i.e. they do have a significant 
impact on the level of schooling acquired. The IV method relies on the 
assumption that the instrumental variables are correlated with schooling 
decisions and not directly with earnings outcomes (Harmon, Oosterbeek & 
Walker, 2003). The results of IVs can, however, lead to large 
inconsistencies if there is a relationship between wages and the 
instruments or there is a weak relationship between the instruments and 
schooling. For example, Bound et al. (1995) demonstrate this by re-
estimating the results from an earlier study of Angrist & Krueger (1991), 
which uses quarter of birth and compulsory school attendance laws as 
instruments and finds that those estimates are even more biased than the 
OLS estimates because the instruments used in that study are weakly 
correlated with schooling. Generally if the correlation between the 
instrument and the endogenous explanatory variable is weak, then even a 
small correlation between the instrument and the error term, produces a 
larger inconsistency in the IV estimates of the returns to schooling than in 
the OLS estimate. 
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2.2.4 Heterogeneity in returns to education 
Heterogeneity (allowing for differences in marginal returns across 
different groups of individuals) may be modelled using interaction terms 
with education. According to Card (1999; 2001), for instance, high ability 
individuals may earn very different returns to their education. Griliches 
(1977) for instance, introduces ability as an explanatory variable into the 
log-linear earnings function and he argues that the more able individuals 
may be able to convert education into human capital more efficiently 
relative to the less able one. An increase in educational investments 
generates more human capital if inherent ability and schooling 
complement each other. Heterogeneity in returns will be considered in 
Section 2.3.4. 
2.3 Empirical evidence on rates of return to education 
2.3.1 Main trends of returns to education in the Literature 
Policy makers are concerned about the returns to education to determine 
whether or not there has been educational over-expansion or skills 
shortages. According to Blaug (1967), educational policy-makers need to 
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know when the returns to educational investments fall to a level below 
which further expansion is not justifiable. They also need to know when 
the returns increase above the alternative discount rate in order to be in a 
position to recommend expansion. Here allocative decisions may involve 
educational investments to be made within education itself (for example, 
by the level of education: primary, secondary and tertiary or by type of 
education: general and technical education) or if education is a form of 
investment, human capital investments should be compared to investments 
in physical capital. Such comparisons may serve as ex ante signals to 
guide resource planning. 
Psacharopoulos (1980) makes comparisons of average returns to physical 
and human capital across countries in the 1970's and for developing 
countries he reports larger returns to higher education (14.9%) in 
developing countries than to physical capital (12.8%) while the pattern is 
slightly reversed for developed countries with returns on investment in 
physical capital (10.5%) being marginally higher than returns on higher 
education (9.3%). He attributes this difference to the relative scarcity of 
human capital in developing countries and the relatively higher ratio of 
human to physical capital in developed countries. However given that 
there is just over one percentage point difference between the two 
investments, he concludes that both kinds of investments (as theory 
predicts) in developed countries have nearly reached the point of near 
50 
equalisation of returns at the margin. In an updated study, Psacharopoulos 
(1985) compares the trend in investing in both kinds of capital over two 
time periods, the 1960's and the 1970's. He confirms that a narrow gap 
exists between the returns to physical and human investment and this 
convergence suggests an equilibrium of 10% returns to both types of 
investments. 
There is a declining pattern across country type, that is, private returns to 
education undifferentiated by level fall, as a country moves from a less 
developed economic status to an advanced status (Psacharopoulos, 1985). 
His analysis is based on the regression co-efficients on years of schooling 
in semi-log (Mincer-type) earnings functions, where he uses years of 
schooling, years of experience and years of experience squared as 
explanatory variables. The estimates cover a total of 61 countries. 
In a recent study, Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2002) reviews and presents 
the latest estimates and patterns, reaffirming the importance of Human 
Capital Theory. He presents estimates of raw returns to education for a 
maximum of 98 countries. The mean rate of return is based on the 
Mincer-Becker-Chiswick regression where the coefficient on years of 
schooling is estimated both by level of education and by level of economic 
development. He reports that low-income countries with only 7.6 years of 
schooling on average have the highest returns to education (10.9%) 
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followed by the middle-income countries (10.7%) such as Europe, Middle 
East and North Africa with an average of 8.2 years of schooling while the 
high-income countries have a coefficient of only 7.4% given that they 
have the highest number of years of schooling on average (9.4 years). It 
must be pointed out that the returns to education for the high income 
group such as the OEeD countries are considerably below the world 
average of 9.7% and its years of schooling exceed the world average of 
8.3. So the pattern of declining returns to education by years of schooling 
and level of economic development is confirmed. He also reports that 
during the last 12 years as average schooling levels have increased, 
average returns to schooling have declined by 0.6 percentage points 
implying that an increase in supply has led to a slight decrease in returns 
to schooling. In other words if education is treated as any other 
investment, then educational expansion will be subject to the law of 
diminishing returns. Moreover private returns to higher education continue 
to remain higher relative to social returns across all countries irrespective 
of level of economic development (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002: 
Table 2). 
A brief summary of the findings of Psacharopoulos (1973; 1980; 1985) 
reveal that returns to education for all levels of education generally exceed 
the aggregate social opportunity cost of capital. According to him, rates of 
return in developing countries, especially in Africa are higher than in the 
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advanced market economIes. However Bennell (1994) criticises the 
quality and relevance of the rates of return estimates and also the reporting 
and aggregation of these estimates by Psacharopoulos. Bennell (1994) 
reports that social returns to all levels of education in sub-Saharan Africa 
have fallen significantly during the last two decades and in many of those 
countries, social returns may be below the aggregate social opportunity 
cost of capital. He points out that private and social returns are highest 
for upper secondary education followed by primary education, whereas 
private returns for higher education continue to exceed the social returns. 
This is so despite the fact this gap has been narrowing due to rapidly 
declining employment opportunities for graduates and acute funding crises 
in African universities. 
Bennell (1994) states that the findings of Psacharopoulos may be 
questioned on several grounds, for instance, there are biases in country 
coverage. Francophone & Lusophone SSA countries are seriously under-
represented, while demographically small countries are over-represented. 
Only 11 of the 18 country studies cited by Psacharopoulos have both 
private and social rates of return estimates for all the three levels of 
education (primary, secondary and tertiary) whereas a complete set of only 
private returns by level of education is available for Cote D'Ivoire. For 
other countries such as Burkina Faso & Sierra Leone, studies have 
complete sets of social returns only. Further, Bennell dismisses the 
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criteria upon which Psacharopoulos chose the estimates. He states that 
many of the studies, even though a particular author or journal referee or 
PhD thesis committee felt that the quality of the work was suitable for 
publication, are of poor quality and the estimates yielded cannot be relied 
upon. He discusses the considerable impact that omitted variables are 
likely to have on the estimates of returns to education. For example, five 
studies (Ghana, Liberia, Western Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe) make 
only a few adjustments for drop-outs, examination failures and 
unemployment whereas further two studies (Ethopia and Sudan) rely on 
crude and unsubstantiated alpha coefficients to account for all other 
independent effects on individual incomes. The alpha coefficient 
represents the proportion of earnings differentials resulting from education 
alone (Hinchliffe 1987). Moreover only the regressions for Kenya and 
Tanzania have separate variables for innate ability and socio-economic 
background. Omission of these factors can seriously bias the estimates to 
returns to education and seriously undermine the comparability of returns 
across countries. Hence Bennell strongly rejects the results reported by 
Psacharopoulos. 
However Psacharopoulos (1996) clearly points out that the studies he has 
included in his analysis (Psacharopoulos, 1973; 1980; 1985) differ 
enormously in terms of data quality, coverage and methodology. But as 
he argues, for example, a household survey for 1970 in an African country 
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cannot be reconstructed to account for all the suggestions made by Bennell 
(1994). Moreover there is no other way of assessing whether the primary, 
secondary or tertiary level should receive priority in the allocation of 
public funds to education in a particular country, other than using existing 
estimates yielded from these existing studies if all studies in this area of 
research are based on representative samples of the population. He also 
argues that the studies he chose obey some ground rules of methodology. 
Hence I will continue to relate to Psacharopoulos' s work. 
Psacharopoulos (1985) analyses the rate of returns estimates over time 
within countries although he acknowledges that the sampling framework 
and methodology may differ from one year to the next. His deductions are 
based on evidence, which clearly indicates that rates of returns have so far 
remained unchanged even though it was preceded by increases in 
educational investments. He chooses some countries where the highest 
quality time series data exists: the US, Japan, Great Britain and Colombia. 
He points out that there is a remarkable stability of returns over a 30-year 
period for the US where the social returns, for example, fluctuated around 
10% to 11% between 1939 and 1969. In Japan however the returns fell 
from 6.4% to 5.7% over a 7-year period while in Great Britain, the returns 
remained constant between 1971 and 1978. Even though the percentage 
of workers with higher education more than doubled between 1973 to 
1978, the returns to education in Colombia fell from only 17.6% to 14.4%. 
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He therefore concludes that the fears of educational expansion leading to 
unemployed graduates or to lower social rates were unfounded. 
Also the difference between the private and social returns can act as policy 
indicators. The Mincerian equation is used to estimate social returns 
whereby the rate of return is based on total costs (private and public) and 
private benefits. While computing the social return to education, private 
returns were adjusted for public subsidisation of primary, secondary and 
tertiary education. In most cases private returns consistently outweighs 
social returns. This will not discourage them from investing in any level 
of education unless there are market imperfections. The state may transfer 
part of the educational expenditure onto the students or their parents 
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002; Sakellariou, 2003). Here estimates of 
private and social returns to education and the gap between them act as 
signals to policy-makers as to where to invest more (when social returns 
exceed private returns) and where to reduce public subsidisation of 
education (when social returns is much lower private returns). With less 
subsidisation, higher education will still be attractive given the high 
private returns. This policy may be inequitable, as students from poor 
families will not have access to higher education unless there are 
alternative measures to finance their education, for example the existence 
of student loans. It is important to consider the discount rate of the 
educational investment. But as discussed earlier, rates of return studies 
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are restrictive in the sense that the analysis may be plagued by lack of 
relevant data. 
Moreover Psacharopoulos (1994) concludes that both private and social 
returns to academic education exceed those of technical education because 
of the high unit cost associated with the latter. Bennell (1996) argues that 
this finding may not be reliable because Psacharopoulos simply lumps 
together data from other studies and the methodologies used across those 
studies may not be homogenous. So after looking for the studies, which 
use similar methodologies, he combines data for Latin America & 
Caribbean countries from Psacharopoulos & Ng (1994) and 
Psacharopoulos (1994) and concludes that social returns to academic 
education are roughly the same as those to vocational education while 
private returns to vocational qualification remains higher. Despite the 
recalculation of private and social returns to education the findings of 
Bennell (1996) remain unconvincing because he fails to address the 
possibility of individuals having a mix of academic and vocational 
qualifications and the resulting different returns to each combination. 
Psacharopoulos (1989) investigates the rates of return to educational 
expansIOn over time by using the same methodology which is the 
Mincerian semi-logarithmic earnmgs function with the same three 
explanatory variables: years of schooling, years of experience, and 
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experience-squared. The returns for the countries reported in his study, 
are estimated from data sets based on each country's population census. 
Out of the nine pairs of end-year estimates, seven declines are reported in 
the returns to education as the years of schooling increases. The country 
that records an increase in return is Chile but this is less than one 
percentage point and may be due to sample variability or particular labour 
market conditions prevailing in one of the two years (1974 and 1980). 
Moreover Dearden et al (2002) concluded that different routes through the 
education system may yield different returns for some qualifications such 
as for individuals who completed their '0' levels and subsequently 
acquired vocational qualifications. These received the highest return to 
their investment in education, whereas those who went on to do their 'A' 
level and a degree received a lower rate of return. The rationale as they 
argue, is that although '0' level or the CSE remain significant, they 
become less relevant in determining future earnings for graduates than for 
an individual who acquires vocational qualifications after gaining this 
lower level of academic qualification. The results are consistent across 
both males and females with the estimated significant co-efficient of 0.248 
and 0.285 respectively and these wage premiums are more than twice as 
large than those who continued the academic route. It should be noted that 
Dearden et al (2002) have also used interaction variables to study whether 
wage premiums to a particular level of education remain the same 
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whatever the additional years of schooling the individuals undertake. For 
example, the wage premium to an A-level may vary according to whether 
or not individuals eventually study for a degree. It is important to check 
whether or not such assumptions are valid by allocating the same wage 
premium to all individuals who completed those years of study. However 
when including interaction terms, we need to have a larger sample in order 
to avoid the problem of small cell sizes for these terms. 
2.3.2 Findings from Studies that Support the Skilled Biased 
Technological change (SBTC) 
Stable returns to education over time may be explained through the 
skilled-biased technology change literature, and this was discussed in 
Section 2.1.3. In this section, I will provide empirical evidence to support 
this SBTC theory. The large wage inequality in the UK during the 1980's 
and 1990's, for instance, may be explained as the increase in the demand 
for skilled labour outstripping the increase in supply. Also, despite the 
increase in the relative cost of skilled labour in the majority of U.S. 
industries, more skilled labour is being employed (Berman & Machin, 
2000). There is widespread evidence of skill-biased technological change, 
that is, technological changes raise the demand for skilled labour6 (in the 
UK, US and other OECD countries). Technological change occurred not 
only within industries but also across different countries especially in 
6 For example, Machin 1996 for the UK. 
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more technologically intensive countries 7 where more is spent on R&D. 
Also it may be argued that the demand for new skills will continue to rise 
as long as there is technological change. However, long-run increases in 
the demand for skills may not be accompanied by corresponding increases 
in the supply of skills. In the case of UK, the slower growth in the supply 
of skills in the 1980's may explain the large rise in wage equalities. 
I focus on two key studies where the authors argue that there has been 
skilled biased technological change. The first study is conducted by 
Machin & Reenen (1998) and the second one is by Berman & Machin 
(2000). Both deal with shifts in demand for labour in favour of skilled 
labour. 
Evidence on educational expansion being associated with rightwards shifts 
of the demand for educated labour can be discussed in light of the findings 
of Machin & Van Reenen (1998). The evidence generated from their 
study shows that skill-biased technical change is an international 
phenomenon, which increases the relative demand for skilled workers. 
They use data on value added and investment from an industry-level panel 
data set compiled by the OECD known as ST AN 8 and a complementary 
database for R&D data known as ANBERD 9 and the Bilateral Trade 
Database for international trade information. They look at seven different 
7 For arguments in favour of technology driven change Machin (2001) 
8 STAN stands for Standardised Analytical database 
9 ANBERD stands for Business Enterprise R&D database 
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countries (the US, UK, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, France & Germany) 
with 16 industries making up the entire manufacturing sector III each 
country. 
Some descriptive statistics of the key variables for the manufacturing 
sectors of these countries between 1973 and 1989 reveal that non-
production worker share of the total wage bill has risen in all countries in 
absolute terms with the largest increase recorded for the US and the UK. 
Also wage differentials between the non-production and production 
workers, increased very rapidly in those two countries in the 1980s. 
Certain skill-biased technological changes favour the wage and 
employment prospects of relatively skilled workers while damaging the 
wages and employment of the less skilled (Bound & Johnson, 1992; 
Johnson, 1997). Machin & Van Reenen (1998) conclude that more highly 
educated workers have increased their relative employment shares and 
there are considerable shifts in skill structure favouring more-skilled 
workers. Faster skill upgrading is concentrated in similar industries across 
countries suggesting that skill-biased technological change has a strong 
effect in shifting relative labour demand in favour of skilled workers in 
different countries. However they also point out that when cross-country 
correlations in industrial R&D intensity are considered 10, all pairwise 
correlations are positive, large in magnitude and significant. Hence, faster 
10 Here only 15 industries are considered in each country due to the unreliability of the 
R&D data for the transport goods industry 
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skill upgrading is observed in similar industries across countries, but the 
R&D correlations are stronger than the skill upgrading correlations, 
implying that there are other factors in addition to technology that 
contributed to the declining labour market position of unskilled workers. 
Nevertheless Machin & Van Reenen (1998) argue that there is sufficient 
evidence of a positive association between new technology and changes in 
skilled wage-bill shares in all the five countries considered. Other factors 
in addition to technology, which may contribute to the declining labour 
market position of unskilled workers, may simply be the ability of 
institutions to set wages or reduce the power of firms to layoff unskilled 
workers. The authors argue that R&D pushes up the demand for skills and 
R&D intensity was higher in these seven countries in the 1980's rather 
than in the 1970's. Their results uphold the skill-biased technological 
change hypothesis: there is evidence of a positive association between new 
technology and changes in skilled wage bill shares in Denmark, Japan, 
Sweden, U.K. and the U.S.A. Also, they report that the coefficient on the 
spillover variable for the UK and US was small and insignificant while it 
was positive and statistically significant with the coefficient on own R&D 
being insignificant. This suggests that spill-overs such as technological 
transfer and stimulated physical investment are more important in the 
smaller Scandinavian economies and Japan but not in the US and the UK. 
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The second study was conducted by Berman & Machin (2000). They used 
a global sample of manufacturing industries to investigate skill-biased 
technological change in developing countries. They report a significant 
increase in demand for skilled workers in the 1980's in middle-income 
countries and this is mostly due to skill upgrading within industries rather 
than to reallocations of employment from low to high-skill industries. The 
authors argue that this cannot be explained by capital-skill 
complementarity and hence skill-biased technological change is the most 
appropriate explanation for this phenomenon. They also show that 
industries, which substituted toward skilled labour in middle-income 
countries in 1980's, had already started this trend in the U.S. through the 
1960's and 1970's. They relate this demand shift to skill biased 
technological change because cross-country correlations of shifting skill 
demand are positively correlated. Also there is evidence of skill-biased 
technological transfer from the aCED to developing countries. 
Berman & Machin (2000) argue that SBTC has been present in U.S 
manufacturing industries since the late 1950's and it may be viewed in 
terms of the historical skill-premium which decreased as the supply of 
educated workers outstripped demand in the 1970's and increased when 
supply did not keep pace with demand. The authors use data compiled by 
the United Nations on employment, wages and production for 
manufacturing industries of several countries. The sample of countries is 
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split into three income groups in 1980: a high income group with GDP per 
capita exceeding US$l 0,000, a middle income group with GDP per capita 
between $2000 and $10,000, and a low income group with GDP per capita 
below $2000. They report that there is strong evidence of shifts in 
demand toward skilled labour in middle and high-income countries in the 
1980's but these are weak in low-income countries. The increased 
demand for skill is mainly a within-industry phenomenon, consistent with 
the SBTC hypothesis. For 11 out of the 12 countries in the high-income 
group, for example in Japan, Germany, the UK and the US, the wage bill 
shares of non-production increased, with upgrading occurring in all of 
them. In 16 out of the 18 countries classified as middle-income group, the 
shift occurred within industries. However this within-industry demand 
shift is weak in the low-income countries. They report that all of the 28 
sub industries within UK manufacturing shifted towards skills in the 1980s 
and these ranged from low to high skill industries. These shifts occurred 
simultaneously with skill upgrading. 
Skill upgrading is present even across countries, for example, the 
correlation between the US and Turkey, a country at the low end of the 
middle-income group is 0.42 and it is significant at the conventional 5% 
significance level. Skill upgrading in the US is a good predictor of skill 
upgrading in middle-income countries. These countries have positive 
correlations with the US pattern of SBTC in the 1980s. 
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Moreover Machin & Van Reenen (1998) argue that in most countries, 
capital-skill complementarity cannot explain the demand shifts toward 
skilled labour as capital output ratios are increasing fast enough. While 
capital complements skilled labour more than unskilled labour does, the 
effect is too small to explain the rise in demand for skilled workers within 
industries. For instance, in order to explain the increases in 1980s wage 
bill shares of 4.5 and 4.2 percentage points in the middle and high-income 
countries respectively, the capital/output ratios ought to be more than 
double. 
However Machin & Van Reenen (1998) base their entire analysis on the 
assumption that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled 
labour is unity. Thus their calculations are only approximations of the true 
degree of demand shifts. Nevertheless they argue that conceptually these 
increases in wage bills for non-production workers are cases for the SBTC 
hypothesis and unlike the study conducted by Machin & Van Reenen 
(1998) do not rely on indicators such as R&D spending and patents which 
are absent outside the OECD. 
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2.3.3 Dealing with ability bias 
A seminal study by Griliches & Mason (1972) addresses the specific 
problem of how the ability measure may be included in estimation of 
returns to education so that the estimates of the coefficient of schooling 
are not biased upwards. 
The study conducted by Griliches & Mason (1972) takes into account 
biases that arise due to the omission of ability and quality of education, 
and report that the schooling coefficient is overstated in the absence of 
ability measures and school quality measures. They use a sample of 3000 
veterans and they supplement the 1964 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data with individual military records in the U.S. However they draw their 
conclusions on only 1454 men who were aged between 21 to 34 and who 
were working full-time at the time of the survey. These men provided 
complete information on their occupation, income, family background and 
their AFQT scores were available. AFQT stands for the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test and it is used as an ability measure instead of the 
standard civilian mental ability, IQ test. The authors use semi-logarithmic 
functional forms and the logarithm of income is their main dependent 
variable. They measure the impact of an additional increment of 
schooling (SI) after military service and hence after the measurement of 
AFQT on the grounds that the bias arising due to the correlation of ability 
with the omitted quality variable, will be solved and SI is uncorrelated 
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with their measure of ability. Their measure of ability is therefore prior to 
entering service and hence prior to S1. They argue that using this measure 
of schooling increment after military service is important because the 
quality of initial schooling is more likely to be correlated with ability since 
there is some correlation between socio-economic status and ability. 
Additionally, because more able students are more likely to get into better 
schools, performance on intelligence tests at the age 18 partly reflects 
differences in both the quantity and quality of education. The increment 
in schooling variable is obtained by subtracting the number of years of 
schooling completed before military service from the total number of 
years of schooling completed. 
The extent of the ability bias is assessed by comparing the schooling co-
efficient in equations whereby the log of income is regressed on education 
excluding any ability measures, log of income is regressed on education 
and ability, log of income is regressed on personal background factors 
(such as father's schooling and occupation and region where the individual 
grew up) and lastly log of income on education, ability and personal 
background factors. The baseline equation controls for the individual's 
colour (COL), age and time spent in military service (AMS). Logarithm 
of income (LINC) is regressed on the following variables: 
LINC; =a; + flliSB+ fl2;SI +6;Coi+A;AGE+r;AMS+e; (1) 
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Where a is a constant and parameters /31 and /32 measures the schooling 
coefficients before military service and after military service, respectively. 
5 and A estimate the impact of colour and age, respectively on the 
individual's income. Griliches & Mason (1972) even control for the 
individual's age, as a proxy indicator of the individual's work experience. 
The other three relevant equations may be rewritten as follows: 
and eventually equation (4) is similar to: 
Here /33 and /34 measure the effects of ability (AFQT) and personal 
background factors (PBF) on income. The proportionate bias in the 
schooling coefficients that arises due to the omission of a relevant factor is 
then derived by subtracting the ratio of the schooling coefficient after the 
inclusion of the relevant factor to that before the inclusion, from 1 or 
simply" [1- ~:J. The drop in the SB (grades of school completed 
before military service) coefficient is greater than in the SI coefficient 
II where /3x and /3y are the schooling coefficient after the inclusion of the relevant factor 
and the schooling coefficient before the inclusion of the relevant factor. 
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when ability or personal background factors are included. The decline in 
the SB coefficient is almost three times greater than that in the SI 
coefficient. Education before military service, SB is highly correlated 
with ability and personal background factors and biased downward. 
Griliches & Mason (1972) attributes this to the absence of a measure of 
school quality. However the difference between the two schooling 
measures are not significant at the conventional 5% level implying that the 
effects of SB and SI are similar on income. 
The same approach of comparing the baseline model with other equations 
as ability and personal background measures are included gradually, is 
adopted to estimate the effect of total number of years of schooling (ST) 
on income. The base line equation is similar to: 
Here a decline of 28% in the total schooling co-efficient is estimated with 
11-15 percent attributed to the inclusion of the ability measure, AFQT and 
the rest attributed to personal background factors, PBF. The authors state 
that PBF relates to the omitted school-quality dimension. Their results 
confirm that the increment in schooling coefficient is over-estimated by 
12% if no measures of ability or school quality are included, but at the 
same time they argue that this is much lower than the 40% originally 
suggested by Denison (1962). However Taubman (1972) argues that the 
sample of veterans is too small to test for interactions and non-linear 
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effects of schooling and ability on the log of wages or to give reliable 
results. He also points out that the ability variable captures only a 
particular type of ability and reminds us that the sample of veterans is not 
representative of the population because it contains extremes of ability and 
certain SES groups are under-represented. Hence the correlation between 
the ability measure, AFQT and the omitted school quality variable may be 
higher for this population of veterans than for the rest of the population, 
implying that Griliches & Mason (1972) overstate the ability bias in the 
education coefficient. Nevertheless their study points out that omitted 
variables do indeed bias the estimate of the schooling coefficient. This is 
an issue that we need to be aware of in this PhD as the data used do not 
contain measures of IQ. 
2.3.4 Endogeneity and measurement errors issues 
I intend to analyse three studies that include instrumental variables in an 
attempt to understand how similar instruments may be applied in different 
contexts. I report all their subsequent findings. The first study is 
conducted by Harmon & Walker (1995), the second by Pons & Gonzalo 
(2002) and the third by Dearden (1999). It should be noted that the first 
two studies deal with only male workers in their samples 'so that 
complications associated with the disrupted work careers of women 
because of childbirth and rearing are avoided' (Pons & Gonzalo, p. 749). I 
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refer to only a part of Dearden's (1999) study to discuss the problem of 
measurement error. 
Harmon & Walker (1995) estimate the economic return to schooling for 
the UK using IV and a selectivity model addressing the endogeneity of 
schooling. Their results suggest the presence of a large and downward 
bias in the OLS estimates of the schooling-earnings relationship. To 
address the problem of endogeneity they use the change in the minimum 
school leaving age as an instrument. The change in the law caused a 
change in the amount of schooling acquired by those individuals who were 
affected by the law, but this did not have any direct impact on wages. The 
data sets they use were nine consecutive annual UK Family Expenditure 
Surveys (FES) from 1978 to 1986 and their sample consists of 34,336 
employed males in the age group 18-64. The minimum school-leaving 
age (SLA) legislation was first introduced in 1947 causing the minimum 
age to rise from 14 to 15 years and then in 1973, the minimum SLA was 
raised from 15 to 16 years. Figure 2 provides the schooling broken down 
by minimum school-leaving age: 
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As the figure clearly shows the 1947 legislation raised participation in 
post-compulsory education, that is, many of those who would have left 
schools at age 14 stayed on beyond the age of 15. However when Harmon 
& Walker (1995) compared the age-specific cohorts who faced a 
minimum SLA of 14 with the same age cohorts but who faced a minimum 
SLA of 15, using the relationship between log-earnings residuals and 
schooling, they found that the two cohorts had an expected wage 
differential of only 3% at school-leaving age 15 and this is statistically 
insignificant. Even the regression of log earnings including the variables: 
years of schooling, age, year and a dummy for the change in the minimum 
SLA reveals that the estimates of the coefficient on the dummy variable 
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are not significant. These results suggest that the mInImUm SLA 
instrument generates insignificant estimates. They pursue an extension of 
the Heckman two-step approach. Their dummies record the exogenous 
change in the minimum school-leaving age on years of schooling. OLS 
yields an estimated return of over 6% which is consistent with the returns 
obtained by other studies for the UK (Machin et al 1993; Moghadam, 
1990). The estimates generated by the IVs method suggest that these OLS 
estimates are much smaller, for example the return to schooling using 
instrumental variables, is estimated to be more than double or around 
15%. 
Dearden (1999) points out that the IV procedures may over-estimate the 
true average marginal return to education. This is true in the case where 
the instruments used rely on interventions that affect schooling choices of 
children with low tastes for education. They may earn 'higher average 
marginal returns to certain education qualifications than the population as 
a whole' (Dearden, 1999: 32). She thus attributes the higher returns 
reported by Harmon et al (1995) to heterogeneous 12 returns to education 
for those leaving school at the minimum school leaving age. Besides, 
Card (1999) argues that returns to schooling are heterogeneous. This 
occurs especially in the case of those whose schooling choices are affected 
12 Heterogeneity in the returns to education is further discussed in a later section. It is 
about individuals responding to education differently. Returns differ across individuals 
because they differ in the efficiency, with which they exploit a given level of education to 
raise their individual productivity (Blundell et aI, 1998). 
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by interventions such as the minimum school leaving age and who come 
from relatively disadvantaged family backgrounds with high discount 
rates. The IV parameter is known as the Local Average Treatment Effect 
(LATE) estimates. He also states that IV studies provide inconsistent 
estimates of the average return for the population as a whole as the 
marginal returns of the above will, in most cases, exceed the average 
return for the population. 
The second study that I intend to look at is the one conducted by Pons & 
Gonzalo (2002). They estimate the returns to schooling in Spain using 
OLS and IV and conclude that OLS not only give inaccurate estimates for 
the coefficient of ~ but this estimate is biased downward. They use two 
Spanish data sets: the Survey of Structure, Conscience and Biography of 
Class (ECBC) for 1991 and the Household Panel of the European Union 
(PHOGUE) for 1994. The results they obtained from the traditional 
Mincerian wage function using OLS, however yield returns to schooling 
that are equal to 6.4 % in ECBC and 5.8% in PHOGUE that the authors 
claim to be similar to the results reported by the majority studies for the 
Spanish case. They then proceed to use the IV method. The instruments 
they use are slightly different from those used by Harmon & Walker 
(1995).Each data set has its own advantages, for example, with ECBC it is 
possible to build a measure of college availability in the province and also 
to build dummy variables based on an individual's age to reflect the 
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change in minimum school-leaving age (MSLA) while PHOGUE also 
provide information on an individual's season of birth. 
But using the data set PHOGUE, Pons & Gonzalo (2002) cannot use 
natural experiments such as the rise in the minimum school leaving age 13 
or the season of birth because these variables need to be sufficiently 
correlated with the years of schooling before they may be used to estimate 
the returns to schooling. If this is not the case, the weak correlation 
between the potential instruments and the wage can result in a large bias in 
the IV estimates and thus, yield more inconsistent estimates than those 
obtained using OLS (Bound et aI, 1995). 
Both the MSLA and the season of birth are weakly correlated with the 
years of schooling in the Spanish case. As a result of the weak correlation, 
Pons & Gonzalo (2002) observe an increase in the standard error of the 
estimated co-efficient of schooling that is not significant, even though the 
season of birth has a positive effect on schooling attainment. F-tests on 
the excluded variables were performed to test the correlation between the 
instruments and the years of schooling and the inclusion of an identifying 
variable must improve the R2. The quality test showed that the correlation 
between these instruments and the years of schooling is not strong enough 
to accurately estimate the returns to schooling. 
13 The MSLA legislation in Spain was introduced in 1970 
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Another instrument that Pons & Gonzalo (2002) use is a data set of family 
backgrounds such as parent education, father's occupation, father's sector, 
father's responsibility and father's contract. The regression results for the 
reduced form of the schooling equation using these sets of instruments 
reveal that men with less educated parents have on average significantly 
fewer years of schooling while those having a self-employed father with a 
high level of responsibility in a job, with a permanent contract, employed 
in a white collar job or working in a non-agricultural sector, have more 
years of schooling. 
Another set of instruments that Pons & Gonzalo (2002) use is college 
availability. Male workers who grew up in an area with no school would 
have incurred high schooling costs and this might have acted as a 
disincentive to stay on at school. They adopt Card's (1993) suggestion 
that a college availability effect might have different consequences 
depending on family income, for example, having a college nearby has a 
greater effect for low income families and hence they include a dummy 
which takes the value of 1 if the father is a manual worker. They also 
adjust for labour market demand. If there is high graduate unemployment, 
this reduces the demand for education and hence they not only account for 
the unemployment rate when the individual was at the age of 16 but they 
also consider the Spanish region where the individual lived at 16. They 
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take into account interactions between the local labour market effect and 
college availability. The variable unemployment at 16 that captures the 
local market effect on demand for education is negative and significant at 
the 5% level and the income of poor families does affect the college 
education inversely. 
Also Pons & Gonzalo (2002) state that they do not expect a consistency 
problem as their sample size is sufficiently large. Consistency means that 
the estimator converges to the population parameter as the sample size 
grows and unbiasedness refers to the estimator having a sampling 
distribution centred on the parameter of interest in a sample of any size 
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001). As instrumental variables are consistent but 
not unbiased,14 while using instruments researchers must work with large 
samples. 
Davidson & McKinnon (1993) also point out that the problem of the 
finite-sample bias becomes worse as the number of instruments used 
within small samples increase. According to them there are two 
conflicting objectives associated with small samples: as the number of 
instruments increases the estimates of the returns may become more 
efficient asymptotically but at the same time, the results may suffer from 
14 IVs estimates involve a ratio of random quantities and they may not have a simple 
form. 
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the finite-sample bias. Also, when the instruments are weakly correlated 
with the endogenous variables in the model, the parameters are not 
strongly identified. However, as has been said already, Pons & Gonzalo 
(2002) argue that their results do not suffer from finite-sample bias, given 
their sufficiently large sample size. Once they use the interaction between 
low-income variable and college availability as an instrument, the estimate 
of the returns to schooling becomes more efficient. When parents' 
education and college availability are considered jointly, the estimate of 
return to schooling is more efficient than when using college availability 
instruments only. They obtain a return to schooling of 10.5%, which is 
higher than the 6.4% derived from OLS. Other studies also confirm that 
IV estimates of the returns to education based on family background are 
higher than classic OLS estimates (Psacharapoulos & Patrinos, 2002; Card 
2001). 
Also instead of using the inverse of Mill's ratio'S (/-) in their selectivity 
model as Harmon & Walker (1995) to test the assumption that schooling 
may be endogenous, Pons & Gonzalo (2002) use the Hausman t-test on 
exogeneity. This test is implemented by including the residual obtained 
from the regression of schooling on the instruments as a regressor in the 
15 The problem of selectivity bias arises because the wage equation is estimated for a non-
random sample of individuals and these individuals are at work. It is argued that the 
characteristics of those who are at work and those who are unemployed differ. The 
Mill's ratio is used to test the hypothesis of no selection bias. This is discussed later in 
Chapter 5. 
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original wage equation. The test allows them to reject the null hypothesis 
that the OLS estimate is consistent (Ho: 130LS = 13IV) with a negative 
estimate significant at 1 % level. So both the conventional IV and the 
selection model provide evidence that OLS estimates are indeed biased 
downward. 
Nevertheless as discussed by Card (2000), even the IV estimation based 
on ideal instruments, will only give a weighted average of returns to 
education for people whose education choices were affected by those 
instruments, rather than the average marginal return to education in the 
population. In other words the effect is estimated for those who are 
affected by the instrument or 'treatment'. Hence the IV parameter is 
called the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). If all subjects in the 
population have the same response to a particular intervention, then the 
experiences of the group of 'compliers' captured by LATE represent those 
of the entire treated group. Hence there is no distinction between LATE 
and other parameters. However if responses within the treatment group 
differ, the parameters estimated by IV s will differ from the average effect 
of interest. Here the 'heterogeneous treatment effects' applies (Angrist & 
Krueger, 2001). 
A related methodological problem with OLS is that, in the case of 
measurement error, the bias in the OLS estimate is downward. The IV 
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method can also address the problem of measurement error. The 
Instrumental Variable method can be used if the instrument is correlated 
with the true measure of education (schooling) but uncorrelated with the 
measurement error in schooling. Measurement error arises because of 
many reasons such as the limited ability of statistical agencies to collect 
accurate information, and recall bias (individuals forgetting things that 
happen a long time ago), and the variables collected in practice do not 
always match those specified in economic theory. If an explanatory 
variable is measured with additive random errors, the coefficient in a 
bivariate ordinary least squares regression will be biased toward zero in a 
large sample and the greater the proportion of variability (due to errors), 
the greater the bias (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). However IVs can provide 
a consistent estimate even in the presence of measurement error. This is 
true if the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error and the 
schooling equation error term but correlated with the correctly measured 
variable. 
Dearden (1999) controls for measurement error in her estimation of 
returns to schooling. She uses the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS) data set for 1981 and 1991 and looks at qualifications obtained by 
the individuals. She acknowledges that qualifications may be measured 
with error in which case her estimates of the returns to school and post-
school qualifications will be biased downward. She however uses the IV 
80 
method and finds at least one instrument, which is correlated with the true 
measure of her qualification variables but uncorre1ated with the 
measurement error. However she only corrects for possible measurement 
error associated with each individual's highest school and post-school 
qualification. 
Given that the qualification measures are discrete, Dearden (1999) first 
estimates two reduced form ordered probits for the school and post-school 
variables. Then she uses the estimates obtained to calculate the Heckman 
selection adjustment term for her two qualification variables. To check 
the robustness of this procedure, she estimates a standard IV model using 
the linear probability models for all the qualification variables she had 
earlier, rather than just the two school and post-school variables. She 
reports evidence of biases associated with measurement error when she 
carries out the traditional IV estimation. 
Her results suggest that the longer the time between completing the 
qualifications and the time of the survey, the more severe the problems of 
measurement error tend to be (Dearden, 1999). She reports that many of 
the individuals in her sample have obtained their qualifications at least 10 
years earlier. If the measurement errors in the 1991 sample are 
uncorre1ated with the measurement errors in the 1981 variables, then these 
variables can be used as instruments to correct for possible measurement 
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error. When she does this, she reports significant measurement error 
problems associated with post-school educational qualifications when the 
standard IV procedure is followed. Finally she concludes that 
measurement error in the education variables can lead to significant 
downward biases in OLS estimates of returns to qualifications. 
2.3.5 Heterogeneity in returns to education 
Returns to schooling may be different for individuals in different parts of 
the wage distribution. Harmon et a1 (2000) show that the returns to 
schooling are different for people in the upper part of the wage distribution 
as opposed to those in the lower portion of the wage distribution. He uses 
a different methodology, the quantile regression (QR). Unlike OLS, 
which only captures the mean effect of education on individuals' wages, 
QR estimate returns to education within different quanti1es of the wage 
distribution. This method requires education levels to be widely spread 
across the different parts of the wage distribution so that the returns for 
each decile can be identified. In other words some individuals in the 
bottom deci1es must have high education and some in the top deci1es must 
have low education. 
The FES data for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 satisfy this requirement and 
the returns are statistically significant for each decile. They report that 
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returns at the top of the wage distribution have risen. Harmon et al (2000) 
argue that the distribution of inherent ability explains the distribution of 
wages. Lower ability individuals predominate in the bottom half of the 
distribution implying that education has a bigger impact on the more able 
than the less able. They even point out that this complementarity between 
ability and education has become larger over time. However this may also 
reduce the internal rate of return if ability to progress in school is 
positively correlated with the ability to earn. Here the more able has 
higher opportunity costs as they could have earned more in the labour 
market. And they argue that the ability measures need to indicate ability 
to make money rather than ability in an IQ sense. 
Harmon et al (2000) use two specialised datasets: the GB National Child 
Development Study (NCDS), which provides information on individuals 
born in 1958 about subsequent careers and earnings, and the International 
Adult Literacy Survey (IALS 16). Among the equations they estimate, for 
the NCDS they use the results of Maths and English ability tests first at the 
age of 7, then at the age of 11 and at the age of 16. They also estimate the 
same model using the IALS data which gives them ability controls at the 
current age. Their results confirm that ability control at a later age is 
contaminated by the effects of schooling and the bias is larger while the 
results with ability controls at the age of 7 generate the most accurate 
estimates. Also using the NCDS, they include interaction terms between 
16 The literacy test is measured on three scales: prose, document and quantitative. 
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ability measures and years of education to allow ability to have a larger 
effect the longer one stays at school. They conclude that although the 
effects of ability on wages are significant, education largely enhances 
productivity. However their results cannot be generalised as these depend 
on the effectiveness of the ability measures included in their analysis and 
returns to schooling may vary according to the individual's ability. 
Heterogeneity in the returns to education can be tested by using interaction 
terms. If the returns to education vary by ability level, then interactions 
between ability measures and schooling may be introduced in the model 
(Card, 1999). Dearden (1999) uses the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS) data set and includes control variables for ability and family 
background effects, and she also investigates bias arising from se1f-
selection into employment. She concludes that the measurement error and 
the selectivity bias offset ability and family background biases. She uses 
interactions between ability and family background variables to look at 
whether or not there is any evidence of heterogeneity in returns to 
schooling. She uses the NCDS, which contains a lot of information about 
family background, parents' education, social class, interest in the child's 
education, financial circumstances and so on. She splits her sample into 
high and low ability groups to deal with the ability bias. Those in the top 
two quinti1es of either the mathematics or reading ability tests are 
considered as high ability individuals. She then interacts all her education 
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variables with the high ability dummy variable. But she finds no evidence 
of heterogeneity in the returns to education according to ability. She also 
interacts her education variable with three family background variables, 
one dummy to denote those with financial difficulties, another one to take 
into account the mother's interest in her child's studies and finally the 
father's number of years of schooling. She reports no heterogeneity in the 
returns to education according to family financial circumstances. 
However she reports that as the father's education increases, returns to 
education decline. Similarly returns to education are lower for 
individuals' whose mother showed interest in their studies at a young age. 
Following Card (1999; 2001), Koop & Tobias (2004) consider a variety of 
possible forms of heterogeneity. They allow the marginal costs and 
marginal returns to education to vary across individuals in the population. 
The intercepts and slopes in their models vary to reflect heterogeneity in 
returns at the individual level. They report that the heterogeneity follows 
a continuous rather than discrete distribution and that bivariate normality 
best describes heterogeneity in intercepts and returns to schooling at the 
individual level. 
Koop & Tobias (2004) use the rich panel study of the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) consisting of 12,686 individuals 
within the age range of 14 to 22 in the U.S. who were first interviewed in 
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1979. They directly control for unobservable effects such as ability and 
motivation through the individual effects, assuming that these factors do 
not vary over time. They restrict their sample to white males who are at 
least 16 years old in a given year, reported as working at least 30 weeks a 
year and 800 hours per year. They do not however investigate the issue of 
measurement error on the grounds that they exclude all individuals whose 
hourly wage is less than $1 or exceed $100 dollars and those whose 
education decreases across time and those for whom the reported change 
in years of schooling over time is not consistent with the change in time 
from consecutive interviews. They thus argue that they delete all 
individuals whose education is misreported from all analyses. 
The dependent variable used in their models, is the log hourly wage at the 
respondents most recent job with other variables being potential labour 
market experience, its square, local unemployment rate, standardised test 
score, highest grade completed by each parent, number of siblings and 
whether or not the respondent lived in a broken home at the age of 14 
(Koop & Tobias, 2004). They report that the effect of ability on wages 
increases as the individual acquires more education and there is a negative 
effect of family size (number of siblings) at small values of education, for 
example, below 12 years of schooling but a positive effect at higher values 
of education. Thus Koop & Tobias (2004) strongly suggest that returns to 
schooling are heterogeneous. 
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2.3.6 Vocational and academic education 
From a policy perspective, it is important to know the labour value of 
different types of qualifications, for example we need to know whether 
vocationally oriented education or academically oriented education yield 
the highest return in the labour market. Some studies lump together all the 
different routes that an individual may take in the educational system and 
many rates of return studies focus on the returns to an additional year of 
education based on the assumption that returns to all types of 
qualifications are homogenous. In this section, I focus on evidence 
available from the UK because the education system of the Republic of 
Mauritius is very similar to that of the UK. Also given that the data set 
available for this PhD does not provide information on ability and family 
background, I compare findings of similar studies to those which account 
for these variables so as to extrapolate the likely bias OLS generates due 
to the omission of these variables. 
As discussed in Sub-section 2.3.5, empirical evidence suggests that returns 
are in fact heterogenous, for instance, Robinson (1997) shows that returns 
to academic qualifications are higher than the returns to vocational 
qualifications. He uses the highest qualifications acquired by the 
individual in his regressions, but unlike Dearden (1999) he neither 
controls for ability nor family background effects. His estimation to 
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returns is based on the assumption that these biases are small which may 
only be true for vocational qualifications but not for some academic 
qualifications. Another study conducted by Dearden (1999) with NCDS 
data set, uses the highest qualification an individual acquired and makes 
no allowance for the different routes an individual may take within the 
educational system. Other studies (Psacharapoulos 1994; Dearden et aI., 
2002) provide sufficient evidence to suggest that returns to education are 
indeed heterogeneous and hence, one needs to distinguish between 
different types of qualifications that arise. 
Dearden et al (2002) find that once the time invested to acqUIre each 
qualification is taken into account, the returns per year of study for 
vocational qualifications tend to move closer to those for academic 
qualifications. They use two British data sets - the 1991 sweep of the 
National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the 1998 Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) - to estimate returns to academic and vocational 
qualifications. They compare the different ways of estimating returns 
from the NCDS and the LFS and conclude that on average the estimates 
obtained from the data provided by the LFS were similar to those provided 
by the NCDS. The NCDS yields estimates that control for variables such 
as ability, family background and measurement error, whereas the LFS 
data set merely allows control for region, age and gender. 
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Nevertheless the empirical models derived from the NCDS data yield 
returns similar to the conventional OLS estimates derived from the LFS 
data. From a methodological perspective Dearden et al (2002) argue that 
this LFS data set can be used to generate reliable estimated returns to 
education. They confirm that estimates that do not control for ability tend 
to be biased upward, whereas those in the presence of measurement error 
in the qualification variables, tend to be biased downwards. Thus, the two 
biases offset each other. The advantage of their approach over any other 
studies is that they allow for the complexity of routes that individuals take 
in the real world and they do not simply analyse wages in relation to the 
highest qualification obtained by an individual. Their wage equations 
include all the qualifications held by the respondents and thus, the wage 
effects from taking any given mix of academic and vocational 
qualifications can be analysed. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Ideally, for private rates of return to education, the calculation involves the 
explicit costs of schooling born by the private individual, his/her 
opportunity cost in the form of foregone labour income, private non-
monetary benefits and the expected increase in his/her future net-of-tax 
labour earnings. The social rate of return to education will take into 
account the total costs of education, the total increase in production 
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(before tax wages) and external effects generated by an Increase In 
schooling attainment (Fuente, 2003). 
However, in reality, calculations of private or social rates of returns to 
education are specific and restrictive due to lack of data. The objections 
raised against the use of rates of return analysis have been discussed. 
These included shortage of data especially in some developing countries, 
the use of cross-sectional data which do not represent the trend of the 
individuals' earnings over the course of their working lives, the exclusion 
of consumption benefits which underestimates the rates of return 
estimates, wages may not be a good proxy of productivity, individuals 
may not behave rationally, there is uncertainty, and non-monetary benefits 
are usually not included in rates of returns analysis. 
Thus, the studies discussed in this chapter provide examples of 
calculations of returns to education that are usually carried out in the real 
world. The problem is empirical rather than conceptual. Thus, similar to 
these studies, I can only provide estimates that are approximations to the 
rates of return to education for the Republic of Mauritius. These will act 
as gross indicators to inform policy making in the absence of alternative 
measures. 
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I now summarise the main empirical trends in the literature. The returns 
to education depends on a country's economic development, that is, 
private returns to education undifferentiated by level fall as the country 
moves from a less developed economic status to an advanced status 
(Psacharopoulos, 1985). The private and social returns are highest for 
upper secondary education followed by primary education, whereas 
private returns for higher education continue to exceed the social returns. 
According to Psacharopoulos (1985) the big difference between private 
and social rates of returns can allow governments to reduce their spending 
on education as with less subsidy higher education will still be attractive 
given the high private returns. 
I intend to investigate whether these hold true for the Republic of 
Mauritius. However the gap between the private and social returns (due to 
the degree of subsidy by government at all levels of schooling) cannot be 
assessed as the micro data to be used does not distinguish between gross 
and net incomes. 
Moreover it is argued that the estimates of returns to education reflect not 
just the productivity enhancing effect of education, but also the effect of 
ability on earnings that education signals. At one extreme, education may 
not be enhance production at all. According to credentialists, education 
only serves to allocate able people to better paid jobs. Education only acts 
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as a mechanism to rank, screen and select people in a mass society (Wolf, 
2002). The signalling value of education in this thesis has been discussed 
in terms of Spence's (1973) 'Job market signalling' theory. 
This might have been partly investigated in this research for the Republic 
of Mauritius, by for example, comparing the returns to 'sixth form' which 
is unsuccessful completion of A level with GCSE and successful 
completion of A level. I can hypothesise that the returns to 'sixth form' 
will be lower than those for GCSE and 'A' level if it signals to the 
employer that the individual is relatively 'less' motivated and hence less 
productive. However it must be pointed out that such a comparison 
cannot actually be made because the sample size of those whose highest 
qualification levels are 'sixth form' constitutes of only 24 individuals. 
Nevertheless, the IV method will be used in Chapter 6 as the main way to 
tackle both the ability bias and the endogeneity problem. 
The endogeneity problem arises when more able individuals choose more 
education. To tackle this endogeneity issue, as stated previously, the 
instrumental variable method will be used in this PhD, for estimating 
social returns to schooling. This requires finding some instrument that 
affects schooling choices but is uncorrelated with (independent of) ability 
factors. IV s may be used if the instrument is uncorrelated with 
measurement error but correlated with schooling. But the estimates of IV s 
92 
may be inconsistent if there is a weak relationship between the instruments 
and schooling. Family background instruments especially the parent's 
education, perform best in the studies reviewed in this chapter and natural 
experiments variables such as season of birth may not always be 
sufficiently correlated with the schooling variable causing standard errors 
to rise. But for the purpose of this PhD, I do not have these data and 
hence I can neither use family background measures nor season of birth. 
Nevertheless I intend to use some other instrument such as the 
introduction of free secondary education for estimating returns to 
schooling in the Republic of Mauritius. However IV estimates are not 
directly comparable to OLS estimates because IV estimates produce only 
LATE estimates - estimates for individuals who would not have received 
the treatment otherwise. The IV methods estimate the return to schooling 
for some specific sub-group. The justification for using IV estimates is 
that even if such estimates are applicable only to a marginal group, policy 
decisions are usually aimed at marginal groups. Also we cannot always 
claim that IV estimates are always higher than OLS estimates because it 
depends on the instruments used. 
In this chapter I discussed the heterogeneity in the returns to schooling and 
conclude that most studies provide strong evidence that returns of 
schooling differ for different routes taken within the education system. For 
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instance, the labour value of different types of qualifications at the same 
level may not be the same. Many of the rates of return studies cited in this 
thesis conclude that the returns to vocational education may be as high as 
the returns to academic education, depending on the educational routes 
taken by the individual. However for this study, data are only available 
for the highest qualification levels achieved by a particular individual and 
thus, it is not possible to look at the market value associated with different 
combinations of qualifications. 
It is argued that educational expansion may not lead to a fall in returns to 
education if it is followed by an increase in demand for education driven 
in part by technological advances. The two studies, Machin & Van 
Reenen (1998) and Berman & Machin (2000) illustrates this through the 
SBTC hypothesis. Machin & Van Reenen (1998) provide evidence to 
show that skill-biased technical change is an international phenomenon, 
which increases the relative demand for skilled workers. This hypothesis 
may also hold true for the Republic of Mauritius as over the recent years 
there has been an increasing demand for skilled workers due to the setting 
up of the Information Technology sector 'Cyberspace'. 
Berman & Machin (2000) argue that increase in demand for skilled labour 
cannot be explained through capital-skill complementarity because, 
although capital complements skilled labour, the effect is too small to 
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explain the rise in demand for skilled workers within industries. Hence 
skill-biased technological change is the most appropriate explanation for 
this phenomenon. Faster skill upgrading is concentrated in similar 
industries across countries and it is a within-industry phenomenon. Stable 
or higher returns to higher levels of education for the Republic of 
Mauritius may be interpreted according to the SBTC. For instance, there 
has been an increase in the supply of education and yet the higher returns 
in the Republic of Mauritius (as will be presented in chapter 5) imply that 
the demand for skills exceeds the supply of skills, which is consistent with 
the SBTC hypothesis. But as the data available to this researcher is only 
one cross sectional data set, I cannot provide evidence over time to 
support this SBTC hypothesis. 
In Chapter 3 I present the education system of the Republic of Mauritius 
and I discuss some issues related to efficiency and equity. These concepts 
will be used in Chapter 7 while discussing the policy implications of the 
findings, arising from this study of the social returns to schooling and to 
qualification levels for the Republic of Mauritius. I also refer to two 
changes in the education law - the 1993 Basic Compulsory Education Act 
and the free secondary education law implemented in 1977. These are 
potential instruments to estimate social returns to an additional year of 
schooling given that OLS may generate inconsistent estimates due to 
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endogeneity bias, ability bias and measurement error in the schooling 
variable (Levin & Plug, 1999). 
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Chapter 3: The Education System in the Republic of Mauritius 
3.0 Introduction 
The Republic of Mauritius is an island group consisting of the island of 
Mauritius, a smaller island Rodrigues and a group of inhabited outer islets. 
The Republic has a democratic system of government based on the British 
pattern and a system of education, which also emerged from the British 
educational system. The main island, Mauritius is of volcanic origin and 
its area is about 720 square miles. 
Population for the Republic of Mauritius is currently estimated at 1.2 
million and its fertility rate is at 2.1 %, that is, at replacement level of the 
existing population. Like other upper middle-income countries, the rate of 
growth of its population is expected to decline as a result of a projected 
reduction in fertility. The percentage of primary school children is around 
11 % of the overall population and is expected to decline to 9.1 % by 2010 
(World Bank, 2002). Hence the total primary pupil population is expected 
to fall accordingly. However the annual growth rate for the total 
secondary student population is estimated at 0.6% and it will decline only 
after 2010 at an annual rate of 2.1 % until 2015 (World Bank, 2002). 
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In this chapter, I will start by discussing the level of investment in 
education in Mauritius, that is, both public and household expenditures on 
education. I use the analysis provided by the data sets: the Continuous 
Multipurpose Household Survey (CMHS) for 1999 and the Budget 
Household Survey (BHS) for 1996/1997 for this purpose. 
I then move on to present and discuss the structure of the education system 
(post Education Reform 2003) in the Republic of Mauritius. A brief 
history about how this system evolved through time is also given. 
Vocational education is discussed at length and I analyse the evolution of 
the institution created to co-ordinate training programmes at national level 
and to maintain international competitiveness. I also include the 
Technical School Act of 1990 in my discussion. 
I look at post-secondary education, listing all the major institutions 
offering such courses in the Republic of Mauritius. A brief comparison is 
made between the proportions of students studying at home and abroad, 
and some figures are provided for the periods 2000-03 to support my 
arguments. Lastly I address the problems of the inefficiency prevailing in 
the education system through the cycle of primary and secondary 
schooling and the inequalities prevailing within these cycles. 
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3.1 Expenditure on education in the Republic of Mauritius 
3.1.1 Public spending on education 
The fiscal year in Mauritius starts on the 1 sl of July. There has been a 
remarkable increase in nominal total public spending on education over 
the last two years due to the massive capital investments in education. 
Total recurrent expenditure on education was around Rs 4563 million for 
the financial year 2003/04. The secondary sector has the major share of 
the budget allocated to the Ministry of Education, followed by the primary 
sector (CSO, 2003b). This is illustrated in the Figure 3.1: 
Fig 3.1: Proportion of spending by sector for 2003/04 
Source: computed from CSO (2003b) 
It should be noted that compared to most upper middle-income countries, 
the Republic of Mauritius spends a lower proportion of its GDP on 
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education (World Bank, 2002). Only 3.3 % of GOP, for instance, was 
spent on education in the Republic of Mauritius during the year 2001. The 
government's objective (in Mauritius) is to provide universal access to 11 
years of quality education and to extend universal access to higher 
education. However, these policies will require a larger share of the GOP 
around 4.9% and 5.4%, respectively (World Bank, 2002). These will 
cover the recurrent costs associated with providing larger access to tertiary 
education. 
3.1.2 Household expenditure 
Usually in Mauritius, a significant proportion of household income is 
spent on private tutoring. Two surveys were conducted: the Continuous 
Multipurpose Household Survey (CMHS) in 1999 and the Budget 
Household Survey (BHS) in 1996/1997. Although the data are not 
directly comparable, they indicate that there has been an increase in 
household spending on education of more than 100 percent between 1996 
and 1999 which is the latest year for which data is available. Private 
spending on education in 1996 according to the BHS data amounted to a 
total of US$ 36.3 million and according to CMHS data, this spending 
amounted to US$ 81.7 million in 1999 (World Bank, 2002). These figures 
indicate a 30% rise in private expenditure on education within a very short 
period and that household contribution to education spending is 
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significant, and is increasing over time. Also data from BHS reveals that 
private tuition l7 accounted for 61.3% of total private spending on 
education and 22.6% was spent on textbooks and other requisites while 
16% was spent on pre-primary schooling. The distribution of household 
expenditure between different levels of education is illustrated in Figure 
3.2. 
Fig 3.2: Total spending on education by Households for 1996/97 
pre-primary 
22.6% 
primary 
Source: CSO (2002d) 
Household expenditure accounts for about 33% of total national spending 
on education which is higher than that of India (2%), Jordan (2%), 
Malaysia (4%) but lower than that of Madagascar (40%) and Kenya (38%) 
(World Bank, 2002). Both public and private spending amounted to 6.1 % 
17 Private tuition is pervasive throughout the education system and constitutes an 
important source of additional income for teachers. 
101 
of GDP in 1999. This corresponds to the total expenditure on education 
for Botswana and Malaysia, that is 8.6 % and 7.9 % respectively (World 
Bank 2005a, World Bank 2005b, World Bank 2005c) during that same 
period. So in summary both private and public expenditure on education 
are increasing in Mauritius but the total proportion of GDP allocated to 
education is still relatively low by international standards. 
3.1.3 Private sector & transfers 
The private sector plays an important role in the provision of education in 
the Republic of Mauritius and most privately run schools receive financial 
resources from the government and like in many other countries private 
provision of education is higher in secondary education than in primary 
education (World Bank, 2002). 
In 2001102 around 11 % of total public spending was given as grants to 
private-aided primary schools, of which 99% was transferred to the 
Roman Catholic Education Authority (RCEA) to pay for teacher's salaries 
and to meet operating expenses and 1 % was allocated to primary schools 
for children with disabilities. Private-aided primary schools enrol around 
one fifth of all primary students. Only thirteen private schools, which 
enrol 4% of all primary students, do not receive subsidies from the 
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government. However it should be noted in the early 2000s, a private-
aided primary school received on average only 54% of the resources 
received by a public primary school and spending per pupil was 48% 
lower in a private-aided school (World Bank, 2002). Grants to private-
aided schools have grown more slowly at 6.4% against 8.2% for the public 
schools. But private-aided schools belonging to the ReEA receive 
additional funding from other sources such as donations from households, 
the church or other religious, foreign, non-governmental organisations. 
I also address the inequality ansmg out of the differences in funding 
between the private aided schools and state schools. Schools in the private 
sector throughout this chapter refer to both state-funded private schools 
and self-financed private schools. In some cases due to the unavailability 
of data, they cannot be separated into two categories and the analysis done 
throughout this study grouped both of them together and labelled them 
simply as 'private schools'. Nevertheless I do give details about state 
funded private schools, how they are funded and on what basis. Funding 
per pupil across all private and state schools is also given. 
The resource gap between public and private-aided schools is greater at 
the secondary education level. Funding is skewed against private aided 
secondary schools and the resource gap is bridged in some cases by 
donations from the community, parents or other sources. However given 
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that secondary education is free, these private-aided schools depend 
mostly on government subsidies 18. Public spending on public schools has 
grown by 35% while those registered with the Private Secondary School 
Authority (PSSA) experienced a growth of only 12% in their financial 
resources (World Bank, 2002). 
The PSSA is an agency established to regulate and allocate grants to 
private-aided schools. It is a major provider of secondary education. 
Fifty-eight percent of this transfer to PSSA (about US$ 23 million) was to 
pay for the salaries of teaching and non-teaching staffs, 30% was allocated 
to pension contributions, allowances, school grants, pre-vocational classes 
and the remaining 12% was allotted to managers of private-aided 
secondary schools (World Bank, 2002). Managers of private-aided 
secondary schools 19 receive payment based on the comprehensive grant 
formula. The grant provides operational and investment expenses based 
upon numbers of students enrolled. It includes an incentive component 
attached to student performances at examinations in the form of payments 
for extra recreational or sportive activities. The Manager receives a flat 
18 A private-aided secondary school receives on average a grant of US $392000 per 
annum, whereas a public secondary school receives an average grant of US $402000 per 
annum. However information about funding per pupil is not available and conclusions 
cannot be drawn as school sizes may differ considerably. 
19 A manager of a private-aided secondary school is usually the owner of the school and 
he/she receives grants for hiring his !her building to the PSSA for educational purpose. 
He/She is empowered to employ all staff within the school, subject to the approval of the 
PSSA. 
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compensation rate and retains any surplus as a reward of the good 
performance of hislher school (Ministry of Education and Science 1995). 
3.1.4 Donor financing 
Overseas assistance IS also important for the financing of education, 
especially higher education. In 1998, for instance overseas funding 
accounted to US $ 23 million, that is, less than 1 % of GDP (World Bank, 
2002). Sixty-three percent of this total was devoted to enhance human 
resources, of which a large proportion went to tertiary education and 
covered the cost of scholarships for Mauritian students to study abroad. 
France is a major financer with its donation constituting 59% of the total 
overseas assistance (World Bank, 2002). 
3.2 Structure of the education system 
Having considered the level of financing of education in Mauritius, I now 
go on to discuss the institutional structure. The Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology is responsible for providing education throughout 
the Republic of Mauritius. Although education is free, the Education Act 
allows private operators to provide education services from pre-primary to 
vocational and tertiary levels. Free education was extended to the 
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secondary and tertiary levels in 1977 and 1988 respectively (British 
Council, 1974). Today education at all levels is governed by the 
Education Act of 1996 (UNESCO, 2000). In Mauritius due to education 
being state funded at all levels, every child has a period of two years of 
pre-primary schooling, a minimum of six years of compulsory primary 
schooling, either three years of pre-vocational schooling or five years to 
seven years of general secondary schooling leading to '0' and 'A' level 
examinations after which hel she is eligible for post-secondary education. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. The school academic year is the same as 
the calendar year. On average boys have 8.9 years and girls have 9.6 
years of schooling (World Bank, 2002). The gender parity ratio or the 
ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary and secondary schools was 
around 102 in 1995 although the most recent ratio (available for the year 
2001) stands at 98 (World Bank, 2005a). 
Promotion to the next grade 1 to grade 6 is automatic but promotion to 
grade 7 requires a pass at the CPE examination. At each subsequent grade 
(from grade 7 to grade 11), the student must acquire the required average 
of marks to move on to the next grade and promotion to grade 12 requires 
a certain performance at the '0' level Cambridge examination conducted 
at a national level. 
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The curricula has recently been modified at the primary and secondary 
levels to introduce subjects such as design technology, computer and 
information technology, and also to lay greater emphasis on science and 
mathematics. These are meant to make the education system more 
adaptable to future needs. The education system also caters for those who 
fail to pass their Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) examinations 
(taken on completion of primary schooling) after the second attempt. 
Instead of dropping out of the system, they join pre-vocational centres 
within secondary schools and the curriculum is designed to provide them 
with the basic tools required to either join the labour market after the age 
of 16 or to pursue a vocational or technical education. 
Also the vocational education institution, IVTB was established to train 
workers to meet the growing demands of industries associated with the 
transition to a newly industrialised country. Mauritius struggles to 
maintain the competitiveness of its exports and to diversify its economic 
base (Ababa, 1997), and skill deficiencies are seen as part of this 
economic problem. 
107 
Figure 3.3: The present educational system in the Republic of 
Mauritius 
Tertiary Education 
• University of Mauritius 
• University of Technology of Mauritius 
• Mauritius Institute of Education 
• Mahatma Gandhi Institute 
• Mauritius College of the Air 
• Polytechnics 
• Vocational education 
'A' level courses offered by Form I to VI 
secondary schools and Form Sixth colleges 
leading to the Cambridge Higher School 
Certificate 
• 
• 
provided by 
Polytechnics 
• NTC 1 
• NTC2 
• NTC3 
• 
• 
Primary Schools (Standard I to VI) Age 6 to 11: Six-year primary schooling) 
• I Pre-primary Schools (Age 3 to 5) I 
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3.2.1 The role of the Mauritius Examinations Syndicate(MES) 
The MES is a national examining body. It conducts all examinations, for 
example the Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) or the 11 plus 
examination taken at the end of primary schooling, the Cambridge School 
Certificate ('0' level) taken at the end of the five years of secondary 
schooling, the Higher School Certificate (HSC) usually taken after two 
extra years of secondary schooling. It also conducts technical and 
vocational examinations, professional examinations for more than 50 
examinations bodies and other locally organised examinations (UNESCO, 
2000). The MES also acts as an examination body for distance learning 
education delivered by overseas institutions for different fields and levels 
of study. 
Let us now consider education at each level in the Republic of Mauritius: 
3.2.2 Pre-primary education 
Various measures have been taken by the State to make quality pre-
primary education accessible to every child. These include the per capita 
grant given to the 4 to 5 age group, the provision of additional pre-primary 
classes through extending existing and building new primary schools and 
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the simultaneous development of standards and guidelines to ensure a 
pleasant and safe physical environment for children both in the private and 
public sector. According to the UNESCO report, around 64% of primary 
schools have a pre-school centre and 1000 private pre-schools are 
registered with the Ministry. Today the gross enrolment ratio for pre-
primary schooling has risen to 99% 20. 
The Mauritius Institute of Education (MIE) runs a Teacher's Certificate 
Course (TCC), accessible to all suitably qualified pre-school teacher 
candidates and a proficiency course through distance education for those 
who do not qualify for TCC. These courses are meant to equip pre-
primary teachers with the necessary pedagogical skills and to give them a 
better insight into the psychology of children. The curriculum is designed 
to facilitate subsequent primary school-based learning and to develop 
personal and social skills. 
3.2.3 Primary education 
The first primary school started in 1767. Primary schools arose originally 
out of missionary endeavour although general education as well as 
religious instruction was provided. By the 1840s the Colonial government 
started schools of its own and also provided financial assistance to 
20 In the year 2000, the gross enrolment ratio was 95%. But the recent educational reform 
(2000-2003) involved the construction of new pre-primary schools and in 2003 the 
enrolment ratio rose by a further 4% 
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missionary schools (British Council, 1974). This system of aided schools 
operating simultaneously with government schools still exists today and it 
has evolved over time. Primary education is now universal. 
Under regulation 37 (1) and (2) of the Education Act of 1993, all children 
must attend primary schools. Admission to any government or aided 
primary school is granted to pupils at the age of 5 until they are 13 years 
old. Failure to do so entails a fine or imprisonment (UNESCO, 2000). 
This legislation for compulsory education carne into force on the 1 sl of 
January 1993 (Ministry of Education & Science, 1995). The total 
number of pupils attending primary schools to the population aged 5 to 11 
years works out to 102% for the year 2003. The average age at which 
primary schooling usually starts is 6. However there are many pupils who 
are admitted to standard 1 when they are 5 years old. The legislation 
specifies that a child cannot be enrolled in standard 1 unless he/she 
reached the age of 5 either before or on the 1 sl of January of the year when 
the child is seeking admission in the primary school. Hence the 
calculation exceeds 100% and this is obvious in Figure 3.4, where the 
enrolment rate has consistently been above 100% since 1992 although a 
gradual decline over the decade can be noted. Also the gross enrolment 
rate for primary and secondary schools tend to converge over time - the 
gap between these two rates is getting smaller and smaller as the 
secondary enrolment rate is rising. 
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Fig 3.4: Gross enrolment rate in primary and secondary schools, 1992-2002 
(Republic of Mauritius) 
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The total pupil population for primary schooling, at March 2003 was 
129,616 of whom 75 .5% went to state schools, 20.1% went to aided 
private schools and the remaining 4.4% went to non-aided private schools. 
Moreover around 96% of this total pupil population was within the island 
of Mauritius. Today there are around 290 primary schools and 222 are run 
by the State, 51 by Roman Catholic Education Authority (RCEA), 2 by the 
Hindu Education Authority and 15 are private non-aided schools. 
Admission to primary schools is based on a catchment area system 
(United Nations, 1999) and primary enrolments tend to follow population 
trends of primary school age children. A national examination is 
administered at the end of primary schooling and this is usually taken at 
112 
the age of 11. The successful completion of grade 6 leads to the award of 
Certificate of Primary Education. On average, girls on both islands tend to 
do better than boys at CPE examinations (CSO, 2002a). 
3.2.4 Secondary education 
The secondary schools were originally reserved for the middle class elite 
and this policy was later changed, for example the Ecole Centrale founded 
in 1800 admitted students from other socio-economic backgrounds in 
1832. But they continued to provide a grammar school type of education 
leading to GCE and Cambridge School and Higher School Certificates. 
Apart from the usual academic streams, few of them had vocational 
streams. 
However, today the way this historically elitist system operates has to 
some extent been changed and the government aims at extending 
secondary schoo ling to all those who fall within the 12-19 age group. The 
Gross Enrolment Ratio of students attending secondary schools as a 
percentage to the population aged between 12 to 19 years of age works out 
to be around 64%. About 30% of pupils attend state secondary schools 
and 70% attend private (both aided and non-aided) secondary schools; the 
government funds nearly 80% of these private schools. Aided schools 
include confessional schools and schools run by individuals and groups. 
113 
Secondary schooling became free to all school age youth in January 1977, 
following the free access to secondary schooling law passed in 1976. 
Prior to this change in the law, fees were charged for each academic year 
of secondary schooling. These fees varied from school to school. 
Unfortunately data on secondary fees are not available. Research on girls' 
education in the Republic of Mauritius suggests that this law played a 
great role in extending access to secondary schooling for girls (Naugah & 
Poonet, 1996; Brooks, 2000). 
Secondary education has two streams: the academic one and the pre-
vocational one. Let us consider each separately: 
o General Education (Academic Stream) 
The Republic of Mauritius has the 6 + 5 + 2 education system where six 
years of primary education are followed by five years of secondary 
schooling and students who read for the Cambridge Higher School 
Certificate / 'A' level stay in secondary schools for two additional years. 
Admission to secondary schools is based on the pupil's performance at the 
Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) examination (United Nations, 
1999). As mentioned earlier, Mauritius had an elitist system. Originally 
these were 'five star' secondary schools, which catered for the top ability 
students and entry into those schools were based on the CPE results. The 
system was examination-oriented and young children were graded and 
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ranked in order of attainment III the subjects21 in which they were 
examined. Ranking especially within the first 2000 boys or 2000 girls in 
the Republic, was a matter of great importance for a child's future as it 
determined whether or not he/she would attend the (five-star secondary 
schools) more academically oriented schools (ACCPUF, 1998). These 
pupils were most likely to go on for higher education. Generally those 
who passed the CPE examinations but failed to achieve the standards set 
by these 'five star' schools would enrol in other government or public-
funded but privately run schools while those who failed the examinations 
after the second attempt would simply drop out. 
However, after the education reforms of 2002, this highly selective system 
was abolished and recruitment of students into secondary schools is now 
based on geographical zones. The 'ranking' system has been replaced by 
the 'grading system' and 'star schools' have been converted into Sixth 
form colleges22 • Admission to form one is now based on geographical 
zones. The Republic of Mauritius is divided into five zones (North, East, 
South, West and Rodrigues). Some schools provide education only up to 
the age of sixteen whereby students are prepared to sit for the '0' level 
21 These subjects included Mathematics, English, French and Environmental studies. 
22 The 'ranking system' adds up the scores of the four main subjects of each candidate 
and generates a total score for each of them. Candidates are then ranked according to 
their total scores and the 'five star' secondary schools select the first few hundred out of 
thousands of candidates. The 'grading system' only provides the grade for each subject 
for each candidate without converting these into total scores and thus, secondary schools 
cannot differentiate between candidates who have similar grades. 
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Cambridge examinations and they can either finish schooling after Form V 
or join any other institutions, if they satisfy the entrance requirements, to 
prepare for their' A' level. 
The number of secondary schools has been increased to cater for the new 
system - the 'zoning' system. Some state secondary schools were set up 
to accommodate additional students which allowed the number of students 
enrolled in form one in 2003 to increase by 56%23. Initially in 1990, there 
were only 22 state secondary schools and this rose to 34 in 2000. At the 
same time, loans at low interest rates were given to private secondary 
schools so as to reduce the disparities in terms of infrastructures that exist 
between state and private schools. Today with the construction of 
additional schools, there are 175 secondary schools of which only 63 are 
state schools and 112 are private schools (aided and non-aided). The 
private schools have sprung up in response to the demand for secondary 
education that the government has so far been unable to meet (World 
Bank, 2002). Also forty-seven of these aided schools run classes up to 'A' 
level while only 16 state schools which offer courses up to 'A' level 
(CSO,2003b). 
23 The number of students enrolled in form I in state secondary schools was only 3700 in 
the year 2000 but it reached 6600 in 2003. 
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Performances at '0' level Cambridge examinations for the Republic of 
Mauritius have declined slightly in terms of percentage over the past 
years. This is most probably because of the percentage of the cohort taking 
the examinations has increased and less able students are now also 
allowed to take it. Also over the last seven years performance at 'A' level 
examinations has improved within the Republic although there was a 
sudden fall in the pass rate in 1999 may be attributed to the fact that the 
number of Rodriguan candidates who sat for the 'A' level examinations 
almost doubled within one year24. The number of candidates examined in 
the island of Rodrigues increased from 39 to 177 during the period 
between 1996-2002. Thus, one may suggest that the fall in the pass rates 
are due to the sudden increase in the number of students taking the 
examinations which may also include those who were less able and those 
who experience poor quality of education and lesser educational 
resources
25 
available to the island of Rodrigues. 
o Pre-Vocational education 
The Basic Secondary Schools within state secondary schools were 
designed to cater for drop-outs. These schools offer pre-vocational 
education, linking practical with academic aspects. Pre-vocational 
education is provided to the less able or to those who fail the CPE 
24 There is a resource gap between the islands of Mauritius and Rodrigues, thus, simply 
increasing the number of candidates in the island of Rodrigues without the provision of 
adequate academic support to them resulted in poor performances. 
2S Lack of appropriate educational resources such as textbooks and trained teachers may 
result in poor performances. 
117 
examinations even after the second attempt. It mainly caters for CPE 
failures who may eventually pursue a non-academic stream. This type of 
school was introduced three years ago to keep drop-outs in the educational 
system until the age of 16 after which they may either join the labour 
market or proceed to vocational courses. These three years of secondary 
pre-vocational schooling provide basic literacy and numeracy skills to 
these less able students and the students are even initiated to different 
trades. In 1997, 873 boys and 318 girls who did not attend the general 
secondary schools were enrolled at 20 basic secondary schools and 2 
private unaided schools (United Nations, 1999). 
Prior to the educational reforms in 2000, many children would simply 
drop out after failing the Certificate of Primary Schooling (CPE) 
examinations a second time. About 25% of children used to drop out and 
the major cause stated was their poor performance at school (Parsuramen, 
1995). But since 2000, a majority of these CPE failures have joined the 
pre-vocational stream causing an improvement in the inter-cycle 
transitional rate (World Bank, 2002). 
In March 2000, there were only 25 schools offering pre-vocational 
education and the total student population was 4695. As from 2001, the 
private sector, guided by the same regulations as the SSSV, took one class 
of those who did not pass the CPE exams leading to a total pre-vocational 
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student population of 4919. By 2002, around 70 schools offered pre-
vocational courses, 65 in the island of Mauritius and 5 in the island of 
Rodrigues; 21 are state schools and 49 are confessional or private schools 
(aided & non-aided). Moreover by March 2003, 114 schools were 
offering specific pre-vocational education: 109 in the island of Mauritius 
and 5 in the island of Rodrigues out of which 49 were state schools and 65 
were private schools (CSO, 2003b). As illustrated in the figure below, 
there were on average more boys than girls enrolled on pre-vocational 
courses. The average pupil-teacher ratio for the island of Mauritius during 
that same period rose from 16: 1 to 17: 1 and from 15: 1 to 17: 1 for the 
island of Rodrigues as the latter registered a bigger proportion of the 
increase in the number of pre-vocational students. 
Fig 3.5: Gross enrolment in pre-vocational education, 2000-2003: 
Republic of Mauritius 
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By 2003 both the number of such pre-vocational schools and enrolments 
had risen by 356% and 56%, respectively as a result of greater 
participation from both the public and private26 sectors. 
3.3 Vocational education 
Vocational education did not figure on the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology agenda until the 1970s when central schools, senior 
primary, junior technical and junior secondary schools were set up. 
Earlier vocationally training was in the form of apprenticeships in areas 
such as horticulture, mechanical engineering and needlework. People 
would learn the required techniques and skills on the job by helping the 
more experienced employees. The first proper technical education school 
was created in 1982 and no organisation was responsible for planning, 
monitoring and evaluating the needs for training. Co-ordination of 
vocational training conducted by several ministries, private centres, 
religious organisations and consulting firms was practically non-existent 
and it was not possible to bridge the gap between the education system 
and the world of work. The Industrial and Vocational Training Board 
(IVTB) was set up in 1988 and was given the role of the lead agency of 
the government to deal with this chaotic situation. The responsibilities of 
26 Secondary schools offering pre-vocational classes could only accommodate around 
1900 students in 2000 but in 2003 this figure reached 3300. 
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this Board as a corporate body are to advise the Minister on issues related 
to training and to monitor training in consultation with the relevant 
authorities. It must also administer, control and operate training schemes 
and provide assistance for the training needs of people who are or will be 
employed in commercial or vocational fields (Munbodh, 1996). 
The 1980s was a period of rapid economic growth whereby the mass of 
unemployed people was easily absorbed within the economy. The 
unemployment figure, which stood at more than 12% prior to the 1980s, 
was reduced to only 1.8% within a decade. A near full employment 
situation prevailed in Mauritius. Industries which earlier demanded less 
skills, less complex technology and which had a ready source of available 
manpower, now required multiple skills and were faced with a situation of 
near full-employment by the 1990s. These resulted in wage pressures, 
loss of competitiveness of domestic products and increasing competition 
from other low-cost suppliers, especially from African and Asian 
countries. Moreover the situation of full employment was not uniform in 
all sectors (United Nations, 1997). Thus, emphasis was laid on vocational 
education to improve labour mobility, adaptability, productivity and to 
restore the firms' competitiveness. The situation advocated the need for 
change in the quality and content of education from its present academic 
emphasis to a more technical orientation at all levels in order to create 
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skills that would meet the demand generated by prospective economIC 
development27 . 
The IVTB was set up to promote training and apprenticeship of persons to 
be employed in technical and vocational fields. It had 17 centres with 
1211 full-time students and 2355 part-time students in 1997. It is funded 
by a grant from the government and a one per cent of basic payroll levy 
paid by the employer. The IVTB came into operation in 1989 and 
promoted training on all fronts at the national level. Its objectives are to 
integrate government's manpower resources, vocational training 
programmes and to ensure that skills training remains ahead of new 
technology. Moreover students after 1988 could combine subjects from 
the academic stream and technical streams at the Cambridge School 
Certificate level. There has been a positive change of attitude in favour of 
vocational education and technical subjects such as fashion and fabrics, 
food studies, geometrical and mechanical drawing, geometrical and 
building drawing, woodwork, metalwork, design and technology and 
design and communication. Today vocational education is conducted in a 
large number of secondary schools. 
27 The creation of the Ministry for Human Resources, Development and Reform 
Institutions was designed to ensure that skills formation remained abreast of new 
technology by reviewing periodically projected manpower needs as opposed to current 
manpower resources and matching the needs of industries and individual clients with 
relevant quality training programmes (United Nations, 1997). 
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However historically the education and training system has been divided 
and the training system operates under the responsibilities of the Ministry 
of Education as well as other various ministries. So the Management Trust 
Fund was created in 1990 to co-ordinate and monitor technical and 
vocational education. Moreover the Technical school (Management Trust 
Fund) Act of 1990 stated the following objectives for its creation: 
• manage technical education centres operating under its 
responsibility 
• organise and run technical education courses at the centres 
• promote technical education 
• advise the minister on short and long term plans for 
technical education and on the need for appropriate 
research in the field of technical education (Atchorena 
1996: 88) 
In 1991, an Education Sector Master Plan was prepared to make the 
education system more efficient and to bring education in line with the 
development needs of the country. The IVTB operates many Vocational 
Training Centres and training is provided in a variety of trades starting 
from automobiles, to jewellery and electronics. 
Vocational training is also offered at post-secondary level. The formal 
training consists of the IVTB and private training institutions. The entry 
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requirements to these vocational training courses are a minimum of three 
years of secondary schooling and an age of 16 years and above. Those 
trainees who successfully complete one year of full-time training in IVTB 
centres are awarded a National Trade Certificate, level 3 (NTC 3). They 
may then proceed to National Trade Certificate, level 2 (NTC 2) and 
eventually to National Trade Certificate, level 1 (NTC 1). The private 
training institutions also provide training leading to internationally 
recognised awards from institutions such as the City & Guilds of the 
London Institute, the Pitman Institute, Chartered Institute of Transport and 
the Institute of Marketing. Also those who have finished their five years 
or seven years of secondary schooling may enrol at Lycee Droopnath 
Ramphul or Lycee Sir Guy Forget to acquire vocational education. 
Courses offered at these lycees include automobile mechanics, mechanical 
production, electronics, building construction, programming, system 
analysis and business administration. The full-time courses in registered 
training institutions, which are primarily meant for school leavers, are also 
attended by some sponsored workers. Nevertheless the part-time courses 
offered after normal working hours are attended mainly by sponsored 
workers. The apprenticeship system is based on the German dual model 
whereby the apprentice spends 1 Vz days per week in a training institution 
and he/she is coached by a tutor in his/her enterprise for the rest of the 
week. Even the University of Mauritius adopts a similar system for some 
of the courses offered such as Management, Accounting and Engineering. 
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Students are sent for training for a minimum period of two months during 
vacations. These are meant to foster the industry-training link and to 
promote on-the-job learning. 
3.5 Tertiary education 
The gross tertiary enrolment rate for 2002 is estimated at 16.7% (TEC 
2003a). However this figure has been computed after adding the number 
of Mauritian students studying abroad as they constitute a significant 
proportion of the total tertiary student population. Also the gross tertiary 
ratio refers to the number of students enrolled at the tertiary level even if 
they do not belong in the relevant age group as a percentage of the 
population in that specific age group 19-24 years. Here the age group base 
is larger than what is prescribed, that is, 19-24 years instead of 20-24 
years. 
Post secondary education within the Republic of Mauritius is provided by 
six different types of institutions namely the University of Mauritius, the 
University of Technology of Mauritius (UTM), the Mauritius Institute of 
Health (MHI), the Mauritius Institute of Education, Mahatma Gandhi 
Institute (MGI), Mauritius College of the Air for distance education 
(MCA) and three polytechnics [Swami Dayanand Institute of Management 
(SDIM), Sir Guy Forget Polytechnic (GFP) and Institut Superior de 
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technologie (1ST)]. These are all publicly funded institutions and there are 
some private providers as well. The number of students enrolled in 
private and publicly funded tertiary institutions increased by 20%28 by 
2003. 
Although the UOM accommodates many students and offers vanous 
courses and there are many other institutions offering post-secondary 
courses, Mauritians still go out of the country to study and the latest data 
available for 2003 shows that over 3000 students left Mauritius to study 
abroad and the majority went to France/Reunion followed by 625 students 
in India and 532 in the UK. The number of students in Mauritian tertiary 
institutions was 17200 in 2003. 
3.5 Efficiency of the education system 
There are a number of potential indicators of the efficiency of the system, 
including the repetition rate, the promotion rate and the drop-out rate. The 
repetition rate is the proportion of students who repeat a grade once or 
twice It is measured by dividing the number of repeaters of a particular 
grade at year (t+ 1) by gross enrolment for that particular grade at year t 
(Wako, 1995). A high repetition rate indicates low internal efficiency as 
access may be denied to those who could not enrol due to unavailability of 
28 The number of students in tertiary institutions has risen from 14300 in 2000 to around 
17200 in 2003 
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places29 and resources of the system are strained. In the Republic of 
Mauritius data on drop outs are not collected, hence the drop-out rate is 
derived when the repetition rate is subtracted from the promotion rate 
(Wako, 1995). The promotion rate is the proportion of those students who 
completed a particular grade successfully and proceeded to the next grade 
in the following year. Drop-out rates measure the ratio of students who 
abandon schooling during a particular year. High drop-out rates indicate 
low internal efficiency or high input/output ratios. 
In the Republic of Mauritius, the primary school cycle operates with a 
higher degree of efficiency compared to the secondary school cycle which 
is beset with high drop out and repetition rates (World Bank, 2002). 
However emphasis must be laid on the fact the retention rate depends 
largely on the educational policy in place and the Republic of Mauritius, 
like the UK has an automatic promotion policy within the primary 
schooling system. Pupils are promoted automatically up to grade 6. 
Moreover given that examination papers at the end of grade 6 are marked 
locally and the national curriculum is designed internally, reducing 
standards to enhance promotion rates within primary schooling and 
transition rates between primary and secondary schooling may be possible. 
In an efficient education system, all intakes go through various grades to 
complete the primary and secondary school cycles in 6 and 7 years 
29 The places are occupied by repeaters. 
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respectively. If students drop out or take more than 13 years to complete 
their schooling, this indicates that the system is less efficient. Drop-outs 
leave the system without acquiring adequate qualifications and repetition 
leads to wastage of educational resources (World Bank, 2002). 
The repetition rate for the year 2003 was on average 4.3% for primary 
schooling and 13.5% for secondary schooling. Repetition rates for both 
primary and secondary schooling have been constantly falling during the 
last twelve-year period: 1991-2002 (CSO, 2002a). Nevertheless repetition 
rates have remained high between grades. As shown in figure 3.6 below, 
the repetition rate is highest at the end of grade 11, followed by grade 13 
(Upper six) and grade 6 (end of primary schooling). Many pupils usually 
repeat grade 6 either because they have failed the CPE examinations or 
because they want to improve their CPE results so that they could secure a 
seat in a five-star secondary schooeo. Many students also repeat grade 10 
(Form 4) so as to prepare for the '0' level Cambridge examination the 
following year. 
30 Note that this elitist system was abolished only in 2003 and this analysis uses data prior 
to this abolition. 
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Fig 3.6: Repetition rate over 1991-2002: Republic of Mauritius 
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The drop-out rate for primary schooling for the Republic of Mauritius was 
estimated at 0.5% for the year 2003 and as can be concluded from Figure 
9, the drop-out rate for the Grade 1 to 5 within the primary school cycle is 
on average close to zero. But during the same period 1991-2002, the 
drop-out rate during the final year of the primary cycle, that is, at grade 6 
was high. Later during the secondary schooling cycle, the drop-out rate is 
lower at all grades until grade 10 (Form 4) and is highest at the end of the 
five-year of secondary schooling, that is, at Grade 11. Also the drop-out 
rate has been high even for the pre-vocation classes, years 1 and 2. The 
drop-out for the primary and secondary schooling cycle had a downward 
trend during 1991-1997 but it suddenly went up in 1998 due to high drop-
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out rates in prevocationa1 courses. This alternative educational stream was 
introduced in 1997 to keep children within the education system until the 
age of 15 and it is likely to have high drop-out rates due to the nature of 
the students taking these courses. Figure 3.7 again illustrates the high 
drop-out rates at the end of the first two years of the pre-vocational 
courses (Pre1 and Pre2). These courses last for three years but most of the 
students drop out at the end of the second year itself at the age of 15/16. 
Fig 3.7: Drop-out rate over 1991-2002: Republic of Mauritius 
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Recently the World Bank (2002) conducted a study to assess the education 
system within the Republic of Mauritius. The survival rate was 
calculated. It was found that out of every 100 boys and 100 girls enrolled 
in grade 1, only 39 boys and 46 girls reach grade 11 (the end of the five 
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year secondary schooling) while only 13 boys and 16 girls reach grade 13 
(the final year of the seven year secondary schooling). It was reported 
that very few pupils drop out or repeat during the cycle of primary 
schooling when compared to those in the secondary school cycle. The rate 
of transition3l from primary to secondary school has been estimated at an 
average of 65% for girls and 75% for boys. Transition rates are low 
within secondary schooling from grade 11 to grade 12, that is, at 38% for 
boys and 42% for girls and only 13% of boys and 16% reach the final 
grade of the seven-year secondary schooling. In other words 40% drop 
out during transition between primary and secondary school cycles while 
38% drop out within secondary cycle and the remaining 22% leave 
schooling after the '0' level Cambridge examination. These are very high 
drop-out rates and have huge implications for the average skill levels of 
the work force. Thus, the Mauritian government should not only improve 
transition rates between different school cycles, it must also improve the 
survival rate within secondary education. Also a pool of students is 
leaving the secondary school cycle with incomplete schooling and this 
reduces the number of qualified students for admission into post-
secondary education. 
As has been said, a system is also inefficient if students drop out or take 
more than the required years to complete the school cycle (World Bank, 
31 These calculations are net of repeaters and also include students who would previously 
drop out of the education system after failing the ePE examination twice. They are now 
included in prevocational classes. 
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2002). As can be deduced from Figure 8, the pattern of repetition in 
secondary schooling is similar to that in primary schooling whereby a 
larger fraction of students repeat the last grade (Grades 6 and 11). 
Repetition of grade 11 of the lower secondary schooling improves the 
probability of students of joining the upper secondary classes. Table 3.1 
provides internal efficiency ratios for the performance of public and 
private-aided schools in the Republic of Mauritius. 
Table 3.1: Student flow efficiency indicators in the Republic of Mauritius 2001 
Inefficiency due to 
repetition and dropout 
Primary cycle 
Public schools 0.82 
Private-aided schools 0.81 
Total primary 0.85 
Secondary cycle 
Public schools 
Private-aided schools 
Total secondary 0.27 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2002) 
Table 3.1 was calculated using patterns of survival and grade repetition to 
estimate the internal efficiency of the education system. This 
methodology compares the resources actually used by the system to 
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produce its graduates with the resources it would use if there were no drop 
out and no repetition. If the primary school cycle starts with 1000 pupils, 
only 694 will complete the 6 years of primary schooling successfully. If 
infinite repetition is allowed, 106 students would graduate in 7 years, 16 
students in 8 years and so on. In Mauritius, the total number of student 
years currently needed for all students to complete grade 6 successfully is 
5061 years. If there are no drop-outs and no repetitions, it would take 694 
students 4164 years to graduate in 6 years (694x6). Hence with drop-outs 
and repetitions in the primary education cycle in the Republic of 
Mauritius, the internal efficiency is estimated at 82.3%32 and if the same 
method of calculation is applied for the secondary education cycle, 
secondary schools will operate at only 27% of their optimal efficiency 
(World Bank, 2002). 
Using these data on repetition and drop-outs, the World Bank estimates 
that a waste of resources amounting to US$6 million in primary and US$ 9 
million in secondary occurs annually in the primary and secondary 
education system of Mauritius. This amounts to a total loss of 10.3% of 
the entire recurrent budget of the Ministry of Education and Scientific 
Research (MOESR) for 2001 (World Bank, 2002). 
32 (4164/5061) x lOO 
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Efficiency ratios for private-aided secondary schools could not be 
calculated due to lack of data on drop-out rates in those schools. However 
the report points out that repetition rates are higher in private-aided 
schools, implying that they may be less efficient. Nevertheless emphasis 
must be laid on the fact that private-aided schools are poorly funded and 
public schools have always enrolled more able students (in terms of good 
ePE results and good '0' level results). Hence it may not be reasonable 
to term private-aided schools as 'less efficient' relative to public schools 
unless the analysis done by the World Bank (2002) adjusts for the quality 
of intakes. 
Moreover one must be cautious when interpreting the results generated 
from the study conducted by the World Bank (2002). Because the 
measures they use to assess the efficiency of the Mauritian education 
system takes no account of education quality and does not relate to the 
costs of achieving a reasonable standard. Also it would be inefficient to 
have a survival rate of 100 % if learning does not take place at school. 
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3.6 Equity issues 
• Gini co-efficient on public expenditure 
Inequity in schooling arises as a significant proportion of school age 
population drop out of the education system and access to education is 
unequally distributed across the population. That segment of the school 
population is forced to withdraw and lose access to public spending on 
education. This gives rise to inequality as the government collects taxes 
from all segments of the population and those who drop out cannot realize 
personally the full benefit of public spending on education. As discussed 
in the previous section, the secondary education cycle is inequitable as a 
significant proportion of the population aged 12-19 drops out every year. 
But with the introduction of pre-vocational education, more students are 
able to continue their education for at least three years thereby reducing 
the inequity. 
Also, disparities between public spending on state schools and private-
aided schools were highlighted earlier. Students who therefore attend 
private-aided schools do not enjoy the same amount of resources as do 
those who attend state schools. Data from other countries suggest that a 
major fraction of students in private aided schools come from poor rural 
families but due to lack of data this cannot be confirmed for the Republic 
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of Mauritius. Biases in favour of urban areas or upper-income households 
for secondary schooling cannot be ruled out (World Bank, 2002). 
Total benefits enjoyed by any member of the society depend on the length 
of time he/she is able to survive in the education system. Any member of 
the society who drops out of the system, stops deriving benefits from the 
public spending that is made on education. It is evident from earlier 
discussions that very few students survive through the school system to 
continue post secondary education. Also, given the fact that unit costs in 
higher education are 4.7 times higher than that of primary education, a 
minority of students capture a significant share of funding allocated for 
education. 
In a study conducted by the World Bank (2002), a pattern of spending 
across a cohort is created which uses information on survival rates to plot 
the progression of survivors across the education system. If a cohort starts 
with 100 members in grade 1 and everyone is promoted to grade 2, then 
according to the per pupil spending in primary education, the total benefit 
accruing to a member would amount to 0.11 times the per capita GDP. 
Completion of the primary school cycle by the 100 members would result 
in 0.66 times per capita GDP and if 30 members drop out after this 
completion, then their total benefit is 19.8 times the capita GDP (0.11 x 6x 
30). Thus, it is possible to calculate the cumulative distribution of benefits 
136 
accumulated by members of a cohort as they exit the education system. 
The study also reports that 28% of any given cohort in Mauritius 
completes only six years of education and they use 14% of total public 
spending. Thus, the incidence of education spending in the Republic of 
Mauritius is not perfect. The study reveals that 20% of the most educated 
in a cohort receive 35% of all public spending on education and is also 
biased in favour of the highly educated. The gini co-efficient is estimated 
at 0.3 suggesting a relatively biased structure of expenditure on education. 
However one should be cautious while using these results as they are 
based on the survival rate that was computed and based on gross 
enrolment rates. These enrolment rates were given the same weight across 
each grade and this results in an overestimate as a larger number of 
students are in lower grades. Most students drop out in later years. 
Moreover the existence of high repetition within the education system 
inflates the value of the gross enrolment rates. The numerator includes all 
children in a cycle irrespective of age while the denominator includes only 
the number of school age-children in the cycle. Thus, the numerator has a 
considerable number of over-age students. 
• The Principles of 'Zoning' 
Historically, parents have favoured public secondary schools rather than 
private-aided secondary schools (World Bank, 2002). Although this 
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highly selective system was abolished in response to the inequity in the 
Mauritian educational system, the education reform still provides a strong 
foundation for maintaining the elite schooling system. Instead of moving 
towards mixed ability schooling, the reform merely redistributes the more 
able into 'star' schools (which are mostly state schools) located in their 
respective geographical zones. Prior to the education reforms of 2002, 
state schools used to select more able students (that is, those with good 
CPE results) and today more able students are still enrolled but this 
selection is now restricted to geographical proximity. However parents 
can take the decision about whether or not their children will attend the 
particular school allotted by the state. There is some degree of parental 
choice. 
The education reforms of 2002 led to the setting up of around 30 state 
schools providing general and technical education up to Form V and Form 
VI (Form Sixth colleges) catering to 'A' level students only. Many 
existing state and private aided schools were converted into either lower 
secondary schools (teaching up to form V only) or into Form Sixth 
colleges. The 'star' schools were usually converted into Form Sixth 
colleges (Ministere de l'Education et de la Recherche Scientifique, 2004). 
The setting up of these colleges were supposed to eliminate duplication 
and inefficiency in the educational system by grouping qualified teachers 
and other resources most suited to the needs of 'A' level students. Instead 
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of making these scarce resources available to many schools around the 
islands, the Ministry thought it best to come up with the Sixth Form 
Colleges. Qualified teachers (especially those holding a degree) were 
redeployed from schools converted into lower secondary. 
Here 'zoning' is seen as a purely administrative regulatory device to 
secure the most efficient allocation of resources and to be able to respond 
to the changing pressures and demands through technical adjustments to 
the system (McCulloch, 1991). However zoning may also be seen as a 
protectionist device that reduces the contestability between schools as the 
Ministry of Education will automatically assign students to schools, 
according to their grades but within their respective geographical zones. 
The principle of zoning may thus reduce incentives of schools to improve 
standards and increase accountability as they no longer need to 'market' 
themselves to parents. When it comes to 'choice', zoning reduces the 
ability of parents and students to select the best school. Moreover 
'zoning' may just serve to increase social inequity by entrenching the 
privileges of older established schools and of families in prosperous areas 
of the country. Some schools especially private-aided schools in 
disadvantaged areas will be in danger of becoming unviable as they lose 
pupils to newly established State schools with superior resources. 
Similarly schools with a high proportion of 'less able' students in terms of 
their CPE results may be at risk of becoming 'ghetto schools'. 
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3.7 Concluding note 
Due to unavailability of data, social class and inequity issues were only 
partly incorporated into the discussion. However this chapter tackles the 
major issues relating to the education system in the Republic of Mauritius. 
The key findings are firstly, that repetition rates tend to be high for the 
same forms associated with high dropout rates which may be explained by 
the fact that these are key grades in the system whereby pupils need to 
achieve 'reasonable' standards before they can proceed further. There are 
serious problems of repetition within and drop-outs from the educational 
system at Standard Six, Form IV, Form V and Upper Six. These suggest 
inefficiency in the education system and they should not be left 
unchecked. Besides the World Bank (2002) suggests that the primary and 
secondary systems operate at efficiency levels of only 82 % and 27% 
respectively (see the section on efficiency of the education system). 
The second main issue is the elitist nature of the system. Nonetheless, for 
reasons discussed earlier in the Chapter, the zone system did not shift 
Mauritius to a mixed ability school system. Originally, 'five star' 
secondary schools dominated secondary schooling in the Republic of 
Mauritius. As a result, the system was too examination-oriented and 
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young children were ranked in order of their CPE results and these were 
important determinants of a child's future. However the Education 
Reforms of 2002, abolished this system and replaced it by the 'zoning' 
system to make the education system more equitable. Nonetheless, for the 
reasons discussed earlier in the chapter, the zone system did not shift 
Mauritius to a mixed ability school system. 
A third issue is the growmg importance of vocational training m 
Mauritius. The IVTB was set up to co-ordinate and ensure that training 
remains ahead of any technological change so that the Republic of 
Mauritius could compete in the international market and also so that 
workers could be equipped with the appropriate skills. The importance of 
vocational education is stressed so that there will be no mismatch between 
the workers' skills and demands for skills by employers. The setting up of 
the pre-vocational section within the secondary schooling system itself 
ensures that students acquire the basic skills that will allow them to move 
on to vocational training programmes leading to NTC3, NTC 2 and NTCl. 
A fourth issue is the nature of tertiary education in Mauritius. Many 
students still continue their higher studies abroad although the University 
of Mauritius and other recognised institutions within the island provide 
degree courses. This level of studying abroad may be explained by the 
relative scarcity of places available within the island compared to the 
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increasing number of students who follow higher education courses. All 
publicly funded institutions play an important role in the provision of 
tertiary education and it was highlighted that distance education still 
provides for 30% of the total tertiary student population. 
In summary, the government appears therefore not to be spending enough 
on the education. This was highlighted during the discussion of the 
section on efficiency. The education system is inequitable such that 
funding is skewed against private aided schools. Even the principle of 
zoning which was supposed to do away with the concentration of high 
ability schools has not moved towards a mixed system. 
The next chapter discusses how the main data set, from which a sample 
will be used to estimate the social returns to levels of qualifications for the 
Republic of Mauritius, were collected and edited. It will also address 
some methodological issues. The justification for using all main variables 
together with the final sample size for the purpose of this study will be 
provided. 
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Chapter 4: The 2000 Population Census data Set and Earnings 
Differentials 
4.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the 2000 Population 
Census data was collected and to assess its reliability, and validity. All 
calculations to estimate the social returns to education will thus be based 
on the data available from the most recent Population Census. The 2000 
Population Census data provide a snapshot of individuals with different 
characteristics along with their earnings at a point in time. 
This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part deals with the 
quality of the data set and the sample size to be used for estimation 
purposes while the second part presents earnings differentials by sub-
groups of the sample along with variables such as qualifications, age, 
gender and tenure. In Section 4.1 I present how the 2000 Population 
Census data was collected with much emphasis laid on the reliability of 
the data set. Section 4.2 looks at the accuracy of the data set while its 
internal consistency is assessed in Section 4.3 and the reliability and 
validity of the 1 % sample of the original data set are discussed in Section 
4.4. Section 4.5, on the other hand, provides the justification for the 
'working' sample and the eventual use of all main variables in the 
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computation of social returns to different levels of qualifications. Section 
4.6 provides the descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole and 
Section 4.7 examines workers' characteristics by gender. Workers' 
characteristics are analysed further by sector of employment in Section 4.8 
and by place of residence in Section 4.9. Finally Section 4.1 0 concludes 
this chapter. 
Much emphasis is placed on the data collection process in this chapter 
because data is often of low quality in developing countries, especially 
lower income countries. Information about individuals has been either 
poorly collected or subjected to huge sample selection problems (Bennell, 
1994; Psacharopoulos, 1996)33. However the Republic of Mauritius is an 
upper-income country and as will be discussed in this chapter, the data set 
that I use in this thesis to estimate the social returns to education, may not 
be very rich but is of good quality and satisfies the required 
methodological ground rules. 
33 Some ofthese problems were discussed in Chapter 2. 
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The 2000 Population Census data Set 
4.1 Collection of the 2000 Population Census data 
The first complete census that was taken in Mauritius dates back to 1735 
when it was still a French colony. Since then a number of censuses have 
taken place with the one in 1931 being followed by another one every ten 
years, except for the one due in 1941 postponed to 1944 with the outbreak 
of the Second World War (CSO, 2002a). The Population Census 2000 is 
the seventeenth for the island of Mauritius and the island of Rodrigues. 
The Population Census 2000 was taken in two rounds. The first round, the 
Housing Census was designed to obtain a list of names and addresses of 
heads of households to eventually serve as a frame for the Population 
census. The Housing Census was conducted four months prior to the 
Population Census or from the i h of February to the 18th of June 2000 
while the latter was conducted from the 19th of June to the 16th of July 
2000. The Population Census enumerated all those alive at midnight on 
the 2nd of July 2000 (CSO, 2002a). Both censuses were conducted on all 
islands34: Mauritius, Rodrigues, Agalega and St Brandon35 . The Housing 
census enumerated all buildings, housing units, households, commercial 
34 The Republic is made up of the main island of Mauritius, the island of Rodrigues and 
several islands located within 350 km from the main island. 
35 The island of Rodrigues is administered by the Ministry of Local Government, 
Rodrigues and, Rural and Urban Development. The other islands are administered by the 
Ministry of External Communications. In the Population Census 2000 data set, 
Rodrigues and the other islands are wholly coded as rural. 
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and industrial establishments, hotels and boarding houses and even fruit 
trees of bearing age on residential premises! The Population Census 
enumerated all persons present on census night (as well as all residents 
who were absent on census night) in all households and communal 
institutions. Wholly absent households who were not in Mauritius on 
Census night were not enumerated and are excluded (CSO, 2002a). 
The census was based on the Statistics Act of the i h of April 1951. This 
Act empowers the Director of Statistics to request for the collection of any 
information relating to censuses and it also ensures that any person who 
refuses to fill in the prescribed forms or to supply the required information 
or knowingly makes false statements is liable to prosecution. At the same 
time, strict rules are laid down to guarantee confidentiality and every 
person employed in connection with censuses takes an oath of secrecy 
before a magistrate. Any breach of confidentiality is accompanied by 
penalties. Census field officers are provided with an authorisation card, 
signed by the Director and it is produced during interviews for the 
censuses. 
There was a publicity campaign started in February 2000 to convince the 
population about the usefulness of the census and to appeal for their co-
operation. Wide coverage of the event included information broadcast via 
radio and television during hours of high audiences in three different 
languages: Bhojpuri, Creole and French. Also during his brief 
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interventions on radio and television, the Director of Statistics covered the 
objectives of the census and the confidential aspect of the infonnation 
collected. 
As has been said, two sets of data were initially collected by the Central 
Statistics Office: the 2000 Housing Census Data and the 2000 Population 
Census data. Housing and population enumerations were conducted on 
the islands of Mauritius, Rodrigues and Agalega except for the St Brandon 
islands where only a count of persons spending the census night was made 
as these islands are fishing stations with no resident population (CSO, 
2002a). All areas were adequately covered with the island of Mauritius 
consisting of both urban and rural areas while all the other islands were 
catergorised as rural only. Some 37,5000 Population Census 
questionnaires were printed and about 300,000 Population Census fonns 
containing around 1,200,000 entries across all geographical areas36 were 
coded and edited (CSO, 2002a) amounting to a response rate of around 
99%37. The project value of the census was Rs 75 millions but, given the 
availability of existing infrastructure, services and human resources, the 
actual census budget turned out to be Rs 70 millions38. 
36 The Republic of Mauritius being very small geographically does not have remote rural 
places from where census information may not be collected as residents are concentrated 
on the islands Mauritius and Rodrigues. 
37 Population estimated in 2001 was 1,205,667 and there was an annual growth rate of 
1 % which implies that population in 2000 stood at 1,193,610 resulting in the response 
rate of 99.46% (CSO, 2002a). 
38 At the exchange rate of 1 GBP = 53_7852 MUR, the estimated project value was £1,394,387 
but the actual cost was £1,301,474, 
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The 2000 Population Census questionnaire is an improvement over the 
1990 Population Census for the purposes of my research. The questions 
on education in 1990 Population Census were reviewed to include 
qualifications, rather than just questions about primary and secondary 
schooling and a question on income for persons aged twelve and above 
was added (CSO, 2000). However the 2000 Population Census data set 
only provides total cash income in rupees received by the individual from 
all sources for the month of June 2000. 
A population census form, with the name and address of the head of 
household as well as other geographical information, was prepared for 
each private household enumerated at the Housing Census. Addressed 
population census forms were also prepared for hotels, institutions, 
collective quarters, vacant housing units and housing units that were under 
construction. 
Enumerators were given a list of addresses to be visited along with the 
geographical identification codes needed to identify households and an 
addressed population census form for each of these addresses which they 
had to deliver personally. They also carried some unaddressed forms for 
newly-formed households and those that could have been missed at the 
Housing Census. They kept a formal record of these names and addresses. 
Each enumerator distributed the Population Census 2000 questionnaires to 
the heads of each household during the week preceding the Census night 
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of the 2nd of July 2000. They were instructed to insert appropriate remarks 
during distribution for each entry on the list of households provided to 
them so that during the collection stage they could keep track of whether 
the questionnaire was delivered and subsequently collected, whether a 
particular household had moved to a new address or whether a previously 
vacant housing unit was now occupied. 
Moreover they had to guide about 50-75 households 3 to 4 days before the 
Census night and they had to call on each of the households after the 
Census night to collect the questionnaires after ensuring that they were 
correctly filled in. They were also instructed to fill in the questionnaires 
either partly or wholly for those unable to do so and to return these to the 
Chief Enumerator ensuring that the information these contained were 
legible, consistent and complete (CSO, 2002a). In order to correct for 
errors and to obtain missing information, they had to call back the 
appropriate households. Completed forms were collected on the 3rd of 
July 2000 and this exercise lasted until the third week of that month. 
Enumeration of foreign workers was done with the assistance of the 
responsible factories officers where these foreigners were working. 
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4.2 Accuracy of the 2000 Population Census data set 
4.2.1 Enumeration Areas 
The mam island, the island of Mauritius, IS divided into nme 
administrative districts39 , and consists of both rural and urban areas. 
Enumeration divisions were based on the Municipal Wards (MW) and 
Village Council Areas (VCA) used at the 1990 Population Census, as 
these constitute administrative regions for which data would be most 
relevant. Further sub-division into census enumeration areas (EAs) was 
carried out by splitting the MWs and VCAs to create well-defined clusters 
with easily identifiable boundaries such as roads, lanes and so on, and so 
that each EA contained an equal number of households. EAs on average 
contained about 75 households in rural regions and about 90 in urban 
regions, although the number of households in some EAs varied from 0 to 
260. The island of Rodrigues was totally defined as rural and split into 
EAs consisting of 85 households on average with the range of variation 
being 0 to 225 households. There were 3472 EAs on the main island, 93 
in Rodrigues and 1 in Agalega. 
39 Nine administrative regions consisting of Five Municipal Council Areas (MCA) and 
four District Council Areas (DCA) which may be further spilt into Municipal Wards 
(MW) and Village Council Areas (VCA) respectively. 
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Although census enumeration maps used for the 1990 Population census 
were retained, these needed further updating. Field visits were conducted 
prior to 2000 to assess considerable development in terms of new 
settlements. Updating of census maps were done after the completion of 
field visits, and these included the relevant geographical districts, MW or 
VC areas and EAs. 
Geographical divisions were designed to follow a hierarchical structure so 
that the software used for tabulation could produce tables at any defined 
geographical level and there were cases where 25 VCAs extended over 2 
or 3 geographical districts. Each EA was identified by a six digit code 
comprising of the island code (1 digit), the geographical district code (1 
digit), the municipal ward or village council area code (2 digits) and the 
enumeration area code (2 digits) 40. The two digits codes of the municipal 
ward or village council area when associated with the relevant district and 
island codes gave the relevant MW or VCA identifiers made up of 4 
digits. These further combined with a particular enumeration area code 
allowed an EA to be uniquely identified. 
40 In cases where geographical sub-divisions such as electoral constituencies and 
localities were used, geographical hierarchies other than the ones stated in the text were 
designed. 
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4.2.2 Enumerator and Supervisors during fieldwork 
A total of 6225 field officers41 were recruited on a part-time basis for the 
census field operation which in some cases lasted over a period of nine 
months (CSO, 2002a). Before the start of the Population Census 2000, 
senior supervisors and supervisors trained Chief enumerators and 
enumerators respectively. For each category training lasted for six hours 
with attention paid to the instructions manual, the Census guide and 
instruction booklets. As part of their training, they were asked to fill in a 
population census form for their households and to discuss the problems 
that they encountered during the exercise. 
Also during the census, to ensure that all interviews were properly 
conducted and that all concepts were well understood, supervisors had to 
accompany each of their enumerators during their first visits to 
households. Surprise and pre-arranged field checks as well as re-
interviews were also done. Supervisors also had to check all completed 
questionnaires at the early stage of enumeration and later a sample of the 
completed questionnaires was checked to ensure that the quality of work 
done by enumerators was adequate. Meetings were held regularly to solve 
problems encountered on the field and to assess the situations on the field. 
Thus, much emphasis was laid upon the training of field workers, daily 
41 These include 1 Chief Supervisor, 2 Assistant Chief Supervisors, 17 Senior 
Supervisors, 143 Supervisors, 1113 Chief Enumerators and 5057 Enumerators. 
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control and supervision of the fieldwork to increase the reliability of the 
information collected. Also to ensure that supervisory control prevailed 
throughout the fieldwork, supervisors were required to keep a dated record 
of daily activities outlining the activities carried out, the problems 
encountered and the remedial actions taken (CSO, 2002a). Thus, the 
supervisory staff could follow the progress of fieldwork and assess the 
performance of all enumerators working under their supervision. 
4.2.3 Coding and editing procedures 
Coding and editing of data started in September 2000 and was completed 
in July 2001. Editors and coders were trained both in small groups and as 
members of teams by the statistician in charge. Completed questionnaires 
were tagged together in batches according to their respective enumeration 
areas (EA) and they were returned to the census storeroom after 
verification. Control forms were used to record the EA number of the 
batch, the date of reception, the name of the officer who returned the batch 
and the relevant counts covered for that particular EA. Again control 
sheets were used to record the processes the EA batches went through, that 
is, from the storeroom, then to the editing and coding sub-unit, followed 
by the Central Information Systems Division (CISD) for data entry, and 
finally back to the storeroom. These control sheets ensured that batches of 
all EAs completed the various stages. Data for around 300,000 Population 
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Census forms containing about 1,200,000 records were keyed in during 
that period (CSO, 2002a). 
4.3 Internal consistency 
The Housing Census 2000 data set was used to check the consistency of 
the 2000 Population Census data. During the early stages of data 
collection, that is, when the census questionnaires were being collected, 
enumerators were asked to compare the resulting person count for each 
household with that obtained previously at the Housing Census and they 
had to explain any resulting differences. 
All EA batches were verified to ensure that all census forms in a given 
batch had the same EA codes. Other checks included the verification of 
the presence of only one 'head' per household, consistency between age 
and date of birth, consistency between age and marital status, consistency 
between age and educational attainment. Each questionnaire was handled 
by two officers with the first one performing the overall verification of the 
EA batch together with the editing and coding of the part of the 
questionnaire involving simple operations. Second officers edited and 
coded the complex part of the questionnaire and they were chosen on the 
basis of their ability to understand the different codes involved. This 
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procedure resulted in a reduction in the number of coding errors (CSO, 
2002a). 
A validation programme that verified field consistencies was run to 
identify records with errors. These records were listed and the relevant 
questionnaires were retrieved to make the necessary corrections and to 
update the data files. Validation on the 2000 Population Census data files 
was carried out on completion of the editing and coding exercise. 
Validation was carried out on Housing Census 2000 data files as well and 
a preliminary set of publication tables was produced using the country 
data file 42. The tables produced confirmed that the Housing Census 2000 
data required no further editing. However the same could not be concluded 
for the 2000 Population Census data although the tabulated counts of 
households and population were consistent with the Housing census 
tabulated figures. Some tables showed inconsistencies and a list of the 
relevant edit specifications was drawn and incorporated in a correction 
programme, CONCOR to remove the inconsistencies from the tabulated 
data. However some tables still contained slight inaccuracies that would 
be too costly and time-consuming to identify and correct (CSO, 2002a). 
Enumeration involved a two-round procedure with the Housing Census 
2000 preceding the Population Census 2000 so that a list of names and 
42 When the validation process was completed, the data files were aggregated at the 
country level. 
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addresses may be obtained to serve as a frame for the latter. However 
separate analysis has been carried out for each data set. 
4.4 Reliability and validity of the one percent sample 
For the purpose of this study, I had access to a 1 % sample of the 2000 
Population Census data set. The sampled households used in this study 
are drawn on a systematic sampling basis. This method ensures that the 
sample is more evenly spread across the population. There is no problem 
of periodicity as the systematic sampling has an equal possibility of 
selecting an individual irrespective of gender or any other personal 
characteristics. Thus, a random 1 % sample has been drawn from the full 
population census and it is a representative sample at the national level. 
The 1% sample consists of 51.4% of males and 48.6% of females, of 
which, 20% are children (aged between zero to eleven years). 
The 2000 Population Census data set satisfies the requirements necessary 
to derive robust returns to education estimates and it meets some of the 
conditions advocated by Bennell (1998). Bennell (1994), for instance, 
argues that RORE studies must not be subject to sample selection, that is, 
not rely on earnings data in the formal sector only 43, the problem of 
43 Bennell (1994) argues that the formal sector employment is a relatively small & 
declining percentage of the labour force in most developing countries. 
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omitted variables must also be addressed as the prOVlSlon of formal 
education is one of the numerous factors affecting income determination 
and studies must rely on formal survey data to ensure the quality of 
research. Estimates generated exclusively from formal earnings III 
countries where the proportion of self employed people comprises a large 
proportion of the working population and among those with basic 
education are most likely to be misleading and seriously overstated. 
Earnings from wage employment tend to be higher than those generated 
from self-employment (Bennell, 1998). The data used for the current 
study is collected for a large, representative sample of the entire 
population across all economic sectors and geographical locations and is 
not confined to very specific locations or to those employed in the formal 
sector only. The Population Census 2000 is a formal survey data and 
includes earnings from both the formal and non-formal sectors and so does 
not suffer from this problem. The problem of omitted variables IS, 
however, assessed through the use of the IV procedure in Chapter 6. 
However, the 2000 Population Census data set does not provide adequate 
information on the socio-economic background of individuals, and it 
contains neither the expenditures on education nor the net income earned 
by the individuals from paid work. The lack of such information 
considerably hinders the analysis of the data set. For example, I am 
restricted to estimating gross returns to education rather than net (private) 
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returns. Nevertheless, inferences about net incomes from wages only and 
the amount spent on education by the average household for instance, may 
be made from analytical reports compiled by the CSO itself for the Budget 
Household Survey (BHS) for 2001102. 
4.5 Descriptive statistics of some main variables 
Some descriptive statistics of the main variables derived from the 1 % 
sample which consists of 12,490 individuals, are presented in this section: 
4.5.1 Age 
The fact that the 2000 Population Census data provides information on 
each individual's age makes it possible for the researcher to construct age-
earnings profiles. However before this may be done, an adult population 
needs to be identified. Initially, data for 6411 males and 6071 females are 
reported. But for the purpose of estimating returns to education in the 
Republic of Mauritius, the sample must be reduced to include only those 
who are of working age. The relevant age boundary, using the range 
logical function is thus restricted to between 12 and 59 years inclusive. 
When an individuals are 60 years old, they are entitled to the State 
retitrement pension and, thus, all analysis excludes those above the 
retirement age. The lower age limit of 12 years has been selected because 
the estimates of labour force, employment and unemployment published 
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for the Republic of Mauritius refer to the population aged 12 and above44 
and this age limit of 12 applies only to estimates made prior to 2004 
(CSO, 2004). There is a considerable percentage of those aged below 21 
years in the sample (around 11 %). However as will be seen in Chapter 5, 
for different analyses, I sometimes restrict the age range of the sample 
differently, that is, I exclude very young workers. 
The reduced sample contains a total of 8906 individuals, with 4670 men 
and 4236 women. Around 20% of the original sample includes those 
below the age of 12 while 8% are above the age of 59. Thus, an adult 
population of working age is identified. 
Next the age-earnings profiles, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, are constructed 
for the four levels of education including those with no schooling at a1l45 . 
The highest earnings profile is that of those workers who successfully 
completed tertiary education, then followed by those who hold vocational 
qualifications and the lowest being for those with no schooling at all or 
with at most primary schooling. 
44 Based on the recommendations of a Technical Committee set up to analyse the findings 
of a World Bank study on unemployment in the Republic of Mauritius, the lower age 
limit has been raised to 15 years as from 2004. 
45 These different levels of schooling are discussed later in this section under the 
'Qualification variables' sub-heading. However, here to simplify the age profile diagram, 
lower secondary, upper secondary and GCSE & sixth form are aggregated under 
secondary education. 
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Figure 4.1: Age-earnings profiles for the adult population 
Age-earnings profiles of workers in the Republic of Mauritius 
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The age earnings profiles for those with no schooling at all or at most 
with basic schooling are flat, implying that these individuals 
experience slower growth rates of earnings as they age. The age 
earnings profiles for tertiary and vocational education are not smooth. 
This may be mainly because there are few individuals at each age in 
each of these two groups. The total numbers of individuals in the 
sample with vocational and tertiary education were only 109 and 114, 
respectively and when these are split by age groups, there were too 
few individuals for each age (Appendix D). These age earnings 
profiles also contain cohort effects, that is, differences in wages in the 
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estimated profiles are also caused by factors which are specific to 
cohorts rather than being due to the effects of age only. 
4.5.2 Hours of work 
Additionally the sample is further restricted to include only those who 
worked during the past week of the Population Census 2000. When all 
the cases for which 'Hours worked during past week> 0' were 
selected, the sample size fell drastically from a total of 8906 to only 
4464 individuals. Around 30% of the sample aged between 12 and 59 
and who were in work, were women, and 66% of these had children. 
Figure 4.2(a) and Figure 4.2(b) show that there is considerable 
disparity between men and women for hours worked. Hours worked 
during the last week tend to be within the range of 40 and 48 for all 
those men above the age of 18, while the range for women tend to be 
wider and unlike men they show an overall downward trend as age 
Increases. 
Figure 4.2(a): Hours worked by age for men 
Hours worked for Men by age 
AGE 
(Years) 
Source: Computed from census data from CSO. 
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Figure 4.2(b): Hours worked by age for women 
Hours worked during the past week for women & by age 
Source: Computed from census data from CSO. 
The information available for the 'hours worked during the past week' 
may be used to adjust for the fact that more educated workers spend 
relatively more time in gainful employment than the less educated. This 
creates greater opportunity for investing further in job skills and 
potentially improves the ability to earn higher wages in the future. This 
observed fact may be accounted for, by including a variable for the 
logarithm of hours worked m earnmgs functions (Kugler & 
Psacharopoulos, 1989; Psacharopoulos & Alam, 1991). However this 
inclusion of the 'log hours' variable may create a source of endogeneity 
bias as the variable 'hours worked during the past week' itself is 
endogenous to the model. 
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4.5.3 Earnings 
As pointed out earlier, the 2000 Population Census data set only provides 
total cash income in Mauritian rupees (MUR) received from all sources 
for the month of June 2000 and no distinction is made between wages and 
other sources of income, thus, all analysis will be carried out on gross 
earnings. The sample is further restricted to include only those individuals 
whose gross incomes exceed zero, that is, only those individuals within 
the adult population who are in paid work are selected. The selected adult 
population in the paid employment sample has a total of 4404 individuals, 
of which 31 % are women. 
The original variable 'gross monthly income' is divided by 4 to adjust for 
the 4 weeks in the month of June 2000 when the census was carried out. 
The gross weekly income is computed because the Population census data 
provides information about the 'hours worked during the past week'. As I 
will use gross incomes per hour earned by the individuals in the sample, 
this transformation is deemed necessary. In order to examine the central 
tendency, dispersion and outlying values of the 'gross weekly incomes' 
variable, the following histogram has been produced (Figure 4.3): 
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Figure 4.3: The distribution of gross weekly incomes from all sources. 
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As shown in Figure 4.3, the gross weekly income distribution is a skewed 
distribution to the right. It displays some extreme values at which gross 
weekly income exceeds MUR. 10000 or £ 18546. The CSO (2002c) reports 
an overall average weekly wage at March 2000 of only MUR 239547 or 
£45 . However average weekly pay for that same period varied from MUR 
1360 (£25) for labourers to MUR 6349 (£118) for medical and health 
officers in the public sector (CSO, 2003a)48. Investigations into extreme 
values are carried out later in this section when box plots are used. 
46 MUR refers to the Mauritian currency: rupee, where an approximation of the MUR to 
the British pound sterling would be: 1 GBP = 54 MUR 
47 The population considered in estimating the size of the labour force comprises persons 
aged 12 years and above which matches with the adult population used for this PhD 
(CSO,2002c). 
48 Average monthly salaries for that same period varied from MUR 5439 (£101) for 
labourers to MUR 25395 (£470) for medical and health officers in the public sector 
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To create a distribution for the dependant variable which is closer to a 
normal distribution, the log of the logarithm of gross hourly income is 
derived from LN( grossweekly incomes ). 
Hoursworkedperweek 
Consider Figure 4.4 which is supplemented by Table 4.1: 
Figure 4.4: The distribution of Log of hourly income: 
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Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census data 
3.00 
Mean = 1.4516 
Std . Dev. = 0.31688 
N = 4,404 
(CSO, 2003a). These average monthly salaries have been divided into four to obtain 
average weekly pay. 
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Table 4.1: Statistics for log of hourly gross income 
Log of hou rly gross incomes 
N Valid 4404 
Missing 4502 
Mean l.4516 
Std. Deviation .31688 
Skewness .617 
Std. Error of Skewness .037 
Kurtosis 1.167 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .074 
Minimum .40 
Maximum 3.07 
Percentiles 25 1.2396 
50 l.4243 
75 l.6 198 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census data 
Some extreme values were detected earlier in this section and now a box 
plot of the variable ' log of gross hourly income' as labelled by ' logwage' 
is used to investigate these further. 
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The relevant boundary for the log of gross hourly income is within 1.51 
and 5.05 for the selected sample of adult population in paid employment. 
This range in terms of the local currency, translates into MUR 4.50 and 
MUR 156 per hour and the CSO (2002c) reports an average wage rate per 
hour of MUR 24.48 for July 2001. Moreover hourly wage rates vary 
across occupations, for instance, in 2002, average hourly earnings ranged 
from around MUR 16 for cleaning services in offices and buildings to 
around MUR 160 for accounting and auditing services in the private sector 
(CSO, 2003). 
4.5.4 Qualification variables 
The selected sample also contains information about the level of 
education. Educational attainment refers to the highest level of education 
completed at school by individuals or the level being attended for those 
still at school (CSO, 2000). Seven dummy variables are created for each 
highest qualification level and these are 'No schooling at all or at most 
primary education', 'lower secondary49" 'upper secondary' 50, 'GCSE & 
49 'Lower secondary' includes all those individuals who studied between Forms 1 to 3 
and at the time when they were studying, these individuals were usually within the age 
range of 12 to 14 years. 
50 Upper secondary includes those individuals who studied up to either Form 4 or Form 5 
and these people on average, were aged between 15 and 17 when they left school. They 
either dropped out at the end of Form 4 or they did not pass their '0' level examinations 
at the end of Form 5. 
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sixth form,5l, 'A level,52, 'vocational education' and 'tertiary education'. 
Table 4.2 shows the number and percentage of individuals within each 
category. 
Table 4.2: Highest qualification variables 
Qualification Valid Cumulative 
Levels Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid no schooling or at most 
primary schooling 1865 43.6 43.7 43.7 
lower secondary 484 11.3 11.3 55.0 
upper secondary 773 18.1 18.1 73.1 
GCSE & sixth form 641 15.0 15.0 88.1 
A level 286 6.7 6.7 94.8 
Vocational education 109 2.6 2.6 97.3 
Tertiary education 114 2.7 2.7 100.0 
Total 4272 100.0 100.0 
Missing System 2 .0 
Total 4274 100.0 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of MaurItIUs. 
The category 'vocational education' includes those who undertook 
vocational and technical training such as secretarial and basic training in 
midwifery outside of normal academic schools, ranging from elementary 
job training to programmes leading to diplomas. These qualifications vary 
from the basic schooling level to programmes leading to diplomas whose 
level would lie above a Higher School Certificate but just below a first 
University Degree in the academic system (CSO, 2002b). In other words, 
this is a very heterogenous group. 
51 Here the category 'GCSE & Sixth form' includes those who passed their '0' level 
examinations or the equivalent ofGCSE in the UK, and those who registered to do an 'A' 
level, however failed to complete successfully their' A' levels. 
52 This category 'A level' includes all those who passed their 'A' level examinations. 
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Initially about 97% of the sample (of the original variable containing 
observations on vocational education) had missing values on this variable. 
But CSO (2002b) report that the number of people enrolling for vocational 
education tends to be less than 5%, thus, the mean value has been set as a 
zero when it is missing. Although the official statistics suggest that the 
percentage of people with vocational education or technical education in 
the selected sample is in line with the national estimates, emphasis must 
still be laid on the fact that some genuinely missing values have been 
wrongly coded as zero, but I can do nothing about this problem. 
The same procedure was applied for tertiary education as 98% of the 
sample (original variable containing observations on tertiary education) 
was missing. Besides the CSO (2002b) report that enrolment in tertiary 
education within a sample of 24,552 household members in 2000, of 
whom 49.3% are males & 50.7% are females for all age groups, was less 
than 5%. Hence all the 'system missing' in the sample were coded as O. 
Again one must bear in mind that in the process, some genuinely missing 
values have been incorrectly coded as zero since there is no better 
alternative assumption. 
Tertiary education in Mauritius includes courses at first university degree 
level or above which normally have a minimum duration of three years' 
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full-time studies. The minimum requirement for entry is an equivalent of 
an 'A' level qualification (ISCED, 1997). Those currently attending a 
post-secondary institution and who had not yet acquired any post-
secondary degree were not included in the tertiary education variable 
(CSO, 2002a). In other words, students are not counted as having 
achieved a degree. 
Earnings differentials 
The main purpose of this part of the chapter is to present all the major 
characteristics of workers from the selection of the sample of those aged 
12 to 59 years old with positive incomes. The rationale for this selection 
from the 1 % sample of the 2000 Population Census data set, for the 
purpose of analysis was dealt with, earlier in Part 1. The sample used in 
this study, thus, consists of 4256 individual workers, for whom all relevant 
information is available and on which the descriptive statistics discussed 
in this chapter are based. Descriptive statistics of all the main variables 
used in this study are supplemented by test statistics (T-tests) and these are 
used in the following discussion of the earnings differentials by gender, 
economic sector and by place of residence. 
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4.6 Earnings differentials and observable workers' characteristics 
Table 4.3 presents a breakdown of mean earnings by level of education 
and workers' other characteristics. The average income per month for the 
sample is MUR 5392 or £1 00, however, sharp earning differentials are 
observed between male and female workers with women earning, on 
average, 26% less than men. In other words, the ratio is about 1: 1.35 in 
favour of males. 
Also, mean earnings in the private sector are substantially lower, with the 
public sector employees earning, on average, about half more than private 
sector employees. 
Workers who reside in the rural areas earn 21 % less than their 
counterparts in the urban areas. This may reflect the prevailing 
competitive market situations in rural areas. However such a statement 
needs further investigation which is undertaken in later sections. 
There is a sharp progression of incomes by the level of education for both 
sexes, for instance, an individual with lower secondary education earns 
11.5% more than those with basic schooling or no schooling at all and 
those with tertiary qualifications earn 40% more than those with 'A' 
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levels. The earnings differential, thus, increases by the level of education. 
Similar findings, for instance, have been reported by Psacharopoulos & 
Alam (1991) for their study on education and earnings in Venuezuela and 
by Siphambe (1997) for a similar study in Bostwana. To test for 
independence between average incomes and the level of education in the 
current study, a chi-square test is conducted. The calculated Chi-Square is 
X2 = 6894.16 and the null hypothesis of no association between the levels 
of education and average incomes is rejected below the 0.1 % level of 
significance. This implies a statistically significant positive relationship 
between education and incomes. 
However as can be deduced from Table 4.3, large standard deviations are 
associated with different incomes, thereby cautioning us about their use 
and making inferences from these. However the researcher can do nothing 
about this situation as the variable 'income' is usually poorly collected. 
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Table 4.3 Mean Monthly earnings by selected worker 
characteristics 
Worker Mean Worker 
Characteristics Earnings Characteristics 
(MUR) 
Sex Highest Education level 
Male 5883 Basic schooling 
(3893) 
Female 4335 Lower secondary 
(3589) 
Upper secondary 
Employment sector GCSE 
Public 8039 Sixth form 
_(39601 
Private 4764 A level 
(3567) 
Vocational 
qualifications 
Place of residence Tertiary qualifications 
Urban 6116 
(4337) 
Rural 4853 Overall income 
(3377) 
N umber of observations 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population census data 
Standard deviations in parenthesis 
Mean 
Earnings 
(MUR) 
3948 
(2296) 
4465 
(2526) 
5020 
(3008) 
6923 
(4166) 
6200 
(2664) 
7993 
(4696) 
10225 
(5018) 
13258 
(6029) 
5392 
(3867) 
4259 
Table 4.4 gives some descriptive statistics of the main variables used in 
this study. The mean age for the sample is 36 years and on average a 
worker has completed 9 years of schooling. He/she works in the current 
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firm for an average of 9 years and the number of hours worked per week is 
43. Such long tenure may indicate low labour mobility across firms 
(Bigsten & et aI, 2004). Forty four percent of the sample have no 
schooling or have at most primary schooling, whereas 51 % have at least 
some secondary education. Fifty seven percent of workers are from rural 
areas and 19% are public sector employees. As stated before, the average 
income per month is MUR 5392. Compared to Bostwana (Siphambe 
1997), for instance, the Republic of Mauritius has a relatively older and 
more schooled labour force. 
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Table 4.4 Mean and S.D. of selected variables in the sample 
Variable Mean S.D. 
Age 35.82 10.575 
Gender (1 = Woman, O=Man) 0.32 0.465 
Years of schooling 9.24 3.517 
Tenure 9.38 9.429 
Rural (Rural =1, Urban=O) 0.57 0.495 
Public sector (1 =Public, O=Private) 0.19 0.394 
Mauritian 0.98 0.149 
Highest Education level: 
Basic education 0.4386 0.4963 
Lower secondary 0.1106 0.3137 
Upper secondary 0.1700 0.3757 
GCSE 0.1073 0.3095 
Sixth Form 0.0042 0.0649 
A level 0.0664 0.2491 
Vocational qualifications 0.0254 0.1572 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0225 0.1485 
Individual's income 5391.99 3866.78 
Hours worked (per week) 42.87 11.612 
Number of observations 4243 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon census data 
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4.7 Earnings differentials by gender 
Table 4.5 Mean Monthly earnings by gender 
Highest Education level: Men Women 
(MUR) (MUR) 
Basic education 4502 2702 
(2399)_ (1397) 
Lower secondary 4960 3167 
(2591) (1791) 
Upper secondary 5691 3184 
(3073) (1839) 
GCSE 7404 5959 
(4109) (4125) 
Sixth form 6419 6025 
(1656) (3347) 
A level 8887 7000 
(5316) (3664) 
Vocational qualifications 10315 10054 
(4655) (5714) 
Tertiary qualifications 13739 12379 
(6340) (5396) 
Number of observations 2759 1266 
Source: Computed from census data 
Standard deviations in parenthesis 
Table 4.5 shows that men with tertiary qualifications earn, on average, 3.1 
times more than men who have at most primary schooling. The equivalent 
figure when comparing women with tertiary qualifications to at most 
primary schooling is 4.6 times. The incomes ratio between male and 
female employees decline as the level of education increases. It is about 
1: 1.67 for those with at most primary schooling and falls to about 1: 1.11 
for those with tertiary qualifications while the ratio is 1: 1.03 for vocational 
qualifications. In other words the gender wage gap is larger at lower 
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levels of education. Some studies carried out elsewhere have shown that 
wages for men and women who have bachelor's degrees are roughly the 
same and that education has a positive link in closing the wage gap 
(Hattiangadi, 1998; Lismoen, 2002). 
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Table 4.6 Mean of selected variables by gender 
Variable Males Females t-values 
(Overall) 
Age 35.97 35.49 -1.384 
Years of schooling 9.27 9.16 -0.966. 
Tenure 10.44 7.13 -10.804 
Rural (Rural =1, Urban=O) 0.59 0.54 -2.573 
Public sector (1 =Public, O=Private) 0.21 0.14 -5.382 
Mauritian 0.98 0.96 -4.919 
Education level: 
Basic education 0.4446 0.4256 -1.164 
Lower secondary 0.1173 0.0962 -2.038 
Upper secondary 0.1823 0.1436 -3.129 
GCSE 0.1049 0.1125 0.748 
Sixth Fonn 0.0028 0.0074 2.178 
A level 0.0512 0.0992 5.869 
Vocational qualifications 0.0244 0.0074 0.574 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0213 0.0252 0.787 
Individual's income 5882.87 4335.39 -12.370 
Hours worked (per week) 43.88 40.69 -8.415 
Number of observations 2893 1350 4243 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population census data 
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Table 4.6 presents the means of the selected variables by gender and gives 
the differences in means of the workers' characteristics. Both sexes are of 
similar ages and have similar years of schooling. Mean differences in age 
between sexes are statistically insignificant and the same applies for the 
mean differences in years of schooling between sexes. So in terms of 
educational attainment, males & females are similar in Mauritius which is 
in line with other upper- middle income countries such as Argentina & 
Venezuela (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002; World Bank, 2007). The 
distribution of education attainment for the Republic of Mauritius differs 
between both groups and the mean differences between sexes for all 
qualifications, with the exception of primary, GCSE, vocational and 
tertiary qualifications, are significantly different from zero, some at the 
1 % and others at the 5% level of significance. Marginally women more 
than men have, on average, at least upper secondary schooling (1 % more) 
and 4% more have tertiary qualifications than their male counterparts, 
However, the mean difference in sector of employment between sexes is 
significant. When workers are disaggregated by gender, the data show 
that the average male worker has 3 more years of experience with the 
same employer than his female counterpart and the mean difference in 
tenure between both sexes is significantly different from zero below the 
0.1 % level of significance. Women earn less than men. This may be 
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explained partly by their lower experience in their current job and by their 
fewer hours worked per week. 
4.8 Earnings differentials by sector of employment and by gender 
Table 4.7 Mean Monthly Earnings by economic sector 
Highest Education level 
Basic education 
Lower secondary 
Upper secondary 
GCSE 
Sixth form 
A level 
V ocational qualifications 
Tertiary qualifications 
Number of observations 
Source: Computed from census data 
Standard deviations in parenthesis 
Public sector 
(MUR) 
5872 
(2659) 
5836 
(2274) 
6822 
(2599) 
8865 
(3123) 
6086 
(1974) 
8041 
(3900) 
9729 
(4412) 
13737 
(5360) 
722 
Private sector 
(MUR) 
3720 
(2138) 
4292 
(2506) 
4707 
(2966) 
6083 
(4283) 
6244 
(29591 
7958 
(5224) 
10823 
(5651) 
12900 
(6508) 
3303 
When earnings are disaggregated into public and private sector employees, 
as illustrated in Table 4.7, a sharp progression of incomes by level of 
education both in the private and public sectors is revealed. In fact, the 
incomes of those in the public sector are consistently higher than those in 
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the private sector at all levels of education except for those holding sixth 
form and vocational qualifications. Similar findings have been reported 
by studies carried out in developing countries elsewhere [AI am & 
Psacharapoulos (1991) for Venezuela, Gomez-Castellanos & 
Psacharapoulos (1990) for Ecuador, Siphambe (1997) for Bostwana]. It 
may be deduced that the public sector is in an advantageous position in 
recruiting employees due to the higher wages it can offer, and due to better 
job security and public sector wages are determined by the government. 
Interestingly, the public sector rewards the 'sixth form' qualification 
relatively less than the 'GCSE' and the 'upper secondary' qualifications. 
One may argue that in the case of sixth form qualification, the signaling 
value of education is at work. Sixth form qualification reflects the 
unsuccessful completion of 'A' level, hence, potentially it signals to the 
employer that the individual in question may be less productive relative to 
someone who holds 'GCSE' or 'A' level. 
Further characteristics of workers, disaggregated into public and private 
sector employees are presented in an attempt to shed light on the 
consistently higher earnings of public sector employees relative to private 
sector workers. Thus, Table 4.8 is derived and it presents the means of 
selected variables by economic sector. Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 present 
the means of selected variables by economic sector and by gender. 
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Table 4.8 Mean of selected variables by economic sector for men 
and women 
Variable Public Private t-values 
Sector sector (All) 
Age 40.63 34.67 14.831 
Gender( l=Woman, O=Man) 0.24 0.34 15.602 
Years of schooling 10.94 8.83 -15.849 
Tenure 16.18 7.76 24.477 
Rural (Rural =1, Urban=O) 0.54 0.58 -2.082 
Mauritian 1.00 0.97 4.341 
Highest Education level: 
Basic education 0.2424 0.4852 -12.812 
Lower secondary 0.0649 0.1214 -4.646 
Upper secondary 0.1310 0.1793 -3.307 
GCSE 0.1689 0.0927 6.358 
Sixth Form 0.0061 0.0038 0.928 
A level 0.1481 0.0471 10.557 
Vocational qualifications 0.0722 0.0142 9.576 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0502 0.0160 5.944 
Individual's income 8038.69 4763.77 23.082 
Hours worked (per week) 40.99 43.32 -5.165 
No. of observations 817 3426 4243 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon census data 
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Table 4.9 Mean of selected variables by economic sector for males 
only 
Variable Public Sector Private t-values 
Males Sector (Males) 
Males 
Age 41.67 34.42 15.837 
Years of schooling 10.52 8.93 11.174 
Tenure 17.35 8.55 20.944 
Rural (1 =Rural O=Urban) 0.57 0.59 -0.817 
Mauritian 1.00 0.98 3.120 
Highest Education level: 
Basic education 0.2862 0.4878 -9.094 
Lower secondary 0.0772 0.1282 -3.511 
Upper secondary 0.1559 0.1894 -1.917 
GCSE 0.1688 0.0875 5.902 
Sixth Form 0.0048 0.0022 1.113 
A level 0.0981 0.0385 6.010 
V ocationa1 qualifications 0.0643 0.0136 7.335 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0434 0.0153 4.313 
Individual's income 7952.05 5319.86 15.558 
Hours worked per week 42.30 44.31 -3.808 
Number of observations 622 2271 2893 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population census data 
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Table 4.10 Mean of selected variables by economic sector and for 
females only 
Variable Public Private t-values 
Sector Sector (females) 
Females Females 
Age 37.31 35.18 2.591 
Years of schooling 12.72 8.87 12.716 
Tenure 12.45 6.23 10.872 
Rural (Rural = 1, Urban=O) 0.44 0.56 -3.155 
Mauritian 0.99 0.96 2.657 
Highest Education level: 
Basic education 0.1026 0.4801 -10.231 
Lower secondary 0.0256 0.1081 -3.628 
Upper secondary 0.0513 0.1592 -3.994 
GCSE 0.1692 0.1029 2.715 
Sixth Form 0.0103 0.0069 0.502 
A level 0.3077 0.0640 10.983 
Vocational qualifications 0.0974 0.0156 6.577 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0718 0.0173 4.525 
Individual's income 8315.04 3664.08 18.792 
Hours worked (per week) 36.80 41.35 -5.331 
No. of observations 195 1155 1350 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn census data 
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Table 4.8, Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 shows the characteristics of the 
sample in the public and private sectors and gives a summary of the tests 
of significance of the difference between the means in these two sectors. 
Table 4.8 shows that the average public sector worker is 6 years older, has 
2 more years of schooling, works 2 less hours per week and has been 
working with the same employer for 8 years more than his/her private 
sector counterpart. Also relative to private sector employees, a slightly 
lower proportion of the public sector employees are from rural areas. The 
differences in means for these 5 characteristics between public and private 
sector workers are significantly different from zero below the 0.1 % level 
of significance, except in the case of place of residence, where the 
differences in means are statistically significant at 5% level. 
There is also a striking disparity in the education levels of those employed 
in both sectors. Twenty four percent of those employed in the public 
sector have had only basic schooling and the equivalent figure for those in 
the private sector is 49%. Moreover 64% of public sector employees have 
had at least some secondary schooling compared to only 47% of the 
private sector. The differences in means for all these characteristics 
between the public and private sector employees (with the exception of 
'sixth form') are significantly different from zero at the 0.1 % level of 
significance. This may be partly attributed to the higher proportion of 
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more qualified females employed in the public sector - 73% as compared 
to 47% in the private sector. 
Mean earnings in the public sector are substantially higher despite the 
fewer hours worked per week. However it must be pointed out that the 
public sector employees are relatively older, have higher tenure and are 
more qualified than their private sector employees. All differences in the 
means of these workers' characteristics between the two economic sectors 
are significantly different from zero at the 0.1 % level of significance. The 
public sector tends to employ a higher proportion of those who are more 
qualified and who have successfully completed their courses, for instance, 
17% have GCSE, 15% have 'A' level, 7% have vocational qualifications 
and 5% have tertiary qualifications whereas the private sector employees 
consist of 49% with at most basic qualifications, 12% with lower 
secondary education, 18% of those with upper secondary education but 
only 9% of those with GCSE, 5% of those with 'A' level, 1 % with 
vocational qualifications and 2% with tertiary qualifications. Clearly the 
differences in tenure, age and education may explain some or all of the 
difference in wages between the sectors. I explore this issue in a 
multivariate analysis framework later in this thesis. 
Differences between sexes become more striking when the sample is 
dis aggregated into sectors of employment by gender. Males in the public 
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sector are 8 years older, have I year more schooling, have 8 years more 
tenure, earn relatively more and work 2 hours less per week than males in 
the private sector. Generally, the differences in means for all these 
variables between public sector males and private sector males are 
significantly different from zero at the 1 % level of significance. However 
the proportion of men employed from rural areas is similar across both 
sectors and the mean difference between these sectors is statistically 
insignificant. Again the proportion of males employed in the private 
sector with at most primary schooling is the highest (48%) against 47% for 
those with at least some secondary schooling. The reverse is true for 
public sector employees with the equivalent figures of 29% and 61 %. 
When comparing the public sector female employees with the private 
sector female employees, the data shows that only 10% of women 
employed in the public sector have at most primary schooling and 73% of 
female employees have at least some secondary schooling. The equivalent 
figures for private sector female employees are 48% and 47%. The latter 
work on average 4 hours more per week but earn substantially less than 
their counterparts in the public sector. This may be attributed to the fact 
that public sector female employees are on average 2 years older, have 5 
more years of schooling and have 6 years more of experience with the 
same employer. Also relative to the public sector, a higher proportion of 
private sector females work in the rural areas (around 12% more). 
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The differences in means between these two sectors for all of these 
characteristics are significantly different from zero at the 1 % level of 
significance, except for the difference in the mean ages which IS 
significant at the 10% level. 
When public sector male employees are compared with public sector 
female employees, men are on average 5 years older, have 1 year less 
schooling, 5 years more experience with the current employer and earn 
relatively less than women, despite the latter working 5 hours less per 
week. This may be attributed to the fact that women in the public sector 
are more qualified than their male counterparts. For instance, 73% of the 
public sector female employees have at least some secondary schooling 
and the equivalent figure is 61 % for male employees. The proportion of 
public sector female employees who reside in rural areas is 13% lower 
than their male counterparts. However the sample size of public sector 
female employees is very small. Hence any deduction made may not 
provide an accurate picture of the prevailing conditions in the public 
sector for the female employees. 
Gender differences are less acute III the private sector. The average 
private sector male employee is 1 year older, works 3 hours more per 
week and has 2 years more of experience in the current job than his female 
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counterpart. Both sexes have similar years of schooling and the 
distribution of educational attainment is almost identical for both groups 
(which is similar to Psacharapoulos & Gomez-Castellanos, 1990 for 
Ecuador). However women in the private sector earn relatively less than 
their male counterparts. 
4.9 Earnings differentials by place of residence and by gender 
As already pointed out, workers who reside in urban areas earn 1.26 times 
more than those who reside in rural areas. Table 4.11, therefore, presents 
a further breakdown of selected variables by place of residence and by 
gender in an attempt to explain the higher mean incomes of workers who 
live in urban areas. Table 4.12 summarises the significance tests of 
differences in the means of workers' characteristics across place of 
residence. 
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Table 4.11 Means of selected variables by place of residence 
Variable Urban Rural t-values 
(All) 
Age 36.29 35.46 -2.518 
Gender( l=Woman, O=Man) 0.34 0.30 -2.573 
Years of schooling 10.03 8.64 -11.017 
Tenure 9.44 9.34 -0.356 
Public sector (1= Public, O=Private) 0.21 0.18 -2.082 
Mauritian 0.98 0.97 -1.533 
Highest Education level: 
Basic education 0.3390 0.5127 11.467 
Lower secondary 0.1304 0.0958 -3.567 
Upper secondary 0.1701 0.1699 -0.010 
GCSE 0.1222 0.0962 -2.708 
Sixth Form 0.0055 0.0033 -1.108 
A level 0.0886 0.0500 -5.022 
Vocational qualifications 0.0352 0.0180 -3.537 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0358 0.0127 -5.032 
Individual's income 6115.99 4853.29 -10.679 
Hours worked (per week) 43.10 42.70 -1.120 
No. of observations 1810 2433 4243 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon census data 
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Table 4.12 Means of selected variables by place of residence for 
men 
Variable Urban Rural t-values 
Males Males Males 
Age 36.70 35.45 -3.148 
Years of schooling 9.82 8.88 -7.863 
Tenure 10.44 10.44 0.001 
Public sector (1= Public, O=Private) 0.22 0.21 -0.817 
Mauritian 0.99 0.98 -1.292 
Highest Education level: 
Basic education 0.3627 0.5023 7.531 
Lower secondary 0.1389 0.1020 -3.053 
Upper secondary 0.1922 0.1753 -1.163 
GCSE 0.1165 0.0967 -1.712 
Sixth Form 0.0025 0.0029 0.220 
A level 0.0591 0.0457 -1.608 
Vocational qualifications 0.0308 0.0199 -1.868 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0324 0.0135 -3.492 
Individual's income 6502.23 5446.48 -7.265 
Hours worked (per week) 44.36 43.55 -1.832 
No. of observations 1195 1698 2893 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn census data 
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Table 4.13 Means of selected variables by place of residence for 
women 
Variable Urban Rural t-values 
Females Females Females 
Age 35.48 35.49 0.013 
Years of schooling 10.44 8.09 -11.017 
Tenure 7.51 6.80 -1.690 
Public sector (1= Public, O=Privatc) 0.18 0.12 -3.155 
Mauritian 0.97 0,96 -1.161 
Highest Education level: 
Basic education 0.2927 0.5367 9.312 
Lower secondary 0.1138 0.0815 -2.006 
Upper secondary 0.1268 0.1576 1.607 
GCSE 0.1333 0.0951 -2.217 
Sixth Form 0.0114 0.0041 -1.560 
A level 0.1463 0.0598 -5.353 
Vocational qualifications 0.0439 0.0136 -3.412 
Tertiary qualifications 0.0423 0.0109 -3.686 
Individual's income 5361.09 3478.32 -9.942 
Hours worked (per week) 40.65 40.73 0.126 
No. of observations 615 735 1340 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population census data 
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As Table 4.11 shows workers from urban areas are 1 year older and have 1 
more year of schooling than their counterpart from rural areas. But they 
both have similar years of experience on the same job and similar hours of 
work per week. Those from rural areas earn 1.26 times less than those 
from urban areas which may be partly attributed to the fact that public 
sector jobs are mostly located in urban areas. Generally, the differences 
in the means for the characteristics of all workers are significantly 
different from zero at the 1 % level of significance, except for tenure and 
hours worked during the week, which are insignificant. 
Considering only males who reside in urban and rural areas, it is found 
that on average, urban males are 2 years older and earn 1.2 times more 
their counterparts residing in rural areas and have 1 more year of 
schooling, although both have similar tenure and both work similar hours 
per week. The differences in means for these characteristics, except for 
tenure, are all significantly different from zero at 1 % level of significance 
(with that of 'hours worked during the past week' being significant at the 
10% level of significance). However, it must be pointed out that the urban 
male employees tend to be more qualified, for example, only 36% have at 
most primary schooling and 57% have at least some secondary schooling, 
and the equivalent figures for the rural male employees are 50% and 36%, 
respectively. The mean differences for some of the levels of qualifications 
are significantly different from zero either at the 1 % or 5% or again at the 
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10% levels of significance, with the exception of 'Sixth Form' and 'A' 
level for which the data do not show any significant differences for males 
between the two locations. 
When only female employees are considered across both the urban and 
rural areas, the data in Table 4.13 suggest that on average, women in urban 
areas are of similar ages, have 2 extra years of schooling, have 1 
additional year of tenure, work similar hours per week and they earn 1.5 
times more than their counterparts in rural areas. Also women in the 
public sector live mostly in urban areas. Moreover, as shown earlier in 
Table 4.8, the public sector employs mostly qualified female workers. 
This is consistent with the findings of Siphambe (1997) for Bostwana. 
Moreover, when male and female employees who reside in urban areas 
only are considered, the data shows that males, on average, are 2 years 
older, have similar years of schooling, work 3 hours more per week and 
have 2 extra years of experience with the same employer than their female 
counterparts. The latter earn 1.2 times less than male employees from 
urban areas although they are more qualified with 62% of women from 
urban areas having at least some secondary schooling out of which 15% 
have 'A' level whereas only 6% of their male counterparts have 'A' level. 
The disparity between male and female employees is more striking when 
only rural areas are considered. The average male worker from a rural 
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area is of similar age, has 2 extra years of schooling, 3 more years of 
tenure and works 2 more hours per week than his female counterpart. 
Moreover, the female employees in rural areas earn 1.6 times less than 
rural male employees although 42% of women have at least some 
secondary schooling and the equivalent figure is only 36 % for men. Also 
the public sector employs around 1.8 times more men from rural areas 
than women and this may be due to the cultural constraints faced by 
women in rural areas such as getting married when they are still very 
young and thus, bearing children at young ages. 
4.10 Concluding note 
In the first part of this chapter, I looked at the data set that will be used to 
estimate social returns to education. Then, the focus shifted from 
assessing the reliability and validity of the 2000 Population census data to 
the actual variables that will be used to generate estimates of the social 
returns to education. A sub-sample of 4256 male and female wage earners 
between 12 to 59 years of age, for whom all necessary information is 
available, were chosen for further analysis. 
The second part of this chapter describes earnings differentials by gender, 
by place of residence and by sector of employment. Three important 
points are evident from the analysis presented so far: Firstly, women tend 
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to earn less than men despite being more qualified in most cases, which 
may be partly attributed to their low tenure and fewer hours of work per 
week. Secondly, earnings vary significantly between the public and 
private sectors and the disparity becomes acute when the sample is further 
dis-aggregated by gender, with women in the private sector earning 2.27 
times less than public sector female employees despite their greater hours 
of work per week. Thirdly, again women from the rural areas tend to earn 
less than the other sub-groups of the sample dis-aggregated by place of 
residence and by gender, which may be partly due to their lower years of 
schooling and tenure. However, it should be emphasised that the fact that 
the sample sizes for some subgroups are small and hence inferences made 
from them may not be generalisable to the country as a whole. 
The next chapter (Chapter 5) provides OLS estimates of social returns to 
education in the Republic of Mauritius and it also deals with the problem 
arising from the fact that these results may be subject to selectivity bias. 
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Chapter 5: Social Returns to Qualifications in the Republic of 
Mauritius, using the Conventional OLS Technique and the 
Heckman Selection Model. 
5.0 Introduction 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the literature distinguishes between two 
rates of return: the private rate of return and the social rate of return. In 
Human Capital Theory the private rate of return relates to all resources 
invested by the private individual including the opportunity costs and 
direct costs and all the benefits that accrue to the individual alone. 
Conceptually, the social rate of return also includes the public cost of 
providing education, tax paid on earnings and the monetary value of all 
external benefits. The private return includes net wage gain for the 
individual, whilst the social return is generally based on gross income as 
the latter is a better proxy to the total effect of education on productivity. 
Education confers both monetary and non-monetary benefits. The 
monetary returns to education are expressed in the form of higher wages 
or earnings in the labour market. Recent studies have attempted to 
measure the non-monetary benefits of education, for instance, in terms of 
reduced family size (through adult female education), better health, 
political awareness, improved child care, reduced poverty, and reduced 
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inequality. (Duraisamy & Malathy, 1990; Schultz, 1988; McMahon, 
1995). Moreover Malathy (1994) shows that women's education 
significantly increases the time allocated to teaching children and Angrist 
& Lavy (1996) report the children of better educated parents stay longer 
and do better in schools. 
Ideally for policy decisions, a measure of the total effects of education in, 
monetary and non-monetary terms is desirable as the non-monetary 
benefits associated with education are arguably potentially large. 
Grossman & Kaestner (1997) for instance, report that an extra year of 
schooling lowers the probability of death of adults by 0.4 percentage 
points per year and they even estimate that the improvements brought 
about by education on one's own health, spouse's health and child's health 
are around 40% of the value of the direct effect of education on earnings. 
'Despite their importance, the non-monetary benefits of education have 
been largely ignored in the study of rates of return' (Menon, 2003; p. 376). 
The available household level data in the Republic of Mauritius are 
inadequate for such a comprehensive return estimation. Hence the present 
study, based on a sample of the 2000 Population Census data, focuses on 
the monetary returns to education, for those who are in wage employment 
for which the income data are available. Moreover the 2000 Population 
Census data set only provides income in rupees, before any tax 
198 
deductions, received by the individual from all sources of incomes (CSO, 
2002a) and currently no information is available on direct and indirect 
costs of education. Thus, all returns to education computed throughout 
this thesis are only approximations to social returns to education and they 
must be interpreted accordingly. In this thesis, all estimates to social 
returns are gross wage premiums. 
Nevertheless this is the first attempt in the Mauritian context to estimate 
returns to education, using national level representative data. Although 
Psacharopoulos (1973; 1985; 1994) along with other researchers 
(Psacharapoulos & Hinchliffe, 1973; Psacharapoulos & Patrinos, 2002; 
Psacharapoulos & Mattson, 1998; Katsis et aI, 1999) have estimated 
returns to education for many countries, the Republic of Mauritius was left 
out due to the lack of information about wages in the population censuses 
conducted prior to 2000. Consequently, the time trend in the returns to 
education in the Republic cannot be investigated due to lack of data53. In 
other words, it is impossible to examine how the returns to education 
varied over time within the country. But the purpose of this study is to use 
existing data to derive an approximation to social returns to education for 
the Republic of Mauritius, and to eventually supplement existing returns 
to education studies conducted elsewhere. 
53 The 2000 Population Census was the first census to have a question on income 
in the census questionnaire. 
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The 2000 Population Census data set does not separate wages from other 
sources of incomes before taxation, and costs of educational investments 
are also not available, thus, it is difficult to estimate private and social 
rates of returns to different qualification levels for the Republic of 
Mauritius. Thus, all estimates only yield social returns and should not be 
interpreted as private or social rates of return to education. All analyses in 
this chapter are based on Mincer wage equations (see Chapter 4 for 
methodology) and estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. The selected 
sample of adult population54 contains 4256 observations, out of which 
68% are male workers (Please refer to the previous chapter for a detailed 
description of these data). The dependent variable for all the models fitted 
on the sample of adult population is the logarithm of hourly gross 
mcomes. Some of the explanatory variables include qualifications, 
gender, nationality, public sector and rural areas. All these explanatory 
variables were described in Chapter 4 and were coded as dummy 
variables. 
Qualifications are split into seven categories but since these are dummy 
variables, only six of them are included: lower secondary, upper 
secondary, GCSE & Sixth Form (for those who passes their '0' level 
exams but either did not study further or dropped out after the first year of 
the 'A' level course) 'A' level, vocational and tertiary education. The 
54 The adult population includes those in paid employment, between the ages of 
12 to 59. This was discussed at length in Chapter 4. 
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base category for the qualification variables up to the tertiary level is an 
individual with no schooling at all or at most with primary schooling, 
termed as 'no schooling or basic schooling' throughout this thesis. 
The other explanatory dummy variables, for instance, 'rural' takes a value 
of 1 if the individual resides in a rural area, the 'public sector' dummy 
takes a value of 1 if the individual is employed in the public sector, 
'gender' takes a value of 1 if the individual is female and the 'Mauritian' 
dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the worker is a non-foreigner, and in 
all the above cases, 0 otherwise. The variable 'age' and a quadratic term in 
'age' are included to test the hypothesis that earnings generally rise at a 
decreasing rate with age. The variable 'tenure' is included, as Human 
Capital Theory predicts that wages increase with tenure because the value 
of the marginal product of labour increases over time due to the 
investments in general training (Becker, 1962) or specific training 
(Becker, 1962; Hashimoto, 1981). The quadratic term in tenure is 
included to allow the impact of tenure to be non-linear, that is, increasing 
or decreasing with tenure. 
All tables in this chapter report only the social returns to qualifications 
along with the constant and do not include coefficients on the other 
explanatory variables as these are explored in the appendix to this chapter 
(full tables of results are also in the appendix). All wage regressions have 
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been carried out using White's (1984) robust estimates in STATA. This 
has important implications for the calculation of standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients. These are consistent in the presence of 
heteroscedastic variances. Finally all estimates derived from this 
conventional OLS estimation are adjusted to give estimates that are free of 
selectivity bias. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.1 outlines the 
method that is initially used to estimate social returns to qualifications in 
this chapter. In Section 5.2 the conventional OLS estimates to 
qualifications for men and women combined and by gender are presented. 
Section 5.3 further analyses the differences in the conventional OLS 
estimates by sector (i.e. private or public). The relative social returns 
enjoyed by men and women in each of these sectors are also considered. 
Section 5.4 looks at conventional OLS estimates to qualifications by place 
of residence to test the hypothesis that social returns are lower for those 
employees who reside in rural areas. Section 5.5 sets out the method that 
is used to correct for selectivity bias. Section 5.6 presents some estimates 
for men and women combined, free from selectivity bias. Section 5.7 
provides social returns to qualifications by rural/urban areas which have 
been adjusted for selectivity bias associated with choice of location. 
Finally Section 5.8 concludes this chapter by highlighting the main 
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findings and also pointing out that the conventional OLS estimates are 
robust to correction for sample selectivity in most cases. 
5.1 Traditional Mincerian approach for measuring social returns 
in the Republic of Mauritius 
The gross returns to qualification levels for the Republic of Mauritius are 
initially estimated using the traditional Mincerian specification, which 
does not include any direct educational cost. The returns to schooling 
are usually obtained by analysing the proportionate effect on wages 
of an increment in schooling. The log wage is linearly related to the 
years of schooling completed with a quadratic term in the labour market 
experience (Mincer, 1974). A simple empirical model using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) techniques may be written as follows: 
log Wi = a + fliSchooling i + Al Experience i + A2 Experience / + c i (1) 
Where log Wi = the log of earnings for the individual i 
a = wage to an individual with no schooling, here a >0 
fli = average rate of return to schooling for the individual i, here fl >0 
C i = the normally distributed residual variance in earnings 
~ and A2 describes the growth of earnings with experience, with ~ >0 
and A2<0. 
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If an individual chooses an additional year of schooling, then hislher 
extra education will cause his wages (log w) to rise by the value 
of the coefficient 'f3'. The parameter of the 'experience squared' 
variable captures the concavity of the observed age-earnings profiles and 
the negative value relates to the diminishing marginal returns to 
experience over time. In other words, earnings will rise due to 
experience but at a diminishing rate. However I do not intend to use 
the 'years of schooling' variable extensively, except to estimate extra 
returns associated with one additional year of schooling at the beginning 
of the analysis and while deriving IV estimates. Instead I will differentiate 
by type of qualification. 
There is no need to assume homogenous returns to each additional year of 
schooling as the present study estimates the labour market value of 
different qualifications using information about the highest qualification 
acquired by each respondent in the 2000 Population Census data set. 
Eight educational dummies will be used to represent the eight different 
highest qualification levels, the base category being someone with no 
schooling at all or with at most primary schooling. 
Consider equation (2): 
logwi = a + /31 LowerSecomaryi + /32 UpperSecordaryi + /33 GCSEsixthfirmi 
+ /34 Aleve!; + /35 vocationa~ + /36 tertiary; + ~Agei + A2 Age/ + rltenure; 
+ r2 tenure; 2 + JiGender; + aiocation; + l5public; + B; (2) 
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where ~l' ~2' ~3, ~4' ~5 and ~6 are all coefficients on dummy variables 
representing the different levels of qualifications acquired by individual i. 
Here the base category for the schooling variables (up to A level) is an 
individual with basic schooling or no schooling at all. All the education 
variables are treated as exogenous. The explanatory power of the model 
improves quite significantly for all groups (for men and women combined, 
by gender, by sector of employment & by area of residence) compared to 
the model with continuous years of schooling55 . The R2 values for all 
groups increase considerably, for example, the R2 value for the whole 
sample rises from to 0.41 to 0.47 and that of rural residents for men and 
women combined rises from 0.39 to 0.43. 
An individual may take different routes in the educational system and the 
returns to all combinations of qualifications may not be homogenous 
(Psacharopoulos, 1994; Robinson, 1997; Dearden et aI., 2002). In the UK, 
for instance, Dearden et al (2002) concluded that individuals who 
completed their '0' levels and then acquired vocational qualifications 
received the highest return to their '0' levels as compared to the return to 
'0' levels for those who went on to do their 'A' levels & a degree. They 
argue that although '0' level or the CSE remain significant for those 
55 The tables of results for OLS wage estimations with the continuous years of schooling 
are available in Appendix A. The model which uses only the continuous years of 
schooling are explored in Chapter 6. 
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pursumg their 'A' levels and a degree, they become more relevant in 
determining future earnmgs for an individual who acqUIres vocational 
qualifications after gaining this lower level of academic qualification. 
However the present study cannot address the complexity of routes that 
Mauritians took within the education system because only the highest 
level of qualification achieved is recorded. Therefore the labour market 
value of such combinations of qualifications cannot be estimated. 
Nevertheless the present study can control for many other factors that 
affect earnings, for instance, as illustrated in equation (2), 11, cr, and yare 
co-efficients on dummy variables which take a value equal to one (1) if 
the individual i is a woman, resides in a rural area, and works in the public 
sector56, respectively. These dummies reveal the wage premium / penalty 
associated with being a female employee, residing in a rural area and 
working in the public sector. /"1 and A2 on the other hand show the rate at 
which age affects gross earnings. This equation estimates the social 
returns to each highest qualification after controlling for some factors 
which may explain variation in the log of gross earnings. It will be used 
throughout this study except for the models to be fitted on male and 
female employees separately (where the dummy variable 'gender' will be 
removed), also for the models to be fitted on rural and urban areas (where 
56 However some regressions will be estimated with and without the sector variables 
since some of the return to education is via choice of the economic sector. The more 
educated individuals may choose to be employed in the public sector, for instance, to earn 
more. 
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the dummy variable 'location' will be removed) and for the models to be 
fitted by sector (where the dummy variable 'public' will be removed) to 
generate the returns to qualifications accordingly. 
Also the variables 'tenure' and 'tenure squared' or 'age' and 'age squared' 
will be used instead of 'experience' and 'experience squared'. Generally 
the variable 'experience' used in most human capital empirical work, is an 
estimate for potential experience which is derived by subtracting the age 
of the individual at the time when the census/survey was carried from the 
age at which he/she left schooling. This assumes that the individual 
spends his/her time in continuous employment after his/her graduation 
until retirement. Age proxies for actual work experience, which in tum 
proxies for general training on the job. However, extended periods of 
unemployment or time out of the labour market may bias this estimate, 
especially in the case of women who have spent time raising their children 
at home. The 2000 Population Census data does not provide any measure 
of actual experience so I cannot avoid this potential bias. Thus, instead of 
'potential experience', 'tenure' will be used throughout this study. Tenure 
is used to proxy for firm specific training. The use of 'tenure' and 'tenure 
squared' variables, thus, allow one to determine the rate at which firm 
specific experience on the job adds to an individual's earnings and also the 
period beyond which tenure contributes negatively earnings. 
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I will estimate social returns to years of schooling and qualifications in the 
public and private sectors to reflect nonlinearities in returns by level of 
qualifications. Regressions based on the 'years of schooling' variable will 
also be estimated for both the private and public sectors. 
Returns to education may vary, for example, by gender. Such issues may 
be tested by using interaction terms between each variable of interest and 
the education variable and of course by estimating separate regression by 
sector, gender etc. Models with interaction terms will be fitted on the 
most appropriate sub-sample to allow for heterogeneous returns to 
qualification levels. 
However, there are several possible sources of bias associated with this 
conventional way of estimating returns and some of these were discussed 
at length in Chapter 2. One possible source of bias that was not discussed 
earlier is sample selection bias. All estimates which are derived from the 
use of the censored sample of the population who is in work may be 
subject to sample selection bias as these will be based on the adult 
population who are in paid work not the population as a whole. In the 
original I % sample available for the Republic of Mauritius, only 44.7% of 
males and 22.4% of females are in paid work. Some of this is explained 
by the fact that the original sample included both young children and 
retired people but the sample of the adult population (that is, those aged 
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between 12 to 59 years, inclusive) included around 44% of individuals 
who were not in paid work, out of which 34% were men. Those who were 
not working may have lower wage offers relative to those working in the 
sample. This is further discussed in Section 5.6. This bias may be 
corrected by using Heckman's (1979) technique which involves a two-step 
procedure. In the first step the probability that an individual will be 
employed is determined according to a probit regression equation which 
includes a series of personal characteristics as regressors. From this probit 
equation a selection variable, the Inverse Mills Ratio is created and 
inserted into the right-hand side of the earnings function. That equation is 
then re-estimated for those employed to yield estimates free of censoring 
bias. This procedure requires some factors that explain the likelihood of 
being in employment but that do not directly affect earnings. This chapter 
will hence also try to account for sample selection bias. 
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5.2 Conventional OLS estimates to qualification levels for both 
men and women combined and by gender 
5.2.1 Conventional OLS estimates to qualification levels for both 
men and women combined 
Table 5.1 Social returns for men and women combined and by 
gender with conventional OLS57 
Variables For men & Men Only Women Only 
women 
combined 
Highest Qualifications 
Lower secondary_ 0.112*** 0.092*** 0.164*** 
Upper secondary. 0.200*** 0.178*** 0.278*** 
GCSE and Sixth form 0.496*** 0.429*** 0.610*** 
A level 0.727*** 0.624*** 0.850*** 
Vocational 0.798*** 0.696*** 0.980*** 
Tertiary 1.208*** 1.079*** l.433*** 
Constant 1.863*** 1.892*** l.481 *** 
R2 0.465 0.394 0.548 
No. of observations 4256 2905 1351 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, MauritIus 
*** significant at 1 % level 
As mentioned before, all regressions in this chapter control for age, age 
squared, gender, place of residence, citizenship, sector of employment, 
tenure and tenure squared. The explanatory power of the model fitted for 
men and women combined (see Table 5.1) is relatively high, as it explains 
57 The model includes the following control variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, citizenship, rural areas, female and public sector. The full table of results is 
available in Appendix A. 
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47% of the variations In gross Incomes for the adult population. All 
coefficients are highly significant and have the expected signs. 
~ Research question: Which level of education yields the highest 
social returns for the Republic of Mauritius? 
As shown in Table 5.l, the highest social returns are reported for those 
who have 'Tertiary' qualifications followed by those who have 
'vocational' qualifications whereas 'lower secondary education' yields the 
lowest social returns58 . Wages for workers with tertiary qualifications are 
121 % (or 235% when the mathematical adjustment for dummy variables is 
made 59) higher than that for an individual with no qualifications or with at 
most basic schooling. However when one considers the marginal60 social 
returns from secondary schooling (i.e. completion of A level) and tertiary 
education (derived from Table 5.1), as shown in Table 5.2, the picture 
becomes clearer. Completing secondary schooling CA' level), in the 
Republic of Mauritius yields the high marginal social return relative to 
58 The base category relative to each qualification is someone who does not have any 
schooling at most or who has at most primary schooling. 
59 The need to use the mathematical adjustment [( ecoefficient - 1) x 100] for dummy 
variables when measuring their percentage effect in semi logarithmic equations was 
highlighted in Chapter 2. 
60 Table 5.1 compared to Table 5.1 shows the marginal or additional gain arising from 
the extra level of education without adjuting for [( ecoefficient - 1) x 100]. The second row 
in Table 5.1 gives the marginal social return to secondary education compared to none or 
primary education at most. The third row gives the equivalent figure for tertiary 
education compared to 'A' level, that is, the difference between social returns to tertiary 
education and 'A' level. This gives the extra social return that is enjoyed when an 
individual decides to go for higher education. The same applies when marginal social 
returns are computed for men and women separately. Again the differences between 
social returns to tertiary education and' A' level are obtained for men and women 
separately from Table 5.1 and these are reported in Table 5.1. 
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basic schooling (106.9% when adjusted by [(ecoefficient - 1) x 100] ), whilst 
continuing and completing tertiary education yields an extra return of 48% 
(or 128% with the mathematical adjustment) for an individual who 
chooses to study beyond 'A' level. 
Table 5.2: Marginal social returns by type of schooling 
Level of education Social returns (%) 
For men Men Women 
and women 
combined 
Secondary schooling, i.e. up to 'A' 73 62 85 
level (relative to basic schooling) 
Tertiary education (relative to 'A' 48 46 58 
level) 
Source: Derived from Table 5.1 
It must be pointed out that the GDP per capita for the Republic of 
Mauritius at the time of the census for 2000 was US$ 3666 (The World 
Bank 2007). Thus, Mauritius is in the upper-middle income group of 
countries and the mean GDP per capita for this group, as reported by 
Psacharapoulos & Patrinos (2002) is US$ 2996. Figure 5.1 shows the 
social returns for one year of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling 
from Pscharapoulos and Patrinos (2002). The returns obtained for 
Mauritius in this study (see Table 5.2) are higher than the world average 
for countries within the same income group. However this comparison is 
misleading because no account has been taken so far of the number of 
years of study taken to achieve a given level of schooling. 
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Figure 5.1: Social returns to type of schooling by income level: 
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Psacharopoulos (1985) reports that there is a declining rate of return 
pattern across levels of per capita income, for instance, the highest returns 
to any level of education are in Africa and the lowest returns are in 
developed countries. He attributes this to the relative scarcity of human 
capital compared to physical capital within each group of countries. He 
further states that there is enough evidence to suggest that in developed 
countries the gap between average returns to physical and human capital 
has narrowed over time and they converge around a 10% return. Given 
that the Republic of Mauritius is an upper middle income country, we 
would expect the returns to schooling to be closer to this 10% return. I 
estimated the social returns to education using 'years of schooling' and I 
controlled for all other workers' characteristics such as age, gender, 
nationality, place of residence, sector of employment and tenure. The 
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estimated social return to a year of schooling in Mauritius (excluding 
vocational qualifications) is 7% and it is statistically significant at the 
0.1 % level61 • The mean years of schooling for men and women combined 
for the Republic of Mauritius, as presented in Chapter 4, is 9.2 years. 
Figure 5.2: Mincerian returns and mean years of schooling 
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The position of the Republic of Mauritius (denoted by +) relative to other 
groups of countries is illustrated in Figure 5.2, suggesting that the classic 
pattern of falling returns to education by years of schooling is maintained. 
That is, countries with higher average years of schooling, have lower 
returns. This is consistent with most of the literature whereby the 
Mincerian returns and mean years of schooling are used across countries 
61 The table of results is available in Appendix A 
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as illustrations of the law of diminishing returns to the formation of human 
capital (Psacharopoulos, 1985). However, it must be pointed out that the 
above comparison of social returns from other groups of countries 
(Psacharapoulos & Patrinos, 2002) with that of the Republic of Mauritius 
(in the current study) are indicative only, and are made in an attempt to 
assess the relative position of Mauritius to the world average. 
I continue to use the qualification variables as unlike the 'years of 
schooling' variable, they do not assume homogenous returns to each extra 
year spent at school. The use of qualification variables in the wage 
regressions provides the labour market value of different qualifications. 
5.2.2 Conventional OLS estimates of returns to qualification levels 
for men and women 
~ Research question: Are there gender differences in the social 
returns to qualifications in the Republic of Mauritius? 
Table 5.1 shows the results of fitting an extended Mincerian earnings 
function by gender for the sample of the 2000 Population Census data. 
For each gender the explanatory power of the model is quite robust 
although it explains greater variation in the gross earnings of women 
(around 55% relative to around 40% for men). All coefficients in the 
model fitted for male and female employees separately are statistically 
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significant at the 1 % level with the expected signs, with the exception of 
the quadratic term in tenure for women only. 
Relative to men, women consistently enjoy higher average social returns 
at all academic qualification levels as well as for vocational qualifications. 
Similar findings have been reported in most studies and such results are 
usually attributed to the lower foregone earnings of females relative to 
males (Psacharopoulos & Alam, 1991 ; Gomez-Castellanos & 
Psacharapoulos, 1990; Psacharopoulos, 1989; Psacharopoulos & Velez, 
1994; Kugler & Psacharopoulos, 1989). As discussed in sub-section 5.32, 
the highest social returns for each sex are reported for those with tertiary 
qualifications, followed by vocational qualifications and 'A' level when 
compared to the base category. The lowest social returns for each sex are 
reported for lower secondary education. Vocational qualifications for men 
and women are significant at the 0.1 % level, yielding 70% and 98%, 
higher returns, respectively, than what would be enjoyed by an individual 
with no schooling at all or with at most primary schooling. The equivalent 
figures when adjusted for (ecocfficient - 1) as required for the calculation of 
percentage effects of dummy variables in semi logarithmic equations are 
100% and 166%, respectively. 
Moreover when the social returns, derived from Table 5.1, are compared 
by schooling type, as shown in Table 5.2, secondary schooling yields the 
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greatest social returns (62%: men, 85%: women) as compared to tertiary 
education (48%: men, 58%: women). This trend is however reversed 
when the mathematical adjustment of (ecoefficient - 1) is done (87%: men, 
134%: women for secondary schooling; 107%: men, 185%: women for 
tertiary education). This adjustment is required so as to avoid serious 
misinterpretation of dummy variables in semi logarithmic equations. 
Emphasis must be laid on the fact that the sample consists of only 114 
individuals who have tertiary education, out of which only 37 are women. 
It is important to remember that in these calculations, no account has been 
taken of the social costs of educational provision as such data are not 
available to the researcher and ideally these must be brought into the 
analysis to judge the profitability of educational investments. 
5.3 Conventional OLS estimates to qualifications by sector and 
gender 
In this section, the social returns to different levels of qualifications are 
considered by both gender and sector. The dependent variable, log of 
income and all the explanatory variables in the semi-logarithmic equations 
used in this sub-section, remain the same as those used in Section 5.3 
except that the dummy variable 'public' is removed, and the dummy 
variable 'gender' is removed whenever social returns are estimated for 
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men and women separately. The explanatory power of each model is 
quite robust and is comparable to some of the results from studies that 
have estimated similar earnings functions on developing countries (Kugler 
& Psacharapou10s, 1989; Psacharapou10s & Steire, 1988; A1-Qudsi, 1989; 
Duraisamy, 2002; Siphambe, 2000). Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 show the 
social returns estimated for the Republic of Mauritius by sector and by 
gender. 
Table 5.3 
Variables 
Lower secondary 
Upper secondary 
GCSE & Sixth 
form 
A level 
Vocational 
Tertiary 
Constant 
R2 
Number of 
observations 
Conventional OLS estimates of wage equation by sector 
and by gender: Republic of Mauritius, 2000 62 
Private Public Private Public Private Public 
sector sector sector sector sector sector 
(For men (For men & (Men (Men (Women (Women 
& women women only) only) only) only) 
combined) combined) 
0.111*** 0.127*** 0.093*** 0.093* 0.151*** 0.308** 
0.179*** 0.327*** 0.157*** 0.280*** 0.247*** 0.634*** 
0.463*** 0.547*** 0.387*** 0.521*** 0.580*** 0.659*** 
0.751*** 0.673*** 0.656*** 0.642*** 0.895*** 0.823*** 
0.856*** 0.762*** 0.722*** 0.738*** 1.114*** 0.900*** 
1.241 *** 1.145*** 1.089*** 1.119*** 1.525*** 1.285*** 
1.852*** 2.477*** 1.814*** 2.774*** 1.564*** 1.987*** 
0.363 0.475 0.286 0.450 0.395 0.565 
3436 820 2280 625 1156 195 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, MaUrItIUS 
*** significant at I % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
62 The model includes the following control variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, citizenship, rural areas, female and public sector. The full table of results is 
available in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.4 (Marginal) social returns by level of schooling, for each 
sector and by gender 
Social Returns Social Returns Social Returns 
(%) (%) (%) 
For men & Men Women 
Type of schooling women combined 
Private Public Private Public Private Public 
sector sector sector sector sector sector 
Secondary schooling, 75 67 66 64 90 82 
i.e. up to 'A' level 
(relative to basic 
schooling) 
Tertiary education 49 47 43 48 63 46 
(relative to 'A' level) 
Source: Denved from Table 5.3 
5.3.1 Conventional OLS estimates to qualifications by sector 
~ Research question: Do social returns in the Republic of 
Mauritius vary between the public and private sectors? 
Referring to Table 5.3: the model has a better fit for the public sector, 
explaining 48% of the variations in gross earnings and the equivalent 
figure is 36% for the private sector. So the model explains variations in 
gross incomes for the public sector better than for the private sector. All 
coefficients for the private sector are significantly different from zero at 
the 0.1 % level of significance. The sample fitted for public sector 
employees is relatively smaller, although almost all estimated explanatory 
coefficients are significantly different from zero, at the 1 %, 5% or 10 % 
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level of significance except for the quadratic term in tenure63 . Table 5.3 
clearly indicates the level of significance of each qualification dummy 
variable. 
The general pattern of rising social returns as the level of qualification 
shifts from low to high qualification levels, as found earlier when the 
Mincerian equation was estimated for men and women combined and by 
gender, also applies in each of the sectors. This applies to both the private 
and public sectors. Thus, tertiary qualifications yield the highest social 
returns, followed by vocational qualifications and again, the lowest social 
returns are reported for lower secondary education in both sectors. All 
coefficients on the qualification variables are statistically significant at the 
I % level and are positive. 
Relative to the private sector, social returns are higher in the public sector 
for those with qualifications up to GCSE and Sixth Form and the reverse 
is true for those with higher levels of qualifications and vocational 
education. However this is not consistent in the case of men only. 
Vocational qualifications generate the second highest social returns for 
employees in both sectors across all three groups (for the samples of men 
and women combined, men only and women only). 
63 The full table of results, containing estimated coefficients for all control variables are 
in Appendix A 
220 
Table 5.4 focuses specifically on the marginal return of completing 
secondary and tertiary education. When social returns are considered 
within a particular sector of employment and for men and women 
combined, those who have completed secondary schooling up to 'A' level 
enjoy the highest social returns to their schooling (relative to someone 
with no schooling at all, or with at most basic schooling), followed by 
those who completed tertiary qualifications. However as found earlier, 
h h . I d· [( coefficient 1) 100]· d once t e mat ematIca a Justment e - x IS one to 
calculate the percentage effect of the qualification dummy variables on 
gross earnings, marginal social returns for both men and women combined 
at the tertiary level are higher than those who end their schooling at 'A' 
level (private sector: tertiary education = 134% and secondary schooling = 
122%; public sector: tertiary education = 118% and secondary schooling = 
96%). It must be pointed out that in the sample used for this PhD, the 
private sector had only 164 individuals who reported 'A' level as being 
their highest qualification level and the equivalent figure for the public 
sector was 122 individuals (Appendix D). 
When social returns (unadjusted for (ecoetTicient - 1)) are considered across 
both sectors and for men and women combined in Table 5.4, those 
employed in the private sector (relative to those employed in the public 
sector) enjoy relatively higher social returns for both levels of schooling. 
The gap is wider for an individual who holds 'A' level (8 percentage 
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points) as he/she gets the highest social returns if he/she is employed in 
the private sector and this gap widens to 16 percentage points once the 
mathematical adjustment is done to the coefficients of the dummy 
variables. 
5.3.2 Conventional OLS estimates to qualifications by economic 
sector and by gender 
Social returns by gender and sector are now considered. Before presenting 
the results, some discussion of the specifications by gender is needed64 . 
Female: Private and Public sectors 
The model specification in Table 5.3 shows social returns by gender for 
each sector of employment. The model has the best explanatory power for 
females in the public sector as it explains 57% of the variations in gross 
incomes, when fitted on public sector female employees, relative to those 
fitted for the other subgroups (private male employees, private female 
employees and public male employees). On the other hand, the semi-
logarithmic model fitted to generate social returns for private sector 
female employees, consists of a relatively larger number of women and 
explains 40 % of the variations in gross earnings. All the coefficients 
generated by the model fitted on private sector female employees are 
significantly different from zero at the 1 % level of significance, except for 
64 Please refer to Appendix A for full table of results. 
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tenure squared, which is insignificant. Moreover all coefficients have the 
expected signs for both of models fitted (private sector female employees 
only and public sector female employees only). 
Male: Private and Public sectors 
When the model is fitted onto private sector male employees it explains 
only 29% of the variation in the gross earnings of private sector male 
employees whereas when fitted onto public sector male employees it 
explains 45% of the variations in gross earnings. Thus, this model 
explains the variations in gross incomes for public sector male employees 
better than private sector male employees. All coefficients generated for 
private sector male workers only are significantly different from zero at 
the I % level of significance and also all the coefficients estimated for 
public sector male employees' wage regression are significant at 1%, 5% 
or 10% level. 
? Research question: Are there differences in social returns for 
women across the public and private sectors in the Republic of 
Mauritius? 
All comparisons of social returns are made to the base category where 
someone has no schooling at all or at most with primary schooling. The 
highest social returns for women are reported for tertiary education, 
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followed by vocational qualifications for both public and private sector 
employees. Once the mathematical adjustment to the coefficients of the 
qualification dummy variables have been done, social returns to tertiary 
education and vocational education for private sector female employees 
raise up to 360% and 205%, respectively, and the equivalent figures for 
public sector female employees only are 262% and 146% 65. 
Those women with low levels of qualifications (i.e. lower secondary, 
upper secondary and GCSE & Sixth Form) can enjoy relatively higher 
social returns in the public sector while those with high levels of 
qualifications (A level, tertiary education) and vocational qualifications 
reap greater rewards in the private sector. The gap is widest when social 
returns to upper secondary education are considered across the two sectors 
for women. The social return, as given in Table 5.3, is 25% for private 
sector female employees and 63% for public sector female employees. 
Once the qualification dummy variables are adjusted by (ecocfficicnt - 1), 
these returns rise up to 28% and 89%, respectively. 
When the marginal returns associated with completing tertiary education 
are considered, as in Table 5.4, it is indeed revealed that the public/private 
wage gap is wide at 17 percentage points66 and women in the private 
65 Only 22 women had tertiary education in the private sector and the sample for women 
with tertiary education in the public sector is even smaller (15 women only). 
66 This gap widens to 81 percentage points once the mathematical adjustment [(eCOeffiCient_ 
1) x 100] is done. 
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sector derive higher marginal returns from tertiary education than their 
counterparts in the public sector. However on average, public sector 
female employees who do not have any schooling at all or who have at 
most primary schooling, earn relatively more than their private sector 
counterparts, that is, the intercept term for the equation fitted for women in 
the public sector is higher. 
>- Research question: Are there differences in social returns for 
men across the public and private sectors in the Republic of 
Mauritius? 
Men, both in the public and private sectors enjoy the highest social returns 
for tertiary education followed by vocational qualifications and 'A' level 
while the lowest social returns are reported for male employees who have 
lower secondary education (Table 5.3). This is similar to the previous 
findings in this chapter. Unlike women, men have consistently higher 
social returns to all qualification levels, except for 'A' level and lower 
secondary education in the public sector. The gap in social returns 
between the private and public sectors for male employees is not as severe 
as in the case of women. The highest gap is reported for upper secondary 
education and GCSE & Sixth Form (12 percentage points in each case)67. 
Social returns to lower secondary education are equalised at 9.3% for men 
67 Once the qualification dummy variables have been adjusted by (ecoefficient - 1), the 
highest gap is obtained for GCSE and sixth form at 21 percentage points. 
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across these two sectors. On average, public sector male employees with 
no schooling at all or with at most primary schooling, earn relatively more 
than their counterparts. The intercept term for the equation fitted for men 
in the public sector is higher. Overall, when social returns are considered 
by the marginal level of schooling (Table 5.4), the marginal return from 
completing secondary and tertiary education are similar in both the public 
and private sectors for males. 
~ Research question: Do women have higher social returns to 
qualifications relative to men in the public or private sector of 
the Republic of Mauritius? 
Mean wages in the public sector are higher for men than women and as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the public sector is a male dominated 
sector, with a small number of female employees (only 24% in the public 
sector sub-sample are females) relative to the male employees in that 
sector, while women in the public sector tend to be more qualified. The 
difference in social returns between males and females in the public sector 
is greatest for upper secondary education, with women enjoying a social 
return of35 percentage points in excess of what men get (or 56 percentage 
points when the qualification coefficients are adjusted by exp (coefficient) 
- 1). Social returns in the private sector are also consistently lower for 
men than for women. For instance, social returns to tertiary and vocational 
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qualifications for women are 44 percentage points and 39 percentage 
points68 , respectively, above those for men in the same sector. It may be 
argued that this disparity is due to lower foregone earnings of women 
relative to men as reported in other studies (Psacharopoulos & Alam, 
1991; Gomez-Castellanos & Psacharapoulos, 1990; Psacharopoulos & 
Velez, 1994; Kugler & Psacharopoulos, 1989). 
5.4 Conventional OLS estimates to qualifications by rural/urban 
location 
);.> Research question: Do social returns vary across rural and 
urban areas in the Republic of Mauritius? 
As suggested by Schultz (1988), returns to education may be estimated by 
separating the sample by place of schooling or by place of birth to 
examine the effect of rural/urban differences in schooling availability and 
quality. However information on place of birth/schooling is not available 
in the 2000 Population Census data. Instead, the place of current 
residence of the individual is used to reflect the influence of rural/urban 
economic differences on the social returns to levels of qualifications. 
Hence the estimates derived for the 'rural dummy' variable must not be 
68 Once the mathematical adjustment (ecoefficient - 1) is done to the qualification 
coefficients, the equivalent figures rise to 162% and 98% respectively. However it must 
be pointed out that in the sample, only 37 women and 77 men (for both sectors 
combined) reported having completed their tertiary education. 
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interpreted as reflecting or indicating the differences due to schooling 
infrastructure between the rural and urban areas. Residents in urban areas 
may have had schooling in rural areas and VIce versa. Thus, the 
urban/rural difference in returns will only reflect the prevailing labour 
market situation in those areas (Duraisamy, 2002). Furthermore, as 
individuals may choose to live in a particular area, location is endogenous. 
The evidence given here is therefore descriptive rather than causal. 
Many studies only include data from individuals living in urban areas. 
Returns to education based on urban samples only may be biased and be 
of limited usefulness for educational planning and policies. However the 
social returns generated in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 do not suffer from this bias. 
Table 5.5 provides social returns to different levels of qualifications for 
both rural and urban areas, after controlling for all other differences. The 
model fitted to generate these returns is the same specification as in the 
models in the previous sections. Table 5.6 is based on the estimates 
presented in Table 5.5 but it highlights the marginal social return to 
completing secondary school and tertiary education. 
For all locations and by gender, the explanatory power of each model is 
quite robust, although the model explains the lowest proportion of 
variation in gross earnings (35%) for those men who reside in rural areas. 
All models explain variation in gross earnings which are comparable to 
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those of other studies (Psacharapoulos, 1987; Psacharapoulos & Alam, 
1991; Siphambe, 1997). All the coefficients generated by each of these 
models in Table 5.5, have the expected signs and are significantly 
different from zero in almost all cases as can be confirmed from the full 
table of results available in the appendix. 
Table 5.5 Social returns to qualifications for men and women 
combined, by gender and by place of residence using 
the conventional OLS 69 
Variables Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
(For men (For men (Men (Men (Women (Women 
& women & women 
combined) combined) 
only) only) only) only) 
Lower secondary 0.096*** 0.143*** 0.089*** 0.108*** 0.110** 0.222*** 
Upper secondary 0.173*** 0.236*** 0.145*** 0.220*** 0.256*** 0.272*** 
GCSE & Sixthform 0.420*** 0.572*** 0.392*** 0.468*** 0.469*** 0.730*** 
A level 0.730*** 0.739*** 0.650*** 0.589*** 0.737*** 0.960*** 
Vocational 0.677*** 0.894*** 0.640*** 0.750*** 0.784*** 1.111*** 
Tertiary 0.972*** 1.340*** 0.806*** 1.235*** 1.412*** 1.513*** 
Constant 1.906*** 1.678*** 1.623*** 2.100*** 1.967*** 0.689*** 
R2 0.432 0.485 0.347 0.445 0.481 0.569 
No. of observations 2434 1822 1699 1206 735 616 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
69 The model includes the following control variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, citizenship, rural areas, female and public sector. The full table of results is 
available in Appendix A. 
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~ Research question: Do rural workers have lower social returns 
to qualifications relative to urban workers in the Republic of 
Mauritius? 
With respect to Table 5.5 all the coefficients for rural and urban workers, 
estimated separately, are statistically significant at the 0.1 % level, except 
for the quadratic tenn in tenure. After adjusting for other differences such 
as tenure, age, nationality, gender and economic sector, the results suggest 
that in the case of rural and urban areas, tertiary education exhibits the 
highest social returns, followed by vocational qualifications, and lower 
secondary education yields the lowest social returns. This is consistent 
with previous results. The key finding here is that urban workers enjoy 
consistently higher social returns than rural workers for all levels of 
qualifications with the widest gap for tertiary education, 37 percentage 
points in excess of the social returns enjoyed by rural workers. This gap is 
further widened to 118 percentage points when the mathematical 
adjustment of exp( coefficient)- 1 is done to avoid serious misinterpretation 
of the dummy variable estimate. 70 
Table 5.6 indicates that the urban-rural gap in the return to education is 
largely at tertiary level. Marginal returns for tertiary education differ 
dramatically across urban and rural areas for men and women combined, 
70. However the number of individuals with tertiary education in the sample is small. 
There are only 77 individuals in urban areas who have a degree in urban areas and the 
equivalent figure for those in rural areas is 37 (Appendix D). 
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with the highest social marginal return of 60% (or 173 % when adjusted by 
ecoefficicnt -1) to tertiary education, obtained in urban areas (Table 5.6) 
compared to the 24% (or 57% when adjusted by ecocfficicnt -1) earned in 
rural areas. 
Table 5.6 Marginal Social returns by type of schooling, by 
gender and by place of residence 
Type of schooling Social returns (%) Social returns (%) Social returns (%) 
(relative to basic For men and Men Women 
schooling) women combined 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Secondary education 73 74 65 59 74 96 
(up to 'A' level) 
Tertiary education 24 60 16 65 68 55 
(vis secondary 
education) 
Source: Denved from Table 5.5 
~ Research question: Do social returns to qualifications vary by 
place of residence and by gender in the Republic of Mauritius? 
Irrespective of place of residence, women have consistently higher social 
returns for all qualification levels than men. In other words, both rural and 
urban labour markets offer higher social returns for women to all 
academic and vocational qualifications when compared to those offered to 
men. 
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For male employees, tertiary education exhibits the highest social returns, 
followed by vocational qualifications and 'A' level, whereas lower 
secondary education exhibits the lowest social returns for males residing 
in both the rural and urban areas. Urban male employees tend to enjoy 
higher social returns than rural male employees for all levels of 
qualifications except for 'A' level. Those men in urban areas who hold 
tertiary qualifications enjoyed around 43% (or 120% when adjusted by 
ecocfficicnt -1) in excess of the social returns obtained by rural males 71. 
Those women who reside in urban areas have consistently higher social 
returns for all levels of qualifications. Again, similar to what has been 
reported in previous sections, social returns are highest for tertiary 
education, followed by vocational qualifications and 'A' level, while 
lower secondary education yields the lowest social returns relative to the 
base category. However the urban-rural gap in social returns to similar 
qualifications is severe in the case of women, varying between 2 to 33 
percentage points 72. The widest gap in returns is experienced by rural 
women with vocational qualifications, 33 percentage points below what is 
obtained by urban women with the same qualifications. But it must be 
71 In the sample used for this PhD, there are only 46 men who reside in urban areas and 
who have tertiary education. The equivalent figure is 28 for those who reside in rural 
areas. 
72 When the qualification coefficients were adjusted to avoid misinterpretation of the 
impact of dummy variable on gross earnings, it was found that the urban-rural gap for 
women varied between 2 to 85 percentage points with the widest gap of 85% reported in 
favour for those urban women with vocational qualifications. However the number of 
women who have completed their degrees are very few in each of these locations 
(Appendix D). 
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pointed out that those women in rural areas who have no education or 
have at most primary education, have consistently higher mean wages than 
urban women with same level of qualification. The intercept term for 
rural female workers is higher than that of the urban female workers. The 
primary sector is mainly concentrated in rural areas and employs around 
9.4% of people. Its contribution to the GDP at market prices has remained 
fairly constant over the years, for example at around 6.3% in 2003. Forty-
six percent of the whole country is used for agriculture (CSO, 2007). It is 
not surprising that rural women with no education or with most primary 
education, have consistently higher average wages. The average daily 
earnings per person in sugar cane (main crop of the Republic of Mauritius) 
alone, for example, are at MUR 242 which is higher than the average daily 
earnings of MUR 218 for all sectors. 
However, all the results presented so far, may be subject to sample 
selection bias as these are based on equations estimated from data from 
only those who are working and all results have thus been estimated from 
this censored sample of the population. The problem is that those who are 
not working may have lower wage offers relative to those working in the 
sample. This bias may be corrected by using the Heckman (1979) two-
step procedure. As has already been said, in the first instance the 
probability that an individual will be employed is determined according to 
a probit regression equation which includes a series of personal 
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characteristics as regressors. From this probit equation a selection 
variable, the Inverse Mills Ratio is created and inserted into the right-hand 
side of the earnings function. That equation is then re-estimated for those 
employed to yield estimates free of censoring bias. This correction is 
considered in the following sections: 
5.5 Sample Selection Bias: empirical model & wage estimations 
I will now explore the possibility of selectivity bias because in the 
regressions estimated above, I estimated the social returns to qualifications 
for those men and women only who were in paid employment and it is 
possible that the characteristics of employed and unemployed men and 
women differ. Thus I have modelled the selectivity of those in work by 
using a sample of both participants and non-participants for the estimation 
of the selection equation. Individuals are defined as a participant in the 
labour market if they report having worked for pay in the month preceding 
the census. A selection model is used to account for the bias that arises 
from using non-randomly selected samples, leading to specification error 
(Heckman 1979). Sample selection bias arises if unobservable 
characteristics which affect work decision are correlated with the 
observable characteristics which affect the process determining wages. As 
will be argued later in this chapter, this problem is present for some groups 
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of individuals and is considerable when it comes to those women who 
reside in urban areas. 
The problem of selectivity bias arises because the equation of interest 
(wage equation) is defined only for a subset of individuals from the overall 
population while ideally we want the estimated coefficients (of the wage 
equation) to pertain to the whole population. If the subset of individuals is 
non-randomly drawn from the overall population, Ordinary Least Squares 
regression analysis leads to inconsistent estimates (Blau & Beller, 1988; 
Dustmann & Rochina-Barrachina, 2001; Heckman, 1979). The dependent 
variable of the wage equation can only be measured when the individual 
participates in the labour market and wage functions estimated on selected 
samples do not generate coefficients for the population wage functions. In 
other words, if participation in the labour market is not random, the 
average observed wage is subject to selectivity bias and the ordinary least 
squares estimates of the coefficients generated by the wage regression are 
biased too (Reimers, 1983). 
Heckman (1979) proposed a simple consistent estimation method to 
eliminate the specification error for the case of censored samples. The 
selection equation (pro bit function) is first estimated for the entire sample 
(participants and non-participants) while the main wage equation of 
interest is then defined solely for participants i.e. the potentially non-
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random sub-population (Dustmann & Rochina-Barrachina, 2001; 
Heckman, 1979). The selection model relates to the individual's decision 
to participate in the labour market which can be written as follows: 
m 
B; * = 50 + L 5j Qj; + &; where B* IS the net benefit of participating 
j=l 
consisting of a set of m variables Qj and a random term, &;' This is an 
underlying utility function which is unobserved and assumed to have a 
normally distributed error term. Potential earnings, Y * are given by the 
k 
Mincerian function: 1';* = flo + LfljXj; +u; relating to a set of k 
j=l 
variables Xj and the random term, u;' Here actual earnings,1'; is equal 
to 1'; * if B; * >0 and ~ not observed if B; * :S 0 (Dougherty 2003). 
According to Heckman (1976), it can be shown that: 
where (Jut: is the population covariance of u and & , (Jt: is the standard 
deviation of& and Ai is the inverse of Mill's ratio. A is 'a monotone 
decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected into 
the sample' (Heckman, 1979; p. 156). It is used to test the null hypothesis 
of no selection bias. If a conventional wage equation does not include the 
selection term, it will be subject to bias if the unobserved factors in the 
selection equation and the wage equation are related, and (Jut: is not equal 
to zero. Thus, the inclusion of A is required to control for the expected 
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error in the wage regression given that the individual's wage is observed 
(Reimers, 1983). A negative coefficient on the selection term, A, indicates 
a negative relationship between the error terms in the wage and selection 
equations. In other words, this implies that those in the working sample 
tended to have lower wage offers than those who are excluded 
(Wellington, 1993). 
Thus, in this study, the technique suggested by Heckman (1980) is used to 
obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients of the wage equation. The 
inverse of the Mills' ratio, A which predicts inclusion in the wage 
regression sample is estimated from a probit equation first, and then, 
inserted as an explanatory variable in the wage regression. In other words, 
for the purpose of this study, the equation which controls for selectivity 
bias may be written, in its general form, as follows: In Wi = B' Xi + bAi + Vi 
where X is a vector of variables affecting gross incomes, Ai is the 
covariance between the errors in the probit and wage equations and Vi is 
the disturbance term, which is normally distributed (Blau & Beller, 1998). 
For each group (men and women combined, by gender, by sector of 
employment and by location), B' X is the consistent estimate of the 
parameters in the wage equation for an individual with the same average 
characteristics as those individuals included in the wage equation. 
bA provides an estimate of the selectivity bias in the average observed 
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wage for the group i (Blau & Beller, 1998; Reimers, 1983). The model is 
fitted, using the Full Maximum likelihood estimation method. 
Few studies have taken potential sample selection bias into account and 
most of them have reported that the impact on the estimates of the 
regression coefficients is small (Blau & Beller, 1998; Dougherty, 2003; 
Heckman, 1980; Kenny et aI, 1979; Wellington, 1993). In this thesis 
similar findings are obtained, and these will be discussed in detail. In 
summary however, the change in the schooling coefficient and the 
coefficients on different qualification variables, after adjusting for 
selectivity bias, is minimal. 
The decision to participate in the labour market depends on several factors 
and the selection equation is used to model this decision. It contains all 
variables included in the wage equation, except for tenure, tenure squared 
and sector of employment 73. This is consistent with the work of Horowitz 
& Schenzler (1999) who used dummy variables in the wage equation to 
indicate the sector, type of work, self employment and hours worked but 
omitting these from selection equation. In this study, the selection 
equation also contains some other explanatory variables that strongly 
73 These variables are excluded from the probit equation because an attempt is being 
made to predict inclusion in the observed wage equation and these variables suit only 
those who are already employed. 'Tenure', for instance, which stands for years of 
service with the same employer or the dummy variable 'public' which takes the value of 
lif one is employed in the public sector and 0 otherwise, cannot be used in the selection 
equation as by definition these variables are equal to zero if someone is unemployed. 
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affect the chances of participating in the labour market but not the 
outcome under study, that is, the wage. While it is assumed that the 
logarithm of hourly gross earnings is a function of education variables, 
age, age squared and all other explanatory variables as used earlier for the 
OLS wage estimation, the likelihood of employment I wage being 
observed for men and women combined is determined by some additional 
factors such as the marital status of the individual, the presence of at least 
one child in the household74, gender interacted with the presence of 
children, gender interacted with the marital status of the individual. 
Having a spouse influences work propensity, therefore an individual who 
is married is coded 1 in the 'married' dummy. The variable 'child' refers 
to the presence of at least one child under the age of six in the household. 
It looks at the working habits of individuals with children under the age of 
six in the household. It is hypothesized that the presence of a child in the 
household influences an individual's decision to participate in the labour 
market. As is subsequently reported throughout the rest of this chapter, 
the presence of least one child increases the chances of participation for 
men in the labour market but, at the same time reduces the likelihood of 
being in employment for women. The gender, child interaction term 
(presence of at least one child under the age of six and gender of the 
individual) is used to capture the greater effect of the presence of young 
74 Marital status and the presence of at least one child in the household may impact on 
wages but due to a lack of alternative selection instruments, they will be used in the 
selection model throughout the rest of this chapter. 
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children In the household on the work-force participation decision of 
women. Age is included in both the selection and wage equations. 
However it serves different purposes; age in the selection equation 
highlights the positive relationship between labour-force participation and 
age while age in the wage equation serves as a proxy for work experience 
(Horowitz & Schenz1er, 1999). 
The other controls in the wage equation include, for example, age, age 
squared, gender and so on. The p-va1ues of the control variables show that 
most of them still have a consistently statistically significant effect on the 
logarithm of gross hourly earnings, even when allowing for selection bias. 
Basically the effect of controlling for the other factors is to reduce the 
social returns of an additional year of schooling. 
5.6 Social returns to schooling and qualifications for men and 
women combined and by gender, free of selectivity bias 
5.6.1 The selection equation for men and women combined and by 
gender 
In Table 5.7 I report all the coefficients from the selection equations for 
men and women combined and by gender. These coefficients from the 
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model are estimated from a first stage equation where 'wfp' (workforce 
participation) is the dependent variable. It is a probit model. 
Table 5.7 Selection equation parameter estimates for those aged 
22 to 59 years 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients 
For men and 
women 
combined Men Women 
Years of schooling 0.027*** 0.0008 0.038*** 
Age (years) 0.098*** 0.081 *** 0.107*** 
Age squared -0.012*** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Mauritians -0.717*** -0.439* -0.863*** 
Rural areas 0.039 0.176*** -0.020 
Female -0.208*** - -
Child 0.185*** 0.115 -0.150*** 
Gender*child -0.280*** - -
Marital status 0.846*** 0.854*** -0.981 *** 
Gender* marital status -1.820*** - -
Constant -0.677** -0.514 -0.960** 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, MaurItIUs 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
Men and women combined: 
The selection equation for the combined male and female sample reveals 
that all the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 % 
level. Moreover an additional year of schooling raises the probability of 
employment by 4 percentage points. The coefficient on age suggests that 
individuals are more likely to participate in the workforce with increasing 
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age and the coefficient of the quadratic term in age implies that the 
probability of labour market participation increases but at a decreasing 
rate. Being a citizen reduces the probability of labour market 
participation, as compared to a non-citizen. Evidence on whether residing 
in rural areas within the Republic of Mauritius affects the likelihood of 
being in employment is inconclusive. The coefficient on the rural dummy 
is insignificant. This may be attributed to the fact that all its islands 75 
other than Mauritius are wholly categorised as rural areas (CSO, 2002a) or 
because employment rates are higher in rural areas. Additionally, being a 
woman reduces the probability of workforce participation by 21 
percentage points, as reflected by the negative coefficient on gender. The 
effect of having at least one child on the likelihood of employment is 28 
percentage points less for a woman than for a man. Those who are 
married are more likely to participate in the workforce but being married 
reduces a woman's chances of workforce participation to a greater extent 
when compared to her male counterparts. 
Males or Females: 
Most of the discussion in the previous paragraph continues to hold true 
when the sample is disaggregated by gender76 except for the 'place of 
residence' dummy variable. The negative coefficient on 'place of 
75 As stated earlier in Chapter 4, the Republic of Mauritius consists of a group of islands 
and the island of Mauritius is divided into rural and urban areas whereas the other islands, 
Rodrigues, Agalega and st. Brandon are categories as rural areas (CSO,2002a). 
76 The directions of all coefficients remain the same except that their magnitudes differ. 
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residence' on the last column suggests that being a woman and residing in 
rural areas reduce the chances of being in employment. However this 
result must be interpreted with caution as this coefficient is insignificant. 
However the equivalent coefficient for men only is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 % level. Residing in rural areas increases their 
probability of being employed by 18 percentage points. 
Being a woman with at least a child reduces the probability of working 
more than just being a woman. 
Another important finding is that an additional year of schooling is likely 
to increase the chances of workforce participation for women by 4 
percentage points while the equivalent figure is only 1.5 percentage points 
and is insignificant in the case of men. This implies that educated women 
are much more likely to participate in the labour market and education 
plays a greater role in explaining the participation of women than men. 
Similar results are obtained when the highest qualification levels (instead 
of the years of schooling) are plugged into the model. 77 Thus, the potential 
selectivity bias may be greater in the case of women, and using the 
conventional OLS estimate to schooling for women may be largely and 
negatively biased downwards. This is investigated below by looking at 
the schooling coefficient in the wage equation. 
77 The selection equations are available in Appendix B 
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5.6.2 Social returns to an additional year of schooling, corrected for 
selectivity bias 
Initially there was some evidence of selectivity bias for the combined male 
and female sample and for males when the sample included young 
working children from the age of 12 years 78 (full tables of results are in 
Appendix A). However when only those individuals who are at least 22 
years old are kept in the sample, selectivity bias is no longer an issue. 
This actually means that selectivity is important for the younger sample 
because those who are most able are not yet in the labour market, that is, 
they are still in education at that age. Insignificant selection terms mean 
that we can expect the conventional OLS and the Heckman selection 
results to be the same. 
Table 5.8 shows social returns to the different qualification dummy 
variables entered in the wage regression after the selectivity term, A, was 
included in the wage equation. Social returns are presented for both sexes 
combined, for males only and for females only 
78 There is, however, no evidence of selectivity for women. 
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Table 5.S Wage regressions for men and women combined and by 
gender, adjusted for selectivity bias for those individuals aged 22 to 59 
years 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients 
For men & 
women 
combined Men Women 
Years of schooling 0.07*** 0.054*** 0.0750*** 
Age (years) 0.0163** 0.0229*** 0.0124 
Age squared -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
Mauritian 0.392*** 0.2339*** 0.5392*** 
Place of residence -0.1035*** -0.0721 *** -0.1461 *** 
Public sector 0.2879*** 0.2108*** 0.5193*** 
Gender 0.1812*** - -
Tenure 0.0236*** 0.0180*** 0.0283*** 
Tenure squared -0.0003*** -0.0002** -0.0001 
Constant 1.7947*** 1.8739*** 1.5357*** 
Inverse of Mill's ratio (A) -0.0409 -0.0742 -0.0769 
X2 2037.06*** 1086.36*** 1016.35*** 
N 5786 2884 2902 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level 
In all three equations (for men and women combined, men only & women 
only), adjusted for selectivity bias, the values for A are insignificant. 
Given that the selection terms are insignificant in each of these cases, we 
expect the conventional OLS results to be similar to those of the Heckman 
selection results. The social return to an additional year of schooling for 
men and women combined (for those aged 22 to 59 years), given by the 
conventional OLS estimation, unadjusted for selectivity bias was 7.03% 
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and after adjusting for selectivity bias, the fall in social return is extremely 
minimal (Appendix A). The social return to an extra year of schooling for 
men only, as given by the conventional OLS estimation was 6.69%, and 
this falls slightly to 6.67% when adjusted for selectivity bias. The 
straightforward OLS estimation also yielded a social return of 7.3% for an 
additional year of schooling for women only and this figure falls to 7.1 % 
when allowing for selectivity. All these estimates are statistically 
significant at 0.1 % level. The difference between the conventional OLS 
estimates and Heckman selection results is therefore minimal. 
5.6.3 Social returns to highest qualification levels for men and 
women combined and by gender, adjusted for sample selection bias 
When individuals who are aged below 22 years are removed from the 
sample, there is no major selectivity bias for men and women combined 
and by gender, although the selection term is significant in some cases. 
When the selection equations and wage equations (including A) are 
estimated using the qualification variables instead of the 'years of 
schooling' variable, the initial significant selectivity term, A, remains 
negative and significant in the case of the two groups (for men and women 
combined and for men only) which implies that the selection issue is 
significant mostly for men.. Also the difference reported in the social 
returns for each qualification between those aged 12 to 59 years and those 
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aged 22 to 59 is minimal. Hence I continue to use my original working 
sample of those aged 12 to 59 years to estimate social returns to 
qualifications, free of censoring bias and also because of comparability 
reasons
79
. 
Table 5.9 Wage estimations for men and women combined and by 
gender, adjusted for selectivity bias 80 
Educational Social Returns (after adjusting for 
variables: selectivity) 
For men and 
women 
combined Men only Women only 
Lower secondary 0.112*** 0.097*** 0.164*** 
Upper secondary 0.199*** 0.185*** 0.278*** 
GCSE & Sixth form 0.493*** 0.438*** 0.610*** 
A level 0.719*** 0.644*** 0.845*** 
V ocational education 0.788*** 0.701 *** 0.973*** 
Tertiary education l.202*** l.1O*** 1.428*** 
Constant 2.034*** 2.391 *** l.510*** 
Inverse of Mill's ratio 
-0.071 ** -0.172** -0.012 
X2 2879.03*** 1575.51 *** 1369.10*** 
N 7881 3980 3901 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, MaUrItIUs 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level 
79 Social returns in this chapter will be compared to those deduced earlier in this chapter 
where the 12-59 years working sample was used. 
80 The selection equation and full table of results are available in Appendix B. The wage 
equation includes the following controls variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, citizenship, rural areas, female and public sector. The full table of results is 
available in Appendix A. 
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Social returns to all qualifications for each group (for men and women 
combined, men only & women only) are significant at the 1 % level. The 
qualification coefficients are positive and significant in all cases. They 
display the expected ordering, that is, one may expect higher wages for 
more education (Horowitz & Schenzler, 1999). The selectivity term, A, is 
negative and statistically significant at 5% level for men and women 
combined and for men only. This implies that the observed wage is lower 
than the wage offers of a randomly selected individual in the population 
(Siphambe, 2000; Horozwitz & Schenz1er, 1999). Besides the same 
conclusion is obtained when results for the sample aged 22 to 59 years are 
analysed (Appendix B). Hence here, inclusion in the wage regression 
sample, is selective of those with lower values of time in alternative uses. 
An example of this would be in non-marketed activities. The coefficient 
of the inverse Mills ratio being significantly negative for men but not for 
women, implies that the sample mean wage is lower than the population 
mean wage. Thus, the conventional OLS wage regression yields biased 
estimates for men8l . However this bias is very minimal when the OLS 
estimates for men are compared with the Heckman selection estimates. 
After adjusting for selectivity (as can be deduced from Table 5.1 and from 
Table 5.9), social returns to lower secondary, upper secondary, GCSE & 
Sixth Form and 'A' level fall by approximately 1 percentage point in each 
81 As will be discussed throughout the rest of this chapter, the selection effects are more 
relevant for men than for women. The selection terms are negative and significant in 
most cases for men in employment. However this unusual and surprising employment 
finding cannot be investigated in the case of the Republic of Mauritius due to the absence 
of data. 
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case, while social returns to tertiary education and vocational education 
remain the same at 101% and 70%, respectively82. Thus in the case of 
men only, the conventional OLS estimates presented earlier in Table 5.1, 
are slightly biased upwards. The Full maximum likelihood (FML) 
estimation technique yields slightly lower social returns to some 
qualification levels. 
The last column of Table 5.9 describes the determinants of the logarithm 
of gross hourly earnings for women. If the assumption of random 
participation of women in the labour market were true, we could be 
satisfied with the conventional OLS wage estimations. However it is 
argued that such participations are unlikely to be random and women who 
would receive low wages may choose to stay out of the labour market, 
thus, causing the sample of observed wages to be biased upwards. An 
examination of the impact of adjusting for sample selection bias in the 
case of women is therefore necessary. Following the exp (coefficient) 
minus one transformation, differences in social returns are only observed 
for 'A' level (1 percentage point), vocational education (1.8 percentage 
points) and tertiary education (0.5 perecntage point). 
We can deduce from the sample available for the Republic of Mauritius 
that the selectivity term is negative in the case of women, but it is 
82 When the mathematical adjustment is done to the coefficients of the qualification 
dummy variables, the bias remains very minimal. 
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insignificant and social returns through the FML estimation are similar to 
the ones generated by the straightforward OLS estimation procedure. 
Thus, in line with many prevIOUS studies which correct for sample 
selectivity bias, the impact is not dramatic (Kenny et aI, 1979; Heckman, 
1980; Blau & Beller, 1988; Wellington, 1993; Dougherty, 2003). Thus, 
one may arguably continue to use the OLS social returns to qualifications 
for all the three groups (for men and women combined, men only and 
women only) for the Republic of Mauritius. Although there is evidence of 
selectivity bias in the case of men, minimal changes are found in the 
qualification coefficients when allowance is made for it. 
5.7 Social returns to qualifications by place of residence, adjusted 
for selectivity bias 
5.7.1 The selection equation by place of residence 
All regressions have included an area of residence dummy variable to 
control for local labour market effects in terms of wages and labour force 
participation rates. This control has been included to account for 
differences between rural and urban areas, for example, differences in 
poverty between rural and urban areas may depend more on differences in 
the characteristics of the households living in those areas (Wodon, 1999). 
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This therefore recogmses, that choice of residential location is 
endogenous, and may be determined by individuals' earning potential and 
their expected returns to education. 
Thus, given these differences, the returns to education may vary between 
rural and urban areas and could also be due to many constraints that may 
create barriers to perfect mobility of labour between rural and urban areas 
(Duraisamy, 2002). The estimates generated earlier (conventional OLS 
estimates), for social returns for each of these two areas may also, be 
subject to censoring bias. The probit model is estimated separately for 
rural residents and urban residents to obtain the selection term, so that 
social returns to qualifications for rural and urban residents which have 
been adjusted for selectivity bias can be obtained. The selection model 
includes the same identifying variables as in the previous sections and 
these are marital status, the presence of at least one child in the household, 
an interaction term between gender and marital status and an interaction 
term between gender and at least one child. Marital status and the 
presence of at least one child have been included in the participation probit 
model because these are believed to be important factors when choosing 
between work and no work, especially for women. 
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Table 5.10 Selection equation parameter estimates for rural and 
urban residents 
Explanatory Variables Rural areas Urban areas 
(for men & women (for men & women 
combined) combined) 
Lower secondary -0.095 0.134 
Upper secondary -0.092 0.061 
GCSE & Sixth form 0.016 0.274*** 
A level 0.136 0.353*** 
Vocational education 0.236 0.561 *** 
Tertiary education 0.099*** 0.342** 
Age (years) 0.277*** 0.269*** 
Age squared -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Mauritians -0.984*** -0.913*** 
Gender (female = 1 ) -0.403*** -0.300*** 
Child -0.039 0.249** 
Gender*child -0.015 -0.172 
Marital status 0.961 *** 0.742*** 
Gender*marital status -1.906*** -1.628*** 
Cons -3.329*** -3.538*** 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, MauritIus 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level 
As can be seen from Table 5.10, all qualification coefficients (except for 
tertiary qualification) are statistically insignificant for rural residents, 
while all qualification coefficients beyond upper secondary education are 
highly significant83 for urban residents. These results imply that 
qualification levels do not influence the probability of being employed for 
83 Except for tertiary qualification which is significant at 5% level. 
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those residing in rural areas whereas post compulsory qualifications 
increase the likelihood of urban residents to be in employment. Thus, 
education seems to play a significant role in influencing the latter's 
decision to participate in the labour market. Age increases an individual's 
chances of being in paid work, but at a decreasing rate. This is true in the 
case of both rural and urban residents. Irrespective of area of residence, 
women are less likely to be in paid work. The gap in the participation rate 
between males and females is greatest in rural areas. 
Marriage plays a highly significant role in influencing an individual's 
decision to work, especially for those who reside in rural areas. Having at 
least one child increases the probability of an urban resident being in paid 
work and this coefficient is significant at the 5% level while that for a 
rural resident is negative and statistically insignificant. Having at least 
one child decreases the probability of an urban woman being in 
employment by 17 percentage points when compared to those without a 
child. Similarly, being a rural married woman or an urban married 
woman, decreases the probability of being in paid work. 
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5.7.2 Wage regressions by place of residence, adjusted for sample 
selection bias 
After the selection equations have been estimated, the values of the 
inverse of Mill's ratio have been plugged into the wage equations. These 
results are displayed in Table 5.11 84. Thus, here we can see that all social 
returns to qualifications by area of residence have been adjusted for 
selectivity bias. 
Table 5.11 Social returns to qualifications by place of residence for 
men and women combined 85 
Educational variables: Social Returns 
Rural Urban 
Lower secondary 0.098*** 0.139*** 
Upper secondary 0.173*** 0.234*** 
GCSE & Sixth form 0.419*** 0.565*** 
A level 0.726*** 0.726*** 
Vocational education 0.671 *** 0.879*** 
Tertiary education 0.971 *** 1.330*** 
Constant 2.063*** 1.867*** 
Inverse of Mill's ratio -0.067 -0.075 
X' 1337.83*** 1362.40*** 
N 4541 3340 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, MauntIUs 
*** significant at I % level, ** significant at 5% level 
84 Full tables of results with control variables are available in Appendix B. 
85 The model includes the following control variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, citizenship, rural areas, female and public sector. The full table of results is 
available in Appendix A. 
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The inverses of Mill's ratio for both groups (rural and urban workers) are 
insignificant. Social returns to all qualifications for these groups of 
workers when adjusted for censoring bias are almost identical to the one 
generated by the conventional OLS wage regressions which did not 
correct for selectivity bias86 . Social returns for the Republic of Mauritius, 
are consistently higher for urban residents (except for A level) than for 
their rural counterparts and tertiary qualification has the largest impact in 
urban areas (36 percentage points higher than in rural areas or 101 
percentage points higher with the exp( coefficient )-1 transformation done 
to the qualification dummy coefficients). This is consistent with the 
findings of another study carried out in another developing country 
(Bangladesh) by Wodon (1999). He reported that higher education has the 
largest impact on wages in urban areas. 
86 A quick comparison between the conventional OLS estimates and those generated by 
the Heckman selection model can be made by looking at Table 5.5 and Table 5.11 of this 
chapter. However after the exp (coefficient)-l adjustment to the qualification dummy 
variables is made, differences (the fall in social returns) between each of the coefficients 
generated by conventional OLS and the Heckman model for urban residents vary 
between 0.5 and 3.8 percentage points. The largest decline is registered in social returns 
for those who reside in urban areas and have tertiary education. 
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5.7.3 Social returns to qualifications by place of residence & by 
gender, adjusted for sample selection bias 
5.7.3.1 The selection equation by place of residence & by gender 
In order to investigate the issue of selectivity bias among males and 
females in rural and urban areas, the sample is further disaggregated by 
gender. Table 5.12 displays some of the results of the participation probit 
. 87 
equatIOns . 
Table 5.12 Selection equation parameter estimates for rural and 
urban residents by gender 
Explanatory Variables Men only Women only 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Lower secondary -0.144 -0.145 -0.076 0.325*** 
Upper secondary -0.260*** -0.128 -0.020 0.172* 
GCSE & Sixth form -0.245** -0.187 0.134 0.528*** 
A level -0.395*** -0.451 *** 0.497*** 0.875*** 
Vocational education -0.257 -0.074 0.604** 0.934*** 
Tertiary education -0.120 -0.435* 0.249 0.955*** 
Age (years) 0.343*** 0.293*** 0.236*** 0.255*** 
Age squared -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Mauritians -0.295 -0.584 -1.293*** -0.749** 
Child -0.085 0.222* -0.038 0.080 
Marital status 0.828*** 0.639*** -0.833*** -0.811 *** 
Cons -4.837*** -3.958*** -2.863*** -4.043*** 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, MaurItius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level 
87 Full tables of results are in Appendix B. 
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All qualification coefficients play a significant role in the likelihood of 
being employed for urban women. These coefficients are positive and 
highly significant for this group of people. In the case of rural men, 
although upper secondary, GCSE & Sixth Form and 'A' level are 
statistically significant, the coefficients are negative. Thus there is little 
evidence to suggest that academic education increases the probability of 
being in employment for all the groups (except for urban women). The 
vocational qualification variable is positive and significant only in the case 
of women, and those women with vocational qualifications in urban areas 
are more likely to be in employment. 
Age has a positive and highly significant coefficient along with the 
quadratic term in age being negative but highly significant (rural men, 
urban men, rural women and urban women). These coefficients imply that 
age increases at a decreasing rate the probability of an individual being in 
paid work. Having at least one child is only statistically significant in the 
case of urban men, nevertheless it suggests that urban men are more likely 
to be in employment if they have children. The coefficient for marital 
status is positive for men and negative for women. These coefficients are 
all significant at 1 % level for all groups (rural men, urban men, rural 
women and urban women) which means that being married increases the 
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likelihood of men (irrespective of area of residence) being in employment, 
while the reverse is true in the case for women. 
5.7.3.2 Wage regressions adjusted for selectivity bias by place of 
residence & by gender 
Table 5.13 displays results of the wage estimations, adjusted for selectivity 
bias when the sample is disaggregated by gender. The values of the 
inverse Mill's ratio remain insignificant for groups of workers except for 
rural males. A is negative and significant at 5% level for those men who 
reside in rural areas88 . This implies that those men who have better 
opportunities outside the labour market (for instance, income from 
landholdings) are less likely to be included in the wage sample for men 
within rural areas. However when social returns to qualifications for this 
group of individuals are compared to the ones generated by the 
straightforward OLS method, the impact of selectivity bias on the 
coefficients for qualifications is minima189. After adjusting for the exp 
(coefficient) - 1, the qualification dummy coefficients rise by less than a 
percentage point except in the case of 'A' level (4 percentage points) and 
tertiary education (4 percentage points) when compared to the estimates 
88 As stated previously, due to lack of good raw data, this curious employment finding 
cannot be investigated. 
89 Please refer to Column 4 of Table 5.5 and to Column 2 of Table 5.13 for a quick 
comparison. There are slight increases in social returns to each qualification level, 
varying from 0.4 percentage point for lower secondary education to 2.3% for upper 
secondary education. However the sample of rural males with tertiary education is very 
small (Appendix D). 
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generated by the conventional OLS after the exp (coefficient)-l 
transformation. 
Table 5.13 Social returns to qualifications by place of residence 
and by gender 90 
Educational Men Women 
variables: Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Lower secondary 0.093*** 0.112*** 0.104* 0.208*** 
Upper secondary 0.155** 0.222*** 0.253*** 0.267*** 
GCSE &Sixth form 0.403*** 0.474*** 0.477*** 0.704*** 
A level 0.671 *** 0.604*** 0.766*** 0.915*** 
Vocational 0.646*** 0.754*** 0.821 *** l.064*** 
Tertiary 0.825*** l.250*** 1.428*** l.463*** 
Constant 2.215*** 2.405*** l.803*** 0.930*** 
Inverse of Mill's ratio -0.201 ** -0.110 0.085 -0.084 
XL 719.88*** 817.21*** 660.14*** 515.32*** 
N 2297 1683 2244 1657 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Mauntms 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
The selectivity term is insignificant in the case of those men who reside in 
urban areas and a quick comparison of the social returns to qualifications 
generated through a straightforward OLS method, unadjusted for 
censoring bias (5 th column in Table 5.5) and FML method, adjusted for 
censoring bias (3 rd column in Table 5.13), indicates that the adjustment for 
selectivity bias causes social returns to increase only slightly. The biggest 
change (only one percentage point before the exp (coefficient)- I 
90 The model includes the following control variables: age, age squared, tenure, tenure 
squared, citizenship, rural areas, female and public sector. The full table of results is 
available in Appendix A. 
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transformation to the qualification dummy coefficients but 3 percentage 
points for 'A' level and 5 percentage points for tertiary education after the 
exp (coefficient)- 1 transformation) is reported for those urban males with 
'A' level and tertiary qualifications 91 • 
The rise in social returns when adjusted for censoring bias is recorded only 
for high levels of qualifications for those women who reside in rural areas, 
with an increase of 2 percentage points for 'A' level and tertiary 
qualifications, and an increase of 4 percentage points for those with 
vocational qualifications while social returns to lower and upper 
secondary qualifications fall by less than 1 percentage point92 in each case. 
However after the exp (coefficient) - I adjustment IS done to the 
qualification dummy coefficients, the largest increase IS obtained for 
vocational education (8 percentage points) while social return to tertiary 
education rises by 7 percentage points and that of 'A' level rises by 6 
percentage points for rural women. The inverse of Mill's ratio is positive 
and insignificant for rural women. 
When those women who reside in urban areas are looked at, it can be 
deduced that although the selectivity term, A, is negative and insignificant, 
91 It must be pointed out that there are 49 individuals who reside in urban areas and who 
have tertiary education within the sample used for the purpose of this study (Appendix 
D). 
92 Compare column 6 of Table 5.5 in this chapter with the 5th column in Table 5.13. 
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social returns to all qualifications, free of censoring bias fa1l 93 . While the 
social return to lower secondary qualifications declines by 1 percentage 
point, that for GCSE and Sixth Fonn falls by 3 percentage points and 
those for vocational and tertiary qualifications, each decline by 5 
percentage points. The biggest decline III social returns (7 percentage 
points), following the correction for selectivity bias, is reported for those 
women who reside in urban areas and who hold tertiary qualifications. 
The decline to all qualification levels widens when the exp (coefficient) -
1 transfonnation is done to the qualification dummy coefficients, for 
instance, social return to 'A' level fall by 11.5 percentage points, that of 
vocational education falls by 14 percentage points and social return to 
tertiary education declines by 22 percentage points. Thus social returns to 
qualifications generated by the straightforward Mincerian equation for 
women who reside in urban areas, are overestimated. It is important to 
bear in mind, however, that although adjusting for selectivity bias has a 
considerable impact on the returns for women who reside in urban areas, 
the coefficient on A in the wage regression for these women are not 
statistically significant and the subgroups of urban women with vocational 
and tertiary education are very small (Appendix D). Thus, the results for 
urban women that include the selectivity bias correction must be 
interpreted with caution. 
93 Compare the last column of Table 5.5 in this chapter and the last column in Table 5.13. 
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5.8 Concluding note 
It is hypothesised that as nations invest more in education, one will see a 
fall in the social return to schooling (Psacharopoulos, 1973; 1981; 1985; 
1989; 1994). For the Republic of Mauritius, one cannot yet analyse time 
trends in the social returns to education as this PhD is the first attempt to 
estimate returns to education in the Mauritian context. However the 
estimates derived in this chapter for the continuous schooling variable may 
be usefully compared with similar estimates for other countries. Figure 
5.2 suggests that there is evidence of diminishing returns to schooling in 
the context of the Republic of Mauritius, that is, with its relatively higher 
average years of schooling, its social returns to education is lower 
compared to other countries which have, on average, fewer years of 
schooling. 
Nevertheless the use of the years of schooling variable assumes that each 
extra year of schooling yields the same return to education. My analysis is 
not restricted to this assumption of homogeneity. I also adopt a non-
linear approach by looking at different qualification levels. When social 
returns to the highest qualification levels (instead of the continuous 
schooling variable) for the Republic of Mauritius are considered, the 
qualification coefficients are positive and highly significant. The 
reference group is no schooling at all or at most primary education. All the 
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results presented in this chapter clearly show that there is a unifonn 
pattern of increasing social returns to rising levels of academic 
qualifications, for men and women combined, by gender, by sector of 
employment and by area of residence. Relative to the reference group, 
tertiary qualifications yield the highest social returns, followed by 
vocational qualifications, while lower secondary education generate the 
lowest social returns. But before any suggestions about whether further 
expansion of a certain level of education is justified, the public costs of 
these education levels must be combined with the wage benefits (Schultz, 
2003). Unfortunately I did not have access to infonnation on the public 
costs of schooling. 
Another finding is that women enjoy consistently higher social returns 
relative to their male counterparts. This is in line with the existing 
literature. Such results are usually attributed to the lower foregone 
earnings of females relative to males (Psacharopoulos & Alam, 1991; 
Gomez-Castellanos & Psacharapoulos, 1990; Psacharopoulos, 1989; 
Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 1994; Kugler & Psacharopoulos, 1989). 
Another important finding is about the differences in social returns to 
qualifications between the private and public sectors. The public sector is 
an important sector in the Republic of Mauritius. It employs around 32% 
of individuals who are in paid jobs and the percentage of workers it 
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employs has been stable over the last five years (CSO, 2005). My results 
suggest that it tends to reward low qualification levels relatively more 
while the reverse is true for the private sector. The rewarding of low 
qualification levels relatively more may be associated with the minimum 
wage legislation or bureaucracy. On the other hand, as the public sector 
offers job security, the private sector has to offer a relatively higher wage 
premium to attract individuals with high levels of education. 
To account for urban and rural differences, wage regressions have been 
estimated by area of residence. Social returns to qualifications are 
consistently higher for urban workers than for rural workers. This may be 
attributed to the fact that most 'good' jobs are available in the urban areas. 
Primary sector94 is mainly concentrated in rural areas with around 86% of 
the total number of individuals employed in that sector, residing in rural 
areas (CSO, 2007). 
The importance of correcting for sample selection bias has been 
highlighted in the literature. However most studies, which have adjusted 
for selectivity bias, found its impact on the estimates of the regression 
coefficients to be small and even negligible (Blau & Beller, 1998; Kenny 
et aI, 1979; Wellington, 1993). Findings reported in this chapter are in 
line with the existing literature. Selectivity bias does not appear to be a 
big issue for the Republic of Mauritius although there is evidence of 
94 Primary sector includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying. 
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selectivity bias in the case of men. OLS estimates to qualifications are 
similar to those generated by the Heckman selection model. In most 
cases, where changes in social returns to different qualification levels are 
considerable (such as in the case of urban women), the selectivity term, A, 
is statistically insignificant and the number of individuals within the 
relevant subgroups of qualifications are few. In the few cases where A is 
significant, the magnitude of the education coefficients remain more or 
less the same. However it should be noted that some of the results suggest 
that selection employment effects are more relevant for men than for 
women. But it is impossible to speculate on this curious employment 
finding in the absence of appriopriate data. 
Adjusting for selectivity bias does not alter the ranking of qualifications in 
terms of social returns at all. All previous trends obtained through the 
conventional OLS estimates are maintained, for example, compared to the 
reference group (that is, those who had no schooling at all or with at most 
primary education) individuals with tertiary education have the highest 
wage premium, followed by those with vocational qualifications and 
individuals with lower secondary qualifications have the lowest wage 
premium. These hold true in all cases (for men and women combined, by 
gender, by sector of employment and by area of residence) 
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However in the case of women, especially those who reside in the urban 
areas, adjusting for selectivity bias can have an impact of up to 7 
percentage points with the biggest decline in social returns being reported 
for those who hold only 'A' level qualifications or 22 percentage points 
lower for those tertiary education when the [( ecocfficient - 1) x 100] 
adjustment is made to the qualification dummy coefficients. But again the 
pattern of rising social returns by qualification level is maintained and the 
selection term is statistically insignificant, suggesting results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
The next chapter considers another issue arising from the use of the simple 
OLS technique, namely that, so far no measure has been adopted to 
account for ability bias, discount rates and endogeneity of schooling. 
Thus, Chapter 6 will explore the instrumental variables approach which 
can solve these problems. 
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Chapter 6: IV and OLS estimates to an extra year of schooling in the 
Republic of Mauritius 
6.0 Introduction 
'Years of schooling are, to a large extent, chosen by the individual' (Cruz 
& Moreira, 2004; p.396) and hence education must be treated as an 
endogenous variable. In this chapter, I focus on changes in the supply side 
which result in random changes to the amount of schooling that students 
have. These supply-side changes can be used as instrumental variables 
(IV) and thus, deal with the endogeneity of schooling (Card, 1999; Card, 
2000; Card, 2001; Pons & Gonzalo, 2002; Levin & Plug, 1999; Harmon & 
Walker, 1995). Bound et al (1995) explain that the IV estimator uses at 
least one instrument to predict the value of the endogenous regressor and 
the predicted values are then used as a regressor in the wage equation. I 
estimate the social returns to an additional year of schooling95 in the 
Republic of Mauritius using two instrumental variables, pertaining to 
schooling legislation: the 1993 Basic Compulsory Education Act and the 
1976 free access to secondary education96 law. However the first stage 
regressions reveal that the 1993 Basic Compulsory Education Act 
instrument is not a good predictor of schooling and thus, the basic 
95 As stated earlier in Chapter 5, the variable 'years of schooling' is up to tertiary level 
and excludes vocational education. 
96 The 1976 free access to secondary schooling law was actually implemented in January 
1977 when the academic year started. 
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compulsory education instrument is dropped from subsequent analysis. 
The second instrument, that is, the free secondary education law, is used 
throughout this chapter mostly in consideration about returns for women. 
However this finding is in line with the national statistics, which show that 
the gross enrolment ratio for girls more than doubled after access to 
secondary schooling became free in 197797 (Brooks, 2000; Naugah& 
Poonet, Forthcoming). 
It must be pointed out that IV generates estimates that are in fact Local 
Average Treatment Effect (LATE) estimates. The OLS estimate is the 
average return for the population as a whole, while the IV estimator 
generates the marginal return for those affected by the particular 
instrumental variable chosen. In this chapter, for example, the IV estimate 
when using the change in the minimum school leaving age provides an 
estimate of the return to education for those who would otherwise have 
dropped out of school. This implies that this particular IV estimate is 
largely for individuals with low schooling and high discount rates 
(Harmon & Walker, 1999). In such cases, the IV estimates are higher than 
the OLS estimates. Hence this explains the higher returns to schooling 
when using IV methods, as compared to OLS estimates, as will be 
reported in the subsequent sections of this chapter for the Republic of 
Mauritius. These results are in line with the majority of other results 
97 Gross enrolment ratio for girls stood at 32% in 1975 and by 2005, it had reached 71 % 
(CSO, 2006). 
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reported in the literature. Also the results are based on interventions that 
have affected only those individuals who would have left school before 
the minimum period. In general therefore the instrument used only affects 
a particular sub-group of the population, and so the resulting IV estimate 
cannot be generalised to all individuals (Angrist & Imbens, 1995; Harmon 
& Walker, 1999; Card, 1999). 
All wage equations used in this chapter have the same explanatory 
variables as in Chapter 5, except for the dummy qualification variables, 
which are replaced by the endogenous 'years of schooling' variable. The 
other explanatory variables include the dummy variables: 'rural' which 
indicates whether or not an individual lives in a rural area98, 'public' 
which indicates whether or not s/he is employed within the public sector99, 
'gender' which allows us to distinguish whether the individual is a woman 
or not, and 'Mauritian' which states his/her nationality. Following other 
98 Region may be highly endogenous and influenced by education itself, for instance, 
good qualifications may enable an individual to get a well-paid urban job. Two tables are 
included in Appendix A (no. 23) to show the effects of excluding location on social 
returns from the wage equation for the Republic of Mauritius. For a quick comparison, 
please refer to Appendix A no.l and no.23. The schooling coefficient rises by 3 
percentage points when the rural dummy variable is excluded from the wage equation. 
When social returns are allowed to vary by qualification level, all qualification 
coefficients rise once the rural dummy variable is excluded from the wage equation. 
Thus, exclusion of the region of residence from the wage equation results in higher social 
returns to an extra year of schooling and at each qualification level. Although individuals 
would have selected themselves into urban/rural areas, it is difficult to find a selection 
instrument which does not affect wages to explain location. Thus, in the thesis, an 
analysis of selection into region of residence is not undertaken but it is included in the 
equations and urban/rural areas are treated separately. 
99 The public sector may be endogenous as this may be the outcome of education. 
Qualification coefficients are reduced as can be deduced from Appendix A (no.22), by 
including the dummy variable 'public sector' into the wage equation for both sexes. For 
a quick comparison, refer to Appendix A no. I and no.22. 
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studies, I also include a quadratic in 'age' to proxy for experience given 
the possible endogeneity of actual labour market experience (Denny & 
Harmon, 2000) and a quadratic term in 'tenure' to allow the impact of 
tenure to increase or decrease over time 100. As the IV method is used in 
this chapter, a first stage schooling equation is estimated, which includes 
all the explanatory variables used in the earnings equation in addition to 
the instrumental variable dummy. Section 6.1 provides background 
knowledge about the problems arising from the use of the conventional 
OLS and highlights the need of the IV procedure. 
6.1 Background 
There are several possible sources of bias associated with the conventional 
OLS way of estimating returns and these were discussed at length in 
Chapter 2. These sources of bias are briefly listed below: 
• Endogeneous schooling 
Schooling may be endogenous and not exogenous as a result of the 
individual's optimal choice, causing the OLS estimates of the returns to be 
biased (Pons & Gonzalo, 2002). For instance, the more able individual 
may invest in extra schooling. 
100 It is recognised that tenure too may be endogenous. However this thesis only deals 
with the endogeneity of schooling. 
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• Omitted variable bias 
In the presence of an unobservable factor such as ability that is correlated 
with both schooling and wages, there is a bias in OLS estimates. This bias 
has generally been found to be upward (Griliches & Mason, 1972; 
Grilliches, 1977) and the data available for the Republic of Mauritius does 
not provide any measure of ability, which may seriously overestimate the 
returns for all qualification levels. 
• Measurement error in the education variables cause OLS estimates 
to be biased downwards (Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Dearden, 1999). 
In order to solve these problems, the instrumental variable (IV) method 
will be used. This is based on the existence of some exogenous events 
that influence schooling decisions. Sub-section 6.21 explores the 
possibility of having some causal exogenous determinants of schooling in 
the case of the Republic of Mauritius. Even better, we may be able to see 
whether exploitation of exogenous changes in the education distribution 
generated from two policy interventions, yields unbiased estimates to the 
coefficients of the 'education' variable. 
6.1.1 Introduction to the instrumental variable approach 
OLS provides an estimate of the rate of return to education on average 
while the IV provides an estimate of the rate of return for a specific group 
of people whose behaviour can be manipulated by the instrument (Angrist 
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& Krueger, 2001). So even though OLS estimates are commonly lower 
than IV estimates, the size of the extra return depends on the choice of 
instruments. The IV approach is just a way of splitting the variance in 
schooling into both an exogenous and endogenous component whereby 
those variables which are not in the wage equation, are added into the first 
stage equation to explain schooling decisions. Usually instrumental 
variables and 'natural experiments' are used to control for things that are 
unobservable yet which affect both the quantity of schooling and the 
observed log wage. The unobserved variable is left in the error term and 
instead of simply estimating the model by OLS, it uses an estimation 
method that recognises the presence of the omitted unobserved variable. 
Thus, to obtain consistent estimates of the schooling coefficient the 
instrumental variable approach may be used for the present study. Some 
exogenous sources of information that are correlated with the quantity of 
schooling but are uncorrelated with ability such as family background 
(father's/mother's education) may be used. However Card (1999) argues 
that although family background is not a direct determinant of earnings, it 
may not be a valid instrument as it does not absorb the effect of omitted 
ability measures completely. Besides, family background measures are 
not available in the context of the Republic of Mauritius. Any particular 
variable to be used as an instrumental variable for schooling needs to be 
uncorrelated with ability but it must be correlated with the education 
variable. 
272 
This requires finding some instrument that affects schooling choices but is 
uncorrelated with (independent of) ability factors. A simple endogenous 
schooling model consists of a two-equation system: 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
The log of wage (Ln Wi) is determined by a vector of exogenous variables 
(Xi) and years of schooling (Si). The schooling equation is a reduced form 
in which Zi is a vector of exogenous variables that influence the schooling 
decision so that Xi is included in Zi and estimating equation (6.1) by OLS 
will yield a biased estimate of the coefficient f3 if Si is not exogenous 
(that is, if Ui and Vi are correlated). 
6.1.2 Potential instruments to estimate social returns to schooling for 
the Republic of Mauritius 
Koop & Tobias (2004) argue that cognitive ability is strongly correlated 
with the quantity of schooling attained and is also correlated with 
observed earnmgs. Thus, failure to account for ability, results in an 
upward bias in the reported ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of the 
returns to education. There are many ways to deal with this problem of a 
biased omitted variable, for example, by using data on identical twins or 
siblings to difference out the unobserved ability or by simply including 
273 
ability test scores in the wage regressions. Thus, if there are measures of 
ability, this problem may be solved. However I cannot use measures of 
ability to solve the ability bias problem while estimating the economic 
returns to education for the Republic of Mauritius. Data on the measures 
of ability are not available in the 2000 Population Census data set. Hence 
the need for IV. 
As reported by Card (2000), many studies focus on the supply-side 
features of the education system as a source of potential instruments, for 
instance, changes to the minimum school leaving age, changes to tuition 
costs and the geographic proximity of schooling. For the Republic of 
Mauritius, I use a number of natural experiments arising from the changes 
in the education system. 
There are two instruments that will be used for the present study. Firstly, 
secondary education became free at all levels in the Republic of Mauritius 
in 1976 and secondly, basic compulsory education was introduced in 
1993 101 up to the age of twelve (inclusive). It is possible to build a set of 
variables based on the individual's age to reflect changes in the legislation 
relating to schooling, such as the provision of free secondary education 
and the introduction of the minimum school leaving age of 12 years for 
primary school pupils. The individual mayor may not have studied under 
the new system in 1977 and subsequent years, and the individual may or 
101 The academic year starts in January for primary and secondary schooling. 
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may not have been affected by the new minimum school leaving age. 
Inclusion of dummy variables based on the age of the individual can 
record these exogenous changes. 
Both the 1976 free secondary education policy and the 1993 compulsory 
primary education up to the age of 12 will be used as instruments for 
schooling while computing the marginal returns to education in Mauritius 
to correct for ability bias and the endogeneity problem. Compulsory 
schooling, for instance, select at random individuals who ordinarily would 
not be schooled and force them into schooling. These instruments are 
suitable as they are correlated to the schooling decision but do not directly 
affect earnings outcomes. However the results thus obtained can lead to 
large inconsistencies if there is a weak correlation between the minimum 
school leaving age and the years of schooling. This is explored in the 
subsection 6.1.3 
6.1.3 Quality, validity and relevance of instruments 
Before any variable is used as an instrument, it must satisfy the conditions 
listed below: 
• Instrumental quality 
Bound et al (1995) argue that a strong correlation between schooling 
and the instruments is required and the addition of the identifying 
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variables to the reduced form must improve the R-squared value of 
that equation. 
• Instrumental validity 
Instruments must be orthogonal, or independent of, the error term of the 
wage equation (E [Zi' Ui] = 0). As argued by Pons & Gonzalo (2002) 
this may be tested when the Sargan mis-specification test is implemented. 
Under the null hypothesis of valid instruments, the Sargan statistics are 
'asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of over-identifying restrictions' (Pons & Gonzalo, 2002; 
p. 751). If the Sargan statistic is significantly larger than it would be under 
the null hypothesis, then either the model is incorrectly specified or some 
of the instruments are invalid. However in this chapter, all the equations \02 
that are estimated (through the IV procedure) are exactly identified. 
• Instrumental Relevance 
Levin & Plug (1999) argue that it is necessary to ask ourselves whether or 
not engaging in 'corrective' procedures for potential endogeneity of 
schooling is necessary. This may be done by testing the null hypothesis 
that the OLS estimate is consistent where there is no difference between 
the estimates generated for f3 through the OLS and IV: f3 OLS= f3 IV . 
102 These refer to all IV models which include only one instrument. The model that 
includes both instruments is estimated only for both sexes and the instruments are valid 
as the Sargan test has a coefficient of 0.42 which is insignificant, suggesting that the 
instruments do not have any direct influence on earnings. 
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The Durwin-Wu-Hausman test for the endogeneity of schooling can be 
done and if it is significant the null hypothesis is rejected (Pons & 
Gonzalo, 2002). But before this test may be carried out, we should have 
ensured that our instruments are valid through the Sargan test. 
Thus, as stated in most studies, while choosing the vector of instruments, 
one must be very cautious with respect to the quality and validity of these 
instruments (Bound et aI, 1995; Card, 2000; Cruz & Moreira, 2002). 
Instrumental variable quality, as already explained, refers to the strong 
correlation between the instruments and schooling (Bound et aI, 1995), so 
the instrument chosen must actually predict the level of schooling acquired 
by the individual student. This technically means that the instruments must 
be significant in the first stage of the IV estimation. To check this, F-tests 
on the excluded instrumental variables are performed. The instrumental 
variables must improve the R2 value of the first stage equation (Pons & 
Gonzalo 2002; Harmon & Walker, 1999). Bound et al (1995) argue that 
the partial R2 and the F statistics on the excluded variable(s) in the first 
stage regression must be routinely reported as these are rough guides to 
the quality of IV estimates. Thus, the F- statistic on the excluded 
instruments in the first stage schooling equation is computed, as is the 
partial R2 value obtained from regressing schooling against the 
instrument(s), having partialled out common exogenous regressors. These 
statistics are reported throughout this chapter, to guard against the hazards 
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of conducting inference with instruments that are weakly correlated with 
schooling (Bound et aI, 1995). 
However we cannot rely on statistical tests to check directly the validity of 
the assumption that the explanatory variables and the disturbance term are 
uncorrelated. One must be careful while selecting instruments especially 
in the context of the Republic of Mauritius where instruments are not 
readily and widely available. The decision to use the IV estimator is made 
on the basis of what theory might tell us or on prior information, 
suggesting variables which would be good instruments, for instance, 
supply side policies such as the change in compulsory schooling law 
(Harmon & Walker, 1995) and the free schooling policy (Denny & 
Harmon, 2000) are argued to be truly exogenous and therefore, good 
instruments, while family backgrounds are not reported as being good 
instruments (Card, 1999; Conneely & Uusitalo, 1999). Family 
background has been used as an instrumental variable (Levin & Plug, 
1988; Denny & Harmon, 2000; Conneely & Uusitalo, 1999). Certainly 
family background influences schooling but due to inter-generational 
effects, it may also be correlated with ability and other unobserved 
characteristics. It may not be a valid instrument even though it has no 
direct effect on earnings (Card, 1999; Conneely & Uusitalo, 1999). Thus, 
recent studies have focused on other supply side sources of identifying 
variables such as education reforms (Patrinos & Sakellariou, 2004). 
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Thus, both instruments (the 1976 Free Education Act and the 1993 Basic 
Compulsory Education Act) that the researcher intends to use for the 
current study can be supported theoretically for not having a direct impact 
onearnmgs. 
6.2 Legislation relating to schooling in the Republic of Mauritius 
Following some recent studies (Harmon & Walker, 1995; Harmon & 
Walker 1999; Harmon et aI, 2000; Pons & Gonzalo, 2002) which have 
used changes in education law as an instrumental variable, I have 
estimated the effect of education on earnings. I argue that the 1993 basic 
compulsory education law and the 1976 free access to secondary 
schooling law introduced an exogenous source of variation in educational 
attainment and had no direct impact on earnings. These laws have been 
incorporated into the model through the use of dummy variables. A 
dummy variable has been created for each instrument. 
For an instrumental variable to be valid, the instrument must affect 
schooling but not be correlated with unobserved characteristics that 
directly influence earnings, such as ability 103. 
103 Card (2000) argues that people with a higher return to schooling will have an incentive 
to acquire more schooling and in a cross-sectional regression of wages on schooling, as is 
the case for this thesis, the OLS estimates will yield an upward biased estimate of the 
average marginal return to schooling. 
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6.2.1 The 1993 Basic Compulsory Education Act as an instrument 
One of the instruments that is used for the IV procedure in this thesis is the 
1993 basic compulsory schooling law, which made education at the 
primary level compulsory up to the age of 12. However if, before the age 
of 12, the child has passed hislher end of primary schooling examinations 
(Certificate for Primary Schooling (CPE) which is taken at the end of 
grade 6), he/she may leave the primary school cycle 104. This law was 
introduced to deal with the problem of high drop-out rates within the 
primary school cycle as discussed in Chapter 3 (which is about the 
education system in the Republic of Mauritius). Drop-out rates within the 
primary schooling cycle fell from 5.5% in 1993 to 0.8% by 2003, that is, 
ten years after the introduction of the law105 . The introduction of the basic 
compulsory schooling law has been incorporated into the IV model in this 
chapter through the use of a dummy variable, 'msl'. The dummy variable 
'msl' captures the effects of the 1993 basic compulsory schooling law on 
the individuals within the sample. It takes a value of 1 to denote each 
individual who was affected by this law and takes a value of 0 otherwise. 
104 The academic year for primary and secondary schooling starts in January in the 
Republic of Mauritius. Thus, the law states that unless a child turns 13 years on the 1 st of 
January, helshe is allowed to repeat grade 6 if hel she failed to pass during the first 
attempt. This law applies to all children enrolled in all government primary schools and 
aided primary schools. 
105 Data on drop-out rates for the Republic of Mauritius were collected at the Statistics 
Department of the Ministry of Education, IVTB Building, Phoenix. 
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It is built based on the individual's age. All individuals in the sample 
who were aged 19 years and below at the time of the census, were affected 
by the introduction of the basic compulsory education law l06 . 
Figure 6.1 107 displays the effect of the 1993 basic compulsory schooling 
law on an individual's highest schooling attainment, for three years prior 
to and three years after the implementation of the law. As pointed out 
earlier in Chapter 3, promotion within the primary school cycle, that is, up 
to grade 6 (year 7 in Figure 6.1) is automatic, however, promotion to grade 
7 (year 8 in Figure 6.1) requires a pass at CPE, that is, at the end of 
primary schooling (grade 6) national examinations are held. Figure 6.1 
clearly shows that the 1993 basic compulsory education law did predict 
the schooling of individuals and there was a high percentage of individuals 
who left school immediately at the end of the i h year spent at school (they 
dropped out of the education system at the end of grade 6) after the 
106 The law made free primary education compulsory up to the age of 12. But since 
government primary schools and aided primary schools do not enrol students who are 
above 12 years old, the upper age limit for benefiting from free primary schooling is 
restricted to 12 years. Thus, for an individual to have benefited from this law, s/he 
should have been within the age range of 0 to 12 years in 1993 and at the time of the 
2000 Population Census, s/he should have turned at most 19 years old. 
107 The working sample that has been used throughout this thesis includes 4256 
individuals, aged between 12 and 59 years, for whom all necessary information is 
available. To draw Figure 6.1, this sample was split into two subsets after allowing for a 
gap of three years prior to and after the introduction of this law. This was done so that a 
visual description of the effect of the 1993 Basic Compulsory Schooling Act on 
educational attainment can be obtained. The first subset includes only those individuals 
who were not affected by the introduction of this compulsory schooling law, that is, those 
born in 1990 and prior to 1990. The second subset of the data includes all individuals 
who were affected by the introduction of this compulsory schooling law, that is, all those 
who were born in 1996 and after 1996. Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of individuals 
within each subgroup along with their highest qualification levels. 
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introduction of the law. The i h year is where the child generally reaches 
the minimum age at which slbe is allowed to leave primary schooling. 108 
The law basically kept at school, those individuals who would have 
otherwise dropped out of the primary school cycle and also provided a 
second attempt at grade 6 national examinations to students who failed to 
pass during their first attempts. 
Figure 6.1: The impact of the 1993 Basic Compulsory Schooling Act on 
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individuals' highest schooling attainments. 
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years of schooling up to 'A' level 
3 years prior to basic 
• compulsory schooling 
law 
3 years after basic 
• compulsory schooling 
law 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
108 However some children may turn 12 in the 6th year and the law allows them to leave 
primary schools during that particular year. This may explain the relatively higher 
percentage of individuals who left school (after the implementation of the 1993 basic 
compulsory education law) after their 6th year at school compared to those prior the 
implementation of this law. 
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Indeed Figure 6.1 reveals that this law allowed a greater percentage of 
individuals (post treatment) to stay on until grade 6 (that is,Year 7), after 
which they dropped out. Also the opportunity to have a second attempt at 
the national examinations at end of year 7, encouraged individuals to 
move to the secondary school cycle, for instance, there has been an 
increase in individuals leaving secondary schooling after Year 8 (Form 1) 
and Year 9 (Form 2). Besides national statistics support this finding: three 
years prior to the 1993 basic compulsory education law, the gross 
enrolment ratio for both sexes in secondary schools was 48% and three 
years after the law, the gross enrolment ratio rose to 53% (CSO 2006) 
Post treatment individuals are denoted by the green bars and pre treatment 
individuals are denoted by the red bars. 
However as will be argued in Section 6.5, the first stage regressions of the 
IV procedure reveal that the coefficient on the dummy variable 'msl', 
capturing the effect of the introduction of the basic compulsory schooling 
law is negative in all cases. This may be attributed to the fact that most 
individuals who were affected by this law are still at school and have yet 
to make their way to the labour market 109. Subsequently this instrument is 
dropped as it cannot be used to predict the schooling of individuals. 
109 The law was passed in 1993 and the data used for this study was collected in 2000, 
implying that the individual was around 19 years, and unless he/she dropped out, he/she 
would be still within the secondary school cycle 
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6.2.2 Using the 1976 Free Access to Secondary Education law as an 
instrument 
The free access to secondary schooling law was introduced in 1977 and it 
made secondary schooling free for all school-age youths. This was 
thought to be a potential instrument as it has no direct impact on earnings 
and is likely to predict the schooling attainments of individuals, as free 
education would be likely to encourage greater participation particularly 
among poorer students. This law was incorporated into the model through 
the use of a dummy variable, 'free'. Like the previous dummy variable 
'msl' for the compulsory education instrument, 'free' is designed to be 
based on the individual's age. The dummy variable 'free' was defined 
such that it takes the value of 1 for individuals who were affected by the 
introduction of free secondary schooling, that is, those born after 1958 
and, thus, who faced a regime of no fees at secondary school. The dummy 
variable took a value ofO, otherwise llo . 
Figure 6.2 displays the effect of the free secondary schooling policy on an 
individual's highest schooling attainment, three years prior to and three 
years after the implementation of the law. It clearly shows that this law 
110 In 1977, secondary schooling was made free for all school-age youths which is 
generally within the age group of 12 to 19 years for the Republic of Mauritius. Thus, for 
the individual to be affected by this law, s/he should have been within the age range of 12 
to 19 in 1977 and by the time of the 2000 Population Census, s/he would have turned at 
most 42 years old. Thus, for all those affected by this law, the dummy variable 'free' will 
be equal to 1 with the age variable being less or equal to 42 and for those unaffected by 
this law, 'free' will be equal to 0 with the age variable being above 42. 
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did predict the schooling of individuals. The achievements of those 
individuals, who started secondary school after the law was implemented, 
were higher than the achievements of those individuals born 3 years 
before the law was implemented. There is a greater percentage of 
individuals from the post treatment group who finished the secondary 
school cycle (up to 'A' level) when compared to the other group. 
Figure 6.2: The impact of the 1976 Free Secondary Education law on individuals' 
highest schooling attainments. 
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Here the free secondary education policy may be used as an instrument to 
estimate returns to schooling on the basis that a subgroup of individuals 
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exists who would have chosen a lower level of education without the 
reform. Thus, the 1976 free access to secondary schooling law is used 
throughout this chapter. 
However as will be shown in Section 6.4, this instrument is significant 
mainly in the case of women and statistically insignificant in the case of 
men, which is nevertheless relevant to existing literature on the education 
of girls in the Republic of Mauritius. It has been reported that free access 
to secondary education led to a doubling in the enrolment rate of girls in 
secondary schools within the Republic of Mauritius, over the period 1977 
to 1990 (Naugah & Poonet, 1996). Besides even Brooks (2000) states: 
"Since Mauritius introduced free education in 1977, girls have enjoyed 
increasing equality of opportunity in the island's education system, as families 
were no longer forced to concentrate their resources on the male children they 
believed would benefit more from schooling." (Brooks, 2000; p.l) 
Instruments, however in conclusion, are not easily and readily available in 
data for the Republic of Mauritius, the 1976 free access to secondary 
schooling law was deemed an appropriate instrument to predict schooling 
behaviour at least for women. All regressions based on the IV procedure 
(in this chapter) include this instrument. 
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6.3 Model specification and estimation issues 
It must also be pointed out that there is a possibility of different 
instruments affecting different margins of the schooling distribution (Card, 
1999; Harmon & Walker, 1999). In a conventional model where the 
variable 'years of schooling' is linear in its effect, estimates are relatively 
stable with respect to the choice of instruments. But once the linearity 
assumption is relaxed (which may be done, for instance, by including a 
measure of years of post secondary education 111), large and different 
returns are reported. Also as argued by Card (1999), the results become 
more sensitive to the choice of instruments once the marginal years of 
higher level of schooling (for example, 'years of post secondary 
education') are included in the model. 
Despite the fact that recent studies have been critical of the linear 
assumption with respect to schooling (Heckman et aI, 1995; Harmon & 
Walker, 1999; Card, 1999), for the purpose of this thesis, the model is 
restricted to the linearity assumption. Instruments are not widely and 
easily available in the context of the Republic of Mauritius and non-linear 
models (with respect to schooling) are sensitive to the choice of 
instruments. Thus, the linearity assumption remains most appropriate. 
111 The inclusion of the 'post secondary education' variable in addition to the 'total 
number years of schooling' captures the possibility that the marginal returns of schooling 
beyond this level differ from the returns to schooling up to this level. 
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This is consistent with much of the existing IV literature in which the 
"specification of the earnings function has typically assumed that log 
wages are linear in years of schooling" (Harmon & Walker, 1999; p.880). 
Thus all IV estimates for the purpose of this thesis, are computed based on 
the assumption that each additional year of schooling yields the same 
return. 
The model specification used throughout the analysis is not subject to 
finite sample bias. The finite sample bias arises because we do not know 
the first stage coefficient r in equation 6.2. Instead we use estimates 
which imply a certain amount of overfitting of the first stage equation, 
causing a bias in the direction of OLS (Sawa, 1969; Nelson & Startz, 
1990; Bound et aI, 1995) and as R;,z ~ 0, the finite sample bias of IV is 
of the same magnitude as the OLS bias. This bias is particularly severe in 
small samples. However Bound et al (1995) argue that even those 
working with large cross-sectional samples can suffer from finite sample 
biases if the relationship between the instruments and the endogenous 
explanatory variable is weak and they recommend that researchers should 
be cautious when adding instruments to increase precision. The F-
statistics on the excluded instruments in the first stage regression of IV 
contains valuable information about the magnitude of the finite sample 
bias of IV relative to OLS and, if the F-statistics is close to 1, there is 
cause for concern. They argue that the partial R2 and F-statistics on the 
288 
excluded instruments in the first stage regression act as rough guides to the 
quality of the IV estimates. However the IV estimates presented in 
subsequent sections are not subject to the finite sample bias as a single 
instrument is used for the IV procedure and it is strongly correlated with 
schooling. 
If schooling were not endogenous, the OLS would generate more efficient 
estimates than the IV procedure (Pons & Gonzalo, 2002), as has been 
discussed. I follow the recommendation made by some researchers and 
present the Durwin-Wu-Hausman test for each regression (Hausman 1978; 
Davidson & Mckinnon, 1993; Pons & Gonzalo, 2002). Thus throughout 
this chapter, I report whether or not the use of IV is warranted while 
estimating the social returns to education. In the case of men, there is 
insufficient evidence to suggest that their schooling is endogenous and this 
is due to the use of a poor instrument (in the absence of any other 
instrument) while for women, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
OLS estimates are inconsistent in most cases. 
Similar to prevIOUS chapters, all tables in this chapter only report the 
coefficients on the explanatory variables of interest and do not report 
coefficients on the other explanatory variables which are explored in the 
appendix. Coefficients on the instrument used, on the 'years of schooling' 
variable and on the intercept term along with the R2 values, partial R2 
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values, F-tests on the excluded variable and Durbin-Wu-Hausman X2 tests 
are reported in each table presented in this chapter. All equations have 
been carried out using robust estimates. 
6.4 Marginal returns to schooling for the Republic of Mauritius 
6.4.1 Marginal returns to schooling for both sexes 
The IV procedure generates the marginal returns among the low education 
sub-group and these returns are relatively high as these reflect the high 
marginal costs of schooling to this group, potentially as a result of their 
low ability (Card, 2000; Card, 2001). Let us consider the social returns to 
an extra year of schooling when each instrument is used separately. As 
reported in Table 6.1, the OLS estimate for an extra year of schooling is 
smaller than that estimated by the IV procedure and this result is in line 
with the majority of results in the literature. 
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Table 6.1 Schooling and wage equations for both sexes with schooling legislation 
instruments 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equations 
Basic Free Basic Free OLS 
compulsory secondary compulsory secondary 
estimates education education education education 
Basic compulsory -1.414*** 
education 
Free secondary 0.395* 
education 
Years of schooling 0.14*** 0.19* 0.07*** 
Constant 10.386*** 8.651*** 0.839** 0.279 l.415*** 
R2 0.209 0.19* 0.306 0.01 0.412 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.006 0.0008 
F-test on excluded F(l,4246) F(l,4245) 
variables 23.28*** 3.53* 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman l test on 4.586** 2.092 
exogeneity 
N 4256 4256 4256 4256 4256 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
However as can be deduced from Table 6.1, the schooling equation using 
the basic compulsory education policy cannot be used to predict schooling 
attainment of individuals. The first stage regression suggests that 
compulsory schooling up to age 12 does not stimulate schooling and that 
the law is associated with a significant decrease in the expected length of 
schooling. Thus, although the F-tests on the excluded variables and the 
partial R2 on the first stage regression suggest that this instrument is 
strongly correlated with the endogenous variable (years of schooling), the 
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1993 basic compulsory education law is dropped from further analysis. 
As mentioned earlier, the negative coefficient of the basic compulsory 
education instrument in the first-stage regression may be attributed to the 
fact that those affected by this law are still at school. This law was 
enacted in 1993 for children below the age of 13 and the data set used for 
this PhD was collected in 2000, leaving a gap of only 7 years. Thus at the 
time of the population census, any individual who was affected by this 
policy would have turned at most 19 years old - an age at which an 
individual is still supposed to be within the secondary school cycle. It is 
thus too early to use this as an instrument, although future research should 
make use of it. 
In the IV model used in the rest of this chapter, identification is achieved 
only through the inclusion of the free secondary schooling law dummy 
variable and this is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level in 
the schooling equation for both sexes, and although it is weakly correlated 
to schooling. The F-test value on the excluded variable is low and as will 
be shown later, the instrument is particularly weak for men. The law is 
associated with an increase in the expected length of schooling. The 
suggested estimate of social returns to schooling for the marginal group of 
individuals is 19%.The F-test is significant at 10 % level. However when 
I carried out the Durwin-Wu-Test to test for the conclusion of endogeneity 
of schooling [following Pons & Gonzalo (2002) and Patrinos & 
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Sakellariou (2004)], there is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent. 
6.4.2 Marginal returns to schooling by gender 
Even when the sample is split by gender (Table 6.2.1 & Table 6.2.2), the 
same main pattern is observed. IV estimates to years of schooling are 
higher relative to those generated by the OLS technique. As has been 
said, the estimates are consistent with recent findings which suggest that 
the sub-groups affected by the policy intervention have larger returns to 
schooling than the average returns suggested by the OLS technique. The 
IV procedure yields marginal returns of around 12.7% for men only and 
around 16% for women only. 
However as pointed out in the literature, IV procedures which make use of 
weak instruments yield more inconsistent point estimates than those 
produced by the conventional OLS (Bound et aI, 1995; Levin & Plug, 
1999). Thus, I conducted the F-test on the excluded variable for men only 
which is statistically insignificant and also the partial R2 for men only 
suggests that the instrumental variable did not improve the R2 value of the 
first stage equation. The correlation between schooling and the free 
secondary education instrument is very weak. This may explain the highly 
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insignificant return estimate of 12% for men only. This is illustrated in 
Table 6.2.1. 
Table 6.2.1 Schooling and wage equations for males only, with schooling legislation 
instrument 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
IV estimates OLS estimates IV estimates 
Free secondary -0.0322 
education 
Years of schooling 0.065*** 0.14 
Constant 6.232*** 1.471*** 1.04 
R2 0.120 0.351 0.22 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.000 
F-test on excluded F(l,2896) 
variables 0.02 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman X2 0.003 
test on exogeneity 
N 2905 2905 2905 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
In the case of men only, there is insufficient evidence to reject this null 
hypothesis (Ho: ~OLS =~IV) due to the poor instrument. Thus, it may be 
concluded that this instrument cannot be used in the case of men, however, 
I will present full results (including those for men) for completeness. 
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Table 6.2.2 Schooling and wage equations for females only, with schooling 
legislation instrument 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
IV estimates OLS estimates IV estimates 
Free secondary education 1.236*** 
Years of schooling 0.075*** 0.152*** 
Constant 11.171*** 1.147*** 0.261 
R2 0.413 0.478 0.356 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.007 
F-test on excluded F(I,1342) 
variables 10.22*** 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman l 2.716* 
test on exogeneity 
N 1351 1351 1351 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
In contrast, in the case of women, free secondary education is strongly 
correlated with schooling. This is illustrated in Table 6.2.2. The F-test on 
the excluded variable for women only is significant at 1 % level and the 
partial R2 suggests that the addition of the identifying variable to the 
reduced form equation improves the R2 value of that equation. Thus the 
criteria of instrumental quality as proposed by Bound et al (1995), that 
there should be a strong correlation between the instrument and schooling 
is satisfied in the case of women only. When the exogeneity test (Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test), is carried out the null hypothesis that OLS estimates 
do not differ from IV estimates, is rejected at the 10% level of 
significance, for females only. Thus, the OLS estimate is not consistent 
and the suggested estimate of social returns to schooling for the marginal 
group of women is 16%. 
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Similar to the conventional OLS, the IV procedure suggests that women 
enjoy higher social returns to schooling when compared to their male 
counterparts. IV estimates of social returns to an extra year of schooling 
for men only and women only are on the order of 12.7% and 16%, 
respectively, compared to the corresponding OLS baseline estimates of 
6.4% and 7.2%, implying that OLS estimates of social returns to an extra 
year of schooling are biased downwards. However the free secondary 
schooling instrument does not predict the schooling attainment of men 
particularly well. Bound et al (1995) argues that the use of such 
instruments produces estimates with large standard errors, leading to 
inconsistencies in the IV estimates. They also argue that in finite samples 
IV estimates are biased in the same direction as OLS estimates, with the 
magnitude of the bias approaching that of OLS as the R2 value between 
the instruments and the endogenous variable approaches zero. 
Thus, as can be deduced from Table 6.2.l and Table 6.2.2, the effect of the 
1976 free secondary education law affected mainly girls and this is in line 
with what has been reported elsewhere for the education for girls in the 
Republic of Mauritius (Brooks, 2000). Therefore, I emphasise the IV 
results for women only. 
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6.4.3 Marginal returns to schooling by sector of employment 
In this section, I use the IV procedure to estimate the social returns to 
schooling for private sector employees only and for public sector 
employees only, so as to take into account the inconsistency associated 
with OLS estimates due to the endogeneity problem between these sectors. 
I first consider the social returns derived by private sector employees only 
for both sexes. Table 6.3.1 presents the results. 
Table 6.3.1 Schooling and wage equations for private sector employees only, with 
the schooling legislation instrument 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
IV estimates OLS estimates IV estimates 
Free secondary education 0.247 
Years of schooling 0.064*** 0.336*** 
Constant 8.537*** 1.487*** -0.843 
R2 0.15 0.296 -1.721 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.0003 
F-test on excluded F(1,3427) 
variables 1.00 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman l 2.885* 
test on exogeneity 
N 3436 3436 3436 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of Mauritius 
* * * significant at 1 % level, * * significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
As shown in Table 6.3.1, the IV estimate to schooling in the case of 
private sector employees only is higher than that generated by the OLS 
technique. However the instrument is statistically insignificant in the first 
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stage equation and the F-test on the excluded variable is also insignificant. 
The correlation between the free secondary education instrument and 
schooling is very weak and this instrument may not be used accurately to 
estimate returns to schooling. The weak correlation explains the 
incredibly inflated IV return estimate of 36% while the conventional OLS 
generates a social return of 6.3% only. But both estimates are statistically 
significant at a 1 % level and the partial R2 value reveals that the 
instrumental variable improves the R 2 value of the first stage equation. I 
also inquired whether it was necessary to correct for the potential 
endogeneity of schooling and I performed the Durbin-Wu Hausman test. 
This exogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference between 
the OLS and IV estimates at the 10% level of significance. 
Table 6.3.2 Schooling and wage equations for public sector employees only, with 
schooling legislation instrument 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
IV estimates OLS estimates IV estimates 
Free secondary education 0.43 
Years of schooling 0.089*** -0.013 
Constant 19.975*** 2.129*** 4.22 
R2 0.252 0.437 0.07 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.002 
F-test on excluded F(1,811) 
variables 1.26 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman X2 0.823 
test on exogeneity 
N 820 820 820 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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Table 6.3.2 shows the results of the IV procedure and OLS technique 
when public sector employees only are considered. Social return to 
schooling derived from the IV technique is negative and statistically 
insignificant. For the IV procedure, in the first stage regression itself, the 
coefficient on the free secondary education variable is insignificant. Thus, 
standard errors of the 'years of schooling' variable in the IV estimates of 
the earnings equation rise, making it insignificant. The quality tests show 
that the correlation between the instrument and schooling is weak and 
cannot generate an accurate estimate of social returns to schooling. The 
Partial R2 is close to zero and the F-test on the excluded variable is 
insignificant. Furthermore the exogeneity test suggests that schooling is 
not endogenous and thus, the null hypothesis that OLS estimates are 
consistent cannot be rejected. However it must be pointed out that the 
sample of individuals within the public sector only, is small. 
The sample is split further by gender in each sector although results for the 
sample of males are not expected as the previous sections showed that the 
instrument does not explain the schooling of men. However for the sake 
of completeness, all results for men as well as women only are presented 
in this section. Thus, Table 6.3.3 shows the results when the IV procedure 
and the OLS technique are used to estimate the social returns to schooling 
for males only for the private sector and public sector, respectively. 
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Table 6.3.3 Schooling and wage equations for private sector male employees only 
and public sector male employees only, with schooling legislation 
instrument 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
(First stage OLS estimates IV estimates 
regressions) 
private Public private public private public 
sector sector sector sector sector sector 
males males males males males only males 
only only only only only 
Free secondary -0.420 0.393 
education 
Years of schooling 0.059*** 0.087*** 0.057 -0.010 
Constant 5.975*** 25.39*** 1.466*** 2.388*** 1.482** 4.903 
R2 0.071 0.178 0.238 0.398 0.238 0.035 
Test results: 
Partial RL 0.001 0.0012 
F-test on excluded F(I,2272) F(1,617) 
variables 2.14 0.74 
Durbin-Wu- 0.0004 0.453 
Hausman l test on 
exogeneity 
N 2280 625 2280 625 2280 625 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
The free secondary education instrument exerts a negative and 
insignificant effect for men only in the private sector, and its coefficient is 
positive but statistically insignificant in the case of public sector male 
employees only. These are consistent with previous results whereby it 
was reported that free secondary education does not predict schooling for 
men. Thus, the instrument neither predicts the schooling of private sector 
male workers nor that of public sector male workers. The Partial R2 and 
the F-test on the excluded variable in the case of men only employed in 
both sectors, confirm that the correlation between the instrument and 
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schooling is weak. As a result of this weak correlation, there is an 
increase in the standard errors of the estimated coefficients of schooling in 
the wage regressions which generates insignificant estimates to social 
returns to schooling. Moreover when the Durbin-Wu Hausman test of 
exogeneity is carried out, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis that schooling is exogenous. However it must be pointed out 
that the instrument is very weak in the case of men, thus, it is not 
advisable to conclude that men who work in the private sector or in the 
public sector choose their level of schooling. 
Conventional OLS, on the other hand, yields an estimate of 6% for private 
sector male employees only and 9% for and public sector male employees 
only. When the wage equations are estimated by OLS, it explains 36% of 
the variations in gross incomes of public sector male workers and 23% of 
the variations in gross incomes of private sector male workers. Also when 
returns are compared for males only, between the public and private 
sectors, the OLS technique suggests that men get relatively higher returns 
to their schooling (around 3 percentage points) in the public sector rather 
than in the private sector. Thus, after controlling for other factors such as 
age and tenure ll2 , it may be concluded that a man is likely to enjoy a 
relatively higher wage premium in the public sector. 
112 All explanatory variables which are used here are similar to those used in Chapter 5. 
Please refer to appendix for full table of results. 
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I next consider the sub sample of women only by sector of employment. 
Table 6.3.4 and Table 6.3.5 present the results from the IV procedure and 
the OLS technique for women only who are employed in the private sector 
and public sector, respectively. 
Table 6.3.4 Schooling and wage equations for private sector female employees only, 
with schooling legislation instrument 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
IV estimates OLS IV estimates 
estimates 
Free secondary education 1.527*** 
Years of schooling 0.073*** 0.166*** 
Constant 11.764*** 1.248*** 0.123 
RL 0.348 0.287 0.048 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.048 
F-test on excluded F(I,1148) 
variables 12.04*** 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman X2 4.057** 
test on exogeneity 
N 1156 1156 1156 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
When the social returns to schooling for private sector female employees 
only are considered, it can be deduced that the IV estimate for schooling 
(17 %) is higher than the OLS estimate (7%), highlighting the fact that 
OLS estimates may be biased downwards. However emphasis must be 
laid on the fact that the IV approach provides LATE estimates and thus 
OLS estimates and IV estimates are not directly comparable. The IV 
estimate is significant at a 5% level of significance. The first stage 
regression shows that the instrument has a positive and highly significant 
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impact on the schooling attainment of those women who work in the 
private sector. Instrumental quality IS ensured as the F-test on the 
excluded variable reveals that the instrument is strongly correlated to their 
schooling and the partial R2 shows an improvement in the R2 value of the 
reduced form equation when the instrument is added to it. The relevance 
of IV is also confirmed in case of private sector female workers when the 
Durbin-Wu Hausman Chi-Square test on exogeneity is carried out. There 
is sufficient evidence (at 5% level of significance) to reject the null 
hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent, suggesting that it is 
necessary to engage in the IV corrective procedure. The use of the free 
secondary education instrument suggests a significant increase and higher 
estimate (10 percentage points) of the return to schooling for private sector 
female workers. 
Table 6.3.5 Schooling and wage equations for public sector female employees only, 
with schooling legislation instrument 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
First stage OLS IV estimates 
regression estimates 
Free secondary education 0.598 
Years of schoo linK 0.092*** -0.026 
Constant 9.574** 1.807*** 3.003 
RZ 0.45 0.540 0.239 
Test results: 
Partial RL 0.004 
F -test on excluded F(l,187) 
variables 0.70 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman X2 0.477 
test on exogeneity 
N 195 195 195 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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As reported in Table 6.3.5, the OLS yields a social return to schooling 
which is around 9% and this estimate is highly significant 113. However 
the equivalent figure derived through the IV procedure is negative and 
highly insignificant. The first stage regression reveals that this instrument 
does not predict the schooling attainment of those women who work in the 
public sector. The instrument has a positive coefficient but is insignificant 
in its effect on schooling for public sector female workers. This weak 
correlation causes an increase in the standard error of the estimated 
coefficient of schooling in the wage equation, which explains the 
insignificance of the schooling variable in the wage regression. Bound et 
a1 (1995) suggest that if the relationship between the instrument and the 
endogenous explanatory variable is weak, then even huge samples will not 
eliminate important finite sample biases. Also, Sawa (1969) states that the 
IV finite sample bias is in the same direction as the OLS bias and has the 
same magnitude as the R2 (of the schooling equation with the instrument) 
approaches zero. Here it must be pointed out that the sample of women 
who work in the public sector is very small (195 women only). Bound et 
a1 (1995) suggest examining the F-tests on the excluded instrument(s) to 
investigate the possibility of finite sample bias and for the current group 
(public sector female employees), the F statistics is less than 1. Hence it is 
113 As has been previously said in Chapter 3, when a comparison is made between the 
private and public sector, OLS reports that women are likely to enjoy a higher wage 
premium in the public sector and this also applies in the case of men. 
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cause for concern. However its coefficient here is insignificant. We do 
not therefore place emphasis on the results for women in the public sector. 
6.4.4 Marginal returns to schooling by place of residence 
In this section, I look at the difference between rural/urban social returns 
to schooling. We note firstly that these differences reflect the prevailing 
labour market situation in those areas as residents in rural areas may have 
had schooling in urban areas and vice versa (Duraisamy, 2002). Also I 
recognise the endogeneity of residential choice although I do not address it 
in this chapter as my stress rests upon the endogeneity of schooling. I first 
use OLS and then the IV procedure to estimate social returns to schooling 
in an attempt to generate consistent estimates in the presence of ability 
bias, measurement error and endogeneity of schooling. 
The IV procedure reveals that all estimates to social returns to an extra 
year of schooling are higher than those generated by the conventional 
OLS 114. However it must be pointed out that instrumental quality is not 
ensured as the correlation between the free secondary education 
instrument and schooling is weak for most sub groups (for rural workers 
only, for urban workers only, for rural male workers only, for urban male 
workers only and for rural female workers only). This is of course 
114 Exceptionally the IV estimate for social return to schooling for urban male workers 
are lower than the OLS estimate. 
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because the prevIOus analysis suggests that the IV does not work for 
males. These results are reported for completeness only. This explains 
the highly insignificant coefficients on the IV estimates of schooling in the 
wage equations. While the partial R2 value reveals that the instrumental 
variable slightly improves the R2 value of the first stage equation, the F-
test on the excluded variable is highly insignificant. Also there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimates 
are consistent, with the important exception of the case of urban female 
workers only, suggesting that it is not necessary to engage in the IV 
corrective procedure to account for endogeneity of schooling. Below I 
present and discuss all of the results by referring to each sub-group. 
In Table 6.4.1, both the OLS and the IV estimates of returns to schooling 
differ in magnitude which is in line with the mainstream literature. OLS 
produces an estimate of social returns to schooling of around 5% for rural 
workers only and 9.3% for urban workers only, while the equivalent 
figures generated through the IV procedure are 13.2% and 29.3%, 
respectively 1 15. This implies that the OLS estimate may be biased 
downwards abut it must be acknowledged that IV estimates measure 
marginal returns for a marginal group of the population who would not 
115 Note that these estimates are obtained after controlling for other individuals' 
characteristics such as age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, nationality, gender and 
sector of employment. In other words the same model specifications (for OLS estimation 
and the IV procedure) are used here as in the previous sections and full tables of results 
are in Appendix 2. 
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have received the treatment otherwise. However emphasis must be laid on 
the fact that the OLS estimates are significant at a 1 % level while both IV 
estimates are statistically insignificant, reflecting the weakness of the 
instruments in these specifications. 
Table 6.4.1 Schooling and wage equations for both sexes by area of residence 
Variables Schooling equation Wage equations 
First stage regressions OLS estimates IV estimates 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
workers workers workers workers workers workers 
only only only only only only 
Free secondary 0.350 0.414 
education 
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.094*** 0.135 0.255 
Constant 6.675*** 9.331 *** 1.522*** 1.127*** 0.962 -0.402 
R2 0.219 0.140 0.388 0.435 0.197 -0.105 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.0001 0.001 
F -test on excluded F(I,2425) F(l,1813) 
variable 1.49 1.86 
Durbin-Wu- 0.467 1.788 
Hausman l test on 
exogeneity 
N 2434 1822 2434 1822 2434 1822 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Mauritius 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
When the IV procedure is used, instrumental quality is not ensured. In 
other words, the results associated with the use of the 1996 free access to 
secondary education law cannot be used in the case of rural workers only 
and urban workers only as the correlation between the instrument and 
schooling is weak. Here the IV procedure will not generate accurate 
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estimates of social returns to schooling. The first stage regressions reveal 
that the coefficients on the instrument are positive but insignificant in both 
cases so the instrument does not predict schooling. The Partial R2 does 
not show much improvement in the R2 value of the reduced form equation 
once the identifying variable is added but the F-tests on the excluded 
variables in the first stage are insignificant. Thus in the case of rural and 
urban residents, one need be concerned about IV yielding more 
inconsistent point estimates than those produced by OLS. 
OLS suggests that those who live in urban areas enJoy higher social 
returns to their schooling (around 4 percentage points) when compared to 
their counterparts in rural areas 116. The same pattern is reported when the 
IV procedure is used. The IV estimates indicate that urban residents enjoy 
a wage premium which is around 16% percentage points higher than those 
enjoyed by rural residents. 
Following Levin & Plug (1999), I checked whether it is necessary to 
engage in the 'corrective' procedure to deal with potential endogeneity of 
schooling for those workers who reside in rural areas only and in urban 
areas only. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman reveals that the endogeneity of 
schooling does not have a significant effect on the estimated schooling 
return and thus, may suggest that the use of IV is not warranted in the case 
116 Please note that similar findings were reported in Chapter 5 when the qualification 
variables were used instead of the 'years of schooling' variable. Refer to Table 5.3.1. 
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of both sexes for rural residents only and urban residents only. This 
however is based on the weak instrument and therefore is inconclusive. 
I also explored potential differences in social returns to schooling by 
gender between rural and urban areas. I first present the case for men only 
between these areas. Table 6.4.2 presents the results from the IV 
procedure and the OLS technique for men only who reside in rural areas 
and urban areas, respectively. 
Table 6.4.2: Schooling and wage equations for men only by area of residence 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation OLS estimates IV estimates 
First stage regressions 
Rural Urban Rural men Urban Rural men Urban 
men men only only men only only men only 
only 
Free secondary -0.109 0.118 
education 
Years of schooling 0.053*** 0.081 *** 0.117 0.023 
Constant 4.257*** 7.975*** 1.257*** 1.610*** 0.983 2.077 
R2 0.146 0.062 0.311 0.396 0.192 0.313 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.0001 0.0001 
F-test on excluded F(l,1691) F(I,1198) 
variable 
0.11 11.29 
Durbin-Wu- 0.020 0.015 
Hausman l test on 
exogeneity 
N 1699 1206 1699 1206 1699 1206 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Mauritius 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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The OLS estimate to schooling in the case of rural men only is as 
expected, lower than the IV estimates. The IV estimate to an extra year of 
schooling is of the order of 12% in the case of rural men only and the 
equivalent figure generated by OLS The Durbin-Wu-Hausman is 5%. 
This suggests that the OLS estimate to social return to schooling may be 
biased downwards. However it must be pointed out that the coefficient on 
schooling in the first stage regression is negative, implying that the 1976 
free secondary education law is associated with a decrease in the expected 
length of schooling for those men who reside in rural areas. But this 
coefficient is insignificant. We therefore discount these results due to 
weak instruments. 
Also while the OLS estimate to an extra year spent at school is significant 
at the 1 % level, the equivalent IV estimate is insignificant. This also 
applies in the case of urban men only. However, IV generates a lower 
social return to their schooling than the conventional OLS (2.5% versus 
8%). In the case of both rural men and urban men, F-tests on the excluded 
variable prove that the instrument and schooling are weakly correlated and 
their partial R2 values do not suggest that the addition of the instrument to 
the reduced form equation improves their respective R2 values. Also when 
the endogeneity test is carried out, there is insufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis: ~OLS=~IV as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is 
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insignificant in each case which agam suggests that the use of IV IS 
unwarranted but this result is on the basis of a weak instrument. 
N ext I consider the sub-sample of women only between rural and urban 
areas (Table 6.4.3 and Table 6.4.4). 
Table 6.4.3 Schooling and wage equations for those women who reside in rural 
areas only 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
IV estimates OLS estimates IV estimates 
Free secondary education 1.443*** 
Years of schooling 0.049*** 0.075 
Constant 9.471 *** l.695*** l.441 *** 
R2 0.409 0.416 0.397 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.01 
F-test on excluded variables 6.97*** 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman XL test on 0.234 
exogeneity 
N 735 735 735 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, RepublIc ofMaunhus 
*** significant at 1 % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
It can be deduced from Table 6.4.3 that instrumental quality is ensured. In 
other words the instrument chosen actually predicts the level of schooling 
acquired by women in rural areas. The first stage regression shows that the 
1976 free secondary education law is associated with an increase in the 
expected length of schooling for women in rural areas and this coefficient 
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is highly significant. The F-test on the excluded variable for these women 
is significant at 1 % level and the instrumental variable improves the R2 
value of the first stage equation. The correlation between the 1976 free 
secondary education instrument and schooling is strong. The IV 
procedure yields an estimate of social returns to schooling of around 7% 
while that obtained through the conventional OLS is around 5%. This 
again suggests that OLS estimates may be biased downward, which is in 
line with existing literature, although it must be pointed out that IV 
estimates are LATE estimates. However when the relevance of IV in the 
case of rural women only, is assessed through the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test for endogeneity of schooling, the coefficient derived is insignificant, 
suggesting that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
that the OLS estimate is consistent. Besides the IV estimate to social 
returns to schooling for women who reside in rural areas only is 
insignificant while that of 0 LS is significant at 1 % level. 
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Table 6.4.4 Schooling and wage equations for those women who reside in 
urban areas only 
Variables Schooling Wage equations 
equation 
IV estimates OLS IV estimates 
estimates 
Free secondary education l.l00** 
Years of schooling 0.112* 0.266** 
Constant 10.8*** 0.192 -1.493 
R2 0.318 0.490 0.155 
Test results: 
Partial R2 0.007 
F-test on excluded variables F(1,608) 
4.26** 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman X2 test on 3.195* 
exogeneity 
N 616 616 616 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
*** significant at I % level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
Considering the case of urban women only, it can be concluded that the 
instrument predicts their schooling (Table 6.4.4). The coefficient on the 
free secondary education instrument is positive and significant at a 5% 
level in the first stage regression. The F-tests on the excluded variable 
along with the partial R2, suggest that there is a satisfactory correlation 
between the instrument and schooling for urban women. The IV estimate 
is around 27% while that generated by the conventional OLS is around 
11 %, indicating the presence of a large and negative bias in OLS estimates 
of the schooling-earnings relationship in the case of urban women. 
However it must be pointed out that IV estimates are LATE estimates and 
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thus, they are yielding marginal returns to schooling for those individuals 
who would have low schooling had the intervention not occurred. These 
individuals tend to have high discount rates (Harmon & Walker, 1999). 
The IV estimate of social returns to schooling for urban women is 
significant at a 5% level and that of the conventional OLS is significant at 
a 10% level. Also, when the relevance of IV is assessed, the coefficient of 
the Durbin Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity is significant at 5% level, 
which means that the null hypothesis that OLS estimate is consistent may 
be safely rejected. Thus, in the case of urban women only, the use ofIV is 
warranted. 
6.5 Concluding note 
Some researchers have successfully exploited changes in the legislation 
pertaining to schooling such as a rise in the minimum school leaving age 
or the introduction of free education to identify the return to education 
(Pons & Gonza10, 2002; Levin & Plug, 1999; Harmon & Walker, 1995). I 
use the introduction of the 1976 free secondary education law whereby 
secondary schooling became free to all school age youth to do the same. 
The validity tests show that the 1976 free secondary education law and the 
years of schooling are satisfactorily correlated for women at least, and 
may be used to estimate IV social returns to schooling. This instrument 
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has a positive and significant impact on the expected length of the 
individual's schooling in the case of women. Another potential instrument 
was thought to be the 1993 basic compulsory education law whereby 
primary schooling became compulsory up to the age of 12 (inclusive). 
But the first stage regression revealed that it does not predict individuals' 
schooling attainment. It is associated with a decrease in the expected 
length of schooling for individuals. This may be attributed to the fact that 
this law was recently introduced and most individuals who are affected by 
it, are still at school. Therefore this instrument was dropped from 
subsequent analysis. 
Social returns to schooling generated by the conventional OLS in all cases 
(for both sexes, by gender, by sector of employment and by place of 
residence) are of the expected signs and are statistically significant at a 1 % 
level. On the other hand, IV estimates of returns to an extra year of 
schooling are significant in some cases such as in the cases of women 
only, private sector employees only and urban women only. But all IV 
estimates to social returns to schooling are higher than those generated by 
the conventional OLS 117. This is in line with the consensus that OLS 
estimates of the returns to education may be biased downwards. However 
emphasis must be laid on the fact that IV estimates are LATE estimates 
which measures returns for the marginal group. 
117 This holds true in all cases except for that of urban men. However the IV estimate to 
schooling for urban men is statistically insignificant. 
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When the sample for both sexes is considered, the 1976 free secondary 
education instrument is only significant at a 10% level in the first stage 
regression. However its addition improves the R2 value of that regression 
and the f-test on the excluded variable is significant at a 5% level which 
confirms that instrumental quality is ensured. The IV estimate to social 
returns to schooling is significant at a 10% level while that obtained 
through the conventional OLS is significant at a 1 % level. The IV 
estimate is 13.2 percentage points higher than the OLS estimate. However 
there is no evidence of endogeneity of schooling when the relevance of IV 
is assessed, partly reflecting the relative weakness of the instrument for 
this sample. 
However in the case of men only, the instrument (1976 free access to 
secondary schooling) does not predict the schooling of men, and the 
results in each section (Section 6.4.2, Section 6.4.3 & Section 6.4.4) 
reinforces this conclusion. The coefficients on the instrument are negative 
in the first stage regressions. The quality tests reveal that the instrument 
does not improve the value of the first stage regressions, and the f-tests on 
the excluded variable are insignificant in the case for men. The IV 
estimate to an extra year of schooling for men only is statistically 
insignificant although it is 6.3 percentage points higher than the OLS 
estimate. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi square test suggests that it is not 
necessary to engage in a 'corrective' procedure to deal with potential 
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endogeneity of schooling for men only and thus, the use of IV is not 
warranted in the case of men only. This however reflects instrument 
weakness. In the absence of any other instrument in the case of men only 
in the Republic of Mauritius, the conventional OLS must be used to obtain 
estimates of social returns to schooling. One must however be aware that 
these estimates are likely to be upward biased. 
In the case of women only, the instrument (1976 free access to secondary 
schooling) predicts the schooling of women well. IV estimates to social 
returns to schooling for women are constantly and significantly higher 
than those generated by the conventional OLS. For instance, the IV 
estimate to an additional year of schooling for women only is 9 percentage 
points higher than the OLS estimate. The instrument improves the value 
of the first stage regression and the f-test on the excluded variable is 
significant at a 1 % level. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi square test 
confirms the need to engage in the 'corrective' procedure to deal with 
potential endogeneity of schooling for women only. The use of IV is 
warranted in the case of women only. Thus, it may be concluded that in 
the case of women in the Republic of Mauritius, the conventional OLS 
does not yield consistent estimates to social returns to schooling and that 
OLS estimates may be downward biased. 
317 
When the sample is split by sector of employment, the instrument predicts 
the schooling of private sector employees only. The IV estimate to 
schooling for private sector employees only is around 30 percentage points 
higher than the OLS estimate. But the quality tests reveal that there is a 
weak correlation between the free secondary education instrument and 
schooling. The instrument is statistically insignificant in the first stage 
equation and the F-test on the excluded variable is also insignificant. A 
similar trend can be observed in the case of public sector employees too, 
with the exception that the IV estimate to an extra year of schooling for 
the public sector workers is negative and insignificant, while only their 
OLS estimate is significant at the I % level. However both the IV estimate 
and OLS estimate are statistically significant at a I % level in the wage 
equation for private sector workers. The exogeneity test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the OLS and IV estimates at the 10% 
level of significance for this group of workers while no evidence of 
endogeneity is found in the case of public sector employees. 
When the sector of employment is further split by gender, it can be again 
deduced that the instrument does not work in the case of men. It does not 
predict the schooling of public sector male workers and private sector 
male workers at all. The correlation between the 1976 free secondary 
education instrument and schooling for these groups is very weak. Some 
researchers have cautioned us against IV procedures which make use of 
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weak instruments as these may yield more inconsistent point estimates 
than those produced by the conventional OLS (Bound et aI, 1995; Levin & 
Plug, 1999). Thus in the case of the private sector male workers and 
public sector male workers, there is a rise in the standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients of schooling in the wage regressions which 
translates into insignificant estimates to social returns to schooling. 
As far as women are concerned across these two sectors of employment, 
the instrument does not work for those women who are employed in the 
public sector. However it must be pointed out the sample size for this 
group of women is very small. Nevertheless the instrument works well in 
the case of private sector female employees. The instrument is positive 
and significant at 1 % level in the first stage regression. The quality tests 
reveal that the addition of the 1976 free secondary education instrument 
improves the value of that equation and the f-test on the excluded variable 
is significant at a 1 % level. The strong correlation between schooling and 
this instrument translates into an IV estimate which is reasonable in 
magnitude and significant at a 1 % level. This IV estimate is around 10 
percentage points higher than the OLS estimate for this group of women. 
When IV estimates and OLS estimates are compared for rural areas (both 
sexes) and urban areas (both sexes), the IV procedure yields estimates 
which are 8.1 percentage points and 20 percentage points (respectively) 
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higher than OLS estimates. Thus, OLS estimates are negatively biased 
which is in line with the mainstream literature. But instrumental quality 
has not been ensured. The correlation between the instrument and 
schooling is weak in both cases. The coefficients on the instrument are 
positive in the first stage regressions but insignificant in both cases. 
Although the Partial R2 show a slight improvement in the R2 value of the 
reduced form equation once the instrument is added, the F-tests on the 
excluded variable are insignificant in both groups of workers. Hence here 
the instrument does not predict schooling and one use the IV estimates. In 
such cases IV estimates tend to yield more inconsistent point estimates 
than those produced by OLS. However (with OLS estimates) it can be 
deduced that urban residents enjoy a higher wage premium of 4.2 
percentage points than their rural counterparts which may be associated 
with the types of jobs and better pay scales available in urban areas. The 
endogeneity of residence choice is recognised and there is inconclusive 
evidence about the endogeneity of schooling for individuals in urban and 
rural areas. 
Moreover the sample is split further by gender to explore potential 
differences in social returns to schooling due to gender, between rural and 
urban areas. In the case of rural men only and urban men only, the same 
pattern as above (as for rural residents (both sexes) and urban residents 
(both sexes)) is found. The instrument does not predict schooling of rural 
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men and urban men. The correlation between the 1976 free secondary 
education instrument and schooling is weak in both cases. The 
coefficients on the instrument in the first stage regressions are 
insignificant in both cases and the F-tests on the excluded variable are also 
insignificant in both cases. The IV estimates for rural men only and urban 
men only are of the order 12% and 3%, respectively, but they are 
statistically insignificant. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman l tests on exogeneity 
also have insignificant coefficients for both groups. 
However in the case of rural women only and urban women only, findings 
are different. The instrument predicts the level of schooling acquired by 
women in rural areas and urban areas. The coefficients on the free 
secondary education instrument are positive and statistically significant in 
the first stage regressions. The F-tests on the excluded variable for these 
both groups of women are statistically significant and the instrumental 
variable improves the R2 values of each first stage equation. The IV 
estimate is 2 percentage points higher than the OLS estimate for rural 
women and 20 percentage points higher than the OLS estimate for urban 
women. These may suggest the presence of a negative bias 118 in the 
conventional OLS estimate of the schooling-earnings relationship, 
particularly large in the case of urban women. However the IV estimate to 
an extra year of schooling is insignificant in the case of rural women and 
118 Here IV estimates yield marginal returns to schooling for those individuals who would 
not have attended secondary schools in the absence of the law. 
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when the relevance of IV in the case of these rural women only, is 
assessed through the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, there is insufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimate is consistent. 
Nevertheless this null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for urban 
women, implying that the IV procedure was necessary. 
The next chapter summarises what has been discussed so far and also sets 
out some recommendations for policy makers. In short, Chapter 7 will 
highlight the purpose, findings and significance of this thesis. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion & Policy implications 
Summary of Findings 
The objective of this PhD is to estimate social returns to individuals' 
highest academic qualification levels or vocational qualifications and also 
to years of schooling in the Republic of Mauritius. Although there is a 
rich empirical literature available on the relationship between earnings and 
education, this relationship in the Republic of Mauritius has not yet been 
studied. This has been mainly due to the absence of data on individuals' 
wages prior to the collection of the 2000 Population Census 119, which was 
the first census to include a question on income. This study is therefore 
able to use a nationally representative sample from the 2000 Population 
Census. 
However the income variable used for this PhD is gross income (income 
from all sources and before taxation). This was the only measure of 
income available and only gross returns (that is social returns excluding 
any non-monetary benefits) to education have been estimated throughout 
this thesis. Although much of the other literature in this field has 
estimated private returns, using net income, one may argue that income 
before taxation acts as a better proxy for productivity. Since no data on 
119 The 2000 Population Census provides a new opportunity to estimate social returns to 
all academic highest qualifications and vocational qualifications in the Republic of 
Mauritius. 
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the costs of educational provlSlon for the individuals sampled was 
available, the estimates are returns to education rather than a rate of return. 
This omission of education provision costs is standard in the Mincerian 
approach to estimating returns to education. 
This first attempt to estimate social returns for the Republic of Mauritius 
attempts to tackle potentially important methodological problems such as 
bias due to sample selection, omitted variables and endogeneity of 
schooling. It also exploits a national representative data set. In the first 
instance, ordinary least square (OLS) estimates are obtained. I then 
produced estimates that correct for sample selectivity bias which arises 
due to individuals' non-random participation in the labour force. The 
problem of the possible endogeneity of schooling remains after correction 
for selection bias. 
The 2000 Population Census data is not very rich and OLS estimation 
based on this data set may suffer from omitted variable bias. This is a 
particular concern for developing countries where data sets do not carry 
sufficiently detailed information about an individual, for example, the 
quality of school they attended, their socio-economic status and a measure 
of their ability. An attempt was made to correct for the omitted variable 
bias and the endogeneity problem via the instrumental variable approach. 
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The earnings regressions are presented for various groups such as both 
sexes, by gender, by private/ public sector and by rural/urban areas. The 
motivation to investigate social returns to education across these sub-
groups for the Republic of Mauritius 120, emerged from the various studies 
which reported significant differences across gender, sector of 
employment and area of residence in other developing countries [for 
instance, Mohammad (2005) for Bangladesh, Siphambe (1997) for 
Bostwana and Duraisamy (2002) for India]. 
The sample is restricted to those who are aged 12 to 59 years, inclusive. 
Age 12 is the standard age for which the Central Statistics Office of the 
Republic of Mauritius recorded entry into the labour force and at the age 
of 60, people are eligible for a state pension. Of the 10,490 individuals in 
the random total sample available for this study, 4256 people who satisfy 
the age restriction and for whom all required information is available were 
selected. The dependent variable in the wage equations is the natural 
logarithm of gross hourly incomes of individuals. This variable is 
calculated from the reported monthly income from all sources before 
taxation and hours worked during the week preceding the census. 
Education variables include both highest academic and vocational 
qualifications and these enter as dummy variables in all equations which 
do not assume homogenous returns to education. In total, there are seven 
categories of educational attainment with 'no schooling at all or at most 
120 The Republic of Mauritius is a developing country. 
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pnmary schooling' being the reference group. A senes of control 
variables such as age and tenure are also included in the models so as to 
account for their respective contributions to wages. 
I estimate both linear and non-linear Mincerian wage equations. The 
former is conducted using years of schooling as the education variable and 
the latter uses dummy variables to indicate each level of schooling. In the 
case of the Republic of Mauritius, the explanatory power of all models 
(for both sexes, by gender, by sector and by area of residence) is quite 
high and is comparable to some of the literature that has estimated similar 
wage regressions for developing countries (Kugler & Psacharapoulos, 
1989; Psacharapoulos & Steire, 1988; AI-Qudsi, 1989; Duraisamy, 2002; 
Siphambe, 2000). All main findings derived from the conventional OLS 
for the Republic of Mauritius are reported below: 
? Social returns to an extra year of schooling for both sexes in the 
Republic of Mauritius is around 7% and this OLS estimate is 
highly significant. 
? Rising social returns to rising academic qualification levels 
All OLS qualification coefficients are positive and significant at a 
1 % level. They display the expected ordering, so reflect higher 
wages for higher qualification levels. Thus, for the Republic of 
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Mauritius, there is a uniform pattern of increasing social returns to 
rising academic qualification levels for both sexes, by gender, by 
sector of employment and by rural and urban areas of residence. 
~ Tertiary education is the most valuable for both sexes with a social 
return of 120% compared to basic or no schooling, while lower 
secondary qualifications yield the lowest social returns of around 
11 % for both sexes valuable. The reference group is no schooling 
at all or at most primary schooling. Social returns to upper 
secondary, GCSE & Sixth form, A' level and vocational 
qualifications for both sexes are around 20%, 50%, 73% and 80%, 
. 1 121 respectIve y. 
~ Women earn consistently higher social returns to all academic 
qualification levels as well as vocational qualifications, relative to 
their male counterparts. This is consistent with the existing 
literature which attributes this trend to the lower foregone earnings 
of women (Psacharopoulos & Alam, 1991; Gomez-Castellanos & 
Psacharapoulos, 1990; Psacharopoulos & Velez, 1994; Kugler & 
Psacharopoulos, 1989). 
121 When the [exp (coefficient)- 1 x100] adjustment is done to the qualification dummy 
coefficients so as to obtain the percentage effect of each qualification level on gross 
earnings (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1978), social returns to lower secondary education, 
upper secondary education, GCSE & Sixth form, A level, vocational education and 
tertiary education for both men and women combined for the Republic of Mauritius are 
12%,22%,64%, 107%, 122% and 235%, respectively. 
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~ The public sector rewards low academic qualification levels 
relatively more, while the private sector rewards high academic 
qualification levels and vocational qualifications better. However 
the pattern of a higher wage premium attached to high academic 
qualification levels and vocational qualifications within the private 
sector, does not hold in the case of men. 
~ Higher social returns to all academic qualification levels and 
vocational qualifications are found in urban areas. This finding 
holds true in all cases except for those men holding A' levels from 
urban areas. 
The problem of sample selectivity bias anses because of the use of 
censored data and because selection into paid work may not be random. 
Unobservable characteristics which affect the work decision may be 
correlated with the observable characteristics which affect the process 
determining wages and these give rise to inconsistent OLS estimates. 
Thus, Heckman (1979) proposed his two step selection model to deal with 
this problem. A selection equation is first estimated for the entire sample 
(labour force participants and non-participants) and the inverse of the 
Mills' ratio is estimated and plugged into the second stage (wage) 
equation. This approach has been adopted in the present study. 
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The Heckman selection model is estimated for each group, that is, for both 
sexes, by gender, by sector of employment and by area of residence. It 
must be noted that the same identifying variables 122 are used throughout 
all the groups. The dummy variables 'child' which stands for the presence 
of at least one child in the household, and 'married' which states the 
marital status of the individual, are known to be particularly important for 
women when they choose between work or no work (Mohammad, 2005). 
All findings arising from the use of the selection model are listed below: 
~ An extra year of schooling increases the probability of being 
employed by 3 percentage points for the sample of men and 
women combined. The coefficient for men is statistically 
insignificant implying that education plays a greater role in 
determining whether or not a woman takes up a job. 
~ The education variable is redefined as qualification dummy 
variables. All qualifications coefficients in the selection equation 
have positive signs and are highly significant (except for lower 
secondary, upper secondary and tertiary qualifications) for both 
sexes. 
122 The identifying variables used in the equation for men & women combined, are 
gender, child, marital status and interaction terms between gender and child, gender and 
marital status. These were discussed in Chapter 5. 
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y Lower academic qualification levels do not matter for women 
while deciding to work or not. But higher academic qualifications 
significantly increase the probability of women joining the labour 
force. Again it is suggested that qualification levels do matter for 
women when deciding to work or not. 
y For men all qualification coefficients are significant, except for 
vocational qualifications, suggesting that vocational qualification 
does not affect the likelihood of men being employed. 
y The identifying variables 'child', 'marital status', 'gender 
interacted with child' and 'gender interacted with marriage' are 
highly significant for both sexes. As expected, being a woman 
reduces the chances of participating in the labour force. 
y Qualifications do not seem to influence the likelihood of someone 
being employed in the private or public sector. All qualification 
coefficients are statistically insignificant for both sexes within each 
sector. When the impact of qualifications on the probability of 
being in paid work in each sector is considered separately for men 
and women, 'lower secondary qualification' plays a positive and 
significant role in the case of private sector female employees (by 
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25 percentage points), and upper secondary qualifications 
influences a man's decision to work in the private sector by 22 
percentage points. 
);- When the chances of being in paid work is considered for rural and 
urban areas, the findings suggest that only those qualifications 
beyond GCSE & Sixth Form and vocational qualifications play 
significant roles (for both sexes) in increasing an individual's 
chances of working. The biggest impact of qualifications on the 
likelihood of being employed is for urban women where all 
qualifications (including vocational qualifications) are positive and 
highly significant (except in the case of upper secondary which is 
significant at 10%). However, a puzzling finding is that for men in 
rural areas with qualification levels between 'upper secondary' and 
'A level', there is a significant decrease in their likelihood of being 
in employment. The sample size for each qualification variable is 
small. 
);- Estimates from the wage estimations adjusted for selectivity bias 
are somewhat similar to those generated by the conventional OLS. 
The selectivity term (inverse of Mills' ratio) is insignificant in 
most cases and in cases where they are significant (that is, for men 
only and rural men only), the impact on the qualifications 
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estimates are minimal. For instance, the biggest decline reported is 
7 percentage points for tertiary qualifications for urban women. 
Although there is evidence of selectivity bias in the case of men, 
conventional OLS estimates are robust to correction for sample 
selectivity in most cases. Adjusting for selectivity bias does not 
alter the expected order of social returns to education so higher 
social returns at higher academic qualifications levels, are obtained 
as previously through the conventional OLS. Also, given that 
there are only tiny differences between the conventional OLS 
estimates and those generated free of censoring bias, conventional 
OLS estimates may continue to be used for the Republic of 
Mauritius. 
Apart from OLS estimates and estimates that correct for sample selectivity 
bias, instrumental variable (IV) estimates are also reported in this thesis. 
OLS estimates may be inconsistent especially in the case of omitted 
variable bias, measurement error and endogeneity of schooling. For the 
Republic of Mauritius, IV estimates are higher than the OLS estimates and 
this is in line with existing literature [for instance, Harmon & Walker 
(1995), Harmon & Walker (1999)]. It must however be pointed out that 
IV generates estimates that are Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) 
estimates, that is, these estimates are generated for those individuals who 
would not have had the treatment otherwise (Angrist & Krueger, 2001). 
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An instrument must actually predict schooling for individuals and also 
have no direct relationship with earnings, i.e. the dependent variable in the 
second stage. IV estimates are generally obtained from two types of 
studies: experimental and non-experimenta1. Non-experimental studies 
focus on for instance, family background characteristics to construct 
instruments for education (Butcher & Case, 1994) while experimental 
studies focus on reforms within the education system which cause 
exogenous variation in school attainment such as compulsory education 
and change in minimum school leaving age (Angrist & Krueger, 1991; 
Harmon & Walker, 1995). This PhD uses an exogenous change in the 
educational distribution of individuals caused by a policy reform in the 
Republic of Mauritius in 1976 whereby secondary schooling was made 
free for all school-age youths. A dummy variable was defined for 
individuals who were born after 1958 to take a value of 1 for those who 
faced a regime of no fees at secondary school and 0 otherwise. This 
instrument is appropriate as it actually predicts schooling, especially in the 
case of women and has no direct association with the outcome (wages) but 
is sufficiently correlated to schooling 123. It is important to note that the 
decision to use this instrument for this PhD has been made on the basis of 
theory and on the recommendations of other studies. These report that 
123 An attempt was also made to use another instrument, the 1993 basic compulsory 
schooling law. This was subsequently dropped from the analysis because it was 
insignificant in explaining school attainment. This may well be because those individuals 
affected by this law were still at school at the time of the census. 
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variables relating to institutional reforms may be good instruments to use. 
(Harmon & Walker, 1995; Denny & Harmon, 2000). Moreover to guard 
against the hazards of deriving inferences from the use of instruments that 
are weakly correlated with schooling, the F-statistic on the excluded 
instruments in the first stage schooling equation is computed, and the 
partial R2 values have been reported throughout the IV chapter. 
Findings arising from the IV approach are listed below: 
~ The quality tests show that the instrument (1976 free secondary 
schooling law) and schooling are satisfactorily correlated for 
women only and can therefore be used to generate consistent 
estimates in the presence of omitted variable, measurement error 
and endogeneity of schooling for women only. This instrument 
actually predicts schooling for women and this is in line with the 
existing literature on education for girls in the Republic of 
Mauritius. 
~ In the case of men, the instrument does not predict their schooling 
and one must rely on the conventional OLS estimates. I cannot 
provide evidence on the extent of the bias in the OLS estimates. 
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~ IV estimates of return to schooling are significant in some cases 
(for women only, private sector employees only and urban women 
only). Most IV estimates to social returns to schooling are higher 
than the conventional OLS estimates. This is in line with the 
consensus that OLS estimates may be largely and negatively 
biased. 
~ The instrument does predict the schooling of women and the IV 
estimate for women is 7.7 percentage points higher than its OLS 
estimate. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggests the need to 
engage in the IV procedure to deal with potential endogeneity of 
schooling for women, that is, OLS estimate is inconsistent. 
~ For women, the instrument is a good predictor of schooling for 
those who are in the private sector. There is a strong correlation 
between the 1976 free secondary education instrument and 
schooling for these women. The IV estimate is 10 percentage 
points higher than the OLS estimate for private sector female 
employees at 17%. 
~ The instrument predicts the schooling of rural and urban women 
well. The IV estimate is around 3 percentage points higher than 
the OLS estimate for rural female workers but 16 percentage points 
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higher in the case of urban women. The IV estimate for rural 
female workers is around 27%, suggesting a large and negative 
bias in the OLS estimate for urban female workers (around 11 %). 
However it must be pointed out that IV estimates are LATE 
estimates. This means they are IV yield estimates for a marginal 
group of the population, who would not have been affected had the 
policy not been implemented. These people generally have high 
discount rates. There is insufficient evidence in the case of rural 
women to reject the null hypothesis that OLS estimates are 
consistent but this hypothesis may be rejected at a 5% level for 
urban women. Thus, we should rely on the higher IV estimate but 
be aware it is a LATE effect. 
~ There is sufficient evidence to suggest that schooling is 
endogenous for those women who work in the private sector and 
who reside in urban areas. Thus, the use of IV is warranted in 
these cases and thus, the use of OLS estimates would be 
misleading. 
Policy implications 
From a policy perspective, information on the private and social rates of 
return to education is important. Rates of return studies may provide 
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results that can act as policy indicators to government when it decides 
about the profitability of investing in a particular level of schooling. 
Specifically, the difference between social and private rates of return 
indicate where it is advisable for the government to increase / decrease 
educational subsidies. Social rates of return give the return to society 
when an individual completes an incremental education program, while 
private rates of return indicate individuals' incentives to undertake specific 
education programmmes (Horowitz & Schenzler, 1999). Efficiency 
requires social rates of return to be equated across all education levels and 
the same applies for the private rates of return, and also to be equal to the 
marginal rate of social time preference (i.e. the marginal social cost of 
capital). The problem is deciding what this is. 
If this is not the case, potential social gams and private gams can be 
achieved by reallocating individuals across education levels. However, as 
no information is available on direct or indirect costs of education and 
only gross incomes are available, this study is restricted to estimating 
social returns to education only. 
Ideally any measure of social returns to education would reflect both 
monetary benefits and non-monetary benefits such as externalities and 
non-economic benefits such as increased health awareness. It is argued 
that non-monetary benefits of education are potentially large (Duraisamy 
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& Malathy, 1990; Schultz, 1988; McMahon, 1995). However in practice, 
due to the difficulty of measuring these non-monetary benefits, most 
social return estimates are only restricted to monetary benefits (Horowitz 
& Schenzler, 1999). Similarly this PhD only looks at wage gains arising 
from educational investments. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
alternatives, the estimates thus obtained may act as rough indicators to 
policy makers in the Republic of Mauritius. These social returns will be 
informative if they are viewed with caution and properly interpreted. 
Careful comparisons of social returns across the different levels of 
education provide a signal of how an education system may be altered to 
improve efficiency. 
On average the Republic of Mauritius has 9 years of schooling and social 
return to an additional year of schooling is around 7% for men and women 
combined. This estimate to social return is in line with other countries 
which have similar years of schooling such as in Hong Kong, Philippines, 
Taiwan and Venezuela - studies used by Psacharopoulos (1985). 
Moreover the Republic of Mauritius is an upper income country and both 
its average years of schooling and the associated return to education are 
close to the averages of 9.9 years and 7.8%, respectively for the groups of 
upper income countries, as provided by Psacharapoulos (1985). 
Additionally, social return to an extra year of schooling in the Republic of 
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Mauritius is similar to the estimate provided for OECD countries 
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002). 
However, policy makers must be aware that there is evidence of 
diminishing returns to schooling in the Republic of Mauritius. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, given its relatively higher average years of 
schooling, its social return to an extra year of schooling for men and 
women combined (7%) is lower than the mincerian returns of those 
countries which have lower years of schooling. In fact, it lies below the 
world average of 7.5 % 124 (Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002). 
When social returns to highest qualification levels are considered 
throughout the different subgroups of the sample, it is found that 'GCSE 
& Sixth Form', 'A level', tertiary and vocational qualifications are 
associated with high returns. These suggest that employers attach a high 
value to these qualifications which is reflected in the high wage premium. 
Employers attach importance to the skills acquired through these high 
academic qualification levels and vocational qualifications. The higher 
the academic qualification level, the higher is the wage premium. 
124 The world average is 8.3 mean years of schooling with an estimated return of 7.5 % 
(Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2002). The world averages as reported by Psacharopoulos 
(1985) were 8.4 mean years of schooling and 10.1 % return. 
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Due to the lack of data, private returns to education cannot be computed 
here. However, given that the government of the Republic of Mauritius 
heavily subsidies education up to tertiary level, one may expect private 
returns to exceed social returns at all education levels in the Mauritian 
context. 
Social returns are highest at the tertiary level. Although no estimate to 
private return to education is obtained here for the Republic of Mauritius, 
it may be argued that private returns to tertiary education are likely to be 
high, given the high degree of subsidy by the government. Thus, 
reallocating resources within the different levels of education may not act 
as a disincentive for individuals to attend universities. It is suggested that 
some resources could be diverted away from higher education to provide 
quality primary education or to improve the transition rate between the 
primary to secondary school cycles and within the secondary school cycle. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a private-aided primary school gets on average 
54% of resources received by a public primary school and grants to 
private-aided schools have grown only at 6.4% against 8.2% for the public 
schools (World Bank, 2002). It has been suggested that some resources be 
diverted away from higher education to provide quality primary education 
as the benefits of primary education have been reported to be huge in the 
literature (Jamison & Lau, 1982; Psacharopoulos, 1989). 
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The resource gap between public and private aided schools is even larger 
at the secondary education level in the Republic of Mauritius and there is 
considerable scope for increasing the productive efficiency of the 
education system, since, as argued in Chapter 3, it is plagued by high drop 
out rates during the transition between the primary and secondary school 
cycles and within the secondary school cycle itself. Funding is also 
skewed against private aided secondary schools while these schools enroll 
more than 50% of the total secondary school population and their funding 
has grown at a lower rate of only 12% per annum against 35% for public 
schools (World Bank, 2002). The estimates of social returns to 
qualifications derived in this thesis reveal that social returns are high, 
especially at 'A' level, tertiary level and even for vocational qualifications. 
It is, thus, suggested that policy makers should act to improve the survival 
rates during the transition between the primary and secondary school 
cycles and within the secondary school cycle They should also provide 
adequate funding to private-aided secondary schools so that an increased 
number of students may qualify for admission into post secondary 
education to have access to education which is equally distributed across 
the population and also benefit from the high social returns associated 
with these high level academic qualifications (' A' level & tertiary 
education) and vocational qualifications. 
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Moreover the high social returns for tertiary education derived from the 
data available for this study, may be used to argue that the most recent 
expansion of the tertiary education system in the Republic of Mauritius 
has not resulted in low returns to education and therefore the country does 
not yet face the problem of over-expansion. Also the Skilled Biased 
Technology Change theory, which suggests that the demand for skills is 
increasing - driven up by technological change, may also explain the high 
social returns to higher qualification levels found in Mauritius (Machin & 
Reenen, 1998; Berman & Machin, 2000). Many sectors in the Republic of 
Mauritius have been developing at a greater pace and there have been 
considerable technical changes due to, for instance, the setting up of the 
information technological sector 'Cyberspace' which absorbs both skilled 
graduates and 'A' level holders. 
Investment in education may help growth to happen faster especially 
through R&D or adapting foreign technology to local production 
(Gemmell, 1996). Here, investment in education helps to offset 
diminishing returns to both physical capital and human capital. Benhabib 
& Spiegel (1994) argue that it facilitates the adoption of foreign 
technology in developing countries and helps to create new domestic 
technologies in the richer countries. Tertiary education is important for 
countries generating new technologies or for adapting the embodied 
technology in physical capital. Thus, policy makers should not merely 
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look at the high private returns and low social returns, they should also 
take into consideration, the level of economic and technological 
developments. 
In the case of the Republic of Mauritius, where private rates of return are 
likely to be much higher than social rates of return at the tertiary level, 
more investment in science or engineering courses at the tertiary level may 
be required to generate new technologies and faster growth 125. These are 
usually associated with high costs such as with the maintenance of 
laboratories and the purchase of specialised equipment, while some 
subjects such as arts and literature do not require high costs. Future rates 
of return analysis must not be simply used to guide the allocation of scarce 
resources. They must also be used along with other government 
objectives. Any development strategy requires human infrastructures to 
support it. 
Card (1999) argues that IV estimation is based on an intervention that 
affects a narrow sub-group and this leads to an estimated return to 
schooling which is usually above an OLS estimator for the same sample. 
Nevertheless such estimates which are computed for specific subgroups 
remain attractive as a number of policy interventions are often directed at 
125 Due to lack of data on net incomes and costs of education, private and social rates of 
return calculations could not be carried out in this thesis. 
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them. While using the IV estimates, policy makers must be cautious as 
these estimates are sensitive to many factors such as model specification 
and assumptions made therein (Levin & Plug, 1999). The IV evidence in 
this PhD suggests that the 1976 free secondary education policy positively 
influenced the education of girls in the Republic of Mauritius. Those girls, 
who would have otherwise dropped out of school, did have access to 
secondary education and their social return to an additional year of 
schooling is 16% and 27% for those who live in urban areas. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, education increases the probability of women to be in 
employment. Women have been the main beneficiaries of the 1976 free 
secondary education policy. However very little is known about these 
women as data on social class and costs of education are unavailable. Yet 
given the cultural and economic situations prevailing at that time, the 
policy has indeed proved to be effective in the case of girls. Parents did 
not have to choose between sending their daughters or sons to school. 
High social returns to all academic & vocational qualifications are 
obtained in urban areas. This is not surprising as urban areas usually offer 
better jobs and characteristically, rural areas mostly offer jobs in 
agriculture, forestry, mining, quarrying and the textile industries. 
Education is associated with a wage premium in urban areas which might, 
in tum, suggest under investment in education by rural residents or 
encourage rural residents to move out of rural areas in search of higher 
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social returns. However due to unavailability of data on urban/rural 
migration and urban/rural employment rate, it is difficult to assess this 
issue in this thesis further. Thus, policy makers should encourage related 
research to be carried out. 
The public sector in the Republic of Mauritius employs around 32% of 
total individuals in paid work (CSO, 2007). It offers permanent jobs and 
automatic increases in pay scales. Social returns estimated here suggest 
that there is a wage premium attached to high academic qualification 
levels and to vocational qualifications for men and women combined, who 
work in the private sector. This may be reflected by the relative scarcity 
of people with these qualifications. As presented in Chapter 4, for 
instance, 45% of public sector workers have 'GCSE & Sixth Form', 'A' 
level, tertiary and vocational qualifications, against only 17% in the 
private sector. It is recommended that policy makers should continue to 
employ qualified individuals. Also public sector workers, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, are on average older, have more schooling, have longer tenure 
and work longer hours per week compared to private sector workers. 
These suggest that highly qualified individuals are employed in the public 
sector and thus, the private sector lacks employees with adequate skills. 
The findings here suggest that the private sector has to revise its salaries 
and any work-based benefits 
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This study will supplement existing literature on the relationship between 
education and earnings, and simultaneously it is expected that it will 
stimulate in-depth studies which will eventually produce estimates across 
other subgroups such as by occupation and by level and type of degree 
that will take the full costs of education into account. In other words it is 
expected that this thesis will act as an incentive for future researchers to 
carry out rate of return analysis. 
All estimates generated for this PhD must be interpreted carefully and 
must be supplemented by other information such as costs of education and 
taxation policy within the Republic of Mauritius, before these can be used 
for policy making purposes. 
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Appendix A: Conventional OLS Wage Estimations 
1 OLS estimates both sexes aged 12 to 59 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 4256 
R-squared = 0.412 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Error Interval[ 
Schooling 0.070 0.003 24.81 0.000 0.065 0.076 
Age 0.036 0.005 6.86 0.000 0.026 0.047 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 -4.96 0.000 -0.001 -0.0002 
Mauritians 0.352 0.043 8.25 0.000 0.269 0.436 
Public sector 0.284 0.020 14.17 0.000 0.245 0.324 
Female -0.210 0.017 -12.25 0.000 -0.244 -0.177 
Rural areas -0.091 0.016 -5.75 0.000 -0.l22 -0.060 
Tenure 0.023 0.003 7.87 0.000 0.017 0.028 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 -2.94 0.003 -0.0004 -0.0001 
Constant 1.415 0.103 13.81 0.000 1.214 1.616 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Republic of MauntlUs 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.112 0.023 
Upper secondary 0.200 0.020 
Gcse & sixthform 0.496 0.024 
A level 0.727 0.034 
Vocational 0.798 0.055 
Tertiary 1.208 0.058 
Age 0.040 0.005 
Age squared -0.0005 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.333 0.037 
Public sector 0.215 0.020 
Female -0.266 0.016 
Rural -0.088 0.015 
Tenure 0.023 0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Constant 1.863 0.099 
Number of observations = 4256 
R-squared = 0.465 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval[ 
4.90 0.000 0.067 0.157 
9.85 0.000 0.160 0.240 
20.52 0.000 0.449 0.544 
21.37 0.000 0.660 0.794 
14.51 0.000 0.690 0.906 
2l.00 0.000 1.095 1.321 
7.83 0.000 0.030 0.050 
-6.29 0.000 -0.001 -0.0003 
9.02 0.000 0.261 0.406 
10.91 0.000 0.176 0.253 
-16.33 0.000 -0.30 -0.234 
-5.76 0.000 -0.118 -0.058 
8.22 0.000 0.017 0.028 
-2.92 0.004 -0.0004 -0.0001 
19.48 0.000 l.676 2.051 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Populahon Census Data, CSO, Republic of MauntlUs 
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2 OLS estimates for men only aged 12 to 59 
(i) Schooling Variable 
Number of observations = 2905 
R-squared = 0.351 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Interval] 
Error 
Schooling 0.065 0.003 19.05 0.000 0.059 0.072 
Age 0.044 0.006 6.75 0.000 0.031 0.056 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 -4.86 0.000 -0.001 -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.220 0.059 3.75 0.000 0.105 0.336 
Public sector 0.207 0.022 9.41 0.000 0.164 0.250 
Rural areas -0.065 0.018 -3.54 0.000 -0.101 -0.029 
Tenure 0.017 0.003 5.13 0.000 .0107 0.024 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0001 -1.87 0.061 -0.0004 8.80e-06 
Constant 1.471 0.124 11.82 0.000 1.227 1.715 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient 
earnings 
Lower secondary 0.09 
Upper secondary 0.178 
Gcse & sixthform 0.429 
A level 0.624 
Vocational 0.696 
Tertiary 1.079 
Age 0.043 
Age squared -0.0005 
Mauritians 0.252 
Public sector 0.161 
Rural -0.065 
Tenure 0.02 
Tenure squared -0.0002 
Constant 1.892 
Number of observations = 2905 
R-squared = 0.394 
Robust t P>t [95% Confidence 
Std. Interval] 
Error 
0.027 3.44 0.001 0.039 0.144 
0.024 7.55 0.000 0.132 0.225 
0.028 15.44 0.000 0.375 0.484 
0.044 14.11 0.000 0.537 0.711 
0.059 11.84 0.000 0.580 0.811 
0.074 14.63 0.000 0.935 1.224 
0.006 6.85 0.000 0.031 0.056 
0.0001 -5.18 0.000 -0.001 -0.0003 
0.051 4.93 0.000 0.152 0.353 
0.021 7.57 0.000 0.119 0.203 
0.018 -3.63 0.000 -0.100 -0.030 
0.003 5.91 0.000 0.012 0.026 
0.0001 -2.49 0.0l3 -0.0004 -0.0001 
0.119 15.94 0.000 1.659 2.125 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of Mauritius 
377 
3 OLS estimates for women only aged 12 to 59 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm Coefficient Robust 
of gross Std. 
earnin~s Error 
Schooling 0.075 0.005 
Age 0.029 0.009 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.452 0.056 
Public sector 0.505 0.042 
Rural areas -0.123 0.03 
Tenure 0.028 0.006 
Tenure -0.0001 0.0002 
squared 
Constant 1.147 0.176 
Number of observations = 1351 
R-squared = 0.478 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
IntervalJ 
13.82 0.000 0.064 0.086 
3.16 0.002 0.011 0.048 
-2.24 0.025 -0.001 -0.0001 
8.05 0.000 0.342 0.562 
12.02 0.000 0.423 0.587 
-4.12 0.000 -0.181 -0.064 
4.98 0.000 0.017 0.038 
-0.48 0.629 -0.0005 0.0003 
6.53 0.000 0.803 1.492 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.164 0.044 
Upper secondary 0.278 0.043 
Gcse & sixthform 0.61 0.048 
A level 0.85 0.058 
Vocational 0.98 0.113 
Tertiary 1.433 0.083 
Age 0.037 0.009 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.429 0.055 
Public sector 0.362 0.043 
Rural -0.102 0.028 
Tenure 0.024 0.005 
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 1.481 .1603 
Number of observations = 1351 
R-squared = 0.548 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
IntervalJ 
3.71 0.000 0.077 0.251 
6.48 0.000 0.194 0.362 
12.76 0.000 0.516 0.704 
14.64 0.000 0.736 0.964 
8.66 0.000 0.758 1.201 
17.36 0.000 1.27 1.595 
4.31 0.000 0.020 0.054 
-3.56 0.000 -0.001 -0.0002 
7.74 0.000 0.320 0.538 
8.37 0.000 0.277 0.447 
-3.62 0.000 -0.157 -0.047 
4.80 0.000 0.014 0.034 
-0.37 0.708 -0.0004 0.0003 
9.24 0.000 1.167 1.796 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntIus 
378 
4 Public sector employees aged between 12 to 59 years (both 
sexes) 
(i) Schooling variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 820 
R-squared = 0.437 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Error Interval] 
Schooling 0.089 0.006 15.41 0.000 0.078 0.100 
Age 0.047 0.015 3.22 0.001 0.019 0.076 
Age squared -0.001 0.0002 -2.82 0.005 -0.001 -0.0002 
Mauritians -0.626 0.074 -8.42 0.000 -0.772 -0.480 
Female 0.116 0.031 3.71 0.000 0.054 0.177 
Rural areas -0.067 0.029 -2.34 0.019 -0.123 -0.011 
Tenure 0.023 0.007 3.46 0.001 0.01 0.035 
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0002 -0.69 0.492 -0.001 0.0002 
Constant 2.129 0.349 6.10 0.000 1.444 2.814 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Republic of MaUrItIUS 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient 
earnings 
Lower secondary 0.127 
Upper secondary 0.327 
Gcse & Sixthfonn 0.547 
A level 0.673 
Vocational 0.762 
Tertiary l.l45 
Age 0.05 
Age squared -0.001 
Mauritians -0.46 
Female 0.075 
Rural -0.051 
Tenure 0.024 
Tenure squared -0.0002 
Constant 2.477 
Number of observations = 820 
R-squared = 0.475 
Robust t P>t [95% Confidence 
Std. Interval] 
Error 
0.053 2.42 0.016 0.024 0.231 
0.048 6.88 0.000 0.234 0.420 
0.039 14.12 0.000 0.471 0.623 
0.053 12.76 0.000 0.569 0.776 
0.062 12.33 0.000 0.641 0.884 
0.079 14.42 0.000 0.99 1.30 
0.015 3.31 0.001 0.020 0.08 
0.0002 -2.95 0.003 -0.001 -0.0002 
0.084 -5.50 0.000 -0.624 -0.230 
0.032 2.30 0.022 0.011 0.138 
0.028 -1.83 0.067 -0.106 0.004 
0.006 3.78 0.000 0.012 0.037 
0.0002 -1.02 0.310 -0.001 0.0002 
0.331 7.48 0.000 1.827 3.127 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of MaUrItIus 
379 
5 Private sector employees aged between 12 to 59 years (both 
sexes) 
(i) Schooling variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 3436 
R-squared = 0.299 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Error Interval] 
Schooling 0.064 0.003 19.72 0.000 0.058 0.070 
Age 0.037 0.006 6.38 0.000 0.025 0.048 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 -4.48 0.000 -0.001 -0.0002 
Mauritians 0.351 0.039 9.00 0.000 0.275 0.428 
Female -0.280 0.019 -14.50 0.000 -0.317 -0.242 
Rural areas -0.094 0.0184 -5.l1 0.000 -0.130 -0.058 
Tenure 0.022 0.003 6.91 0.000 0.016 0.029 
T enure squared -0.0003 0.0001 -2.70 0.007 -0.0005 -0.0001 
Constant 1.487 0.108 13.76 0.000 1.275 1.70 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.111 0.025 
Upper secondary 0.179 0.022 
Gcse & sixthform 0.463 0.030 
A level 0.752 0.048 
Vocational 0.856 0.092 
Tertiary 1.241 0.081 
Age 0.042 0.006 
Age squared -0.0005 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.35 0.036 
Female -0.326 O.OIS 
Rural -0.OS7 O.OIS 
Tenure 0.022 0.003 
T enure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 1.S54 0.102 
Number of observations = 3436 
R-squared = 0.363 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
4.46 0.000 0.062 0.l59 
8.09 0.000 0.l35 0.222 
15.13 0.000 0.403 0.522 
15.66 0.000 0.657 0.845 
9.34 0.000 0.676 1.036 
15.15 0.000 1.081 1.4 
7.4S 0.000 0.031 0.053 
-5.96 0.000 -0.0006 -0.0003 
9.65 0.000 0.279 0.421 
-IS.0S 0.000 -0.361 -0.290 
-4.SS 0.000 -0.122 -0.052 
7.24 0.000 0.016 0.029 
-2.99 0.003 -0.001 -0.0001 
IS.20 0.000 1.654 2.053 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of Maunhus 
380 
6 Private Male Employees Only 
(i) Schooling variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 2280 
R-squared = 0.238 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Error Interval[ 
Schooling 0.059 0.004 14.44 0.000 0.051 0.067 
Age 0.045 0.007 6.30 0.000 0.031 0.059 
Age squared -0.001 0.0001 -4.48 0.000 -0.001 -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.253 0.057 4.45 0.000 0.142 0.365 
Rural areas -0.064 0.022 -2.97 0.003 -0.108 -0.022 
Tenure 0.018 0.004 4.53 0.000 0.010 0.025 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0001 -1.99 0.047 -0.001 -3.16e-06 
Constant 1.467 0.l34 10.96 0.000 1.205 1.729 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. Error 
Lower secondary 0.093 0.03 
Upper secondary 0.157 0.027 
Gcse & sixthform 0.387 0.037 
A level 0.656 0.063 
Vocational 0.722 0.095 
Tertiary 1.089 0.108 
Age 0.047 0.007 
Age squared -0.001 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.289 0.051 
Rural -0.062 0.021 
Tenure 0.02 0.004 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 1.814 0.129 
Number of observations = 2280 
R-squared = 0.286 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
3.l2 0.002 0.034 0.151 
5.86 0.000 0.105 0.21 
10.57 0.000 0.315 0.459 
10.36 0.000 0.532 0.78 
7.60 0.000 0.536 0.909 
10.06 0.000 0.877 1.302 
6.63 0.000 0.033 0.061 
-5.05 0.000 -0.001 -0.0003 
5.64 0.000 0.189 0.390 
-2.93 0.003 -0.104 -0.021 
5.15 0.000 0.012 0.027 
-2.54 0.011 -0.001 -0.0001 
14.06 0.000 1.561 2.068 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
381 
7 Private Female Employees Only 
(i) Schooling variable 
Number of observations 1156 
R-squared = 0.287 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Error Interval[ 
Schooling 0.073 0.006 12.39 0.000 0.061 0.084 
Age 0.024 0.01 2.48 0.013 0.005 0.044 
Age squared -0.0002 0.0001 -1.62 0.104 -0.001 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.461 0.053 8.69 0.000 0.357 0.565 
Rural areas -0.137 0.034 -4.06 0.000 -0.203 -0.071 
Tenure 0.028 0.006 4.55 0.000 0.016 0.040 
T enure squared -0.0001 0.0002 -0.46 0.645 -0.001 0.0003 
Constant 1.248 0.186 6.72 0.000 0.884 1.612 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.151 0.045 
Upper secondary 0.247 0.044 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.580 0.054 
A level 0.895 0.076 
Vocational 1.114 0.185 
Tertiary 1.525 0.098 
Age 0.032 0.009 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.453 0.059 
Rural -0.113 0.032 
Tenure 0.025 0.006 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0002 
Constant 1.564 0.168 
Number of observations = 1156 
R-squared = 0.395 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.31 0.001 0.061 0.24 
5.66 0.000 0.162 0.333 
10.77 0.000 0.475 0.686 
11.74 0.000 0.745 1.044 
6.01 0.000 0.751 1.478 
15.54 0.000 1.332 1.718 
3.54 0.000 0.014 0.05 
-2.88 0.004 -0.001 -0.0001 
7.64 0.000 0.336 0.57 
-3.52 0.000 -0.175 -0.05 
4.50 0.000 0.014 0.04 
-0.88 0.378 -0.001 0.0002 
9.33 0.000 1.235 1.893 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of Mauntms 
382 
8 Public Sector Male Employees Only 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient 
gross earnings 
Schooling 0.087 
Age 0.038 
Age squared -0.0004 
Mauritians -0.680 
Rural areas -0.069 
Tenure 0.022 
Tenure squared -0.0002 
Constant 2.388 
Number of observations = 625 
R-squared = 0.398 
Robust T P>t [95% Confidence 
Std. Interval[ 
Error 
0.007 13.20 0.000 0.074 0.099 
0.018 2.18 0.030 0.004 0.073 
0.0002 -1.82 0.069 -0.001 0.00003 
0.073 -9.34 0.000 -0.823 -0.537 
0.033 -2.10 0.037 -0.134 -0.004 
0.007 3.12 0.002 0.008 0.036 
0.0002 -0.96 0.336 -0.001 0.0002 
0.425 5.61 0.000 1.553 3.224 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Robust 
earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.093 0.055 
Upper secondary 0.28 0.049 
Gcse & sixthform 0.52 0.042 
A level 0.643 0.062 
Vocational 0.738 0.074 
Tertiary 1.119 0.096 
Age 0.037 0.017 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0002 
Mauritians -0.488 0.097 
Rural -0.063 0.032 
Tenure 0.026 0.007 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0002 
Constant 2.774 0.389 
Number of observations = 625 
R-squared = 0.45 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
1.68 0.093 -0.016 0.202 
5.68 0.000 0.183 0.377 
12.41 0.000 0.438 0.603 
10.42 0.000 0.521 0.764 
9.98 0.000 0.593 0.883 
11.66 0.000 0.930 1.308 
2.09 0.037 0.002 0.071 
-1.70 0.091 -0.001 0.0001 
-5.06 0.000 -0.678 -0.299 
-1.96 0.051 -0.126 0.0003 
3.70 0.000 0.012 0.039 
-1.66 0.097 -0.001 0.0001 
7.13 0.000 2.01 3.538 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
383 
9 Public Sector Female Employees Only 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 195 
R-squared = 0.54 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Error Interval] 
Schooling 0.092 0.012 7.70 0.000 0.068 0.116 
Age 0.069 0.031 2.25 0.026 0.008 0.129 
Age squared -0.001 0.0004 -2.13 0.034 -0.002 -0.0001 
Mauritians -0.587 0.126 -4.66 0.000 -0.836 -0.339 
Rural areas -0.029 0.060 -0.48 0.629 -0.147 0.089 
Tenure 0.017 0.016 1.01 0.312 -0.016 0.049 
Tenure squared 0.0004 0.0005 0.87 0.387 -0.001 0.001 
Constant 1.807 0.643 2.81 0.005 0.538 3.075 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification Variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.308 0.148 
Upper secondary 0.634 0.161 
Gcse & sixthform 0.659 0.119 
A level 0.823 0.130 
Vocational 0.90 0.130 
Tertiary 1.285 0.164 
Age 0.075 0.032 
Age squared -0.001 0.0004 
Mauritians -0.467 0.150 
Rural 0.017 0.057 
Tenure 0.019 0.015 
Tenure squared 0.0003 0.0005 
Constant 1.987 0.651 
Number of observations = 195 
R-squared = 0.565 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
2.09 0.038 0.017 0.60 
3.95 0.000 0.317 0.951 
5.53 0.000 0.424 0.894 
6.34 0.000 0.567 1.079 
6.90 0.000 0.642 1.157 
7.85 0.000 0.962 1.608 
2.34 0.021 0.012 0.139 
-2.24 0.026 -0.002 -0.0001 
-3.12 0.002 -0.762 -0.172 
0.29 0.770 -0.096 0.129 
1.26 0.209 -0.011 0.05 
0.74 0.459 -0.001 0.001 
3.05 0.003 .7021 3.271 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntIus 
384 
10 Rural Areas both sexes aged between 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling Variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 2434 
R-squared = 0.388 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Std. Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.052 0.004 14.22 0.000 0.045 0.059 
Age 0.033 0.007 5.05 0.000 0.020 0.046 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 -3.86 0.000 -0.001 -0.0002 
Mauritians 0.424 0.035 12.31 0.000 0.357 0.492 
Public sector 0.322 0.026 12.45 0.000 0.271 0.373 
Female -0.264 0.022 -11.98 0.000 -0.308 -0.221 
Tenure 0.023 0.004 6.34 0.000 0.016 0.030 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 -2.75 0.006 -0.001 -0.0001 
Constant 1.523 0.12 12.70 0.000 1.288 1.758 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.096 0.030 
Upper secondary 0.173 0.026 
Gcse & Sixthform 0.42 0.033 
A level 0.73 0.053 
Vocational 0.677 0.090 
Tertiary 0.972 0.135 
Age 0.037 0.006 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.318 0.033 
Public sector 0.243 0.027 
Female -0.311 0.021 
Tenure 0.023 0.004 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 1.906 0.112 
Number of observations = 2434 
R-squared = 0.432 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.21 0.001 0.037 0.155 
6.76 0.000 0.123 0.223 
12.74 0.000 0.355 0.484 
13.69 0.000 0.625 0.835 
7.56 0.000 0.502 0.853 
7.19 0.000 0.707 1.237 
5.83 0.000 0.025 0.05 
-4.80 0.000 -0.001 -0.0003 
9.69 0.000 0.254 0.382 
9.18 0.000 0.191 0.295 
-14.85 0.000 -0.352 -0.27 
6.43 0.000 0.016 0.030 
-2.59 0.010 -0.0005 -0.0001 
16.95 0.000 1.686 2.127 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
385 
11 Urban areas both sexes aged between 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Schooling 0.094 0.004 
Age 0.042 0.009 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.250 0.093 
Public sector 0.253 0.032 
Female -0.173 0.026 
Tenure 0.020 0.005 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0002 
Constant 1.126 0.171 
Number of observations = 1822 
R-squared = 0.435 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval[ 
20.97 0.000 0.085 0.103 
4.83 0.000 0.025 0.058 
-3.30 0.001 -0.0006 -0.0002 
2.69 0.007 0.068 0.432 
8.01 0.000 0.191 0.315 
-6.53 0.000 -0.224 -0.121 
4.30 0.000 0.011 0.029 
-1.27 0.204 -0.0005 0.0001 
6.57 0.000 .790 1.462 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Robust 
earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.143 0.035 
Upper secondary 0.236 0.034 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.572 0.036 
A level 0.739 0.046 
Vocational 0.894 0.068 
Tertiary 1.34 0.054 
Age 0.044 0.008 
Age squared -0.0005 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.361 0.086 
Public sector 0.178 0.030 
Female -0.215 0.026 
Tenure 0.022 0.004 
T enure squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Constant 1.678 0.163 
Number of observations = 1822 
R-squared = 0.485 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
4.05 0.000 0.073 0.212 
7.00 0.000 0.170 0.303 
16.00 0.000 0.502 0.642 
16.08 0.000 0.649 0.829 
13.10 0.000 0.76 1.025 
24.94 0.000 1.235 1.445 
5.15 0.000 0.028 0.060 
-4.08 0.000 -0.001 -0.0002 
4.22 0.000 0.193 0.529 
5.90 0.000 0.118 0.237 
-8.39 0.000 -0.265 -0.165 
4.97 0.000 0.014 0.030 
-1.41 0.159 -0.0005 0.0001 
10.32 0.000 1.40 1.998 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of MauntIus 
386 
12 Rural Male employees aged between 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 1699 
R-squared = 0.311 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
2ross earnin2s Std. Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.053 0.005 11.49 0.000 0.044 0.062 
Age 0.055 0.008 6.55 0.000 0.038 0.071 
Age squared -0.001 0.0001 -5.44 0.000 -0.001 -0.0004 
Mauritians 0.364 0.043 8.42 0.000 0.28 0.449 
Public sector 0.232 0.028 8.30 0.000 0.177 0.286 
Tenure 0.017 0.004 3.83 0.000 0.008 0.025 
T enure squared -0.0001 0.0001 -0.96 0.339 -0.0004 0.0001 
Constant l.257 0.148 8.51 0.000 0.967 1.546 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Robust 
earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.089 0.036 
Upper secondary 0.145 0.031 
Gcse & sixthform 0.392 0.038 
A level 0.65 0.065 
Vocational 0.64 0.087 
Tertiary 0.806 0.159 
Age 0.055 0.008 
Age squared -0.001 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.334 0.044 
Public sector 0.179 0.028 
Tenure 0.018 0.004 
T enure squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Constant l.623 0.143 
Number of observations = 1699 
R-squared = 0.347 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.48 0.013 0.019 0.16 
4.68 0.000 0.084 0.206 
10.39 0.000 0.318 0.466 
10.06 0.000 0.523 0.776 
7.36 0.000 0.469 0.810 
5.07 0.000 0.494 1.118 
6.73 0.000 0.039 0.071 
-5.69 0.000 -0.001 -0.0004 
7.60 0.000 0.248 0.42 
6.44 0.000 0.124 0.233 
4.12 0.000 0.009 0.027 
-1.21 0.225 -0.0004 0.0001 
1l.33 0.000 1.342 l.904 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of MauntlUs 
387 
13 Rural Female employees aged between 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm Coefficient Std. 
of gross Error 
earnings 
Schooling 0.049 0.007 
Age 0.005 0.011 
Age squared 0.00002 0.0002 
Mauritians 0.424 0.055 
Public sector 0.669 0.058 
Tenure 0.027 0.006 
Tenure -0.0002 0.0002 
squared 
Constant 1.695 0.199 
Number of observations = 735 
R-squared = 0.416 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
7.32 0.000 0.036 0.063 
0.45 0.656 -0.017 0.027 
0.l0 0.917 -0.0003 0.0003 
7.70 0.000 0.316 0.532 
11.63 0.000 0.556 0.782 
4.12 0.000 0.014 0.039 
-1.05 0.295 -0.0006 0.0002 
8.49 0.000 1.303 2.087 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntlUs 
(ii) Qualification Variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary O.llO 0.053 
Upper secondary 0.256 0.052 
Gcse & sixthform 0.469 0.065 
A level 0.737 0.lO4 
Vocational 0.784 0.257 
Tertiary 1.412 0.181 
Age 0.009 0.010 
A~e squared -0.0001 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.338 0.063 
Public sector 0.518 0.070 
Tenure 0.026 0.006 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0002 
Constant 1.967 0.184 
Number of observations = 735 
R-squared = 0.481 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.09 0.037 0.007 0.214 
4.91 0.000 0.l54 0.359 
7.23 0.000 0.342 0.597 
7.07 0.000 0.532 0.942 
3.05 0.002 0.279 1.289 
7.79 0.000 1.06 1.768 
0.92 0.359 -0.011 0.03 
-0.42 0.675 -0.0004 0.0002 
5.38 0.000 0.215 0.461 
7.39 0.000 0.381 0.656 
4.29 0.000 0.014 0.038 
-1.46 0.143 -0.001 0.0001 
10.68 0.000 1.606 2.328 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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14 Urban Male employees aged between 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 1206 
R-squared = 0.396 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
~ross earnin~s Std. Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.081 0.005 15.78 0.000 0.071 0.091 
Age 0.034 0.010 3.41 0.001 0.015 0.054 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0001 -1.87 0.061 -0.0005 0.00001 
Mauritians 0.011 0.139 0.08 0.939 -0.262 0.283 
Public sector 0.189 0.036 5.15 0.000 0.118 0.259 
Tenure 0.017 0.005 3.15 0.002 0.006 0.027 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0002 -1.36 0.175 -0.0006 0.0001 
Constant 1.610 0.220 7.33 0.000 1.179 2.041 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification Variables 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Robust 
earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.108 0.040 
Upper secondary 0.22 0.037 
Gcse & sixthform 0.468 0.041 
A level 0.589 0.061 
Vocational 0.750 0.081 
Tertiary 1.235 0.065 
Age 0.033 0.010 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.132 0.112 
Public sector 0.140 0.034 
Tenure 0.021 0.005 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0002 
Constant 2.1 0.199 
Number of observations = 1206 
R-squared = 0.445 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.69 0.007 0.029 0.187 
5.89 0.000 0.147 0.293 
11.33 0.000 0.387 0.549 
9.73 0.000 0.470 0.708 
9.32 0.000 0.592 0.909 
19.00 0.000 1.107 1.362 
3.36 0.001 0.014 0.053 
-2.05 0.041 -0.0005 -0.00001 
1.17 0.241 -0.089 0.352 
4.12 0.000 0.073 0.207 
4.19 0.000 0.011 0.031 
-2.06 0.040 -0.001 -0.00001 
10.53 0.000 1.708 2.491 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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15 Urban Female employees aged between 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm Coefficient Robust 
of gross Std. 
earnings Error 
Schooling 0.l12 0.009 
Age 0.062 0.015 
Age squared -0.0007 0.0002 
Mauritians 0.436 0.110 
Public sector 0.361 0.062 
Tenure 0.023 0.010 
Tenure 0.00008 0.0003 
squared 
Constant 0.194 0.281 
Number of observations = 616 
R-squared = 0.514 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
12.11 0.000 0.094 0.131 
4.03 0.000 0.032 0.093 
-3.22 0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 
3.97 0.000 0.22 0.651 
5.84 0.000 0.24 0.482 
2.46 0.014 0.005 0.042 
0.25 0.803 -0.0006 0.0007 
0.69 0.490 -0.357 0.7450 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. Error 
Lower secondary 0.222 0.073 
Upper secondary 0.272 0.075 
Gcse & sixthform 0.73 0.071 
A level 0.96 0.077 
Vocational 1.11 0.115 
Tertiary 1.513 0.097 
Age 0.072 0.015 
Age squared -0.001 0.0002 
Mauritians 0.601 0.115 
Public sector 0.214 0.059 
Tenure 0.018 0.009 
Tenure squared 0.0003 0.0003 
Constant 0.689 0.267 
Number of observations = 616 
R-squared = 0.569 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.05 0.002 0.079 0.365 
3.63 0.000 0.125 0.419 
10.33 0.000 0.591 0.868 
12.46 0.000 0.809 1.11 
9.69 0.000 0.886 1.336 
15.68 0.000 1.324 1.703 
4.87 0.000 0.043 0.100 
-4.35 0.000 -0.001 -0.0005 
5.14 0.000 0.376 0.826 
3.62 0.000 0.098 0.331 
2.07 0.039 0.001 0.036 
0.89 0.374 -0.0003 0.001 
2.58 0.010 0.165 1.212 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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16 OLS estimates for both sexes aged 22 to 59 
Logarithm of Coefficient 
2ross earnings 
Schooling 0.072 
Age 0.018 
Age squared -0.0001 
Mauritians 0.385 
Public sector 0.274 
Female -0.209 
Rural areas -0.094 
Tenure 0.024 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Constant 1.733 
Robust 
Number of observations = 3854 
R-squared = 0.397 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Std. Error Interval) 
0.003 24.35 0.000 0.066 0.078 
0.007 2.43 0.015 0.003 0.032 
0.0001 -1.48 0.138 -0.0003 0.00005 
0.044 8.77 0.000 0.30 0.470 
0.020 13.43 0.000 0.234 0.311 
0.018 -1l.39 0.000 -0.245 -0.173 
0.017 -5.60 0.000 -0.127 -0.061 
0.003 8.l7 0.000 0.018 0.030 
0.0001 -3.33 0.001 -0.0005 -0.0001 
0.139 12.51 0.000 1.461 2.004 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
17 OLS estimates for men only aged 22 to 59 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Schooling 0.068 0.004 
Age 0.026 0.009 
Age squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.237 0.06 
Public sector 0.2001 0.022 
Rural areas -0.062 0.019 
Tenure 0.019 0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Constant 1.765 0.167 
Number of observations = 2634 
R-squared = 0.318 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
18.89 0.000 0.061 0.075 
2.97 0.003 0.009 0.044 
-1.96 0.050 -0.0005 -1.63e-07 
3.98 0.000 0.120 0.354 
9.01 0.000 0.157 0.244 
-3.21 0.001 -0.1004 -0.024 
5.34 0.000 0.012 0.025 
-2.15 0.031 -0.0004 -0.00002 
10.55 0.000 1.437 2.093 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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18 OLS estimates for women only aged 22 to 59 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
Number of observations = 1220 
R-squared = 0.477 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
2ross earnings Std. Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.076 0.006 13.43 0.000 0.065 0.087 
Age 0.013 0.013 1.03 0.302 -0.012 0.038 
Age squared -0.0001 0.0002 -0.61 0.542 -0.0004 0.0002 
Mauritians 0.504 0.056 9.00 0.000 0.394 0.613 
Public sector 0.493 0.044 1l.28 0.000 0.407 0.578 
Rural areas -0.134 0.032 -4.21 0.000 -0.197 -0.072 
Tenure 0.029 0.006 5.04 0.000 0.018 0.04 
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0002 -0.68 0.494 -0.0005 0.0002 
Constant 1.414 0.240 5.89 0.000 0.943 l.884 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
19 OLS estimates to qualifications for both sexes within the age 
range 22 to 59 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient. 
earnings 
Lower secondary 0.119 
Upper secondary 0.205 
Gcse & sixthform 0.529 
A level 0.739 
Vocational 0.827 
Tertiary l.213 
Age 0.026 
Age squared -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.342 
Public sector 0.204 
Rural -0.092 
Female -0.270 
Tenure 0.023 
Tenure squared -0.003 
Constant 2.121 
Number of observations = 3854 
R-squared = 0.455 
Robust t P>t [95% Confidence 
Std. Interval) 
Error 
0.024 4.94 0.000 0.0712 0.167 
0.022 9.38 0.000 0.162 0.248 
0.026 20.72 0.000 0.479 0.579 
0.037 20.08 0.000 0.667 0.811 
0.055 15.05 0.000 0.719 0.934 
0.058 20.98 0.000 l.l0 1.326 
0.007 3.74 0.000 0.012 0.040 
0.0001 -3.06 0.002 -0.0005 -0.0001 
0.0376 9.11 0.000 0.268 0.416 
0.0201 10.18 0.000 0.165 0.244 
0.016 -5.69 0.000 -0.123 -0.060 
0.017 -15.54 0.000 -0.305 -0.236 
0.003 8.24 0.000 0.018 0.029 
0.0001 -3.13 0.002 -0.0004 -0.0001 
.1312 16.16 0.000 1.863 2.377 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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20 OLS estimates to qualifications for men only within the age 
range 22 to 59 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient. Robust 
earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.101 0.028 
Upper secondary 0.187 0.026 
Gcse & sixthform 0.462 0.029 
A level 0.638 0.048 
Vocational 0.722 0.057 
Tertiary 1.087 0.074 
Age 0.029 0.009 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.263 0.052 
Public sector 0.154 0.022 
Rural -0.062 0.019 
Tenure 0.020 0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 2.160 0.161 
Number of observations = 2634 
R-squared = 0.367 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.63 0.000 0.0467 0.1563 
7.37 0.000 0.137 0.237 
15.92 0.000 0.405 0.518 
13.43 0.000 0.545 0.732 
12.62 0.000 0.61 0.834 
14.65 0.000 0.942 1.233 
3.30 0.001 0.012 0.046 
-2.43 0.015 -0.001 -0.0001 
5.03 0.000 0.160 0.365 
7.13 0.000 0.111 0.196 
-3.29 0.001 -0.099 -0.025 
6.00 0.000 0.014 0.027 
-2.69 0.007 -0.001 -0.0001 
13.44 0.000 1.845 2.476 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of MauntiUs 
21 OLS estimates to qualifications for women only within the age 
range 22 to 59 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.164 0.048 
Upper secondary 0.277 0.048 
Gcse & sixthform 0.643 0.052 
A level 0.858 0.063 
Vocational 1.028 0.116 
Tertiary 1.432 0.083 
Age 0.029 0.012 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0002 
Mauritians 0.434 0.058 
Public sector 0.354 0.045 
Rural -0.118 0.03 
Tenure 0.024 0.005 
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0002 
Constant 1.642 0.226 
Number of observations = 1220 
R-squared = 0.550 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.42 0.001 0.070 0.258 
5.80 0.000 0.184 0.371 
12.43 0.000 0.541 0.744 
13.60 0.000 0.734 0.982 
8.86 0.000 0.800 1.256 
17.18 0.000 1.268 1.595 
2.41 0.016 0.005 0.052 
-2.10 0.036 -0.001 -0.00002 
7.54 0.000 0.321 0.547 
7.90 0.000 0.266 0.441 
-3.94 0.000 -0.177 -0.059 
4.63 0.000 0.014 0.035 
-0.45 0.651 -0.0004 0.0003 
7.28 0.000 1.2 2.086 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of Mauritius 
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22 Social returns to qualifications without the public sector 
variable for those aged 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Years of shoo ling 0.080 0.003 
Age 0.037 0.005 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.380 0.044 
Female -0.215 0.018 
Rural areas -0.084 0.016 
Tenure 0.027 0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 1.283 0.103 
Number of observations = 4256 
R-squared = 0.387 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
29.76 0.000 0.074 0.085 
7.00 0.000 0.027 0.048 
-4.98 0.000 -0.0005 -0.0002 
8.58 0.000 0.293 0.467 
-12.14 0.000 -0.249 -0.180 
-5.21 0.000 -0.116 -0.052 
9.18 0.000 0.021 0.032 
-2.88 0.004 -0.0004 -0.0001 
12.48 0.000 l.082 1.485 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of MaUritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.119 0.023 
Upper secondary 0.218 0.020 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.545 0.024 
A level 0.811 0.032 
Vocational 0.885 0.053 
Tertiary 1.286 0.057 
Age 0.0415 0.005 
Age squared -0.0005 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.353 0.039 
Female -0.276 0.017 
Rural areas -0.083 0.015 
Tenure 0.026 0.003 
T enure squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Constant 1.807 0.097 
Number of observations = 4256 
R-squared = 0.452 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
5.17 0.000 0.074 0.164 
10.64 0.000 0.178 0.2587 
23.07 0.000 0.499 0.591 
25.46 0.000 0.749 0.874 
16.61 0.000 0.781 0.990 
22.39 0.000 1.174 1.399 
8.05 0.000 0.031 0.0517 
-6.44 0.000 -0.001 -0.0003 
9.12 0.000 0.277 0.429 
-16.68 0.000 -0.308 -0.244 
-5.39 0.000 -0.113 -0.053 
9.21 0.000 0.020 0.031 
-2.84 0.005 -0.0004 -0.0001 
18.69 0.000 l.618 1.997 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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23 Social returns to qualifications without the urban/rural 
variable for those aged 12 to 59 years 
(i) Schooling variable 
Logarithm of Coefficient Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Years of schooling 0.073 0.003 
Age 0.034 0.005 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.363 0.044 
Public sector 0.281 0.020 
Female -0.207 0.0173 
Tenure 0.023 0.0029 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 1.338 0.102 
Number of observations = 4256 
R-squared = OA07 
t P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval[ 
26.59 0.000 0.068 0.079 
6.59 0.000 0.025 0.045 
-4.60 0.000 -0.0005 -0.0002 
8.23 0.000 0.276 0.449 
13.95 0.000 0.241 0.319 
-11.95 0.000 -0.240 -0.173 
7.85 0.000 0.017 0.028 
-3.01 0.003 -0.0004 -0.00009 
13.16 0.000 1.139 1.537 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
(ii) Qualification variables 
Logarithm of Coefficient. Robust 
gross earnings Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.129 0.023 
Upper secondary 0.210 0.020 
Gcse & sixthform 0.515 0.024 
A level 0.753 0.033 
Vocational 0.823 0.055 
Tertiary 1.243 0.058 
Age 0.039 0.005 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.340 0.037 
Public sector 0.211 0.02 
Female -0.265 0.016 
Tenure 0.023 0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 1.807 0.095 
t 
5.68 
10.44 
21.39 
22.57 
14.91 
21.61 
7.61 
-5.99 
9.20 
10.71 
-16.10 
8.18 
-2.97 
19.08 
Number of obs = 4256 
R-squared = 0.461 
P>t [95% Confidence 
Interval[ 
0.000 0.085 0.174 
0.000 0.171 0.251 
0.000 0.468 0.562 
0.000 0.687 0.818 
0.000 0.715 0.932 
0.000 1.131 1.356 
0.000 0.029 0.049 
0.000 -0.0006 -0.0003 
0.000 0.268 0.413 
0.000 0.172 0.249 
0.000 -0.23 -0.232 
0.000 0.017 0.028 
0.003 -0.0004 -0.0001 
0.000 1.621 1.993 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
395 
Appendix B: Heckman Selection Models 
1 Both sexes within the age range: (12 to 59 years) with schooling 
variable 
Number of observations = 7881 
Uncensored observations = 4256 
Log likelihood = -6234.812 
Log of gross Coefficient 
earnings 
Lower secondary 0.112 
Upper secondary 0.199 
Gcse & sixthform 0.493 
A level 0.719 
Vocational 0.788 
Tertiary 1.202 
Age 0.030 
Age squared -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.367 
Public 0.215 
Rural -0.088 
Female -0.219 
Tenure 0.023 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Constant 2.034 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.002 
Upper secondary -0.036 
Gcse + sixthform 0.133 
A level 0.234 
Vocational 0.403 
Tertiary 0.222 
Age 0.274 
Age squared -0.003 
Mauritians -0.976 
Rural 0.012 
Female -0.353 
Child 0.087 
Female & child -0.090 
Married 0.859 
Female &married -1.776 
Constant -3.403 
Athrho -0.152 
Lnsigma -0.759 
Rho -0.151 
Sigma 0.468 
Lambda -0.071 
Std Error 
.0243 
.0205 
.0225 
.0319 
.0457 
.0481 
0.007 
0.0001 
0.052 
0.021 
0.015 
0.027 
0.007 
0.0001 
0.126 
0.057 
0.050 
0.054 
0.073 
0.131 
0.140 
0.010 
0.0001 
0.170 
0.036 
0.053 
0.073 
0.088 
0.073 
0.081 
0.234 
0.070 
0.012 
0.069 
0.005 
0.032 
Censored observations = 3625 
Wa1d chi2 (14) = 2879.03 
Prob> chi2 = 0.0000 
z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
4.61 0.000 0.064 0.160 
9.74 0.000 0.159 0.240 
21.94 0.000 0.449 0.537 
22.52 0.000 0.656 0.781 
17.23 0.000 0.698 0.877 
25.01 0.000 1.108 1.297 
4.54 0.000 0.017 0.044 
-3.85 0.000 -0.0005 -0.0002 
7.11 0.000 0.266 0.468 
10.40 0.000 0.175 0.256 
-5.93 0.000 -0.117 -0.059 
-8.19 0.000 -0.272 -0.170 
8.41 0.000 0.018 0.028 
-2.95 0.003 -0.0004 -0.0001 
16.09 0.000 1.786 2.281 
-0.03 0.975 -0.113 0.109 
-0.73 0.464 -0.134 0.061 
2.47 0.013 0.027 0.238 
3.20 0.001 0.091 0.378 
3.07 0.002 0.146 0.661 
1.59 0.113 -0.053 0.497 
28.11 0.000 0.255 0.293 
-25.00 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
-5.75 0.000 -1.309 -0.643 
0.35 0.726 -0.057 0.082 
-6.62 0.000 -0.457 -0.248 
1.19 0.233 -0.056 0.231 
-1.03 0.305 -0.261 0.082 
11.84 0.000 0.717 1.001 
-21.88 0.000 -1.936 -1.617 
-14.53 0.000 -3.862 -2.944 
-2.17 0.030 -0.289 -0.015 
-65.87 0.000 -0.781 -0.736 
-0.282 -0.015 
0.458 0.479 
-0.134 -0.007 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 4.33 Prob > chi2 = 0.034 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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2 Men only within the age group of 12 to 59 years with schooling 
variable 
Heckman selection model 
Log likelihood = -3223.519 
Log of gross Coefficient Std. 
incomes Error 
Years of schooling 0.065 0.003 
Age 0.022 0.009 
Age squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.234 0.074 
Public sector 0.216 0.024 
Rural areas -0.076 0.018 
Tenure 0.017 0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Constant 1.921 0.177 
Select 
Years of schooling -0.033 0.009 
Age 0.321 0.014 
Age squared -0.004 0.0002 
Mauritians -0.429 0.269 
Rural areas 0.090 0.057 
Child 0.047 0.076 
Married 0.725 0.088 
Constant -4.329 0.363 
Athrho -0.329 0.093 
Lnsigma -0.728 0.015 
Rho -0.318 0.083 
Sigma 0.483 0.007 
Lambda -0.154 0.041 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): 
Number of observations = 3980 
Censored observations = 1075 
Uncensored observations = 2905 
Wald chi2(8) = 118l.57 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Z P>z (95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2l.l1 0.000 0.059 0.071 
2.47 0.013 0.005 0.039 
-1.55 0.120 -0.0004 0.00005 
3.15 0.002 0.089 0.340 
9.02 0.000 0.169 0.263 
-4.09 0.000 -0.112 -0.039 
5.08 0.000 0.010 0.024 
-1.83 0.067 -0.0004 0.00001 
10.84 0.000 1.574 2.268 
-3.44 0.001 -0.051 -0.014 
22.25 0.000 0.293 0.350 
-19.53 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 
-1.60 0.111 -0.956 0.098 
1.58 0.113 -0.021 0.202 
0.62 0.532 -0.10 1 0.196 
8.28 0.000 0.553 0.896 
-11.93 0.000 -5.040 -3.618 
-3.56 0.000 -0.511 -0.148 
-48.52 0.000 -0.757 -0.699 
-0.470 -0.147 
0.469 0.497 
-0.235 -0.073 
chi2(1) = 8.87 Prob > chi2 = 0.003 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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3 Women only within the age group 12 to 59 with schooling 
variable 
Heckman selection model 
Log of gross Coefficient 
earnings 
Years of schooling 0.071 
Age 0.024 
Age squared -0.0002 
Mauritians 0.501 
Public sector 0.530 
Rural areas -0.132 
Tenure 0.027 
Tenure squared -0.0001 
Constant 1.365 
Select 
Years of schooling 0.028 
Age 0.249 
Age squared -0.003 
Mauritians -1.192 
Rural areas -0.043 
Child -0.002 
Married -0.879 
Constant -3.384 
Athrho -0.159 
Lnsigma -0.668 
Rho -0.157 
Sigma 0.513 
Lambda -0.081 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(8) = 1109.34 
Log likelihood = -3178.78 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
3901 
2550 
1351 
Std. Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Error. Interval) 
0.005 15.34 0.000 0.062 0.080 
0.011 2.10 0.036 0.002 0.044 
0.0001 -l.60 0.109 -0.0005 0.00005 
0.084 5.97 0.000 0.336 0.665 
0.045 11.87 0.000 0.442 0.617 
0.030 -4.44 0.000 -0.190 -0.074 
0.006 4.90 0.000 0.016 0.038 
0.0002 -0.43 0.667 -0.0005 0.0003 
0.217 6.28 0.000 0.939 1.791 
0.007 3.96 0.000 0.014 0.042 
0.013 19.28 0.000 0.224 0.275 
0.0002 - 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
16.87 
0.215 -5.55 0.000 -l.613 -0.771 
0.046 -0.93 0.355 -0.133 0.048 
0.050 -0.03 0.976 -0.100 0.097 
0.060 - 0.000 -0.997 -0.761 
14.56 
0.312 - 0.000 -3.996 -2.771 
10.83 
0.010 -l.59 0.113 -0.354 0.037 
0.022 - 0.000 -0.710 -0.626 
31.01 
0.097 -0.340 0.037 
0.011 0.492 0.535 
0.051 -0.180 0.019 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 2.32 Prob> chi2 = 0.128 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
398 
4 Both sexes within the age range: (22 to 59 years) with highest 
qualification levels 
Heckman selection model 
Censored observations = 1932 
Wald chi2(14) = 2677.13 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Log of gross Coefficient Std. 
earnings Error 
Lower secondary 0.116 0.026 
Upper secondary 0.201 0.022 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.520 0.024 
A level 0.725 0.035 
Vocational 0.817 0.047 
Tertiary 1.205 0.049 
Age 0.023 0.007 
Age squared -0.0002 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.368 0.053 
Public sector 0.205 0.021 
Rural areas -0.093 0.016 
Female -0.221 0.029 
Tenure 0.023 0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 2.176 0.135 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.146 0.069 
Upper secondary 0.127 0.059 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.417 0.064 
A level 0.573 0.095 
Vocational 0.480 0.143 
Tertiary 0.310 0.142 
Age 0.103 0.017 
Age squared -0.001 0.0002 
Mauritians -0.762 0.176 
Rural areas 0.048 0.042 
Female -0.242 0.078 
Child 0.133 0.090 
Female & child -0.291 0.103 
Married 0.871 0.081 
Female & married -1.805 0.100 
Constant -0.559 0.350 
Athrho -0.154 0.075 
Lnsigma -0.753 0.012 
Rho -0.153 0.073 
Sigma 0.471 0.006 
Lambda -0.072 0.035 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0): 
Number of observations 
Uncensored observations 
Log likelihood = -5077.224 
5786 
3854 
Z P>z [95% 
Confidencelnterv 
al) 
4.42 0.000 0.064 0.167 
9.20 0.000 0.158 0.244 
21.64 0.000 0.473 0.567 
21.00 0.000 0.657 0.792 
17.28 0.000 0.724 0.909 
24.77 0.000 1.110 l.301 
3.31 0.001 0.009 0.037 
-2.73 0.006 -0.0004 -0.0001 
6.97 0.000 0.265 0.472 
9.69 0.000 0.163 0.246 
-5.92 0.000 -0.124 -0.062 
-7.58 0.000 -0.278 -0.164 
8.37 0.000 0.018 0.029 
-3.08 0.002 -0.0004 -0.0001 
16.08 0.000 1.911 2.441 
2.10 0.036 0.010 0.282 
2.15 0.031 0.011 0.243 
6.50 0.000 0.291 0.543 
6.05 0.000 0.388 0.759 
3.36 0.001 0.200 0.760 
2.18 0.029 0.032 0.588 
6.17 0.000 0.070 0.135 
-5.87 0.000 -0.002 -0.0008 
-4.34 0.000 -1.107 -0.418 
1.15 0.250 -0.034 0.130 
-3.10 0.002 -0.395 -0.089 
1.48 0.139 -0.043 0.310 
-2.81 0.005 -0.493 -0.088 
10.71 0.000 0.712 1.031 
-18.05 0.000 -2.001 -1.609 
-1.60 0.110 -1.246 .1273 
-2.07 0.038 -0.301 -0.008 
-62.66 0.000 -0.776 -0.729 
-0.292 -0.008 
0.460 0.483 
-0.140 -0.004 
chi2(1) = 4.03 Prob > chi2 = 0.045 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Republic of MauntIUs 
399 
5 Men only within the age range: (22 to 59 years) with highest 
qualification levels 
Heckman selection model Number of observations 2884 
(regression model with sample selection) Censored observations = 250 
Uncensored observations = 2634 
Wa1d chi2(13) = 1477.60 
Log likelihood = -2412.242 Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient Std. Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
Lower secondary 0.098 0.030 3.27 0.001 0.039 0.157 
Upper secondary 0.185 0.025 7.41 0.000 0.136 0.233 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.456 0.028 16.17 0.000 0.401 0.512 
A level 0.642 0.043 15.07 0.000 0.559 0.726 
Vocational 0.725 0.055 l3.16 0.000 0.617 0.833 
Tertiary l.097 0.058 18.89 0.000 0.983 1.210 
Age 0.023 0.009 2.56 0.010 0.005 0.040 
Age squared -0.0002 0.0001 -l.83 0.067 -0.0004 0.00001 
Mauritians 0.270 0.071 3.78 0.000 0.130 0.410 
Public sector 0.153 0.023 6.54 0.000 0.107 0.200 
Rural areas -0.067 0.019 -3.57 0.000 -0.104 -0.030 
Tenure 0.020 0.003 6.23 0.000 0.014 0.027 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 -2.72 0.006 -0.0005 -0.00008 
Constant 2.296 0.176 13.04 0.000 l.951 2.641 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.119 0.124 0.96 0.335 -0.124 0.362 
Upper secondary 0.069 0.100 0.69 0.490 -0.127 0.264 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.270 0.122 2.22 0.026 0.032 0.508 
A level -0.090 0.144 -0.63 0.532 -0.372 0.192 
Vocational 0.018 0.195 0.09 0.925 -0.365 0.401 
Tertiary -0.165 0.194 -0.85 0.394 -0.545 0.215 
Age 0.077 0.029 2.60 0.009 0.019 0.134 
Age squared -0.0009 0.0004 -2.47 0.014 -0.002 -0.0002 
Mauritians -0.503 0.272 -l.85 0.065 -l.036 0.031 
Rural areas 0.l65 0.074 2.24 0.025 0.021 0.309 
Child 0.123 0.194 1.32 0.188 -0.060 0.306 
Married 0.859 0.094 9.10 0.000 0.674 1.044 
Constant -0.261 0.591 -0.44 0.659 -1.418 0.900 
Athrho -0.255 0.134 -1.90 0.057 -0.516 0.007 
1nsigma -.0776 0.015 - 0.000 -0.807 -0.746 
50.19 
Rho -0.245 0.126 -0.476 0.008 
Sigma 0.460 0.007 0.446 0.474 
Lambda -0.115 0.059 -0.230 0.00002 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2(l) = 2.96 Prob > chi2 = 0.0851 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
400 
6 Women only within the age range: (22 to 59 years) with highest 
qualification levels 
Number of observations 2902 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
1682 
1220 
Wald chi2(l3) = 1265.19 
Log likelihood = -2578.322 
Log of gross Coefficients Std. 
earnings Error 
Lower secondary 0.162 0.051 
Upper secondary 0.276 0.046 
Gcse & sixthform 0.634 0.045 
A level 0.841 0.064 
Vocational 1.012 0.090 
Tertiary 1.417 0.09 
Age 0.028 0.012 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0002 
Mauritians 0.453 0.083 
Public sector 0.354 0.045 
Rural areas -0.118 0.029 
Tenure 0.024 0.005 
Tenure squared -0.00008 0.0002 
Constant 1.671 0.234 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.155 0.085 
Upper secondary 0.146 0.075 
Gcse & sixthform 0.457 0.075 
A level 0.916 0.119 
Vocational 0.793 0.193 
Tertiary 0.686 0.194 
Age 0.120 0.021 
Age squared -0.001 0.0003 
Mauritians -0.82 0.227 
Rural areas 0.011 0.051 
Child -0.145 0.056 
Married -0.929 0.066 
Constant -l.l26 0.447 
Arthrho -0.070 0.115 
Lnsigma -0.747 0.021 
Rho -0.070 0.114 
Sigma 0.474 0.010 
Lambda -0.033 0.054 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(l) = 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
3.17 0.002 0.062 0.261 
6.05 0.000 0.186 0.365 
l3.96 0.000 0.545 0.723 
l3.15 0.000 0.716 0.966 
11.24 0.000 0.835 l.l89 
15.75 0.000 1.240 1.593 
2.40 0.017 0.005 0.051 
-2.15 0.032 -0.0006 -0.00003 
5.45 0.000 0.290 0.617 
7.91 0.000 0.266 0.442 
-4.12 0.000 -0.175 -0.062 
4.60 0.000 0.014 0.035 
-0.43 0.666 -0.0004 0.0003 
7.l3 0.000 1.211 2.130 
1.81 0.070 -0.013 0.322 
1.94 0.053 -0.002 0.293 
6.09 0.000 0.310 0.605 
7.70 0.000 0.683 1.149 
4.10 0.000 0.414 1.172 
3.54 0.000 0.306 1.067 
5.83 0.000 0.079 0.160 
-5.50 0.000 -0.002 -0.0009 
-3.60 0.000 -1.265 -0.374 
0.21 0.834 -0.089 0.111 
-2.57 0.010 -0.265 -0.034 
-14.16 0.000 -1.057 -0.800 
-2.52 0.012 -2.002 -0.250 
-0.61 0.541 -.2949 0.155 
-35.98 0.000 -0.788 -.7064643 
-0.287 .1533375 
0.455 0.493 
-0.139 0.073 
0.36 Prob > chi2 = 0.5458 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
401 
7 Both sexes aged 12 to 59 years with highest qualification levels 
Log likelihood = -6234.812 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Lower secondary 0.112 0.024 
Upper secondary 0.199 0.020 
Gcse & sixth form 0.493 0.022 
A level 0.719 0.032 
Vocational 0.788 0.046 
Tertiary 1.202 0.048 
Age 0.030 0.007 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0001 
Mauritians 0.367 0.052 
Public sector 0.215 0.021 
Rural areas -0.088 0.015 
Female -0.219 0.027 
Tenure 0.023 0.003 
Tenure square -0.0003 0.0001 
Constant 2.034 0.126 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.002 0.057 
Upper secondary -0.036 0.05 
Gcse & sixth form 0.133 0.054 
A level 0.234 0.073 
Vocational 0.403 0.131 
Tertiary 0.222 0.14 
Age 0.274 0.01 
Age squared -0.003 0.0001 
Mauritians -0.976 0.17 
Rural areas 0.012 0.036 
Female -0.353 0.053 
Child 0.087 0.073 
Female with child -0.090 0.087 
Married 0.859 0.073 
Female with married -1.776 0.081 
Constant -3.403 0.234 
Athrho -0.152 0.070 
Lnsigma -0.759 0.012 
Rho -0.151 0.069 
Sigma 0.468 0.005 
Lambda -0.071 0.032 
Number of observations = 7881 
Censored observations = 3625 
Uncensored observations = 4256 
Wald chi2(14) = 2879.03 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
4.61 0.000 0.065 0.16 
9.74 0.000 0.159 0.24 
21.94 0.000 0.449 0.537 
22.52 0.000 0.656 0.781 
17.23 0.000 0.70 0.877 
25.01 0.000 1.108 1.297 
4.54 0.000 0.017 0.044 
-3.85 0.000 -0.001 -0.0001 
7.11 0.000 0.266 0.468 
10.40 0.000 0.175 0.256 
-5.93 0.000 -0.117 -0.059 
-8.19 0.000 -0.272 -0.167 
8.41 0.000 0.018 0.028 
-2.95 0.003 -0.0004 -0.0001 
16.09 0.000 1.786 2.281 
-0.03 0.975 -0.113 0.109 
-0.73 0.464 -0.134 0.061 
2.47 0.013 0.027 0.238 
3.20 0.001 0.091 0.378 
3.07 0.002 0.146 0.661 
1.59 0.113 -0.053 0.497 
28.11 0.000 0.255 0.293 
-25.00 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
-5.75 0.000 -l.309 -0.643 
0.35 0.726 -0.057 0.082 
-6.62 0.000 -0.457 -0.248 
l.l9 0.233 -.0563 0.231 
-1.03 0.305 -0.261 0.082 
1l.84 0.000 0.717 1.001 
-21.88 0.000 -l.936 -1.617 
-14.53 0.000 -3.862 -2.944 
-2.17 0.030 -0.290 -0.015 
-65.87 0.000 -0.781 -0.736 
-0.282 -0.015 
0.458 0.479 
-0.134 -0.007 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2 1) = 4.33 Prob> chi2 = 0.038 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
402 
8 Public sector employees with highest qualification levels. 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(13) 736.37 
Log likelihood = -364.4715 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.120 
Upper secondary 0.328 
Gcse & sixthform 0.55 
A level 0.675 
Vocational 0.758 
Tertiary 1.142 
Age 0.050 
Age squared -0.001 
Mauritians -0.362 
Rural areas -0.051 
Female 0.069 
Tenure 0.024 
Tenure squared -0.0002 
Constant 2.366 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.682 
Upper secondary 0.452 
Gcse & sixth form 0.627 
A level 0.349 
Vocational 0.126 
Tertiary 0.206 
Age -0.122 
Age squared 0.002 
Mauritians 1.892 
Rural areas -0.191 
Female -0.189 
Child -1.55 
Female & child 2.055 
Married 1.679 
Female & married -1.991 
Constant 1.819 
Athrho 0.605 
Lnsigma -1.022 
Rho 0.541 
Sigma 0.360 
Lambda 0.194 
832 
12 
820 
Std. 
Error 
0.056 
0.043 
0.037 
0.049 
0.056 
0.065 
0.014 
0.0002 
0.263 
0.026 
0.032 
0.0059 
0.0002 
0.382 
0.571 
0.602 
0.55 
0.514 
0.576 
0.603 
0.151 
0.002 
0.906 
0.317 
0.558 
0.574 
0.769 
0.568 
0.749 
2.717 
0.515 
0.027 
0.364 
0.01 
0.133 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.14 0.032 0.01 0.23 
7.65 0.000 0.244 0.412 
14.85 0.000 0.477 0.622 
13.78 0.000 0.579 0.771 
13.52 0.000 0.648 0.868 
17.67 0.000 1.015 1.268 
3.67 0.000 0.023 0.077 
-3.22 0.001 -0.001 -0.0002 
-l.38 0.168 -0.877 0.1526 
-1.97 0.049 -0.lO3 -0.0003 
2.17 0.030 0.007 0.132 
4.15 0.000 0.013 0.036 
-1.12 0.265 -0.001 0.0001 
6.20 0.000 1.618 3.114 
-1.19 0.233 -1.801 0.438 
0.75 0.453 -0.728 1.633 
1.14 0.254 -0.45 1.705 
0.68 0.497 -0.659 1.357 
0.22 0.827 -1.003 1.254 
0.34 0.732 -0.975 l.388 
-0.81 0.418 -0.418 0.174 
0.95 0.341 -0.002 0.006 
2.09 0.037 0.115 3.668 
-0.60 0.548 -0.813 0.431 
-0.34 0.735 -1.283 0.905 
-2.70 0.007 -2.674 -0.426 
2.67 0.008 0.547 3.562 
2.96 0.003 0.566 2.792 
-2.66 0.008 -3.459 -0.525 
0.67 0.503 -3.507 7.144 
1.17 0.240 -0.404 1.614 
-37.72 0.000 -1.076 -0.969 
-0.383 0.924 
0.341 0.379 
-0.067 0.456 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2 1) = 0.79 Prob > chi2 = 0.373 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
403 
9 Private sector employees with highest qualification levels. 
Heckman selection model Number of observations = 3819 
(regression model with sample selection)Censored observations = 383 
Uncensored observations = 3436 
Wald chi2(13) = 1862.96 
Log likelihood = -3505.759 Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Log of gross Coefficient Std. Z P>z (95% Confidence 
earnings Error Interval] 
Lower secondary 0.109 0.027 4.09 0.000 0.057 0.162 
Upper secondary 0.176 0.023 7.68 0.000 0.131 0.221 
Gcse & sixthform 0.460 0.027 17.01 0.000 0.407 0.513 
A level 0.748 0.041 18.26 0.000 0.668 0.828 
Vocational 0.86 0.065 13.15 0.000 0.732 0.989 
Tertiary 1.25 0.064 19.60 0.000 1.125 1.375 
Age 0.041 0.006 7.40 0.000 0.03 0.052 
Age squared -0.001 0.0001 -6.07 0.000 -0.001 -0.0004 
Mauritians 0.366 0.053 6.92 0.000 0.262 0.469 
Rural areas -0.088 0.0173 -5.12 0.000 -0.122 -0.055 
Female -0.31 0.020 -15.34 0.000 -0.35 -0.271 
Tenure 0.022 0.003 7.28 0.000 0.016 0.028 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 -2.93 0.003 -0.001 -0.0001 
Constant 1.864 0.108 17.30 0.000 1.653 2.075 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.055 0.094 0.58 0.563 -0.13 0.239 
Upper secondary 0.109 0.084 1.30 0.192 -0.055 0.274 
Gcse & sixth form 0.120 0.096 1.25 0.210 -0.068 0.308 
A level 0.136 0.152 0.89 0.372 -0.163 0.434 
Vocational -0.05 0.213 -0.23 0.816 -0.467 0.368 
Tertiary -0.307 0.188 -1.63 0.103 -0.676 0.062 
Age 0.012 0.019 0.64 0.523 -0.026 0.05 
Age squared -0.0002 0.0003 -0.59 0.555 -0.001 0.0004 
Mauritians -0.756 0.295 -2.57 0.010 -1.334 -0.179 
Rural areas 0.065 0.06 1.08 0.281 -0.053 0.183 
Female 0.169 0.104 1.62 0.106 -0.036 0.373 
Child 0.251 0.104 2.42 0.015 0.048 0.455 
Female & child -0.457 0.134 -3.40 0.001 -0.72 -0.193 
Married 0.389 0.099 3.91 0.000 0.194 0.584 
Female & married -0.95 0.133 -7.17 0.000 -1.21 -0.691 
Constant 1.695 0.444 3.82 0.000 0.825 2.565 
Athrho -0.192 0.120 -1.60 0.110 -0.428 0.043 
Lnsigma -0.725 0.013 -54.20 0.000 -0.752 -0.70 
Rho -0.190 0.116 -0.404 0.043 
Sigma 0.484 0.006 0.472 0.497 
Lambda -0.092 0.057 -0.203 0.019 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2 1) = 2.01 Prob > chi2 = 0.157 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
404 
10 Private sector male employees only with highest qualification 
levels 
Heckman selection model Number of observations = 2431 
(regression model with sample selection) Censored observations = 151 
Uncensored observations = 2280 
Wald chi2(12) = 909.72 
Log likelihood = -2083.509 Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient Std. Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
Lower secondary 0.094 0.032 2.98 0.003 0.032 0.156 
Upper secondary 0.153 0.027 5.63 0.000 0.1 0.207 
Gcse & sixthform 0.387 0.034 11.38 0.000 0.32 0.453 
A level 0.654 0.053 12.30 0.000 0.55 0.759 
Vocational 0.724 0.079 9.15 0.000 0.57 0.88 
Tertiary 1.101 0.078 14.09 0.000 0.95 1.255 
Age 0.045 0.007 6.40 0.000 0.031 0.059 
Age squared -0.0004 0.0001 -4.94 0.000 -0.0007 -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.297 0.075 3.93 0.000 0.149 0.444 
Rural areas -0.0658 0.021 -3.12 0.002 -0.108 -0.024 
Tenure 0.0196 0.004 5.31 0.000 0.012 0.027 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 -2.58 0.010 -0.001 -0.0001 
Constant 1.853 0.141 13.14 0.000 1.577 2.130 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.073 0.122 -0.59 0.554 -0.313 0.167 
Upper secondary 0.217 0.122 1.78 0.075 -0.022 0.455 
Gcse & sixth form 0.061 0.141 0.44 0.663 -0.214 0.337 
A level 0.115 0.226 0.51 0.610 -0.327 0.557 
Vocational -0.008 0.302 -0.03 0.978 -0.60 0.584 
Tertiary -0.367 0.246 -1.49 0.136 -0.85 0.115 
Age 0.011 0.026 0.44 0.660 -0.04 0.063 
Age squared -0.0003 0.0003 -0.88 0.380 -0.001 0.0004 
Mauritians -0.697 0.428 -1.63 0.103 -1.535 0.142 
Rural areas 0.170 0.085 2.01 0.044 0.004 0.336 
Child 0.166 0.107 1.55 0.121 -0.044 0.376 
Married 0.551 0.114 4.85 0.000 0.328 0.777 
Constant 1.747 0.62 2.82 0.005 0.533 2.962 
Athrho -0.208 0.178 -1.17 0.241 -0.557 0.14 
Lnsigma -0.736 0.017 -44.62 0.000 -0.768 -0.703 
Rho -0.205 0.170 -0.505 0.139 
Sigma 0.479 0.008 0.464 0.495 
Lambda -0.098 0.082 -0.260 0.063 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 1.07 Prob > chi2 = 0.301 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
405 
11 Public sector male employees only with highest qualification 
levels 
Log likelihood = -265.1785 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.096 
Upper secondary 0.281 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.518 
A level 0.639 
Vocational 0.744 
Tertiary 1.130 
Age 0.0378 
Age squared -0.0004 
Mauritians -0.597 
Rural areas -0.063 
Tenure 0.025 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Constant 2.867 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.464 
Upper secondary 0.057 
Gcse & sixthforrn 6.034 
A level 4.966 
Vocational -0.486 
Tertiary -0.539 
Age -0.745 
Age squared 0.010 
Mauritians 1.797 
Rural areas -0.427 
Child -1.641 
Married 2.265 
Constant 14.09 
Athrho -0.504 
Lnsigma -1.024 
Rho -0.465 
Sigma 0.359 
Lambda -0.167 
Number of observations 632 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(12) 510.42 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
7 
625 
Std. Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
0.059 1.62 0.104 -0.02 0.211 
0.045 6.22 0.000 0.192 0.37 
0.040 12.84 0.000 0.439 0.598 
0.059 10.84 0.000 0.524 0.755 
0.065 11.49 0.000 0.619 0.876 
0.077 14.62 0.000 0.979 1.282 
0.017 2.22 0.026 0.0049 0.071 
0.0002 -1.78 0.075 -0.001 0.00004 
0.378 -1.58 0.114 -l.337 0.143 
0.030 -2.13 0.033 -.1213 -0.005 
0.007 3.75 0.000 0.012 0.038 
0.0002 -1.62 0.105 -0.001 0.0001 
0.508 5.65 0.000 1.872 3.863 
0.76 -0.61 0.541 -1.953 1.025 
0.769 0.07 0.941 -1.450 1.563 
113641. 0.00 1.000 -222726.5 222738.6 
2 
25448.4 0.00 1.000 -49873.13 49883.06 
7 
0.796 -0.61 0.541 -2.047 1.074 
0.781 -0.69 0.490 -2.067 0.992 
0.568 -l.31 0.189 -1.858 0.368 
0.008 l.25 0.210 -0.005 0.025 
1.10 1.63 0.102 -0.358 3.951 
0.619 -0.69 0.491 -l.641 0.788 
0.727 -2.26 0.024 -3.067 -0.216 
0.686 3.30 0.001 0.921 3.609 
10.15 l.39 0.165 -5.799 33.978 
0.751 -0.67 0.502 -1.978 0.968 
0.029 -35.00 0.000 -1.082 -0.967 
0.589 -0.962 0.748 
0.011 0.339 0.380 
0.213 -0.584 0.250 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0): chi2(l) = 0.41 Prob > chi2 = 0.522 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
406 
12 Private sector female employees only with highest qualification 
levels 
Number of observations 1388 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations = 
Wald chi2(12) 750.84 
Log likelihood = -1383.389 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.145 
Upper secondary 0.248 
Gcse & sixth form 0.576 
A level 0.90 
Vocational 1.120 
Tertiary 1.528 
Age 0.034 
Age squared -0.0004 
Mauritians 0.472 
Rural areas -0.111 
Tenure 0.025 
Tenure squared -0.0002 
Constant 1.548 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.249 
Upper secondary 0.016 
Gcse & sixth form 0.167 
A level 0.132 
Vocational -0.118 
Tertiary -0.166 
Age 0.009 
Age squared 0.00004 
Mauritians -0.94 
Rural areas -0.042 
Child -0.1417 
Married -0.596 
Constant 1.954 
Athrho -0.146 
Lnsigma -0.73 
Rho -0.145 
Sigma 0.482 
Lambda -0.07 
232 
1156 
Std. 
Error 
0.050 
0.044 
0.045 
0.066 
0.114 
0.109 
0.01 
0.0001 
0.081 
0.030 
0.006 
0.0002 
0.182 
0.147 
0.121 
0.129 
0.209 
0.299 
0.293 
0.029 
0.0004 
0.415 
0.087 
0.092 
0.106 
0.658 
0.222 
0.024 
0.217 
0.011 
0.105 
LR test of independent equations. rho = 0): 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.92 0.004 0.048 0.243 
5.58 0.000 0.161 0.335 
12.77 0.000 0.488 0.665 
13.42 0.000 0.762 1.023 
9.86 0.000 0.897 1.343 
14.03 0.000 1.314 1.741 
3.52 0.000 0.015 0.052 
-2.99 0.003 -0.001 -0.0001 
5.84 0.000 0.314 0.631 
-3.66 0.000 -0.171 -0.052 
4.45 0.000 0.014 0.036 
-0.85 0.395 -0.001 0.0002 
8.50 0.000 1.191 1.905 
1.69 0.092 -0.041 0.539 
0.13 0.895 -0.222 0.254 
1.29 0.196 -0.086 0.420 
0.63 0.528 -0.278 0.542 
-0.40 0.692 -0.705 0.468 
-0.57 0.570 -0.741 0.408 
0.31 0.753 -0.048 0.066 
0.09 0.924 -0.001 0.001 
-2.27 0.023 -1.752 -0.127 
-0.48 0.629 -0.214 .1299 
-1.53 0.125 -0.323 .0399 
-5.64 0.000 -0.803 -0.389 
2.97 0.003 0.665 3.244 
-0.66 0.509 -0.581 0.288 
-30.92 0.000 -0.776 -.684 
-0.524 0.281 
0.46 0.505 
-0.277 0.137 
chi2(l) = 0.31 Prob > chi2 = 0.575 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
407 
13 Rural residents only with highest qualification levels 
Number of observations = 4541 
Censored observations = 2107 
Uncensored observations = 2434 
Wald chi2(13) =1337.83 
Log likelihood = -3434.71 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.098 
Upper secondary 0.173 
Gcse & sixthform 00419 
A level 0.726 
Vocational 0.671 
Tertiary 0.971 
Age 0.028 
Age squared -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.349 
Rural areas 0.244 
Female -0.263 
Tenure 0.023 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Constant 2.063 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.095 
Upper secondary -0.092 
Gcse & sixth form 0.016 
A level 0.136 
Vocational 0.236 
Tertiary 0.099 
Age 0.277 
Age squared -0.003 
Mauritians -0.984 
Female -00403 
Child -0.039 
Female &Child -0.015 
Married 0.961 
Female &Married -1.906 
Constant -3.329 
Athrho -.149 
Lnsigma -.790 
Rho -.148 
Sigma 0454 
Lambda -.067 
Std. 
Error 
0.032 
0.026 
0.030 
0.046 
0.067 
0.082 
0.009 
0.0001 
0.064 
0.027 
0.04 
0.003 
0.0001 
0.169 
0.077 
0.065 
0.075 
0.108 
0.199 
0.248 
0.013 
0.0002 
0.220 
0.071 
0.099 
0.117 
0.101 
0.112 
0.312 
0.105 
0.015 
0.103 
0.007 
0.047 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0): 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.02 0.003 0.034 0.161 
6.68 0.000 0.122 0.224 
13.90 0.000 0.36 00478 
15.81 0.000 0.64 0.816 
9.96 0.000 0.54 0.803 
11.85 0.000 0.81 1.132 
3.12 0.002 0.01 0.046 
-2.81 0.005 -0.001 -0.0001 
5049 0.000 0.224 00473 
8.87 0.000 0.19 0.297 
-6.66 0.000 -0.3406 -0.186 
6.71 0.000 0.0163 0.03 
-2.68 0.007 -0.001 -0.0001 
12.22 0.000 1.733 2.394 
-1.23 0.218 -0.247 0.056 
-lAO 0.161 -0.22 0.037 
0.22 0.827 -0.131 0.164 
1.26 0.208 -0.075 0.346 
1.19 0.235 -0.154 0.627 
0040 0.690 -0.386 0.584 
20.70 0.000 0.251 0.3032 
-18.35 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
-4047 0.000 -1.416 -0.553 
-5.64 0.000 -0.542 -0.263 
-0.39 0.694 -0.233 0.1548 
-0.13 0.895 -0.245 0.2142 
9.53 0.000 0.763 1.159 
-17.06 0.000 -2.124 -1.687 
-10.66 0.000 -3.941 -2.717 
-1.42 0.156 -0.3550 0.057 
-51.60 0.000 -0.82 -0.762 
-0.341 0.057 
0044 00468 
-0.159 0.0250 
chi20) = 1.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.182 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
408 
14 Urban residents only with highest qualification levels 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(13) = 1362.40 
Log likelihood = -2761.801 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.139 
Upper secondary 0.234 
Gcse & sixthform 0.565 
A level 0.726 
Vocational 0.879 
Tertiary l.33 
Age 0.033 
Age squared -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.397 
Public 0.178 
Female -0.169 
Tenure 0.022 
Tenure squared -0.0002 
Constant 1.867 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.134 
Upper secondary 0.061 
Gcse & sixth form 0.274 
A level 0.353 
Vocational 0.561 
Tertiary 0.342 
Age 0.269 
Age squared -0.003 
Mauritians -0.912 
Female -0.30 
Child 0.249 
Female &Child -0.172 
Married 0.742 
Female &Married -l.628 
Constant -3.538 
Athrho -.1577 
Lnsigma -0.731 
Rho -0.156 
Sigma 0.481 
Lambda -0.075 
LR test of independent equations. 
3340 
1518 
1822 
Std. 
Error 
0.037 
0.033 
0.034 
0.046 
0.063 
0.061 
0.010 
0.0001 
0.090 
0.032 
0.037 
0.004 
0.0001 
0.193 
0.084 
0.077 
0.078 
0.1021 
0.176 
0.172 
0.014 
0.0002 
0.272 
0.081 
0.111 
0.133 
0.106 
0.12 
0.354 
0.096 
0.018 
0.093 
0.008 
0.045 
rho = 0): 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z (95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.77 0.000 0.067 0.212 
7.04 0.000 0.169 0.299 
16.53 0.000 0.498 0.632 
15.66 0.000 0.635 0.817 
13.92 0.000 0.755 l.003 
2l.69 0.000 1.21 l.450 
3.30 0.001 0.0136 0.053 
-2.61 0.009 -0.001 -0.0001 
4.39 0.000 0.220 0.574 
5.61 0.000 0.116 0.241 
-4.60 0.000 -0.242 -0.097 
4.96 0.000 0.014 0.031 
-l.39 0.164 -0.0005 0.0001 
9.67 0.000 1.488 2.245 
l.59 0.112 -0.031 0.298 
0.80 0.425 -0.090 0.212 
3.51 0.000 0.121 0.426 
3.46 0.001 0.153 0.553 
3.18 0.001 0.216 0.907 
l.98 0.047 0.004 0.679 
18.65 0.000 0.24 0.30 
-16.63 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
-3.36 0.001 -l.445 -0.371 
-3.72 0.000 -0.458 -.1418 
2.23 0.026 0.03 0.467 
-l.29 0.196 -0.434 0.089 
6.98 0.000 0.534 0.950 
-13.59 0.000 -l.862 -1.393 
-9.98 0.000 -4.233 -2.843 
-l.65 0.099 -0.345 0.030 
-4l.60 0.000 -0.766 -0.70 
-0.332 0.03 
0.465 0.498 
-0.164 0.0137 
chi2(1) = 2.57 Prob > chi2 = 0.109 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
409 
15 Rural male residents only with highest qualification levels 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(12) 719.88 
Log likelihood = -1729.721 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.093 
Upper secondary 0.155 
Gcse & sixthform 0.403 
A level 0.671 
Vocational 0.646 
Tertiary 0.825 
Age 0.025 
Age squared -0.0003 
Mauritians 0.348 
Public sector 0.174 
Tenure 0.018 
Tenure squared -0.0002 
Constant 2.215 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.145 
Upper secondary -0.260 
Gcse & sixth form -0.245 
A level -0.395 
Vocational -0.257 
Tertiary -0.12 
Age 0.343 
Age squared -0.004 
Mauritians -0.295 
Child -0.085 
Married 0.828 
Constant -4.837 
Athrho -0.467 
Lnsigma -0.7740 
Rho -0.436 
Sigma 0.461 
Lambda -0.201 
2297 
598 
1699 
Std. 
Error 
0.038 
0.031 
0.036 
0.056 
0.077 
0.096 
0.010 
0.0001 
0.087 
0.030 
0.004 
0.0001 
0.207 
0.123 
0.10 
0.122 
0.155 
0.257 
0.345 
0.020 
0.0003 
0.334 
0.103 
0.124 
0.467 
0.109 
0.020 
0.088 
0.009 
0.043 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0): 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.46 0.014 0.019 0.168 
5.03 0.000 0.095 0.216 
11.04 0.000 0.331 0.474 
12.02 0.000 0.562 0.780 
8.38 0.000 0.495 0.798 
8.60 0.000 0.637 1.013 
2.40 0.016 0.005 0.0454 
-2.13 0.033 -0.001 -0.00002 
4.02 0.000 0.178 0.518 
5.64 0.000 0.113 0.234 
4.46 0.000 0.0103 0.027 
-1.37 0.172 -0.0004 0.0001 
10.78 0.000 1.812 2.618 
-1.18 0.238 -0.385 0.096 
-2.59 0.010 -0.456 -0.063 
-2.01 0.045 -0.484 -0.006 
-2.54 0.011 -0.67 -0.090 
-1.00 0.317 -0.761 0.247 
-0.35 0.728 -0.797 0.557 
16.96 0.000 0.304 0.383 
-15.11 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 
-0.88 0.376 -0.949 0.359 
-0.83 0.406 -0.287 0.116 
6.69 0.000 0.585 1.071 
-10.36 0.000 -5.752 -3.922 
-4.28 0.000 -0.681 -.2534 
-38.67 0.000 -0.813 -0.735 
-0.592 -0.248 
0.443 0.480 
-0.285 -0.117 
chi2(1) = 2.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.156 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
410 
16 Urban male residents only with highest qualification levels 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Waldchi2(12) 817.21 
Log likelihood = -1335.841 
Log of gross Coefficient 
earnings 
Lower secondary 0.112 
Upper secondary 0.222 
Gcse & sixthforrn 0.474 
A level 0.604 
Vocational 0.754 
Tertiary 1.25 
Age 0.017 
Age squared -0.0001 
Mauritians 0.160 
Public sector 0.140 
Tenure 0.021 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Constant 2.405 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.145 
Upper secondary -0.128 
Gcse & sixthforrn -0.187 
A level -0.451 
Vocational -0.074 
Tertiary -0.435 
Age 0.293 
Age squared -0.004 
Mauritians -0.584 
Child 0.222 
Married 0.639 
Constant -3.958 
Athrho -0.243 
Lnsigma -0.777 
Rho -0.238 
Sigma 0.460 
Lambda -0.110 
1683 
477 
1206 
Std. 
Error 
0.042 
0.037 
0.040 
0.060 
0.075 
0.074 
0.014 
0.0002 
0.l27 
0.036 
0.005 
0.0002 
0.276 
0.128 
0.120 
0.123 
0.158 
0.265 
0.239 
0.021 
0.0003 
0.468 
0.115 
0.127 
0.576 
0.l58 
0.023 
0.150 
0.011 
0.070 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0): 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.69 0.007 0.031 0.194 
6.04 0.000 0.150 0.294 
11.71 0.000 0.40 0.554 
10.06 0.000 0.493 0.721 
10.00 0.000 0.606 0.901 
16.95 0.000 1.105 1.394 
1.25 0.210 -0.010 0.044 
-0.49 0.624 -0.0004 0.0003 
1.26 0.208 -0.089 0.41 
3.91 0.000 0.07 0.211 
4.16 0.000 0.011 0.031 
-1.96 0.050 -0.001 0.000 
8.71 0.000 1.863 2.946 
-1.13 0.259 -0.396 0.l07 
-1.07 0.283 -0.362 0.106 
-1.44 0.150 -0.442 0.067 
-2.85 0.004 -0.761 -0.141 
-0.28 0.780 -0.594 0.446 
-1.82 0.069 -0.903 0.034 
13.72 0.000 0.251 0.335 
-11.98 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 
-1.25 0.212 -1.502 0.334 
1.94 0.053 -0.003 0.447 
5.04 0.000 0.39 0.887 
-6.87 0.000 -5.087 -2.829 
-1.54 0.125 -0.553 0.067 
-34.00 0.000 -0.822 -0.732 
-0.503 0.067 
0.44 0.481 
-0.246 0.027 
chi2(1) = 2.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.l56 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
411 
17 Rural female residents only with highest qualification levels 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(12) 660.14 
Log likelihood = -1643.406 
Log of gross Coefficient 
earnings 
Lower secondary 0.l04 
Upper secondary 0.253 
Gcse & sixthform 0.477 
A level 0.766 
Vocational 0.821 
Tertiary 1.428 
Age 0.0170 
Age squared -0.0001 
Mauritians 0.263 
Public sector 0.517 
Tenure 0.026 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Constant l.803 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.076 
Upper secondary -0.020 
Gcse & sixthform 0.134 
A level 0.498 
Vocational 0.604 
Tertiary 0.249 
Age 0.233 
Age squared -0.003 
Mauritians -1.293 
Child -0.038 
Married -0.833 
Constant -2.863 
Athrho .1979 
Lnsigma -0.828 
Rho 0.l95 
Sigma 0.437 
Lambda 0.085 
2244 
1509 
735 
Std. 
Error 
0.061 
0.053 
0.054 
.088 
0.140 
0.159 
0.012 
0.0002 
0.l16 
0.061 
0.006 
0.0002 
0.263 
0.102 
0.0876 
0.095 
0.145 
0.293 
0.332 
0.018 
0.0002 
0.287 
0.067 
0.081 
0.414 
0.l97 
0.035 
0.189 
0.015 
0.085 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0): 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval] 
l.70 0.089 -0.0156 0.224 
4.75 0.000 0.1485 0.357 
8.88 0.000 0.372 0.583 
8.66 0.000 0.592 0.939 
5.85 0.000 0.546 l.096 
9.01 0.000 l.l18 1.739 
1.31 0.189 -0.008 0.042 
-0.87 0.386 -0.0005 0.0002 
2.27 0.023 0.036 0.492 
8.43 0.000 0.397 0.638 
4.l4 0.000 0.014 0.038 
-1.36 0.173 -0.001 0.0001 
6.85 0.000 1.287 2.319 
-0.75 0.454 -0.275 0.123 
-0.23 0.819 -0.192 0.152 
1.41 0.l60 -0.053 0.321 
3.42 0.001 0.212 0.783 
2.06 0.039 0.029 l.l78 
0.75 0.454 -0.403 0.90 
13.12 0.000 0.198 0.267 
-11.45 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
-4.51 0.000 -l.854 -0.731 
-0.57 0.568 -0.169 0.093 
-10.29 0.000 -0.992 -0.674 
-6.92 0.000 -3.67 -2.052 
l.00 0.315 -0.1882 0.584 
-23.65 0.000 -0.897 -0.759 
-0.l86 0.526 
0.408 0.468 
-0.081 0.252 
chi2(1 = l.l9 Prob > chi2 = 0.275 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
412 
18 Urban female residents only with highest qualification levels 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wa1d chi2(12) 515.32 
Log likelihood = -1352.54 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.208 
Upper secondary 0.267 
Gcse & sixthform 0.704 
A level 0.915 
Vocational 1.064 
Tertiary 1.463 
Age 0.062 
Age squared -0.001 
Mauritians 0.636 
Public sector 0.217 
Tenure 0.018 
Tenure squared 0.0003 
Constant 0.93 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.325 
Upper secondary 0.172 
Gcse & sixth form 0.528 
A level 0.875 
Vocational 0.934 
Tertiary 0.955 
Age 0.255 
Age squared -0.003 
Mauritians -0.749 
Child 0.08 
Married -0.811 
Constant -4.043 
Athrho -0.171 
Lnsigma -0.701 
Rho -0.169 
Sigma 0.496 
Lambda -0.084 
1657 
1041 
616 
Std. 
Error 
0.073 
0.069 
0.067 
0.089 
0.119 
0.119 
0.018 
0.0002 
0.131 
0.062 
0.008 
0.0003 
0.367 
0.113 
0.105 
0.098 
0.134 
0.2027 
0.237 
0.0020 
0.0003 
0.331 
0.079 
0.094 
0.465 
0.179 
0.034 
0.174 
0.17 
0.088 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0): 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
2.84 0.004 0.065 0.352 
3.86 0.000 0.131 0.402 
10.44 0.000 0.572 0.836 
10.26 0.000 0.740 1.09 
8.96 0.000 0.831 1.3 
12.29 0.000 1.229 1.7 
3.50 0.000 0.027 0.096 
-3.32 0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 
4.87 0.000 0.38 0.89 
3.50 0.000 0.096 0.338 
2.21 0.027 0.002 0.035 
0.93 0.352 -0.0003 0.0008 
2.53 0.011 0.211 1.65 
2.87 0.004 0.103 0.547 
1.64 0.100 -0.033 0.378 
5.39 0.000 0.336 0.719 
6.51 0.000 0.611 1.138 
4.11 0.000 0.488 1.38 
4.02 0.000 0.489 1.420 
12.69 0.000 0.216 0.295 
- 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 
11.35 
-2.26 0.024 -1.398 -0.01 
1.01 0.314 -0.076 0.235 
-8.60 0.000 -0.996 -0.627 
-8.69 0.000 -4.955 -3.132 
-0.95 0.342 -.5220 0.181 
- 0.000 -0.770 -0.635 
20.86 
-0.48 0.179 
0.464 0.530 
-0.256 0.089 
chi2(l) = 0.85 Prob > chi2 = 0.358 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
413 
19 Men only with highest qualification levels aged 12 to 59 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(13) = 1575.51 
Log likelihood = -3086.615 
Log of gross Coefficient 
earnings 
Lower secondary 0.097 
Upper secondary 0.185 
Gcse & sixthform 0.438 
A level 0.644 
Vocational 0.701 
Tertiary l.l0 
Age 0.018 
Age squared -.0002 
Mauritians 0.276 
Public sector 0.159 
Rural areas -0.070 
Tenure 0.020 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Constant 2.391 
Select 
Lower secondary -0.159 
Upper secondary -0.216 
Gcse & sixth form -0.226 
A level -0.43 
Vocational -0.174 
Tertiary -0.381 
Age 0.321 
Age squared -0.004 
Mauritians -0.411 
Rural areas 0.085 
Child 0.048 
Married 0.7281 
Constant -4.50 
Athrho -0.388 
Lnsigma -0.769 
Rho -0.37 
Sigma 0.464 
Lambda -0.171 
3980 
1075 
2905 
Std. 
Error 
0.028 
0.0237 
0.027 
0.041 
0.054 
0.058 
0.008 
0.0001 
0.072 
.023 
0.018 
0.003 
0.0001 
0.1649 
0.088 
0.076 
0.088 
0.11 
0.184 
0.194 
0.015 
0.0002 
0.273 
0.057 
0.076 
0.088 
0.361 
0.089 
0.015 
0.077 
0.007 
0.037 
LR test of independent equations. (rho = 0 : 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.45 0.001 0.042 0.l52 
7.80 0.000 0.138 0.231 
16.17 0.000 0.385 0.491 
15.79 0.000 0.564 0.724 
12.96 0.000 0.595 0.807 
18.91 0.000 0.985 1.212 
2.19 0.028 0.001 0.034 
-1.41 0.159 -0.0004 0.0001 
3.85 0.000 0.135 0.416 
6.84 0.000 0.114 0.205 
-3.95 0.000 -0.105 -0.035 
6.19 0.000 0.014 0.026 
-2.60 0.009 -0.0005 -0.0001 
14.50 0.000 2.069 2.715 
-1.81 0.071 -0.332 0.0135 
-2.82 0.005 -0.365 -0.066 
-2.55 0.011 -0.399 -0.052 
-3.91 0.000 -0.646 -0.2142 
-0.95 0.344 -0.534 0.186 
-1.97 0.049 -0.76 -0.002 
21.89 0.000 0.292 0.35 
-19.32 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 
-1.51 0.132 -0.946 .0123 
1.49 0.137 -0.027 .0197 
0.64 0.524 -0.10 .0196 
8.31 0.000 0.556 .090 
-12.46 0.000 -5.106 -3.790 
-4.36 0.000 -0.56 -0.214 
-50.11 0.000 -0.80 -0.738 
-0.51 -0.211 
0.45 0.478 
-0.244 -0.10 
chi2(1) = 12.95 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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20 Women only by highest qualifications levels aged 12 to 59 
Number of observations 
Censored observations 
Uncensored observations 
Wald chi2(13) = 1369.10 
Log likelihood = -3031.668 
Log of gross earnings Coefficient 
Lower secondary 0.164 
Upper secondary 0.278 
Gcse & sixthform 0.608 
A level 0.845 
Vocational 0.973 
Tertiary 1.428 
Age 0.036 
Age squared -0.0004 
Mauritians 0.438 
Public sector 0.362 
Rural areas -0.102 
Tenure 0.024 
Tenure squared -0.0001 
Constant 1.511 
Select 
Lower secondary 0.088 
Upper secondary 0.050 
Gcse & sixth form 0.305 
A level 0.656 
Vocational 0.763 
Tertiary 0.653 
Age 0.244 
Age squared -0.003 
Mauritians -1.09 
Rural areas -0.008 
Child 0.007 
Married -0.829 
Constant -3.328 
Athrho -0.027 
Lnsigma -0.762 
Rho -0.027 
Sigma 0.467 
Lambda -0.012 
3901 
2550 
1351 
Std. 
Error 
0.047 
0.042 
0.042 
0.059 
0.087 
0.089 
0.0107 
0.0001 
0.082 
0.0429 
0.027 
0.005 
0.0002 
0.217 
0.075 
0.067 
0.067 
0.097 
0.178 
0.189 
0.013 
0.0002 
0.212 
0.046 
0.051 
0.061 
0.309 
0.128 
0.019 
0.128 
0.009 
0.060 
LR test of independent. equations. (rho = 0): 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 
Z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
3.51 0.000 0.072 0.255 
6.67 0.000 0.196 0.359 
14.52 0.000 0.526 0.69 
14.38 0.000 0.73 0.96 
11.17 0.000 0.803 1.144 
16.12 0.000 1.254 1.601 
3.38 0.001 0.015 0.057 
-3.05 0.002 -0.0007 -0.0002 
5.33 0.000 0.277 0.6 
8.45 0.000 0.278 0.446 
-3.76 0.000 -0.155 -0.0487 
4.78 0.000 0.014 0.034 
-0.36 0.717 -0.0004 0.0003 
6.95 0.000 1.085 1.936 
1.17 0.241 -0.059 0.235 
0.75 0.451 -0.080 0.181 
4.51 0.000 0.172 0.437 
6.76 0.000 0.466 0.846 
4.28 0.000 0.413 1.112 
3.45 0.001 0.282 1.024 
18.47 0.000 0.217 0.269 
-16.32 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
-5.13 0.000 -1.505 -0.673 
-0.18 0.854 -0.099 0.082 
0.13 0.893 -0.093 0.1069 
-13.61 0.000 -0.949 -0.71 
-10.78 0.000 -3.933 -2.723 
-0.21 0.834 -0.278 0.224 
-39.34 0.000 -0.799 -0.723 
-0.271 0.221 
0.45 0.49 
-0.12 0.105 
chi2(1) = 0.04 Prob > chi2 = 0.835 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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Appendix C: Instrumental variable approach 
1. IV procedure using the instrument 'basic compulsory 
education' for both sexes 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 4256 
F( 9, 4246) = 124.20 
Centered R2 = 0.2084 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9000 
Schooling Coefficient 
Age 0.155 
Age squared -0.004 
Tenure -0.019 
Tenure squared 0.0007 
Mauritian -l.231 
Public sector 2.620 
Rural areas -1.445 
Female -0.066 
Basic compulsory -1.4149 
education 
Constant 10.386 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
0.039 3.99 0.000 0.079 0.231 
0.001 -6.98 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 
0.018 -l.06 0.288 -0.055 0.016 
0.001 l.23 0.219 -0.0004 0.002 
0.328 -3.75 0.000 -1.873 -0.588 
0.130 20.09 0.000 2.364 2.876 
0.097 -14.88 0.000 -1.639 -l.257 
0.106 -0.63 0.531 -.273 0.141 
0.293 -4.82 0.000 -l.989 -0.84 
0.748 13.89 0.000 8.92 1l.851 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of MauntlUs 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0055 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 4246) = 23.28 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 4246) P-value 
Schooling 0.0055 0.0055 23.28 0.0000 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 4256 
Centered R2 = 0.3059 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9750 
F( 9, 4246) = 200.64 
Prob> F 0.0000 
Logarithm of Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.136 0.035 3.88 0.000 0.067 0.205 
Age 0.02 0.010 1.92 0.055 -0.0004 0.040 
Age squared -0.0001 0.0002 -0.31 0.759 -0.0004 0.0003 
Tenure 0.024 0.003 7.60 0.000 0.018 0.031 
Tenure squared -0.0003 0.0001 -3.11 0.002 -0.0005 -0.0001 
Mauritian 0.441 0.073 6.06 0.000 0.298 0.583 
Public sector 0.l1O 0.095 1.16 0.248 -0.077 0.297 
Rural areas 0.005 0.054 0.09 0.926 -0.100 0.110 
Female -0.206 0.018 -11.43 0.000 -0.242 -0.171 
Constant 0.839 0.326 2.57 0.010 0.199 1.478 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Republic of MauntIus 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 4.19445 F( 1 ,4245) P-value = 0.04062 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 4.20117 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.04040 
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2. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for both sexes 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 4256 
Centered R2 = 0.2084 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9000 
Schooling Coefficient 
Age 0.222 
Age squared -0.004 
Tenure -0.023 
Tenure squared 0.001 
Mauritian -1.349 
Public sector 2.646 
Rural areas -1.453 
Female -0.064 
Free secondary 0.395 
schooling 
Constant 8.606 
F( 9, 4246) = 124.20 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
0.036 6.l1 0.000 0.l51 0.293 
0.001 -7.83 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 
0.018 -1.25 0.212 -0.059 0.013 
0.001 1.46 0.143 -0.0003 0.002 
0.328 -4.11 0.000 -1.992 -0.706 
0.131 20.22 0.000 2.389 2.902 
0.098 -14.90 0.000 -1.644 -1.26 
0.106 -0.60 0.547 -0.271 0.144 
0.210 1.88 0.060 -0.017 0.806 
0.667 12.93 0.000 7.301 9.911 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of MauntIus 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0008 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 4246) = 3.53 
Prob> F 0.0603 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 4246) P-value 
Schooling 0.0008 0.0008 3.53 0.0603 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 4256 
Centered R2 0.3059 
Logarithm Coefficient Std. 
of gross Error 
earnin2s 
Schooling .1900837 .1046157 
Age .0066894 .0267133 
Age squared .0001978 .0005033 
Tenure .0256893 .0044078 
Tenure -.0003658 .0001457 
squared 
Mauritian .5124609 .1538706 
Public sector -.031396 .2765401 
Rural areas .0829908 .1530578 
Female -.2029316 .0217367 
Constant .370897 .9203235 
F( 9, 4246) = 200.64 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9750 
z P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval[ 
l.82 0.069 -.0149593 .3951267 
0.25 0.802 -.0456677 .0590465 
0.39 0.694 -.0007886 .0011842 
5.83 0.000 .0170501 .0343285 
-2.51 0.012 -.0006514 -.0000801 
3.33 0.001 .21088 .8140417 
-0.11 0.910 -.5734047 .5106127 
0.54 0.588 -.2169971 .3829786 
-9.34 0.000 -.2455348 -.1603285 
0.40 0.687 -1.432904 2.174698 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Repubbc ofMaunhus 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 2.08765 F(1,4245) P-value = 0.14857 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:2.09203 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.l4807 
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3. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for men only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 2905 
Centered R2 = 0.1198 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9055 
Schooling Coefficient 
Age 0.204 
Age squared -0.003 
Tenure -0.017 
T enure squared -0.0002 
Mauritian 0.991 
Public sector 2.088 
Rural areas -l.014 
Free secondary -0.032 
schooling 
Constant 6.232 
F( 8, 2896) = 49.26 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval[ 
0.043 4.72 0.000 0.119 0.289 
0.001 -5.44 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 
0.021 -0.81 0.418 -0.059 0.024 
0.001 -0.24 0.810 -0.001 0.001 
0.464 2.13 0.033 0.081 1.902 
0.147 14.18 0.000 1.799 2.377 
0.115 -8.85 0.000 -1.238 -0.789 
0.242 -0.13 0.894 -0.506 0.442 
0.830 7.51 0.000 4.605 7.86 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0000 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 2896) = 0.02 
Prob > F 0.8941 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 2896) P-value 
Schooling 0.0000 0.0000 0.02 0.8941 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 2905 
Centered R2 = 0.2234 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9775 
F( 8, 2896) = 110.34 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
earnings Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.135 1.282 0.10 0.916 -2.378 2.647 
Age 0.03 0.259 0.11 0.909 -0.478 0.537 
Age squared -0.0002 0.004 -0.05 0.963 -0.009 0.008 
Tenure 0.019 0.022 0.84 0.401 -0.025 0.062 
T enure squared -0.0002 0.0002 -0.77 0.441 -0.001 0.0003 
Mauritian 0.l52 l.271 0.12 0.905 -2.339 2.643 
Public sector 0.063 2.678 0.02 0.981 -5.l86 5.311 
Rural areas 0.005 1.300 0.00 0.997 -2.543 2.554 
Constant l.041 7.98 0.13 0.896 -14.599 16.680 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of Mauntms 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
0.000 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.00347 F(1,2895) P-value = 0.95304 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:0.00348 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.95296 
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4. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for women only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Centered R2 = 0.4120 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9027 
Number of observations = 1351 
F( 8, 1342) = 117.54 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
Schooling Coefficient Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
Age 0.179 0.063 2.83 0.005 0.055 0.304 
Age squared -0.004 0.001 -4.35 0.000 -0.006 -0.002 
Tenure -O.OlD 0.034 -0.30 0.768 -0.077 0.057 
Tenure squared 0.001 0.001 0.55 0.586 -0.002 0.003 
Mauritian -3.149 0.450 -7.00 0.000 -4.032 -2.267 
Public sector 3.77 0.257 14.68 0.000 3.266 4.273 
Rural areas -2.128 0.172 -12.35 0.000 -2.466 -1.790 
Free secondary 1.236 0.387 3.20 0.001 0.478 1.995 
schooling 
Constant 1l.l71 1.088 10.27 0.000 9.037 13.305 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0076 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 1342) = 10.22 
Prob> F 0.0014 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 1342) P-value 
Schooling 0.0076 0.0076 10.22 0.0014 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 1351 
F( 8, 1342) = 95.51 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total(centered)SS 651.8345472 CenteredR2 = 0.3561 
Total (uncentered) SS = 13589.10886 Uncentered R2 = 0.9691 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Std. Z P>z [95% Confidence 
earnings Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.152 0.056 2.74 0.006 0.043 0.261 
Age 0.009 0.018 0.51 0.608 -0.026 0.044 
Age squared 0.0001 0.0004 0.43 0.670 -0.001 0.001 
Tenure 0.029 0.006 4.69 0.000 0.017 0.041 
T enure squared -0.0002 0.0002 -0.74 0.462 -0.001 0.0003 
Mauritian 0.694 0.191 3.63 0.000 0.319 1.069 
Public sector 0.215 0.213 1.01 0.313 -0.202 0.633 
Rural areas 0.043 0.123 0.35 0.727 -0.l98 0.284 
Constant 0.261 0.665 0.39 0.695 -1.043 1.566 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of MauntIus 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 2.39174 F(1,1341) P-value=0.12221 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 2.40528 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.12093 
423 
5. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for private sector employees only (both sexes) 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 3436 
Centered R2 = 0.1502 
Uncentered R2 = 0.8889 
Schooling Coefficient 
Age 0.243 
Age squared -0.004 
Tenure -0.029 
Tenure squared 0.001 
Mauritian -10403 
Rural areas -1.599 
Female -0.299 
Free secondary 0.247 
schooling 
Constant 8.537 
F( 8, 3427) = 75.72 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Std. T P>t 
Error 
0.040 6.08 0.000 
0.001 -7.36 0.000 
0.020 -1044 0.l50 
0.0006 l.67 0.096 
0.335 -4.l9 0.000 
0.110 -14.58 0.000 
0.l17 -2.56 0.011 
0.247 l.00 0.318 
0.699 12.20 0.000 
[95% Confidence 
Interval) 
0.164 0.321 
-0.006 -0.003 
-0.069 0.011 
-0.0002 0.002 
-2.059 -0.746 
-l.814 -1.384 
-0.528 -0.070 
-0.238 0.732 
7.165 9.908 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of Mauntius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0003 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 3427) = 1.00 
Prob > F 0.3175 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 3427) P-va1ue 
Schooling 0.0003 0.0003 1.00 0.3175 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 3436 
F( 8, 3427) = 29.42 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 1252.875221 Centered R2 = -1.7214 
Total (uncentered) SS = 35853.7673 Uncentered R2 = 0.9049 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
earnings Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.336 0.315 1.07 0.287 -0.282 0.953 
Age -0.034 0.083 -0.41 0.682 -0.195 0.128 
Age squared 0.001 0.002 0.61 0.539 -0.002 0.004 
Tenure 0.030 0.011 2.69 0.007 0.008 0.053 
Tenure squared -0.001 0.0004 -1.43 0.153 -0.001 0.0002 
Mauritian 0.73 0.452 1.62 0.106 -0.155 1.615 
Rural areas 0.34 0.505 0.67 0.500 -0.649 1.329 
Female -0.199 0.101 -1.97 0.049 -0.396 -0.001 
Constant -0.843 2.711 -0.31 0.756 -6.157 4.47 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of Mauntms 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
0.000 
Wu-Hausman F test: 2.87923 F(1,3426) P-va1ue = 0.08982 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 2.88521 Chi-sq(l) P-va1ue = 0.08940 
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6. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for Public sector employees only (both sexes) 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Centered R2 = 0.2524 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9354 
Number of observations = 820 
F( 8, 811) = 34.23 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Schooling Coefficient Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
Age -0.067 0.110 -0.61 0.543 -0.282 0.149 
Age squared -0.001 0.001 -0.92 0.359 -0.004 0.001 
Tenure 0.035 0.048 0.73 0.464 -0.059 0.129 
Tenure squared 0.0001 0.001 0.05 0.957 -0.003 0.003 
Mauritian -4.708 2.104 -2.24 0.026 -8.837 -0.579 
Rural areas -0.815 0.209 -3.90 0.000 -1.226 -0.405 
Female 1.01 0.25 4.05 0.000 0.520 1.500 
Free secondary 0.437 0.389 1.12 0.262 -0.327 1.201 
schooling 
Constant 19.975 3.064 6.52 0.000 13.962 25.988 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntiUs 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0016 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 811)= 1.26 
Prob> F 0.2618 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 811) P-value 
Schooling 0.0016 0.0016 1.26 0.2618 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 820 
F(8, 811)= 17.55 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 199.0376318 
Total (uncentered) SS = 12180.09113 
Centered R2 = 0.0736 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9849 
Residual SS 184.391959 RootMSE .47 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
earnin2s Error Interval) 
Schooling -0.013 0.144 -0.09 0.928 -0.296 .2699 
Age 0.042 0.02 2.11 0.035 0.003 0.08 
Age squared -0.001 0.0003 -2.lO 0.036 -0.001 -.00004 
Tenure 0.026 0.009 2.85 0.004 0.008 0.044 
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0002 -0.52 0.601 -0.0005 0.0003 
Mauritian -1.112 0.768 -1.45 0.l47 -2.618 0.393 
Rural areas -0.15 0.l22 -1.23 0.219 -0.389 0.089 
Female 0.22 0.153 1.44 0.150 -0.08 0.52 
Constant 4.222 3.003 1.41 0.160 -1.663 lO.lO8 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Populahon Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of MaUrItIUS 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
0.000 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.81354 F(1,810) P-value = 0.36734 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.82276 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.36438 
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7. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for private sector male employees only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Centered R2 = 0.0712 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9000 
Number of observations = 2280 
F( 7, 2272) = 24.90 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Schooling Coefficient Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval[ 
Age 0.239 0.047 5.06 0.000 0.146 0.331 
Age squared -0.004 0.0007 -5.57 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 
Tenure -0.02 0.023 -0.85 0.396 -0.065 0.026 
Tenure squared 7.53e-06 0.001 0.01 0.992 -0.001 0.001 
Mauritian l.064 0.467 2.28 0.023 .1487 l.979 
Rural areas -1.112 0.129 -8.66 0.000 -l.365 -0.861 
Free secondary -0.420 0.287 -1.46 0.144 -0.983 0.143 
schooling 
Constant 5.975 0.86 6.95 0.000 4.289 7.661 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauntius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0009 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 2272) = 2.14 
Prob > F 0.1439 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 2272) P-value 
Schooling 0.0009 0.0009 2.14 0.1439 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 2280 
F( 7, 2272) = 59.51 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 727.6721205 Centered R2 = 0.2378 
Total (uncentered) SS = 25335.84928 Uncentered R2 = 0.9781 
Logarithm of Coefficient Std. z P>z (95% Confidence 
~ross earnin~s Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.057 0.112 0.50 0.614 -0.164 0.277 
Age 0.049 0.025 l.86 0.063 -0.003 0.094 
Age squared -0.0005 0.0004 -1.19 0.236 -0.001 0.0003 
Tenure 0.017 0.004 4.02 0.000 0.009 0.026 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0001 -l.97 0.049 -0.0005 -l.0Ie-06 
Mauritian 0.256 0.141 l.83 0.068 -0.019 0.530 
Rural areas -0.067 0.128 -0.53 0.599 -0.317 0.183 
Constant 1.482 0.680 2.l8 0.029 0.l49 2.814 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauntms 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.00048 F(1,2271) P-value = 0.98251 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.00048 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.98248 
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8. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for Public sector male employees only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 625 
Centered R2 = 0.1781 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9257 
Schooling Coefficient 
Age -0.339 
Age squared 0.002 
Tenure 0.072 
T enure squared -0.002 
Mauritian -5.60 
Rural areas -.7116 
Free secondary 0.393 
schooling 
Constant 25.393 
F ( 7, 617) = 19.11 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
0.14 -2A2 0.016 -0.612 -0.063 
0.002 lAO 0.161 -0.001 0.006 
0.056 1.29 0.198 -0.038 0.182 
0.002 -1.16 0.247 -0.005 0.001 
3.06 -1.83 0.068 -11.608 OAlO 
0.248 -2.87 0.004 -l.l97 -0.225 
OA56 0.86 0.389 -0.502 1.287 
4.191 6.06 0.000 17.163 33.623 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0012 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 617) = 0.74 
Prob > F 0.3894 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 617) P-value 
Schooling 0.0012 0.0012 0.74 0.3894 
Number of observations = 625 
F( 7, 617) = 9.68 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 145.5784684 
Total (uncentered) SS = 9108.900295 
0.9846 
Logarithm Coefficient Std. z 
of gross Error 
earnings 
Schooling -0.010 0.182 -0.05 
Age 0.006 0.065 0.09 
Age -0.0002 0.0005 -0.34 
squared 
Tenure 0.029 0.015 l.88 
Tenure -0.0004 0.0004 -0.89 
squared 
Mauritian -1.227 1.136 -l.08 
Rural areas -0.138 0.134 -l.02 
Constant 4.904 4.779 l.03 
Centered R2 = 0.0350 
Uncentered R2 = 
P>z [95% Interval) 
Confidence 
0.956 -0.366 0.347 
0.928 -0.122 0.133 
0.731 -0.001 0.001 
0.060 -0.001 0.059 
0.374 -0.001 0.0004 
0.280 -3.452 0.998 
0.306 -0.401 0.126 
0.305 -4.463 14.270 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of MaurItIUs 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.44654 F( 1 ,616) P-value = 0.50423 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.45274 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.50104 
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9. V procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for private sector female employees only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 1156 
Centered R2 = 0.3485 
Uncentered R2 = 0.8859 
Schooling Coefficient 
Age 0.124 
Age squared -0.003 
Tenure -0.003 
Tenure squared -0.0003 
Mauritian -3.187 
Rural areas -2.30 
Free secondary 1.527 
schooling 
Constant 11.764 
F( 7, 1148) = 87.74 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval[ 
0.070 l.78 0.076 -0.013 0.26 
0.001 -2.98 0.003 -0.005 -0.001 
0.038 -0.07 0.942 -0.077 0.071 
0.001 -0.22 0.826 -0.003 0.002 
0.468 -6.81 0.000 -4.105 -2.27 
0.192 -1l.98 0.000 -2.672 -l.92 
0.440 3.47 0.001 0.663 2.39 
1.162 10.13 0.000 9.485 14.044 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0104 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 1148) = 12.04 
Prob > F 0.0005 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 1148) P-value 
Schooling 0.0104 0.0104 12.04 0.0005 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 1156 
F( 7, 1148) = 25.93 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 440.2910932 Centered R2 = 0.0481 
Total (uncentered) SS = 10517.91803 Uncentered R2 = 0.9602 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
earnine;s Error Interval] 
Schooling 0.166 0.054 3.08 0.002 0.060 0.271 
Age 0.003 0.017 0.17 0.863 -0.030 0.036 
Age squared 0.0003 0.0003 0.81 0.418 -0.0004 0.001 
Tenure 0.029 0.007 4.11 0.000 0.015 0.043 
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0002 -0.47 0.639 -0.0006 0.0004 
Mauritian 0.756 0.191 3.95 0.000 0.381 1.130 
Rural areas 0.08 0.13 0.61 0.541 -0.175 0.334 
Constant 0.123 0.684 0.18 0.857 -1.217 1.463 
Source: Computed from 2000 Popu1ahon Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 4.03968 F(1,1147) P-value = 0.04468 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 4.05709 Chi-sq(l) P-value = 0.04399 
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10. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for Public sector female employees only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 195 
F( 7, 187) = 21.87 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 1960.133333 Centered R2 0.4502 
Total (uncentered) SS = 31302 Uncentered R2 = 0.9656 
Schooling Coefficient Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval[ 
Age 0.561 0.164 3.41 0.001 0.237 0.885 
Age squared -0.010 0.002 -4.80 0.000 -0.015 -0.006 
Tenure -0.097 0.090 -1.07 0.285 -0.275 0.081 
Tenure squared 0.007 0.003 2.57 0.011 0.002 0.012 
Mauritian -3.236 2.484 -1.30 0.194 -8.136 1.663 
Rural areas -0.77 0.363 -2.12 0.035 -1.485 -0.054 
Free secondary 0.598 0.715 0.84 0.404 -0.812 2.009 
schooling 
Constant 9.574 4.064 2.36 0.020 1.558 17.591 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, RepublIc ofMauntlUs 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0037 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 187) = 0.70 
Prob > F 0.4039 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 187) P-value 
Schooling 0.0037 0.0037 0.70 0.4039 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 195 
F( 7, 187) = 12.54 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 50.15698776 
Total (uncentered) SS = 3071.190832 
Logarithm of gross Coefficient Std. 
earnings Error 
Schooling -0.026 0.220 
Age 0.137 0.131 
Age squared -0.002 0.002 
Tenure 0.006 0.026 
Tenure squared 0.001 0.002 
Mauritian -0.98 0.863 
Rural areas -0.120 0.183 
Constant 3.003 2.35 
z 
-0.12 
1.05 
-0.88 
0.21 
0.77 
-1.14 
-0.66 
1.28 
Centered R2 = 0.2390 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9876 
P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
0.906 -0.458 0.406 
0.296 -0.120 0.394 
0.380 -0.007 0.003 
0.834 -0.046 0.057 
0.444 -0.002 0.004 
0.256 -2.671 0.712 
0.511 -0.479 0.238 
0.201 -1.603 7.609 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of Mauritius 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
0.000 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.45629 F(I,186) P-value = 0.50020 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.47719 Chi-sq(l) P-value = 0.48970 
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11. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for rural residents only (both sexes) 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Centered R2 = 0.2190 
Uncentered R2 = 0.8864 
Number of observations = 2434 
F( 8, 2425) = 85.00 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Schooling Coefficient Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Intervall 
Age 0.237 0.05 4.78 0.000 0.14 0.334 
Age squared -0.005 0.0007 -6.10 0.000 -0.006 -0.003 
Tenure -0.049 0.024 -2.04 0.041 -0.096 -0.002 
Tenure squared 0.001 0.0007 1.36 0.l74 -0.0004 0.002 
Mauritian -0.604 0.412 -l.46 0.143 -l.412 0.205 
Public sector 3.087 0.176 17.50 0.000 2.741 3.433 
Female -0.558 0.145 -3.85 0.000 -0.841 -0.274 
Free secondary 0.350 0.286 l.22 0.222 -0.211 0.910 
schooling 
Constant 6.676 0.890 7.50 0.000 4.93 8.421 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of Mauritius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0006 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 2425) = 1.49 
Prob>F 0.2219 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 2425) P-value 
Schooling 0.0006 0.0006 1.49 0.2219 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 2434 
F( 8, 2425) = 118.48 
Prob> F = 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 876.4586656 Centered R2 = 0.1974 
Total (uncentered) SS = 26002.737 Uncentered R2 = 0.9729 
Logarithm of Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Error Interval] 
Schooling 0.135 0.139 0.97 0.332 -0.138 0.408 
Age 0.012 0.037 0.32 0.751 -0.061 0.085 
Age squared 0.0001 0.0007 0.07 0.941 -0.001 0.001 
Tenure 0.027 0.008 3.38 0.001 0.011 0.043 
Tenure squared -0.0004 0.0002 -2.02 0.043 -0.001 -0.00001 
Mauritian 0.474 0.109 4.36 0.000 0.261 0.686 
Public sector 0.067 0.429 0.16 0.877 -0.775 0.908 
Female -0.218 0.081 -2.68 0.007 -0.378 -0.059 
Constant 0.962 0.952 1.01 0.312 -0.903 2.828 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.46480 F(1,2424) P-value = 0.49546 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.46663 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.49454 
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12. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for male rural residents only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 1699 
Centered R2 = 0.1461 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9004 
F( 7, 1691) = 41.33 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Schooling Coefficient Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval) 
Age 0.21 0.059 3.56 0.000 0.094 0.326 
Age squared -0.004 0.001 -4.16 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 
Tenure -0.038 0.027 -1.40 0.161 -0.092 0.015 
Tenure squared -0.00002 0.001 -0.02 0.984 -0.002 0.002 
Mauritian 2.221 0.559 3.98 0.000 1.126 3.317 
Public sector 2.457 0.190 12.90 0.000 2.084 2.83 
Free secondary -0.109 0.323 -0.34 0.736 -0.742 0.524 
schooling 
Constant 4.257 1.076 3.96 0.000 2.147 6.367 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntIUs 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0001 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 1691) = 0.11 
Prob > F 0.7355 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 1691) P-value 
Schooling 0.0001 0.0001 0.11 0.7355 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 1699 
F( 7, 1691) = 69.35 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 529.6382923 Centered R2 = 0.1922 
Total (uncentered) SS = 19417.80218 Uncentered R2 = 0.9780 
Logarithm of Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
gross earnings Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.117 0.497 0.24 0.814 -0.856 1.091 
Age 0.042 0.101 0.41 0.680 -0.156 0.239 
Age squared -0.0004 0.002 -0.24 0.811 -0.004 0.003 
Tenure 0.019 0.02 1.00 0.317 -0.019 0.057 
Tenure squared -0.0001 0.0001 -0.87 0.386 -0.0004 0.0002 
Mauritian 0.221 1.105 0.20 0.841 -1.944 2.386 
Public sector 0.073 1.223 0.06 0.953 -2.325 2.470 
Constant 0.983 2.115 0.46 0.642 -3.162 5.128 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
0.000 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.01967 F(1,1690) P-value = 0.88847 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.01978 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.88816 
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13. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for male urban residents only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Number of observations = 1206 
F( 7, 1198) = 11.29 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Centered R2 = 0.0619 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9142 
Schooling Coefficient 
Age 0.222 
Age squared -0.004 
Tenure -0.011 
T enure squared 0.0006 
Mauritian -1.555 
Public sector 1.46 
Free secondary 0.118 
schooling 
Constant 7.975 
Std. 
Error 
0.064 
0.001 
0.034 
0.001 
0.821 
0.232 
0.363 
1.308 
t 
3.48 
-3.82 
-0.34 
0.56 
-1.89 
6.30 
0.33 
6.10 
P>t [95% Confidence 
Intervall 
0.001 0.097 0.347 
0.000 -0.005 -0.002 
0.733 -0.077 0.055 
0.576 -0.002 0.003 
0.058 -3.l67 0.055 
0.000 1.005 1.915 
0.745 -0.593 0.829 
0.000 5.408 10.541 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Republic of MauntlUs 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0001 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 1198) = 0.11 
Prob > F 0.7450 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 1198) P-value 
Schooling 0.0001 0.0001 0.11 0.7450 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 1206 
F( 7, 1198) = 58.60 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total (centered) SS 452.8555945 
Total (uncentered) SS = 15026.94739 
Centered R2 = 0.3132 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9793 
Logarithm of Coefficient Std. z P>z [95% Confidence 
2ross earnin2s Error Interval) 
Schooling 0.023 0.515 0.04 0.964 -0.986 1.032 
Age 0.047 0.118 0.40 0.686 -0.183 0.279 
Age squared -0.001 0.002 -0.25 0.803 -0.004 0.003 
Tenure 0.016 0.008 1.94 0.053 -0.0002 0.033 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0004 -0.54 0.589 -0.001 0.001 
Mauritian -0.08 0.808 -O.lO 0.922 -l.664 1.505 
Public sector 0.274 0.751 0.36 0.715 -l.l97 1.745 
Constant 2.077 4.14 0.50 0.615 -6.027 lO.182 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.01444 F(1,1197) P-value = 0.90436 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.01455 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.90398 
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14. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for female rural residents only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Centered R2 = 0.4093 
Uncentered R2 = 0.8747 
Number of observations = 735 
F( 7, 727) = 71.98 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Schooling Coefficient Std. t P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval] 
Age 0.144 0.087 l.66 0.098 -0.026 0.314 
Age squared -0.003 0.001 -2.71 0.007 -0.006 -0.001 
Tenure -0.017 0.047 -0.37 0.710 -0.11 0.075 
T enure squared -0.001 0.002 -0.70 0.482 -0.004 0.002 
Mauritian -3.108 0.595 -5.13 0.000 -4.276 -l.94 
Public sector 4.612 0.386 1l.96 0.000 3.855 5.37 
Free secondary 1.443 0.547 2.64 0.008 0.37 2.517 
schooling 
Constant 9.471 1.502 6.30 0.000 6.522 12.420 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of Mauritius 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0095 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( 1, 727) = 6.97 
Prob > F 0.0085 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 727) P-value 
Schooling 0.0095 0.0095 6.97 0.0085 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 735 
F( 7, 727) = 59.62 
Prob > F 
Total (centered) SS 264.0340737 
Total (uncentered) SS = 6584.934821 
Logarithm of Coefficient Std. z 
gross earnin2s Error 
Schooling 0.075 0.054 1.38 
Age -0.001 0.017 -0.07 
Age squared 0.0002 0.0003 0.47 
Tenure 0.027 0.007 3.96 
Tenure squared -0.0002 0.0002 -0.89 
Mauritian 0.504 0.189 2.66 
Public sector 0.550 0.257 2.14 
Constant 1.441 0.579 2.49 
0.0000 
Centered R2 = 0.3966 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9758 
P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
0.167 -0.031 0.182 
0.944 -0.035 0.032 
0.639 -0.001 0.001 
0.000 0.014 0.041 
0.374 -0.001 0.0002 
0.008 0.133 0.875 
0.032 0.047 1.054 
0.013 0.307 2.575 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubhc of MaurItius 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
(equation exactly identified) 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
Wu-Hausman F test: 0.23136 F( 1,726) P-value = 0.63066 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 0.23415 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.62846 
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15. IV procedure using the instrument 'free secondary education' 
for female urban residents only 
First-stage regression of Schooling: 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
Centered R2 = 0.3184 
Uncentered R2 = 0.9301 
Number of observations = 616 
F( 7, 608) = 40.58 
Prob > F 0.0000 
Schooling Coefficient Std. T P>t [95% Confidence 
Error Interval] 
Age 0.206 0.092 2.24 0.025 0.026 0.386 
Age squared -0.004 0.001 -3.30 0.001 -0.007 -0.002 
Tenure -0.017 0.049 -0.34 0.734 -0.114 0.080 
Tenure squared 0.003 0.002 1.80 0.073 -0.0003 0.006 
Mauritian -3.213 0.682 -4.71 0.000 -4.552 -1.874 
Public sector 2.715 0.337 8.07 0.000 2.054 3.376 
Free secondary 1.10 0.533 2.06 0.040 0.052 2.148 
schooling 
Constant 10.802 1.517 7.12 0.000 7.823 13.782 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIon Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntIus 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.0070 
Test of excluded instruments: 
F( I, 608) = 4.26 
Prob> F 0.0395 
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Summary results for first-stage regressions: 
Variable Shea Partial R2 Partial R2 F( 1, 608) P-value 
Schooling 0.0070 0.0070 4.26 0.0395 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
Number of observations = 616 
F( 7, 608) = 33.82 
Prob > F 
Total (centered) SS 345.5109061 
Total (uncentered) SS = 7004.174038 
Logarithm of Coefficient Std. z 
2ross earnin2s Error 
Schooling 0.266 0.114 2.34 
Age 0.019 0.038 0.51 
Age squared 0.0002 0.001 0.29 
Tenure 0.026 0.012 2.24 
Tenure squared -0.0004 0.0005 -0.74 
Mauritian 0.924 0.395 2.34 
Public sector -0.052 0.316 -0.16 
Constant -1.493 1.299 -1.15 
0.0000 
Centered R2 = 0.1546 
Un centered R2 = 0.9583 
P>z [95% Confidence 
Interval) 
0.019 0.043 0.489 
0.612 -0.055 0.093 
0.770 -0.001 0.002 
0.025 0.003 0.049 
0.461 -0.001 0.001 
0.019 0.149 1.699 
0.870 -0.671 0.567 
0.250 -4.039 1.053 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntIUs 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 0.000 
Tests of endogeneity of: Schooling 
Ho: Regressor is exogenous 
(equation exactly identified) 
Wu-Hausman F test: 3.16468 F(1,607) P-value = 0.07575 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 3.19495 Chi-sq(1) P-value = 0.07387 
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Appendix D: Nature of the Sample 
Number of men & women combined by qualification level & by age 
Age No school / Lower Upper GCSE A Vocational Tertiary Total 
years primary secondary secondary & 6th level education education 
schooling form 
12 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
14 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
15 6 2 1 0 0 0 0 9 
16 19 3 2 0 0 0 0 24 
17 13 2 3 1 0 0 1 20 
18 24 12 9 3 1 0 0 49 
19 28 12 19 6 4 0 1 70 
20 30 20 24 20 14 2 0 110 
21 42 15 21 21 13 2 0 114 
22 36 17 25 14 15 2 1 110 
23 44 10 22 12 12 3 5 108 
24 44 16 30 12 17 2 6 127 
25 50 16 20 22 17 0 9 134 
26 29 9 16 16 12 4 2 88 
27 42 22 27 23 14 7 6 141 
28 45 9 32 17 17 10 4 134 
29 33 14 35 12 10 5 2 III 
30 35 8 38 13 11 4 5 114 
31 40 15 30 17 9 2 5 118 
32 68 14 34 19 13 2 1 151 
33 44 10 18 20 12 6 2 112 
34 60 15 25 22 10 2 4 138 
35 48 21 33 25 7 9 9 152 
36 45 22 40 24 6 3 3 143 
37 40 19 19 19 15 1 3 116 
38 64 19 27 31 7 2 3 153 
39 51 17 23 16 6 0 6 119 
40 60 16 17 27 3 3 3 129 
41 63 12 21 21 9 5 6 137 
42 59 11 14 22 4 0 0 110 
43 58 14 19 15 3 3 2 114 
44 50 8 16 20 3 8 3 108 
45 46 11 11 19 0 3 3 93 
46 47 5 9 22 7 1 3 94 
47 58 12 12 11 5 2 3 103 
48 52 9 9 12 3 4 5 94 
49 70 14 15 20 2 2 0 123 
50 60 4 10 14 0 0 0 88 
51 38 5 10 6 0 2 3 64 
52 36 7 6 8 0 1 0 58 
53 31 3 3 7 1 1 1 47 
54 30 4 8 11 1 3 2 59 
55 29 2 3 5 1 1 0 41 
56 38 2 7 7 0 1 0 55 
57 18 3 3 5 1 0 1 31 
58 24 1 5 3 1 1 0 35 
59 12 2 2 1 0 0 1 18 
Total 1,865 484 773 641 286 109 114 4,272 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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1. Number of men & women combined by qualification level and by 
gender 
Qualification levels Male Female Total 
No schooliIlK or at mostprima!y schooling_ 1,291 574 1,865 
Lower secondary 352 132 484 
Upper secondary 567 206 773 
GCSE & sixth form 410 231 641 
A level 151 135 286 
V ocational education 72 37 109 
Tertiary education 77 37 114 
Total 2,920 1,352 4,272 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
2. Number of men & women combined by qualification level and by 
sector of employment 
Qualification levels Private Public Total 
sector sector 
No schooling or at most primary schooling 1,667 198 1,865 
Lower secondary 430 54 484 
Upper secondary 653 120 773 
GCSE & sixth form 420 221 641 
A level 164 122 286 
Vocational education 50 59 109 
Tertiary education 68 46 114 
Total 3,452 820 4,272 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of MauntIus 
3. Number of men only by qualification level and by sector 
Qualification levels private public Total 
sector sector 
No schooling or at most primary schooling 1,113 178 1,291 
Lower secondary 303 49 352 
Upper secondary 460 107 567 
GCSE & sixth form 252 158 410 
A level 89 62 151 
V ocational education 32 40 72 
Tertiary education 46 31 77 
Total 2,295 625 2,920 
Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, Repubbc of Mauntius 
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4. Number of women only by qualification level and by sector 
Qualification levels Private Public Total 
sector sector 
No schooling or at most primary schooling 554 20 574 
Lower secondary 127 5 132 
Upper secondary 193 13 206 
GCSE & sixth form 168 63 231 
A level 75 60 135 
Vocational education 18 19 37 
Tertiary education 22 15 37 
Total 1,157 195 1,352 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of Mauntms 
5. Number of men & women combined by qualification level and by 
area of location 
Qualification levels Urban Rural Total 
areas areas 
No schoolingor at most primary schooling 614 1,251 1,865 
Lower secondary 245 239 484 
Upper secondary 332 441 773 
GCSE & sixth form 333 308 641 
A level 163 123 286 
V ocational education 65 44 109 
Tertiary education 77 37 114 
Total 1,829 2,443 4,272 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
6. Number of men only by qualification level and by area of location 
Qualification levels Urban Rural Total 
areas areas 
No schooling or at most primary schooling 435 856 1,291 
Lower secondary 174 178 352 
Upper secondary 250 317 567 
GCSE & sixth form 195 215 410 
A level 72 79 151 
V ocational education 38 34 72 
Tertiary education 49 28 77 
Total 1,213 1,707 2,920 
.. Source: Computed from 2000 PopulatIOn Census Data, CSO, RepublIc of Mauntms 
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7. Number of women only by qualification level & by area oflocation 
Qualification levels Urban Rural Total 
areas areas 
No schooling or at most primary schooling 179 395 574 
Lower secondary 71 61 132 
Upper secondary 82 124 206 
GCSE & sixth form 138 93 231 
A level 91 44 135 
V ocationa1 education 27 10 37 
Tertiary education 28 9 37 
Total 616 736 1,352 
Source: Computed from 2000 Population Census Data, CSO, Republic of Mauritius 
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